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Abstract 
 
In its most recent global report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) reported that the number of individuals in need of protection had reached a “record” 
of 68.5 million persons, including 25.4 million refugees. The customary and international laws 
that comprise the international refugee regime delineate a number of avenues through which 
individuals can potentially obtain protection, including asylum and the three durable solutions 
of voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. However, individuals may 
encounter barriers in attempting to seek asylum, and the legal, economic, and social conditions 
that are conducive to local integration and voluntary repatriation are not necessarily present in 
all host communities.  
 
Furthermore, there are some individuals for whom resettlement is the only possible 
durable solution. Nevertheless, resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary 
and international law, and there appear to be persistent cross-national differences in 
resettlement contributions. Indeed, an analysis of resettlement arrivals demonstrates that the 
United States and Canada were among the largest—if not the largest—contributors to 
resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016. This observation 
raises the question: why have the United States and Canada voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies? 
 
Scholars have proposed many explanations for why some countries adopt a more 
generous approach to refugee protection and have cited the influence of ‘partialist’ and 
‘impartialist’ ideologies, foreign policies, perceived public and (or) private benefits, and 
structural factors, among other possible explanations. Though these perspectives could help us 
understand how some governments determine which refugees to resettle, they do not offer a 
fulsome explanation of why the United States and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies. Furthermore, the majority of the extant literature is state-
centric in focus and ignores domestic factors such as the longstanding and extensive 
mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with ‘voluntary sector’ organisations in the 
United States and Canada. In addition, scholars neglect the involvement of many voluntary 
sector organisations in advocacy and how such efforts could impact resettlement admissions. 
 
This thesis attempts to understand why the United States and Canada have voluntarily 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an inductive exploration of 
perceptions on (a) the motivations for resettlement and its benefits, (b) the nature of 
government-voluntary sector relations, (c) the potential relationship between resettlement 
admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and (d) the 
potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy.  
 
In the United States, qualitative interviews with senior government officials and 
‘voluntary agency’ representatives indicate that the government is perceived to engage in 
resettlement for humanitarian and normative reasons and that contributing to this durable 
solution is consistent with the history and values of the United States and confers reputational 
and cultural benefits. One could interpret this perception as consistent with the literature on 
refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on public goods more 
generally. Interviews also indicate that the government and voluntary agencies perceived their 
relationship as both ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary’ in nature. One could interpret this 
perception as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector 
relations, and with the historical evolution of relations between these parties. Furthermore, all 
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but one of the interviewees perceived that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary 
agencies had enhanced resettlement admissions in the United States. One could interpret the 
extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing as consistent with the dominant 
approach to the provision of public goods and services, though scholars continue to debate why 
government-voluntary sector partnerships are such a prominent feature in this area. Finally, a 
government official indicated that the government is open to interest representation efforts and 
many voluntary agency representatives believed their advocacy efforts had a positive impact 
on resettlement admissions and funding. One could interpret these perceptions as consistent 
with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the structure of 
interest representation in the United States. Though preliminary research indicates that ethnic 
community-based organisations may play a limited role in voluntary sector advocacy on 
resettlement, further research is required. However, the bipartisan consensus that has 
traditionally underpinned resettlement to the United States could be at risk, and the context and 
salience of resettlement could condition the impact of advocacy efforts. 
 
In Canada, qualitative interviews with senior government officials and private sponsors 
indicate that the government is perceived to engage in resettlement for humanitarian and 
normative reasons and that contributing to this durable solution confers reputational and 
cultural benefits. One could interpret this perception as consistent with the literature on refugee 
protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on public goods more 
generally. Interviews also indicate that the government and private sponsors perceived their 
relationship as complementary in some ways and as supplementary in other ways. One could 
interpret this perception as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary 
sector relations, and with the historical evolution of relations between the government and 
voluntary sector groups in Canada. Furthermore, all but one of the interviewees perceived that 
domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies had enhanced resettlement admissions 
in Canada. One could interpret the extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing 
as consistent with the historical pattern of public service delivery in Canada. However, some 
private sponsors expressed concerns about two operational and programmatic changes in 
resettlement and worried that the government is engaging in responsibility shifting. On the 
matter of advocacy, two government officials stated that there were recently tensions between 
the government and certain private sponsors, while private sponsors appeared divided on 
whether and how best to engage in advocacy. One could interpret these perceptions as 
consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, but these 
perceived tensions could also impact the potential effectiveness of advocacy efforts on 
resettlement. Though preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations 
engage in advocacy on resettlement in Canada, further research is required—especially given 
the growing inclusion of ethnic minorities in Canadian politics. Finally, though immigration 
has often been a low salience issue, the Canadian public has not always welcomed persons in 
need of protection, and so advocacy efforts may be conditioned by the issue context 
surrounding resettlement. 
 
The author concludes with a brief summary and comparative analysis between the US 
and Canada, before drawing attention to possible implications and future research prospects. 
 
 
  
Page 5 of 361 
 
Dedication 
 
This thesis is dedicated first and foremost to my husband, Ian. Your willingness to 
embark on another overseas adventure and your unwavering love, encouragement, patience, 
and support made this journey possible. À ma fille Emily: tu nous apportes tellement de joie et 
ta naissance m’a montré ce qui est réellement important dans la vie. Je t’aime! This thesis is 
also dedicated to my parents, Garry and Viviane. Though I have missed far too many birthdays, 
holidays, and countless other moments, the love, encouragement, and reassurance that you have 
always offered so freely has made me the person I am today. In addition, the work ethic and 
sense of perseverance that you instilled in me have carried me through some difficult moments 
in both my academic and professional life. I also want to convey my sincere thanks to my in-
laws, Jean and David, and to my sister-in-law Catriona and her husband Ted, for their 
encouragement and support, as well as their generous hospitality in both Canada and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
From an academic perspective, I would like to thank Dr. Eiko Thielemann for his 
supervision. I must also express my gratitude to the individuals who agreed to meet with me to 
share their views. Without their input, this thesis would be a very different sort of work—and 
a much less insightful one at that. By the same token, I would like to thank those individuals 
in the United States and Canada who volunteered to help me identify prospective interviewees. 
Their willingness to assist is deeply appreciated, and indeed, made much of the research 
possible. I must also thank my fellow PhD students in the Government Department for their 
encouragement and support. Our shared celebrations and commiserations over endless cups of 
coffee and tea have made the research process far less “lonely” than anticipated!  
 
In addition, I must also acknowledge the generous support I received from my previous 
employer, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, which funded part of my studies. Though this 
thesis is very much my own work, I could not have undertaken this project without their 
assistance. Likewise, I would like to thank the officials at Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
(now Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada) who encouraged and supported my 
decision to pursue my doctorate. Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to Debra Pressé. 
Though I did not have the opportunity to work with Debra directly, she offered invaluable 
advice and insight for which I am very grateful. Debra was highly respected among members 
of the resettlement community in Canada and at the UNHCR, and she is widely missed. 
 
Laura Robbins-Wright 
August 2018 
  
Page 6 of 361 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Dedication .................................................................................................................................. 5 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... 6 
Chapter One: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 8 
1.1 Research Problem and Question .......................................................................................... 8 
1.2 Potential Explanations for Differences in Resettlement Admissions ................................ 25 
1.3 Research Design................................................................................................................. 39 
1.3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Framework ................................................................ 39 
1.3.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................... 42 
1.3.3 Methods........................................................................................................................... 46 
1.3.4 Ethics............................................................................................................................... 49 
1.4 Originality and Expected Contributions ............................................................................ 50 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis .......................................................................................................... 51 
Chapter Two: Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing in the United 
States ........................................................................................................................................ 53 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 53 
2.2 History of Resettlement in the United States ..................................................................... 54 
2.3 Size and Composition of Resettlement Flows ................................................................... 60 
2.4 Organisational Structure of Resettlement in the United States .......................................... 67 
2.5 The Perceived Motivations and Benefits of Resettlement in the United States ................ 71 
2.6 The Perceived Nature of Government-Voluntary Sector Relations in Resettlement ........ 84 
2.7 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Domestic 
Responsibility Sharing ........................................................................................................... 101 
2.8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 112 
Chapter Three: Resettlement Admissions and Voluntary Advocacy in the United States .... 115 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 115 
3.2 History of Resettlement Advocacy in the United States .................................................. 117 
3.3 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Advocacy ............. 119 
3.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 147 
Chapter Four: Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing in Canada .. 149 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 149 
4.2 History of Refugee Resettlement in Canada .................................................................... 150 
4.3 Size and Composition of Resettlement Flows to Canada ................................................ 153 
4.4 Organisational Structure of Resettlement to Canada ....................................................... 159 
4.5 The Perceived Motivations and Benefits of Resettling Refugees in Canada ................... 162 
4.6 The Perceived Nature of Government-Voluntary Sector Relations in Resettlement ...... 174 
4.7 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Domestic 
Responsibility Sharing ........................................................................................................... 185 
4.8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 192 
Chapter Five: Resettlement Admissions and Voluntary Advocacy in Canada ...................... 195 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 195 
5.2 History of Resettlement Advocacy in Canada ................................................................. 197 
5.3 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Advocacy ............. 199 
5.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 229 
Chapter Six: Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 232 
6.1 Summary .......................................................................................................................... 232 
6.2 Comparative Analysis ...................................................................................................... 236 
6.3 Potential Implications ...................................................................................................... 241 
Page 7 of 361 
 
6.4 Future Research Prospects, Potential Hypotheses, and Concluding Remarks ................. 245 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 248 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 296 
 
 
 
  
Page 8 of 361 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Research Problem and Question 
In its most recent global report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) reported that the number of individuals in need of protection had reached a “record” 
of 68.5 million persons in 2017, including 25.4 million refugees (UNHCR 2018, 2). That year, 
44 per cent of all refugees originated from just three countries: Syria (6.3 million refugees), 
Afghanistan (2.6 million refugees), and South Sudan (2.4 million refugees) (UNHCR 2018, 2 
own calculation). 
The customary and international laws that comprise the international refugee regime 
delineate a number of avenues through which individuals can potentially obtain protection, 
including asylum and the three durable solutions of voluntary repatriation, local integration, 
and resettlement (United Nations General Assembly 1948, sections 13 and 14; United Nations 
General Assembly 1951, section 1; United Nations General Assembly 1967, section 1; 
UNHCR 2011, 3). In contrast to local integration or voluntary repatriation, resettlement 
involves the “transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought asylum to another 
State that has agreed to admit them as refugees and to grant them permanent settlement and the 
opportunity for eventual citizenship (UNHCR 2011, 9).” 
Though customary and international law offers a framework through which individuals 
can seek protection, these individuals may encounter barriers in attempting to avail themselves 
of these solutions. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affords individuals 
the right to leave their home countries in search of asylum (United Nations General Assembly 
1948, sections 13 and 14). Though state parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees have a “de facto duty” to admit asylum seekers and to consider their claims for 
protection in order to minimise the risk of refoulement (Hathaway 2005, 300-1), there is no 
requirement to actually grant refugee protection (Boed 1994, 8-14). Furthermore, not everyone 
has the ability and means to seek asylum, and those who do face a number of potential risks, 
including dangerous journeys, refoulement, prolonged detention, and destitution, among many 
others (c.f. Goodwin-Gill 1986, 202-5; Goodwin-Gill 2011, 450-51; Kissoon 2010, 5-6 and 12-
25; UNHCR 2014, no pagination).  
Furthermore, though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also grants 
individuals the right to return to their respective countries, some asylum seekers and refugees 
are discouraged or prevented from doing so due to persistent conflict and political instability 
in their respective countries of origin (United Nations General Assembly 1948, section 13; 
UNHCR 2016, 3-6). In addition, while the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
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stipulates that governments must grant lawfully present refugees favourable treatment with 
respect to the provision of particular economic and social rights (United Nations General 
Assembly 1951, sections 4, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22), local integration is a complex and 
lengthy process and the legal, economic, and social conditions that are conducive to this 
process are not necessarily present in all host communities (UNHCR 2011, 7).  
Though these barriers are formidable, they are not necessarily insurmountable. In 2016, 
the most recent year for which data was available, a total of 899,980 asylum seekers were 
granted Convention refugee status or another complementary form of protection (UNHCR 
2018, 51 own calculation). That same year, 23,018 refugees obtained citizenship in their 
respective host countries, and 552,230 persons of concern returned home (UNHCR 2018, 21). 
Nevertheless, access to protection remains uncertain for many, as 2,837,117 asylum 
applications were pending at the end of 2016, and the total population of refugees and 
individuals in a “refugee-like” situation reached 16,533,748 by the end of that year (UNHCR 
2018, 10). 
Though local integration and voluntary repatriation may be feasible options for many 
refugees, there are some individuals for whom resettlement is the only possible durable 
solution. These include individuals and groups of refugees whose lives or other human rights 
are under threat in their respective countries of asylum (UNHCR 2011, 3). Indeed, the UNHCR 
(2011, 1) has argued that resettlement has “grown even more vital as a durable solution” given 
that the protracted nature of many conflicts has constrained opportunities for voluntary 
repatriation and countries of first asylum are already “heavily burdened” and thus “reluctant to 
expand possibilities for local integration.”  
Resettlement has been an essential component of refugee protection since the end of 
World War I. In 1923, the League of Nations implemented the first large-scale international 
repatriation and resettlement efforts in collaboration with governments and voluntary sector 
organisations (Holborn 1939, 126 and 130; Loescher, 1993, 37-38). Over time, organisations 
including the International Labor Organization, the International Refugee Organization, and 
the UNHCR have resettled millions of refugees from Europe and countries and regions as 
diverse as Uganda, Chile, and Southeast Asia, among many others (Holborn 1939, 126-30; 
UNHCR 2011, 47-50). Appendix Table 1 displays the total number of resettlement arrivals 
each year between 1980 and 2016, the most recent year for which data was available. Table 1 
demonstrates that there have been considerable variations in resettlement admissions during 
this period, from a high of 277,070 in 1980 to a low 51,031 in 2002, following the decision of 
the United States (US) to dramatically reduced admissions after the terrorist attacks of 11 
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September, 2001. The mean number of resettlement admissions between 1980 and 2016 was 
117,215 (see table for sources). 
However, these aggregate figures conceal a considerable degree of cross-national 
variation in resettlement admissions. First, a glance at the list of countries that participated in 
resettlement in 2016 demonstrates that few members of the international community contribute 
to this durable solution. Figure 1 depicts the countries that resettled refugees in 2016, the most 
recent year for which data was available: 
Figure 1 – Participating Countries in Resettlement, 2016
Figure 1 demonstrates that most countries of resettlement are located in Europe, though 
North America, Oceania, and parts of East Asia also resettled refugees in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 
206).1 Though these are not the only countries to resettle refugees, European, North American, 
and Oceanian states are among the oldest and most consistent contributors to this durable 
solution. For example, Sweden adopted a formal resettlement programme and quota in 1950, 
making it the oldest country of resettlement in Europe (Ostling and Joseph 2013, 1). Decades 
later, a range of countries adopted resettlement programmes, including Australia in 1977, 
Canada in 1978, Denmark in 1979, and the US in 1980 (UNHCR 2016, 2; UNHCR 2018, 2; 
UNHCR 2018, 2).  
Though countries in Europe, North America, and Oceania are among the most 
consistent participants in resettlement, one can observe considerable cross-national differences 
in the absolute and relative number of refugees resettled around the world. Figure 2 illustrates 
the range in the absolute number of refugees resettled in 2016, the most recent year for which 
data was available at the time of research:  
                                                 
1 The 30 countries that resettled refugees in 2016 were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Norway, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the US. 
Figure 2 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals by Country, 2016
Figure 2 demonstrates that Australia, Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the 
US each resettled more than 2,001 refugees in 2016, making them the largest absolute 
contributors to resettlement that year (UNHCR 2018, 206). France, Germany, and Sweden each 
resettled between 1,001 and 2000 refugees in 2016, while Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland resettled between 500 and 1,000 refugees that year (UNHCR 2018, 
206). For their part, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Spain each resettled between 500 
and 1,000 refugees in 2016, while Brazil, Cambodia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Iceland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, and South Korea resettled between 1 
and 100 refugees that year (UNHCR 2018, 206). The median number of refugees resettled in 
2016 was 333, indicating that most countries made small contributions relative to the 373,942 
refugees estimated to be in need of resettlement that year (UNHCR 2018, 206 own 
calculation).2 
Detailed figures on the absolute number of refugees resettled reinforce the observation 
concerning the cross-national variations in resettlement contributions. Appendix Table 2 shows 
the total number of resettlement arrivals for all 30 countries that participated in resettlement in 
2016, the most recent year for which data was available at the time of research. Table 2 
demonstrates that there were considerable differences in resettlement contributions among 
participating states in 2016. Indeed, resettlement contributions ranged from one refugee 
resettled in Cambodia to 84,994 refugees resettled in the US (UNHCR 2018, 206).  
The fact that some countries resettled more refugees than others in 2016 does not appear 
to be an aberration but part of a consistent pattern that has emerged since 1980. Tables 3 to 5 
in the appendix demonstrate that the US resettled the largest number of refugees each and every 
year between 1980 and 2016 (see table for sources). In total, the US resettled 2,966,585 of the 
4,336,960 refugees granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, representing 68.4 per 
cent of the total (see table for sources). Notably, the US retained its position as the largest 
contributor to resettlement even after significantly reducing resettlement admissions following 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. 
Canada resettled the second-largest number of refugees in 23 of the 37 years between 
1980 and 2016, and the third-largest absolute number of refugees in 14 of the remaining years 
during that period (see table for sources).3 In other words, Canada ranked as the second- or 
                                                 
2 The author used the median as Australia, Canada, and the US resettled considerably more refugees than the 
other 27 participating countries. 
3 Canada was the second-largest contributor to resettlement in 1980, 1984 through 1993, 1997, 2000 to 2002, 
2007, 2009 to 2012, and 2014 to 2016. It resettled the third-largest number of refugees between 1981 and 1983, 
1994 to 1996, 1998 to 1999, 2003 to 2006, 2008, and 2013. 
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third-largest resettlement country each year between 1980 and 2016. In total, Canada resettled 
658,153 of the 4,336,960 refugees granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, 
representing 15.1 per cent of the total (see table for sources). 
Australia rounds out the list of the top three largest contributors to resettlement. It 
resettled the second-largest absolute number of refugees in 13 of the 37 years between 1980 
and 2016 (see table for sources).4 This antipodean country was also the third-largest contributor 
to resettlement in 23 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016. In total, Australia resettled 
438,124 of the 4,336,960 refugees granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, 
representing 10.1 per cent of the total (see table for sources). 
Cumulatively, these three countries resettled 3,920,579 of the 4,176,252 refugees 
granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, representing 93.8 per cent of the total 
(see table for sources). The only exception to this pattern occurred in 1999 when Germany 
elected to resettle 15,000 Kosovar refugees on an ad hoc basis, making it the second-largest 
absolute contributor to resettlement that year, and pushing Canada and Australia to third and 
fourth place, respectively (UNHCR 2004, 40). Nevertheless, the figures presented above 
illustrate and reinforce the observations concerning the significant cross-national differences 
in resettlement contributions. 
One can also observe substantial cross-national differences in the relative number of 
refugees resettled. Figure 3 shows the range of refugees resettled per 1 million residents in 
2016, the most recent year for which data was available at the time of research: 
  
                                                 
4 Australia was the second-largest contributor to resettlement between 1981 and 1983, 1994 to 1996, 1998, 2003 
to 2006, 2008, and 2013. It resettled the third-largest number of refugees in 1980, 1984 to 1993, 1997, 2000 to 
2002, 2007, 2009 to 2012, and 2014 to 2016. 
 Figure 3 – Resettlement Arrivals per 1 Million Residents, 2016 
 
 Figure 3 demonstrates that Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Monaco, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, and the US each resettled more than 101 refugees per 1 million residents in 
2016 (UNHCR 2018, 206; World Bank 2018, no pagination own calculation). Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom resettled between 11 and 100 refugees per 1 million residents in 2016, 
while the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Spain resettled 
between 1.1 and 10 refugees per 1 million residents that year (UNHCR 2018, 206; World Bank 
2018, no pagination own calculation). For their part, Brazil, Cambodia, Japan, and South Korea 
each resettled between 0.01 and 1 refugee per 1 million residents in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 206; 
World Bank 2018, no pagination own calculation). These governments resettled a median 
number of 40.4 refugees per 1 million residents in 2016, indicating that resettled refugees 
constitute a small part of the total population of each participating country (UNHCR 2018, 206; 
World Bank 2018, no pagination own calculation).5 
Detailed figures on the relative number of refugees resettled per capita reinforce the 
observation concerning the cross-national variations in resettlement contributions. Appendix 
Table 6 shows the number of resettlement arrivals per 1 million residents in 2016, the most 
recent year for which data was available at the time of research. Table 6 demonstrates that there 
were considerable differences in resettlement contributions among participating states in 2016. 
Indeed, resettlement contributions ranged from 0.06 refugees resettled per 1 million residents 
in Cambodia to 1287.8 refugees resettled per 1 million residents in Canada (UNHCR 2018, 
206 own calculation; World Bank 2018 no pagination). From this, it is apparent that some 
countries have made substantially larger contributions to resettlement per capita than other 
members of the international community. 
In addition, a more detailed analysis of historical data on resettlement admissions per 
capita reveals a pattern in which some countries have consistently resettled more refugees per 
capita than other states between 1980 and 2016. Tables 7 to 9 in the appendix demonstrate that 
though the US, Canada, and Australia also made relatively generous contributions to 
resettlement between 1980 and 2016, Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden, as well as occasional outliers such as New Zealand and Liechtenstein made 
meaningful contributions as well. 
                                                 
5 The author used the median as some countries, such as Australia, Canada, and Norway, resettled considerably 
more refugees per capita than the other 27 participating countries. 
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Though the US has never been the largest relative contributor to resettlement, it was 
the second-largest contributor in relative terms in 1981 and the third-largest contributor in 17 
of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016 (see table for sources).6 Canada was the largest relative 
contributor to resettlement in 12 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016, the second-largest 
contributor in 21 of the 37 years, and the third-largest contributor in a further three years 
between 1980 and 2016 (see table for sources).7 Australia was the largest relative contributor 
to resettlement in 23 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016, and the second-largest relative 
contributor to resettlement in 11 of the 37 years during this period (see table for sources).8 
Australia was also the third-largest relative contributor to resettlement in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 
206; World Bank 2018, no pagination). 
The considerable variation in resettlement admissions is perhaps unsurprising given 
that resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international 
humanitarian law (UNHCR 2011, 36). During the crisis in Southeast Asia, many governments 
began to experience “resettlement fatigue” and to perceive resettlement as the “least desirable 
solution (Fredriksson and Mougne 1994, 5-6).” This “disenchantment with resettlement” 
prompted many governments to reduce resettlement admissions and to emphasise voluntary 
repatriation and local integration instead (Milner 2003, 56). 
In response to the disillusionment with resettlement, the UNHCR attempted to 
“revitalize [sic] the international protection regime” in 2000 through the Global Consultations 
on International Protection, which recommended in part that the organisation examine how to 
implement resettlement in a strategic manner (UNHCR 2003, 1-2). Three years later, the 
UNHCR Working Group on Resettlement (2003, 2) published a discussion paper that reframed 
resettlement as a strategic instrument for protection that has direct and indirect benefits for 
refugees, host countries, receiving countries, and the international refugee protection regime. 
The Working Group explained that “a substantial increase in the global resettlement capacity 
is required” to successfully implement the strategic use of resettlement (UNHCR 2003, 7). To 
achieve this, the Group argued that more countries must resettle refugees and also made an 
                                                 
6 The US was the third-largest contributor to resettlement in relative terms in 1980, between 1982 and 1992, and 
in 1996, 1998, 2005, 2010, and 2013. 
7 Canada resettled the largest number of refugees per capita in 1980, between 1987 and 1992, between 2000 and 
2001, and in 2012 and 2015, respectively. It resettled the second-largest number of refugees per capita between 
1982 and 1986, from 1995 to 1998, from 2002 to 2011, and from 2013 to 2014. Canada resettled the third-
largest number of refugees per capita in 1981, 1993, and 1999. 
8 Australia resettled the most refugees per capita between 1981 and 1986, in 1993, from 1995 to 1998, between 
2006 and 2011, and from 2013 to 2014. It resettled the second-largest number of refugees per capita in 1980, 
between 1987 and 1991, in 1994, between 1991 and 2001, and in 2012. 
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implicit connection between the number of resettlement countries and the number of 
resettlement places (UNHCR 2003, 8).9  
Though the number of resettlement countries has grown progressively to 30 in 2016 
(UNHCR 2018, 206 own calculation), the observations presented above concerning the 
considerable cross-national variations in the absolute and relative number of resettled refugees 
raises the question that forms the central research question explored in this thesis: why have 
the US and Canada adopted generous resettlement admissions policies? In the general context 
of the literature on refugee protection, scholars have advanced a range of explanations for why 
some countries are more generous in granting protection than others, and the author offers an 
analysis of the central tendencies in the literature in section 1.2. However, observations 
concerning the structure of resettlement programmes in most participating countries raise a 
different and potentially complementary explanation concerning the role of domestic 
responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations and the potential for these 
organisations to influence admissions through advocacy. 
Indeed, domestic responsibility sharing appears to be the modus operandi of most 
resettlement programmes in Europe, North America, and Oceania. Appendix Table 10 
illustrates the current involvement of voluntary sector organisations in three phases of the 
resettlement process: first, in the delivery of pre-departure activities, including the 
identification, referral, and (or) submission of resettlement applications (ID), pre-departure 
cultural orientation programmes (PDCO), and the provision information sessions for receiving 
communities (INFO); second, in the provision of reception services, including meeting 
refugees at the airport (REC) and offering short-term housing (STH); and third, in the supply 
of orientation and integration services. This may include the delivery of post-arrival orientation 
programmes (ORI), translation and (or) interpretation services (TR/IN), advice and (or) 
referrals to other service providers (AD/RE), assisting refugees in locating long-term housing 
(LTH) and employment opportunities (EMP), and delivering language classes (LANG). The 
table also captures the involvement of volunteers (VOL), who may play a variety of roles such 
as befrienders or mentors. 
Table 10 demonstrates that 20 of 22 current and recent resettlement countries in Europe, 
North America, and Oceania have adopted one or more mechanisms for domestic responsibility 
sharing with voluntary sector organisations. Indeed, the information available at the time of 
                                                 
9 The Working Group also cited the need to expand the geographic distribution of resettlement countries, to 
facilitate collaboration between current and emerging resettlement countries, and to amend UNHCR managerial 
and operational practices, among other proposed changes (UNHCR 2003, 8). 
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research indicates that only the Hungarian and Polish governments have not involved voluntary 
sector organisations in any aspect of the resettlement process. Table 10 also illustrates how the 
depth and breadth of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing differ across countries. 
For example, voluntary sector organisations in the US and Canada contribute to multiple 
aspects of the pre-departure, reception, and orientation and integration phases of resettlement, 
whereas engagement in resettlement was limited to the identification of Iraqi refugees in 2011 
(Scharf 2013, 3-4). In some cases, voluntary sector engagement in resettlement has expanded, 
thanks in part to the recent introduction of private sponsorship initiatives (either as pilots or as 
annual programmes) in Germany, Ireland, and New Zealand (International Catholic Migration 
Commission 2017, 26 and 28-31; Office of the Minister of Immigration 2017, 5). This analysis 
is not all-encompassing but it indicates the cross-national variation in the structure of 
government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement. 
The existence of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing in resettlement is not 
a new phenomenon. In 1981, Wright (157) observed that there were 15 countries in which 
resettlement “was accomplished through some combination of the efforts of government and 
voluntary agencies.” Despite the prevalence and persistence of such arrangements and the 
burgeoning literature on the involvement of voluntary sector organisation in the provision of 
public goods and services, few academics have analysed (or theorised) the involvement and 
impact of voluntary sector organisations in resettlement, as discussed in greater detail in section 
1.2. 
The observations concerning both the considerable cross-national variations in the 
absolute and relative number of resettled refugees and the existence and structure of 
mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing present a compelling academic puzzle. 
However, the situation may also impact human security since resettlement is intended to protect 
persons whose human rights are at risk in their respective countries of asylum as well as groups 
threatened by deportation and refoulement, as previously noted (UNHCR 2011, 37-38). 
Understanding the potential reasons for why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted 
generous resettlement admissions policies appears particularly essential since the UNHCR 
acknowledges that the number of refugees in need of resettlement still “vastly outnumber” the 
number of available places (UNHCR 2016, 13).  
The gap between resettlement needs and admissions is not new. In 1994, Fredriksson 
and Mougne (51) noted, “In recent years, there has been a discrepancy of between 40 and 60 
percent [sic] between projected numbers and numbers actually resettled.” Though this 
phenomenon is not novel, the cross-national differences in resettlement contributions remain 
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salient in light of the unprecedented scale of displacement and the significant number of 
refugees in need of resettlement. In 2019, the UNHCR estimates that 1,428,011 refugees will 
need of resettlement in the medium-term (UNHCR 2018, 12). The organisation estimates that 
Syrians are the largest group in need of resettlement, totalling 601,152 individuals or 42.0 per 
cent of all refugees in need of resettlement in 2019 and beyond (UNHCR 2018, 59 own 
calculation). The majority of Syrian refugees in need of resettlement live in Turkey, where 
approximately 400,000 individuals, or 66.5 per cent, reside (UNHCR 2018, 66 own 
calculation). Though data on the exact locations of Syrian refugees in Turkey was unavailable 
at the time of research, the largest concentrations of Syrian refugees are in the bordering 
provinces of Gaziantep, Hatay, and Sanliurfa, as well as in Istanbul (UNHCR 2018, 1). In 
contrast to many other refugee populations, 94 per cent of Syrian refugees in Turkey do not 
live in camps (European Commission 2018, 1). Disaggregated demographic information on 
Syrian refugees in need of resettlement from Turkey was unavailable at the time of research, 
but 53.1 per cent of Syrian refugees in Turkey are men, and the largest plurality of male (28.4 
per cent) and female (23.7 per cent) refugees were adults aged 18-59 (UNHCR 2018, no 
pagination). Besides the Syrians in Turkey, approximately 97,000 Syrian refugees in need of 
resettlement live in Lebanon, 64,883 Syrian refugees reside in Jordan, and approximately 
23,000 Syrians live in Iraq at present (UNHCR 2018, 66). 
Refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo comprise the second-largest group 
in need of resettlement, totalling 163,448 persons or 11.4 per cent of all refugees who will need 
resettlement in 2019 and beyond (UNHCR 2018, 60 own calculation). The largest number of 
displaced persons have sought refuge in Tanzania, where 80,808 individuals have sought 
protection in the Nyarugusu camp located in the province of Kigoma in western Tanzania 
(UNHCR 2018, 1). Of Congolese refugees living in Tanzania, approximately 50,800 are 
refugees in need of resettlement, representing 31.0 per cent of the total number of Congolese 
refugees in need of resettlement (UNHCR 2018, 64 own calculation). Though disaggregated 
demographic information on Congolese refugees in need of resettlement from Tanzania was 
unavailable at the time of research, 49.1 per cent of all Congolese asylum seekers and refugees 
in Nyarugusu are female, 50.9 per cent are male, and a plurality of male (21.3 per cent) and 
female (20.9 per cent) refugees are adults aged 18-59 (UNHCR 2018, no pagination). In 
addition to the Congolese refugees in Tanzania, approximately 34,000 Congolese refugees in 
need of resettlement live in Uganda, while another 28,418 Congolese refugees reside in 
Burundi and a further 17,157 Congolese refugees live in Rwanda at present (UNHCR 2018, 
61-64). 
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Refugees from South Sudan constitute the third-largest group who will need 
resettlement, totalling 158,474 individuals or 11.0 per cent of all refugees in need of this 
durable solution in 2019 and beyond (UNHCR 2018, 59 own calculation). The largest number 
of South Sudanese refugees in need of resettlement live in Uganda, where approximately 
115,000 individuals or 72.5 per cent reside (UNHCR 2018, 64 own calculation). Though data 
on the exact locations of South Sudanese refugees in need of resettlement from Uganda was 
unavailable at the time of research, the majority of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda have 
sought shelter in some of the northern districts of the country. In particular, 287,801 individuals 
or 27.0 per cent of the South Sudanese population live in the Yumbe district in northern 
Uganda, 268,720 refugees or 25.2 per cent live in the Arua district, and a further 235,420 South 
Sudanese or 22.1 per cent live in the Adjumani district (UNHCR 2018, no pagination). Though 
disaggregated demographic information on South Sudanese refugees in need of resettlement 
from Uganda was unavailable at the time of research, information indicates that those who have 
succeeded in fleeing to Uganda are “highly vulnerable” and includes many women who have 
suffered sexual and gender-based violence (UNHCR 2017, 23). In addition, 65 per cent of the 
South Sudanese population in Uganda are children (UNHCR 2017, 23). In addition to the South 
Sudanese refugees in Uganda, approximately 25,000 South Sudanese in need of resettlement 
live in Ethiopia, while 10,450 South Sudanese refugees reside in Kenya at present (UNHCR 
2018, 62-63).  
The humanitarian rationale for exploring the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions, domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, 
and voluntary sector advocacy is further reinforced by the fact that the number of refugees in 
need of resettlement has grown steadily since 2012 (UNHCR 2011, 9; UNHCR 2012, 10; 
UNHCR 2013, 9; UNHCR 2014, 9; UNHCR 2015, 12; UNHCR 2016, 14; UNHCR 2017, 11; 
UNHCR 2018, 12). Indeed, the number of refugees in need of resettlement increased by 149.6 
per cent from 2012 to 2018 (UNHCR 2011, 9; UNHCR 2017, 11 own calculation). If 
governments are unable or unwilling to increase resettlement admissions, the number of 
refugees in need of this durable solution could rise even further. 
Obtaining a better understanding of the potential reasons why the US and Canada have 
voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies is also salient given that 
resettlement serves two strategic purposes. First, resettlement encourages governments in 
countries of first asylum to continue admitting individuals in need of protection and to enhance 
their procedures and standards of protection, thereby also benefitting refugees for whom 
resettlement is not an appropriate solution (UNHCR 2011, 38). Second, resettlement enables 
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other governments to demonstrate solidarity with countries of first asylum through 
international responsibility sharing (UNHCR 2011, 38). 
Finally, the desire to understand the potential reasons why the US and Canada have 
voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an examination of the 
potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing 
with voluntary sector organisations and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector 
advocacy is salient given efforts by the UNHCR to promote the involvement of voluntary 
sector organisations in the provision of this durable solution. Since 1995, the UNHCR has 
organised the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement to facilitate dialogue between 
resettlement countries, voluntary sector organisations, and the UNHCR itself (UNHCR 2018, 
para. 1 of 4). 
However, the UNHCR has recently augmented efforts to promote collaboration with 
voluntary sector organisations—especially since the author originally submitted this thesis for 
examination in September 2015. On 3 September, 2015, media organisations around the world 
broadcast images of three-year-old Syrian Alan Kurdî, his brother Galib, and mother Rehana. 
The Kurdî family had attempted to travel to the Greek island of Kos in search of asylum, but 
the young boys and their mother sadly drowned on route—joining the more than 3,700 
individuals who perished while attempting to cross the Mediterranean that year (International 
Organization for Migration 2016, para. 1 of 16). The images raised global awareness of the 
suffering in Syria and also galvanised public opinion in favour of government action (BBC 
News 2015, para. 1 and 3 of 12). On 4 September, 2015, the UNHCR released a statement 
which called the existing European response to the outflow of asylum seekers and refugees 
“untenable” but praised the “selfless generosity of private citizens and civil society 
organizations reaching out to welcome and help the new arrivals (UNHCR 2015, para. 3 of 
11).” The UNHCR called on the European Commission to mobilise the resources of its member 
states and to work in partnership with international and civil society organisations to ensure 
asylum seekers and refugees are “welcomed into a safe and caring environment (UNHCR 2015, 
para. 6 of 11).” 
In addition to these measures, the UNHCR (2015, para. 9 of 11) called on governments 
around the world to “make some fundamental changes to allow for larger resettlement and 
humanitarian admission quotas […].” In particular, the UNHCR has promoted the expansion 
of humanitarian admissions programmes and the adoption of additional ‘admissions pathways’ 
for Syrian refugees—that is, legal channels for protection above and beyond existing 
obligations on asylum (UNHCR 2016, 5). In March 2016, the UNHCR hosted a conference 
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that enabled participants to share best practices on the admission of Syrian refugees (UNHCR 
2016, 1). In his closing remarks, Filippo Grandi, the High Commissioner for Refugees, noted 
that many attendees had “underlined the need to forge a partnership between private and public 
initiatives,” and acknowledged that “private sponsorship programmes […] have proven very 
successful (UNHCR 2016, 2).” 
This conference served as the precursor to a high-level meeting of the United Nations 
General Assembly on 19 September, 2016, which culminated in the adoption of the New York 
Declaration on for Refugees and Migrants. Part of the declaration includes provisions for the 
development of a “comprehensive refugee response framework” founded on a “multi-
stakeholder approach” that seeks to involve not only national and local governments but also 
civil society and faith-based organisations, among many others (UNHCR 2016, 16). 
This framework constitutes the foundation of a “global compact” on refugees that 
members of the international community are formulating in 2018 (UNHCR 2016, 5). In that 
context, the Government of Canada and the UNHCR, in collaboration with the University of 
Ottawa, the Radcliffe Foundation, and the Open Society Foundation, launched the Global 
Refugee Sponsorship Initiative in December 2016. The Initiative seeks to augment the number 
of resettlement places and the quality of resettlement programmes, as well to strengthen 
receiving communities and to promote a more positive discourse on refugee protection, through 
training and information dissemination, “championing” the adoption of private sponsorship 
programmes outside Canada, and the provision of both capacity building and technical 
assistance services (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, para. 11 and 14 of 
14).  
Furthermore, the UNHCR organised talks on how “harnessing the goodwill of citizens” 
can contribute to responsibility sharing in November 2017 (UNHCR 2017, para. 1 of 29). 
Though participants underlined the “discretionary nature of resettlement,” the thematic 
discussions also underscored the importance of a “whole of society approach” to resettlement 
and the potential of ‘civil society’ organisations to assist in the delivery of resettlement 
programmes and to build public awareness and support for this durable solution (UNHCR 
2017, 2 and 5). Though these developments have taken place since the author originally 
submitted this thesis in September 2015, they reinforce the salience of exploring the potential 
reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions 
policies. 
In sum, though resettlement admissions have fluctuated over time, a more detailed 
analysis demonstrates that there are also considerable cross-national differences in resettlement 
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contributions. While the UNHCR has sought to help resettlement countries to overcome their 
“fatigue” and to expand participation in the provision of this durable solution, the figures 
presented above indicate that the US, Canada, and Australia have consistently been among the 
largest—if not the largest—contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms 
since 1980. Having outlined the research problem and question and rationalised this approach 
in both academic and humanitarian terms, section 1.2 offers a critical analysis of the current 
literature on why some countries adopt generous refugee protection policies. 
1.2 Potential Explanations for Differences in Resettlement Admissions 
The observations presented in the preceding section on the structure of resettlement 
programmes provide a clear rationale for examining the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector 
organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. However, 
other factors may also help explain why countries like the US and Canada voluntarily resettle 
more refugees than other states. The academic literature on refugee protection is vast, and 
scholars have proposed a broad range of reasons why governments choose to grant protection. 
In a meta-analysis, Meyers (2004, 6-7) describes several general theoretical approaches to the 
study of immigration control policies, including “cultural-based” theories and international 
relations.10 From a cultural perspective, the ‘partialist’ or ‘impartialist’ perspectives on 
belonging may influence immigration control policies. Gibney (2004, 19 and 23) explains that 
for partialists, including communitarian, conservative, and constitutional realist theorists, 
countries are “distinct cultural communities possessing a right to self-determination which 
justifies priority for the interests of citizens over those of refugees in entrance decisions.” This 
cultural distinctiveness motivates governments to develop admissions policies that place the 
interests of citizens above those of refugees (Gibney 2004, 19 and 23). This perspective implies 
that admitting large numbers of refugees could endanger the cultural interests of citizens and 
their right to self-determination as a community, thus providing a rationale for limiting 
admissions. 
Culture can also circumscribe those that belong to the community and those that do not. 
The influential communitarian theorist Michael Walzer (1983, 50) elaborates on the 
fundamental characteristics that shape the boundaries of belonging, arguing that, “[…] 
                                                 
10 In a separate article, Meyers (2000, 1246) defines immigration control as policies concerning the “admission 
and selection of permanent immigrants, temporary migrant workers and refugees, as well as attempts to restrict 
illegal immigration.” 
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communities must have boundaries; and however these are determined with regard to territory 
and resources, they depend with regard to population on a sense of relatedness and mutuality.” 
This is not to say that bounded communities have no obligations towards non-members. Indeed, 
Walzer (1983, 48-49) admits that “Toward some refugees, we may very well have obligations 
of the same sort that we have toward fellow nationals.” 
On the surface, the communitarian philosophy appears generous in defining the scope 
of obligations towards individuals from other communities. For example, Walzer (1983, 48-
49) argues that a community that perpetuates conflict in another community must protect those 
that flee as a result of the hostilities. Walzer (1983, 48-49) also acknowledges that communities 
may choose to grant protection for less tangible reasons and suggests: 
 
“[…] We can also be bound to help men and women persecuted or oppressed by someone else—if they 
are persecuted or oppressed because they are like us. Ideological as well as ethnic affinity can generate 
bonds across political lines, especially, for example, when we claim to embody certain principles in our 
communal life and encourage men and women elsewhere to defend those principles.” 
 
Nevertheless, communitarians like Walzer envision limits on the admission of refugees. 
Walzer (1983, 49-50) argues that the principle of mutual aid only applies when the number of 
refugees is small, and if the flow of refugees increases, then countries should select those for 
whom the state feels ideological or ethnic “affinity.” 
In the context of resettlement to the US and Canada—the two case studies examined in 
this thesis—the partialist approach may explain how these governments have decided which 
refugees to resettle. In the US case, its involvement in conflicts in Southeast Asia, Kosovo, and 
Iraq (among others) may potentially explain why it resettled refugees from these areas. The 
decision to resettle refugees from these regions and countries may have been motivated in part 
by a sense of duty or a desire to assist those attempting to reject communism or 
authoritarianism. However, the data on resettlement admissions indicates that resettlement 
admissions are not guided exclusively by these considerations, as the US has also resettled 
refugees from countries in which there has been no recent military engagement and from states 
in which the sense of “ethnic affinity” is arguably less clear than Walzer implies (1983, 49-50) 
(e.g. Refugee Processing Center 2018, no pagination). 
Canada has been less interventionist than its southern neighbour and, excluding large-
scale conflicts such as World War I and World War II, military engagement has traditionally 
been more limited due to public reticence and lower defence spending. This is not to say that 
the Canadian government has never resettled refugees fleeing conflicts in which it participated, 
but interviews with senior government officials and members of the Private Sponsorship of 
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Refugees (PSR) programme indicate that part of the perceived motivation for engaging in 
resettlement is to demonstrate a commitment to the norms embedded in the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol—especially the norm of responsibility 
sharing. Chapter four, section 4.5 discusses this theme in greater detail. Furthermore, the data 
on resettlement admissions shows that Canada resettles refugees from a broad range of 
countries—not just those from states in which it has engaged in military conflict or 
peacekeeping operations, or with which it feels a sense of “ethnic affinity” (Walzer 1983, 49-
50) (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2016, no pagination; Immigration, 
Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination). 
Furthermore, the partialist approach does not necessarily explain why both the US and 
Canada are consistently among the largest—if not the largest—contributors to resettlement in 
absolute and relative terms. Thus, though the partialist approach may tell us more about how 
governments decide which refugees to resettle, in this case, it appears to offer an incomplete 
understanding of why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies (Carens 1992, 33; Singer and Singer 1988, 120). 
In contrast, Gibney (2004, 20 and 23) explains that for impartialists, including 
utilitarians and liberals, governments are “cosmopolitan moral agents […] the only legitimate 
admissions policy is one that takes into equal account the interests (or rights) of refugees and 
citizens.” The utilitarian theorists Singer and Singer (1988, 116-17) question whether 
immigration policies that distinguish between residents and non-residents are compatible with 
the belief in human equality. Instead, Singer and Singer (1988, 121-22) argue that immigration 
and refugee policies “should be based on the interests of all those affected […]. Where the 
interests of different parties conflict, we should attempt to give equal consideration to all 
interests, which would mean that more pressing or more fundamental interests take precedence 
[…].” Though Singer and Singer (1988, 127) do not prescribe the number of refugees that 
governments should resettle, they contend that governments should continue admitting 
refugees until “the adverse consequences that are now only speculative possibilities would 
become probabilities or virtual certainties.” Singer and Singer (1988, 128) conclude by 
recommending that states “gradually increase their refugee intakes,” while monitoring the 
consequences of these increases, thereby enabling them to balance moral, political, and 
community interests. 
Conversely, the renown liberal theorist Joseph Carens (1987, 260 and 268) argues that 
governments should welcome immigrants based on their right to equal treatment in the public 
sphere, and he only supports those (minimal) restrictions that are necessary to maintain public 
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order. Though Carens (1987, 270) acknowledges that there are differences between “aliens and 
citizens,” he argues that excluding individuals who have expressed a desire to join the 
community is incompatible with the “idea of equal moral worth.” Carens (1987, 270) succinctly 
concludes that “If people want to sign the social contract, they should be permitted to do so.” 
In other words, though impartialist scholars have emphasised the importance of equal 
treatment, they appear divided in their attitudes towards refugee protection; whereas Singer 
and Singer (1988) envision limits on resettlement admissions at the margins, Carens (1987) 
suggests such constraints are anathema to the principle of equality. 
In the US, the President establishes an annual ceiling on resettlement admissions 
following recommendations from the departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and 
Human Services and following consultations with Congress (US Department of State, US 
Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 
6). The ceilings are designed as firm limits rather than as “goals” to be achieved (Martin 2005, 
16). Furthermore, though the US does not use selection criteria in its Resettlement Admissions 
Program, the programme does emphasise the importance of learning English and achieving 
“economic self-sufficiency” as soon as possible (UNHCR 2017, 9-10). The UNHCR and 
employees from the Department of Homeland Security also convey the importance of language 
skills and obtaining employment to resettlement applicants at the referral and interview stages, 
so that refugees clearly understand their responsibilities if they are resettled in the US (Limón 
2013). Though the US was the largest contributor to resettlement in absolute terms and was 
also among the largest contributors to resettlement in relative terms between 1980 and 2016, 
these contributions remain small relative to its total population. Thus, while the US appears 
less selective than other contributors to this durable solution, its firm limits on resettlement 
admissions could be interpreted as inconsistent with the utilitarian perspective outlined by 
Singer and Singer (1988) and the open borders vision articulated by Carens (1987).  
In Canada, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship adopts annual 
targets for each of the four resettlement programmes, following departmental consultations and 
engagement with stakeholders and members of the public (UNHCR 2018, 4). These targets 
establish a lower and upper bound for resettlement admissions through these programmes and, 
as such, they are in principle more flexible than the quotas used in most other resettlement 
countries. Though the figures presented in section 1.1 demonstrate that Canada was among the 
largest contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016, 
the fact that the government adopts these targets indicates that there are still limits on 
resettlement admissions. Furthermore, Canada is one of only seven governments that use 
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selection criteria as part of the resettlement application process.11 Though officials can waive 
these criteria for the most vulnerable refugees, their existence suggests that officials are 
concerned about resettling refugees who can adapt to the country, rather than resettling any 
refugee willing to “sign the social contract (Carens 1987, 270).” 
Impartialist theorists offer compelling normative arguments for why governments 
should admit more refugees. However, though the governments of the US and Canada have 
made important voluntary contributions to resettlement, both countries use ceilings and targets 
to limit admissions even though resettlement needs continue to exceed the available number of 
resettlement places. Furthermore, though both governments appear to fundamentally respect 
protection considerations when considering applications for resettlement (UNHCR 2018, 3-4; 
UNHCR 2017, 3), they also tend to seek out refugees who possess particular qualities, such as 
language skills and employment experience. One could interpret these strategies as inconsistent 
with impartialist arguments on equality and, therefore, this approach also offers an incomplete 
perspective on why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies. 
In addition to the partialist and impartialist schools of thought, other academics have 
emphasised the relationship between refugee protection and foreign policies, which can 
“facilitate or to restrain” refugee admissions (Teitelbaum 1984, 433 and 439-40). The refugee 
crisis in Southeast Asia is a useful example, as numerous countries resettled large numbers of 
refugees from this region and their efforts are exceptionally well-documented. In the US, there 
is ample evidence that foreign policies influenced its approach to resettlement from Southeast 
Asia. Koehn (1989, 79) captures the influence of foreign policy in his explanation that “A sense 
of obligation to those affected by U.S. actions in Indochina certainly accounts for the 
exceptionally high number of admission slots this country has consistently awarded to refugees 
from that region.” Though this observation appears consistent with the partialist framework, 
the literature also indicates that other factors including humanitarianism, advocacy efforts, and 
strategic considerations, influenced resettlement admissions. As the administration became 
aware of the delicate political situation in countries of first asylum such as Malaysia and 
Singapore, the US agreed to resettle 30,000 ‘boat people’ between June 1978 and April 1979—
even though the number of refugees living on land was considerably higher (Government 
Accounting Office 1979, ii and v). Furthermore, the government agreed to resettle 33,000 
                                                 
11 Countries that use selection criteria include Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and Romania (UNHCR 2016, 4; UNHCR 2016, 4; UNHCR 2016, 3; UNHCR 2016, 4; UNHCR 
2016, 2-3; UNHCR 2018, 3-4; UNHCR 2018, 4-5). 
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Cambodian refugees living in inadequate conditions in Thailand following pressure from 
American officials in the region and the media (Robinson 1998, 133 and 156 footnote 18). 
Concurrently, officials were keen to reframe the crisis as a global problem and so the American 
government may have assumed a leadership role in resettlement in order to encourage other 
countries to adopt generous admissions policies as part of the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(Betts 2006, 42; Government Accounting Office 1979, iii-iv and 24). In total, the US resettled 
1,287,399 Southeast Asian refugees between 1975 and 1997 (Robinson 1998, appendix 2). 
This contribution represented 65.9 per cent of all refugees resettled from Southeast Asia during 
this period (own calculation). 
In the Canadian case, there is evidence that foreign policy considerations may have 
shaped its approach to resettlement at first, but it appears that humanitarian concerns became 
more influential from 1977 onwards. Though the government initially hesitated to resettle 
refugees due to negative public attitudes towards the Vietnam War, it agreed to resettle up to 
3,000 Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees between 1975 and 1977 in order to demonstrate 
“token solidarity” with the US and to encourage other countries to contribute to this durable 
solution (Adelman 1982, 32-34 and 170 footnote 1). However, Adelman (1982, 34) explains 
that the government agreed to resettle 50 families per month in 1977 as it “began to realize 
[sic] that the continuing flow of refugees from Vietnam was not a direct result of the conclusion 
of the Vietnam War.” Similarly, the government volunteered to resettle approximately 600 of 
the roughly 2,500 refugees rescued from the Hai Hong in 1978 (Adelman 1982, 35).12 That 
same year, the government enacted a new Immigration Act that pledged to “uphold Canada’s 
humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted” and provided the 
legislative framework for the PSR programme (Adelman 1982, 36). The programme proved to 
be extremely popular; in June 1979, the government announced its intent to resettle 4,000 
refugees through this new programme (Adelman 1982, 37).13 One month later, the government 
increased the PSR target to 21,000 refugees in response to intense public interest and agreed to 
match every application received, thereby raising the total resettlement target for 1979-1980 to 
50,000 refugees (Adelman 1982, 38).14 In total, Canada resettled 202,178 refugees from 
                                                 
12 Adelman (1982, 35) argues Canada resettled 608 of the 2,500 refugees aboard the Hai Hong, while Robinson 
(1998, 138) states Canada resettled 604 of the 2,450 refugees aboard. 
13 In addition, the government pledged to resettle 8,000 refugees from Southeast Asia through the Government 
Assisted Refugees programme (Adelman 1982, 37). 
14 The UNHCR awarded the people of Canada a Nansen medal in 1986 in recognition of their contribution to 
resettlement (Beiser 1999, 41-42). 
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Southeast Asia between 1975 and 1997, representing 10.3 per cent of all refugees resettled 
from Southeast Asia during this period (Robinson 1998, appendix 2 own calculation). 
Though the US and Canada may have adopted generous resettlement admissions 
policies for refugees from Southeast Asia due to the influence of foreign policies, one should 
not overstate this relationship. Gibney (2004, 133) argues that “in the early 1980s, the Reagan 
administration ignored the supposed foreign policy benefits of anti-communist refugees and 
began actively interdicting Cubans on their way to the US. Moreover, the US accepted more 
refugees during the 1990s than in any other decade since the 1940s, despite the end of the Cold 
War. If ideological and strategic considerations have always been important in refugee and 
asylum policy, other factors have also played a role.” Indeed, the academic scholarship 
indicates that humanitarian considerations also shaped resettlement admissions from Southeast 
Asia. 
In addition to the potential explanations outlined above, some scholars have drawn on 
the theory of public goods to attempt to understand why some countries are more (or less) 
generous in granting protection to asylum seekers and refugees (e.g. Betts 2003; Hatton 2012; 
Suhrke 1998; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006; Thielemann and El-Enany 
2010; see also Roper and Barria 2010). Private goods have benefits that are fully excludable 
and rival, meaning that whoever provides the good can prevent others from benefiting from it, 
and once one actor has enjoyed the good, no one else can (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9 and 
30). Conversely, public goods are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning that whoever 
provides the good cannot prevent others from benefiting from it, and one actor can appreciate 
the good without diminishing the ability of others to take pleasure in it as well (Cornes and 
Sandler 1996, 8-9). However, private markets are discouraged from providing a Pareto efficient 
level of a public good due to the incentives for free riding,15 and numerous economists have 
argued that this behaviour creates a case for government intervention in the provision of the 
good or service (e.g. Chamberlain 1974; Friedman 1962, chapter 12; Hochman and Rodgers 
1969; Olson 1965, part I; Warr 1982). 
However, Cornes and Sandler (1996, 6 and 241) argue that public goods exist along a 
“spectrum” between purely public and purely private and these impure public goods can be 
                                                 
15 Perloff (2011, 322) explains that a Pareto improvement occurs when a change in the allocation of goods and 
services “makes one person better off without harming anyone else […].” The distribution of goods and services 
is Pareto efficient when “any possible reallocation would harm at least one person (Perloff 2011, 588).” Thus, 
for example, a change that allows a country to resettle more refugees for the same amount of money (or less) 
would be a Pareto improvement. Cornes and Sandler (1996, 22) note that the Pareto criterion is a normative one, 
not a positivist one. 
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more (or less) rival and excludable than others. Furthermore, Cornes and Sandler (1996, 9) 
explain that the provision of public goods sometimes generates joint products, which are 
“multiple outputs, some of which can be private, others purely public, and still others impurely 
public.” Therefore, though governments can also fail to provide a Pareto efficient level of a 
public good (Gruber 2011, 197-98; Perloff 2011, 590-91),16 the potential existence of 
excludable benefits may induce governments to overcome the incentives for free riding. 
Suhrke (1998) was the first to conceptualise refugee protection as a public good, and 
she appears to be the only author to focus on resettlement. Drawing on the theories of public 
goods and collective action, Suhrke (1998, 396-415) analyses why collective action is more 
difficult to achieve in refugee protection than in other public goods such as defence. Suhrke 
(1998) proposes several reasons why governments may participate in international 
responsibility sharing schemes. She suggests that governments may do so because they believe 
that international law creates a collective “moral duty” and “obligation” to assist refugees and 
that assisting persons in need of protection reduces global inequality and minimises the 
incentives for economically disadvantaged countries to restrict access to asylum (Suhrke 1998, 
398). In many ways, her perspective aligns with the norms embedded in the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and efforts by the UNHCR to “revitalize [sic] the international 
protection regime” in 2000 (UNHCR 2003, 1-2). However, though Suhrke analyses three 
examples of international cooperation on resettlement, she does not offer a detailed discussion 
of whether and how to conceptualise resettlement as a public good or how such an approach 
could impact resettlement admissions. 
Thielemann has explored the issue of asylum as a public good in several papers, 
focusing mainly on the dynamic of free-riding and international responsibility sharing (e.g. 
Thielemann 2003; Thielemann 2018; Thielemann and Dewan 2006; Thielemann and El-Enany 
2010). For example, Thielemann (2003, 253-73) analyses why some European states accept 
responsibility for more asylum seekers and refugees than others. Through an analysis of the 
Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovar refugees, Thielemann (2003, 265-59) finds 
a positive relationship between the number of relocated refugees and a commitment to norms 
such as solidarity and the protection of human rights. Thielemann (2003, 270) concludes that 
countries may accept responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees based on a cost-benefit 
                                                 
16 Governments can also fail to provide public goods in alliance scenarios. However, since the author focuses on 
domestic responsibility sharing rather than international responsibility sharing, a discussion of collective action 
failures is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a discussion of why small and large groups and organisations 
underprovide public goods and an overview of the theory of collective action, see Olson (1965, 9-16 and 22-36). 
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calculation and for normative reasons, but that “the relation between the two is often subtle.” 
This perspective suggests that governments may have complex, multifaceted motivations for 
granting protection. 
Betts (2003, 286) also deepens our understanding by conceptualising the decision to 
grant protection to asylum seekers as an impure public good that could generate joint products 
for receiving countries. Betts (2003, 276, 286-87, and 292) analyses the excludable benefits of 
protection for asylum seekers and theorises that some European governments offer protection 
to more asylum seekers because they derive altruistic benefits from “fulfilling either ethical or 
legal norm” and because they obtain ‘prestige’ benefits that they can leverage in other policy 
areas due to issue linkages. Conversely, Betts (2003, 292) speculates that other governments 
offer protection to fewer asylum seekers because they derive greater private security benefits 
from limiting access to protection and minimising flows. Though Betts (2003, 286-88) uses 
statistical methods to support his arguments about the nature of refugee protection as a public 
good and the perceived private security benefits, his analysis of excludable prestige and 
altruistic benefits is limited to a discussion of the economic and international relations 
literature, as well as the literature on humanitarian norms. 
Hatton (2012, 1-30) also adds value to our conceptual understanding of refugee 
protection as a public good through his analysis of asylum policy in the European Union. 
Hatton (2012, 2-7 and 25) conceptualises asylum as a local public good and develops a 
mathematical model of the demand for asylum in a given country based on the openness of its 
asylum policy and the proportion of asylum seekers who prefer that particular country. Hatton 
(2012, 4) demonstrates that “asylum policies are more generous for both countries when the 
public good [sic] effects are taken into account through cooperative policy setting.” This 
perspective suggests that countries may be motivated to grant protection based on some 
perceived benefit (or benefits) and that examining these perceived benefits may help us 
understand why some countries adopt generous refugee protection policies. 
These authors have made influential contributions to the conceptualisation of refugee 
protection as a public good and the relationship between refugee protection and responsibility 
sharing. Collectively, they demonstrate that refugee protection can generate a broad range of 
public and private benefits, which suggests that refugee protection could be an impure public 
good. Furthermore, these authors illustrate how responsibility sharing can influence the 
provision of refugee protection in certain circumstances. 
Though the contributions from Thielemann, Betts, and Hatton have served to elaborate 
the concept of refugee protection as a public good, these scholars focus exclusively on asylum. 
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Given that governments have a “de facto duty” to admit asylum seekers and to consider their 
applications for protection but no obligation to resettle refugees (Hathaway 2005, 300-301; 
UNHCR 2011, 36), the rationale for being more (or less) generous in granting protection may 
be fundamentally different from the rationale for being more (or less) generous in offering 
resettlement. 
Finally, this aspect of the literature is limited insofar as the overwhelming majority of 
scholars focus on international responsibility sharing in refugee protection and ignore domestic 
structures for responsibility sharing in this area (e.g. Betts 2003; Cook 2004-2005; Fonteyne 
1978-1980; Hathaway and Neve 1997; Noll 2003; Schuck 1997; Suhrke 1998; Thielemann 
2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006). Though van Selm (2003, 157-74) analyses public-private 
partnerships in resettlement in the US and select European countries, her discussion is mainly 
descriptive, and her analysis concentrates on the relationship between welfare regimes and the 
strength of the partnerships, rather than on the relationship between resettlement admissions 
and domestic responsibility sharing. 
In addition to qualitative work on asylum and refugee protection policies, a small 
number of academics use quantitative methods in an attempt to better understand why some 
countries receive more asylum applications than others and why some states adopt more (or 
less) generous refugee protection policies than others. Though many scholars include the rate 
of asylum seekers granted refugee protection as an independent variable (e.g. Böcker and 
Havinga 1998; Hatton 2005; Hatton 2009; Havinga and Böcker 1999; Keogh 2013; Neumayer 
2005; Thielemann and Dewan 2006), few examine the rate of asylum seekers granted refugee 
protection as a dependent variable—the approach most relevant to this thesis (Holzer et al. 
2000; Neumayer 2005; Sicakkan 2008; Toshkov 2014; Toshkov and De Haan 2013; Vink and 
Meijerink 2003). Furthermore, there is no consensus among these scholars on whether the rate 
of asylum seekers granted refugee protection is genuinely correlated to factors such as the 
number of asylum applications received, Gross Domestic Product, and unemployment, among 
other factors (c.f. Neumayer 2005; Toshkov 2014; Toshkov and De Haan 2013). However, 
there is evidence that these quantitative indicators may be more useful in explaining differences 
between countries as opposed to variations within states (Toshkov 2014, 207-8). Furthermore, 
scholars also suggest that fixed effects which are specific to the receiving country may conflate 
the rate of asylum seekers granted refugee protection (Neumayer 2005, 62-63; Toshkov 2014, 
205). Given the limited size of this scholarship, one cannot draw any definitive conclusions at 
this stage. However, the potential influence of fixed effects suggests that examining the role of 
domestic factors could potentially contribute to a better understanding of why some countries 
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voluntarily adopt generous refugee protection policies as the US and Canada have in 
resettlement. 
In light of the findings presented above and the focus on domestic responsibility sharing 
in this thesis, one cannot help but discuss an interesting paper from Holzer et al. (2000), who 
analyse the relationship between asylum recognition rates and the decentralisation of power, 
using Switzerland as a case study. More precisely, Holzer et al. (2000, 261) examine whether 
cantons that adopt a centralised approach to the administration of accommodation for asylum 
seekers are more (or less) likely to be more generous in granting protection than cantons that 
have opted to delegate this responsibility to ‘nonprofit’ organisations. Based on an analysis of 
181,100 asylum applications lodged in Switzerland between 1988 and 1996, the authors find a 
negative relationship between recognition rates and government centralisation that is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level, ceteris paribus. More precisely, a centralised 
accommodation system is estimated to decrease the odds of having one’s asylum application 
recognised by a magnitude of 0.899 (Holzer et al. 2000, 267). These results hold when 
controlling for key canton characteristics, including language, size, the share of the foreign-
born population, and attitudes towards foreigners (Holzer et al. 2000, 267). 
Holzer et al. (2000) theorise that asylum recognition rates increase when cantons 
delegate the administration of asylum accommodation to non-profit organisations, but provide 
no concrete rationale for this conjecture, citing only a research seminar which indicated that 
“Involving the communes or nonprofit organizations has proven beneficial for all persons 
involved in the asylum domain, not the least for the asylum seekers themselves (Holzer et al. 
2000, 261).” They imply that asylum seekers in cantons with decentralised administration 
systems are less anonymous (Holzer et al. 2000, 268) but do not test this in their model. This 
supposition suggests that further research into the mechanisms through which domestic 
responsibility sharing can impact admissions decisions could be advantageous.  
Finally, Sicakkan (2008) examines the potential relationship between the rate of asylum 
seekers granted protection and cooperation between governments and ‘non-governmental 
organisations’ in 17 European Union Member States. Sicakkan (2008, 211) argues that 
domestic “sovereignty-sharing” arrangements may have a powerful impact on recognition rates 
and that “international, transnational and domestic non-state as well as intergovernmental 
actors have gained considerable decision power (Sicakkan 2008, 206).” Sicakkan (2008, 219) 
explains that governments deliberately include ‘non-governmental organisations’ on asylum 
appeal boards because they are “supposed to be more competent and less impartial” in their 
approach to decision-making. His multivariate regression analysis demonstrates that 
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cooperation between governments and ‘non-governmental organisations’ increases the rate of 
asylum seekers granted Convention refugee protection by a magnitude of 0.017, ceteris paribus 
(Sicakkan 2008, 217). However, this relationship was not statistically significant. Conversely, 
cooperation increases the rate of asylum seekers granted protection rates by a magnitude of 
0.349 when considering both Convention and subsidiary forms of protection, ceteris paribus 
(Sicakkan 2008, 217). This relationship was significant at the 0.001 level, and the results were 
robust when controlling for cases in which ‘non-governmental organisations’ are not involved 
in the asylum appeal process (Sicakkan 2008, 220). On that basis, Sicakkan (2008, 229) 
concludes that “When correct institutional settings are established to facilitate effective 
sovereignty-sharing and cooperation between states and different refugee-protecting agencies, 
the result is higher rates of asylum recognition.” Though Sicakkan’s analysis concerns the 
provision of asylum, his findings suggest that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary 
sector organisations may have a positive impact on protection, underscoring the value of 
exploring the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic 
responsibility sharing in the US and Canada. 
In sum, academics have proposed a broad range of explanations for why some countries 
are generous in granting refugee protection, though the body of both qualitative and 
quantitative literature remains small at present. However, the extant literature is limited by its 
overwhelmingly state-centric focus. The focus on the role of governments in determining the 
size and composition of refugee admissions is unsurprising given that states are the backbone 
of the international refugee regime as they retain authority and discretion over admissions 
decisions, including resettlement. However, this emphasis ignores the longstanding 
involvement of voluntary sector organisations in this area. Indeed, the League of Nations only 
became involved in resettlement following a direct appeal from voluntary sector organisations 
led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Holborn 1939, 124). In countries such as 
the US and Canada, voluntary sector involvement in resettlement predates the establishment of 
formal resettlement programmes (Haines 2010; Robinson 1998). 
Furthermore, the focus on states neglects the burgeoning scholarship on government-
voluntary sector relationships and the roles that these organisations often play in the 
administration and implementation of resettlement programmes. In his influential taxonomy 
on government-voluntary sector relations, Young (1999; 2000) suggests that government-
voluntary sector relations can be ‘complementary,’ ‘supplementary,’ and (or) ‘adversarial’ in 
nature (Young 1999; Young 2000; see also Coston 1998; Kramer 1998; and Najam 2000). In 
the complementary model, governments and voluntary sector organisations create partnerships 
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in which the government finances the voluntary sector provision of public goods and services 
(Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150). In the process, governments and voluntary sector 
organisations form a ‘symbiotic’ and relationship which produces advantages for both partners 
(Grønbjerg 1987, 66; see also Young 2000, 150). In the supplementary model, voluntary sector 
organisations fill gaps in the demand for provision of public goods and services that are 
“unsatisfied by government (Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150).” In addition to this 
taxonomy, economists, political scientists, and sociologists have all sought to advance our 
understanding of government-voluntary sector relations, the reasons for their emergence and 
persistence, and some of the potential risks of collaboration (e.g. Hansmann 1987; Moulton 
and Anheier 2001; Salamon 1987; Salamon and Anheier 1998; Steinberg and Gray 1993; 
Weisbrod 1975 [1986]). 
Despite the growing body of literature on government-voluntary sector relations, 
scholars of refugee protection have largely ignored the active involvement of voluntary sector 
organisations in the provision of public goods and services in the US and Canada, including 
those utilised by resettled refugees in various phases of their resettlement. Where academics 
acknowledge the role of voluntary sector organisations in this process, it is more as an aside 
than a central feature of the analysis. Indeed, most of the extant literature consists of descriptive 
accounts of the structure of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement, or the 
analysing the impact of their involvement in the integration of resettled refugees. This 
scholarship provides useful background information, and in light of the nature of resettlement 
as a durable solution, there is no doubt that finding ways to facilitate the integration of resettled 
refugees is of crucial importance.  
Nevertheless, in light of the current scale of human displacement, the persistent gap 
between resettlement needs and available places, and the observations concerning the cross-
national differences in resettlement contributions, there is a clear rationale for conducting a 
deliberate and detailed exploration of the nature of government-voluntary sector relations in 
the US and Canada and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and 
domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations in these countries. 
Finally, the current academic literature on refugee protection has devoted inadequate 
attention to advocacy, and it appears that no scholar has attempted to explore the potential 
relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. This lacuna is 
problematic for two reasons: first, the inattention to advocacy ignores the reality of public 
policymaking in advanced liberal democracies such as the US and Canada. Though individuals 
and groups do not always have sufficient or equitable resources to support their advocacy 
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efforts and may not always succeed in their attempts to influence policies and legislation, many 
voluntary sector organisations in both the US and Canada regularly express their views on an 
array of resettlement issues, including admissions levels. Though not all voluntary sector 
organisations have the desire or resources necessary to engage in advocacy, many of these 
organisations are not only service providers—they may also be active members of civil society 
who employ a range of strategies in an effort to have their voices and views heard by 
policymakers in the US and Canada. 
Indeed, Young (1999; 2000) acknowledges that relations between governments and 
voluntary sector organisations are not necessarily limited to service provision alone. Young 
(2000, 151) argues that government-voluntary sector relations can also take on an “adversarial” 
character when voluntary sector organisations press governments to enact policy changes. 
Young does not conceptualise this as a static or unidirectional process, but instead, as a 
dynamic process in which governments may regulate the behaviour of advocacy organisations 
but also potentially collaborate with them in pursuit of a common goal. Similarly, Seibel (1990, 
46) has also encouraged scholars to move beyond the conceptualisation of voluntary sector 
organisations as service providers and to acknowledge that these groups can also serve as 
“important factors of social and political coordination.” 
The broader structure of interest representation in the US and Canada and the particular 
characteristics of the resettlement policymaking process in these countries also condition the 
impact of advocacy efforts. However, the literature on voluntary sector advocacy on 
resettlement to the US and Canada was underdeveloped at the time of research and, as with the 
literature on domestic responsibility sharing, few scholars have deliberately sought to analyse 
the advocacy efforts of voluntary sector organisations in resettlement. Furthermore, though 
many ethnic communities have formed voluntary sector organisations and could potentially 
engage in advocacy on resettlement issues, few scholars have explored this avenue—
potentially due in part to fundamental challenges in identifying and classifying what constitutes 
an ‘ethnic community-based organisation’ (e.g. Gleeson and Bloemraad 2012). Nevertheless, 
the potential of voluntary sector organisations to shape resettlement admissions policies 
through advocacy creates a clear rationale for exploring this potential relationship in the context 
of the US and Canada. 
Overall, Martin (2005, 2) makes the point that “Refugee admissions cannot be based 
solely on any single-factored analysis.” However, given the limitations of the existing literature 
outlined above and the longstanding neglect of the potential influence of domestic factors, this 
thesis suggests that internal factors such as the extensive mechanisms for responsibility sharing 
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found in the US and Canada could offer complementary insights into the question of why these 
countries have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. On that basis, 
section 1.5 describes the research design employed in this thesis and addresses key issues 
related to epistemology, ontology, methods, and ethics. 
1.3 Research Design 
To better understand the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the author conducted two qualitative case 
studies of resettlement admissions. This section discusses how the research was designed, 
including the ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations of the study. In 
addition, the author presents the methods used and sets out the rationale for selecting the US 
and Canada as case studies. The section concludes with a discussion of the procedures used to 
ensure reliability and validity. 
1.3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Framework 
From an ontological perspective, the research presented in this thesis is informed by 
relativism, which is more of a mixture of “loosely interconnected doctrines” than a cohesive 
ontological stance (Baghramian 2010, 31-36). The contemporary approach to relativism is 
grounded in the ideas of Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche (Baghramian 2010, 39). Kant introduced 
the idea that individuals cannot see the ‘true’ nature of the world as space and time mediate 
their experiences, and this perspective contributed to the relativist argument that individuals 
should not privilege “one conception of truth, rationality, or knowledge” as there may be 
multiple explanations for a given belief or phenomenon (Baghramian 2010, 40-42). 
Furthermore, the Hegelian emphasis on historicism influenced the relativist argument that 
attitudes and other perspectives must be examined in their proper historical context 
(Baghramian 2010, 43-44). However, Nietzsche has exerted perhaps the greatest influence on 
contemporary relativism through his rejection of absolute truth, stating: “The world with which 
we are concerned is false, that is it is not a fact but a fable and approximation on the basis of a 
meagre sum of observations; it is ‘in flux’ a something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood 
always changing but never getting near the truth: for—there is no ‘truth’ (Nietzsche 1968, 
subsection 616).” This contention has influenced postmodern relativists like Foucault, who 
claims that every society has its own “truth and moral imperatives” which change according to 
the historical and political context (Baghramian 2010, 46). 
The author adopts a subjectivist epistemological stance since interviewees in the US 
and Canada may have diverse perspectives on the perceived motivations for resettlement and 
its benefits, the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector relations, the potential 
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relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and the 
potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. This 
approach holds that individual experiences, interpretations, perceptions, ethical principles, and 
material and social conditions influence their worldview (Demirdirek 2010, 904; Ratner 2008, 
839-41). Though similar historical and social constructs can lead to subjectivities that are 
remarkably alike, subjectivism argues that ‘reality’ is unknowable and that any ‘truths’ that 
may emerge are “local truths” shaped by the subject in question (Demirdirek 2010, 904; Ratner 
2008, 841). 
These ontological and epistemological perspectives have influenced this thesis in 
several ways: first, as noted in section 1.4, the author acknowledges that there may be multiple 
potential explanations for why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies. Nevertheless, the author endeavours to complement extant 
explanations by conducting an inductive exploration of the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector 
organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Second, 
given that relativism and subjectivism both accord great importance to historical context, the 
author has endeavoured to provide rich background information on the history of resettlement, 
government-voluntary sector relations, and advocacy in the US and Canada to help 
contextualise the analysis. This is complemented by a discussion of the political context 
surrounding the provision of this durable solution in these two countries. Furthermore, since 
the individual experiences and subjective perceptions of each interviewee may have influenced 
their responses, biographical information on each respondent is provided in the appendix to 
add some perspective to their comments. Finally, though the author conducts a comparative 
analysis of the findings in chapter six, the author does not claim that the findings in one case 
study can inherently be generalised to other cases. 
The ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis have also informed the 
decision to adopt an idiosyncratic approach to the use of terminology on what some refer to as 
the ‘voluntary sector.’ This decision is not unusual in the context of the academic literature in 
this area, as there is no scholarly consensus on how to refer to organisations that are neither 
part of the government nor for-profit, and the use of terms varies according to discipline and 
national context (Hall and Banting 2000, 4-5). Indeed, Steinberg and Gray (1993, 298) 
challenge the presumption that universal taxonomies should exist in this sector, and argue that 
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“There is no self-evident reason that the same definition should be applied in different countries 
with different traditions.”17 
In the case of the US and Canada, the analysis presented in chapters two through five 
indicates that these countries use different terms despite their similar histories of immigration, 
the development and evolution of government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement, 
and the structure of interest representation. In the academic scholarship on the US and Canada, 
scholars often use the terms ‘voluntary sector’ and ‘voluntary sector organisations.’ However, 
resettlement organisations in the US refer to themselves as ‘voluntary agencies’ or, more 
colloquially, as ‘volags.’ In Canada, the federal government and the organisations that 
implement resettlement use more functional and officious titles such as ‘Service Provider 
Organizations,’ ‘Sponsorship Agreement Holders,’ and ‘Private Sponsors,’ though they 
commonly abbreviate the former two titles as ‘SPOs’ and ‘SAHs.’ In keeping with the relativist 
and subjectivist perspectives embedded in this thesis, the author strives to use these distinctive 
terms when discussing the particular groups involved in resettlement to the US and Canada. 
However, the author also incorporates the terms ‘voluntary sector’ and ‘voluntary sector 
organisations’ when discussing the literature and when referring to these organisations in a 
more general, less sector- or country-specific manner. 
Finally, the epistemological and ontological frameworks that form the foundations of 
this thesis have informed the choice to adopt an inductive approach to the analysis. Inductive 
research begins with observations about a given phenomenon and uses these observations to 
develop explanations for the phenomenon in question (Chambliss and Schutt 23-24). These 
explanations can potentially generate novel “insights” and hypotheses to test through 
subsequent deductive research (Chambliss and Schutt, 23-24).  
In the case of the present study, the author seeks to generate insights about the potential 
relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with 
voluntary sector organisations and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector 
advocacy through an interpretivist approach. Given the epistemological and ontological frames 
used in this thesis, the goal of employing an interpretivist approach is to gain a meaningful 
understanding of the views articulated by the interviewees by trying to “make sense” of their 
views in relation to the broader context surrounding government-voluntary sector relations, 
advocacy, and resettlement in the US and Canada—in other words, to obtain a meaningful 
understanding of their views in their particular context. 
                                                 
17 For a useful overview and critical analysis of different terms, see Morris (2000, 25-43). 
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1.3.2 Methodology 
The ontological and epistemological frameworks that ground this thesis have informed 
the decision to conduct two qualitative case studies to better understand the potential reasons 
why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. 
Yin (2014, 17 original emphasis) argues that this methodological approach can “excel in 
accommodating a relativist perspective” because it enables researchers to recognise that there 
are “multiple realities having multiple meanings […].” Demidirek (2010, 904) adds that this 
approach is also congruent with subjectivism and asserts that case studies are a “source of 
methodological strength and reflexivity and contributes to the building of theory itself.” Since 
this thesis adopts an inductive approach that endeavours to propose rather than test theories, 
the case study is a suitable methodological choice. Nevertheless, given the inductive approach 
utilised in this thesis, some prospective hypotheses are suggested in the conclusion in chapter 
six. 
That said, the use of case studies as a methodological approach is not uncontested in 
academia. Indeed, Gerring (2007, 5-8) acknowledges that there is a “paradox” between how 
some scholars perceive case studies and actual practice since some academics doubt the 
strength of inference, the level of impartiality, and the degree of external validity that case 
studies offer (Flyvbjerg 2011, 302). This paradox is linked to the “dichotomization of research 
methods” that imposes rigid divisions between qualitative and quantitative methodologies and 
between experimental, observational, and small-n and large-n research designs (Gerring 2007, 
10-12). 
In an effort to balance the desire to offer deep insight about the potential reasons why 
the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies with 
the need for methodological rigour, this thesis adopts a small-n approach through an 
exploration of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic 
responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement 
admissions and voluntary sector advocacy in the US and Canada. To select the case studies, 
the author first analysed the involvement of voluntary sector organisations in 22 resettlement 
countries in Europe, North America, and Oceania. In particular, the author examined the 
involvement of these organisations in four phases of the resettlement process:  
1) In the identification and selection of refugees for resettlement, and in the 
delivery of pre-departure activities (including the dissemination of 
information);  
2) In the reception of refugees in their country of resettlement; 
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3) In the provision of post-arrival orientation programmes; and,  
4) In the delivery of a broad range of integration services.18  
The author then constructed a simple scoring mechanism and assigned each country 
one point for every area in which they involved voluntary sector organisations in resettlement, 
up to a maximum of 12 points. The author then added the scores for each country and ranked 
them from highest to lowest. Finally, the author eliminated countries that had resettled refugees 
on an ad hoc basis or through a pilot programme, as their limited involvement in resettlement 
could make it difficult to generate theories about the prospective relationship between 
resettlement admissions, domestic responsibility sharing, and voluntary sector advocacy. The 
author excluded countries that recently adopted resettlement programmes for the same reason. 
The comparative analysis demonstrated that at the time this thesis was originally 
submitted in September 2015, both the US and Canada had developed the most extensive 
mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing. Since 1980, the US has resettled refugees 
through the Resettlement Admissions Program, which it implements through a complex 
institutional structure based on partnerships between the federal and state governments and 
organisations known as ‘voluntary agencies’ or ‘volags.’ These organisations are involved in 
most aspects of resettlement, from offering input on populations in need of resettlement and 
processing applications to delivering pre-departure cultural orientation programmes and post-
arrival reception, orientation, and integration services (Cultural Orientation Resource Center 
2015, see section entitled ‘Who Provides Overseas CO?’; US Department of State, US 
Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 
2, 7, and 18-20). 
The US is a compelling case study due to the purported relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing. In their analysis of the 
involvement of faith-based resettlement agencies in the US, Eby et al. (2011, 587) argue that 
voluntary agencies are “powerful advocates” and that “the United States has become the 
leading refugee resettlement country in the world particularly because of the long-standing 
active engagement and support of communities of faith in refugee resettlement and local 
integration.” Though their analysis is limited to the involvement and advocacy efforts of 
Church World Service, their arguments and analysis raise questions about whether government 
officials and other voluntary agencies have similar perceptions, and provides a clear rationale 
for analysing the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic 
                                                 
18 For further details on the involvement of voluntary sector organisations, please refer to appendix Table 10. 
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responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies and between resettlement admissions and 
voluntary agency advocacy in greater depth. 
In Canada, domestic responsibility sharing is a core component of its four resettlement 
programmes. In the case of the PSR programme—the primary focus of chapters four and five—
the scheme was deliberately created in order to enhance resettlement admissions through the 
involvement of voluntary sector organisations and members of civil society (Canadian Council 
for Refugees 2014, 1; Tait 1978, 3). Since 1979, these groups have assumed responsibility for 
the identification of refugees in need of resettlement, and they offer numerous post-arrival 
services, including airport reception, short-term accommodation, and orientation and 
integration services, among other duties (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 9-10). 
However, academics, practitioners, and advocacy groups have long expressed concern 
that the programme serves more as a vehicle for ‘burden shifting’ than for ‘burden sharing,’ 
and certain recent policy and programme changes have reinforced these concerns (Canadian 
Council for Refugees 1996, para. 1 to 4 of 4; Canadian Council for Refugees 2014, 1; Dirks 
1984, 299; Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 184-85). This point of contention makes Canada an 
appealing case study and provides a clear rationale for exploring the potential contemporary 
relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the 
PSR programme. In addition, the active involvement of some private sponsors and the 
Canadian Council for Refugees in advocacy on resettlement issues supports the decision to 
explore the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and advocacy. 
In addition to the US and Canada, the analysis of resettlement programmes indicated 
that Australia has a long history of government-voluntary sector partnerships in their 
“offshore” resettlement programme (UNHCR 2018, 2). Though the Australian government 
leads the provision of pre-departure and post-arrival services for most resettled refugees, the 
Special Humanitarian Program enables individuals and community organisations to “propose” 
the resettlement of individuals who are not recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol but who have suffered 
a “gross violation of their human rights” in their respective countries of origin (Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection 2017, 10 and 14). The Program was established in 1981 
and proposers must meet the resettled individuals at the airport upon arrival, organise 
permanent accommodation, and facilitate their orientation to life in Australia (Department of 
Home Affairs 2018, see section entitled ‘Proposer Obligations’; Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection 2017, 14). However, the Australian government funds the provision of 
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social assistance and other forms of orientation and integration support (Department of Home 
Affairs 2018, see section entitled ‘Proposer Obligations’). 
In 2013, when research for this thesis was already well underway, the Australian 
government introduced the Community Proposal Pilot to enable individuals and community 
groups to identify and sponsor refugees for resettlement (Refugee Council of Australia 2015, 
3). The pilot programme was modelled on the Canadian PSR programme and ran until 2017, 
when the government introduced the Community Support Program (Hoang 2017, para. 1, 5, 
and 13 of 19).19 Since 2017, the Community Support Program has enabled individuals, groups, 
and businesses to propose up to 1,000 refugees for resettlement, under the umbrella of an 
Approved Proposing Organisation (UNHCR 2018, 3). In contrast to the Special Humanitarian 
Program, the Community Support Program mandates that proposers be responsible for the full 
costs of resettlement, including the application fee, medical examinations, travel, 
accommodation, and financial support for 12 months (UNHCR 2018, 11-12). Though the 
Australian government funds the provision of health care and social security for all resettled 
refugees (Department of Human Services 2018, para. 3 of 5), proposers also assume 
responsibility for assisting resettled refugees with their orientation and integration into 
Australian society, including assistance in finding employment (UNHCR 2018, 11-12). 
This brief overview indicates that there are many parallels between the design of 
resettlement programmes in the US, Canada, and Australia. Furthermore, these three countries 
share similar histories of immigration and similar structures of interest representation. In 
addition, as demonstrated in section 1.1, Australia was also among the largest contributors to 
resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016. For these reasons, it 
could make for an interesting and insightful case study that would complement the analysis of 
the US and Canada. 
However, in the interest of transparency, it should be noted that the author originally 
designed the present study as an analysis of resettlement admissions, domestic responsibility 
sharing, and voluntary sector advocacy in North America and Europe. It is for this reason that 
Australia was not selected as a case study. To achieve this, the author conducted extensive 
research on resettlement in Denmark and the United Kingdom—two countries that resettle 
fewer refugees and also have comparatively fewer mechanisms for domestic responsibility 
sharing with voluntary sector organisations. To support the discussion, the author interviewed 
                                                 
19 This initiative is sometimes called the Community Support Program and at other times it is called the 
Community Support Programme. 
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eight individuals, including an official from the Danish Immigration Service 
(Udlændingestyrelsen), four representatives from the Danish Refugee Council (Dansk 
Flygtningehjælp) (one of whom had formerly held a senior position in the Danish Immigration 
Service), two former representatives from the Danish Refugee Council, and a Scandinavian 
official with knowledge of the Danish case in December 2014. In the United Kingdom, the 
author met with a senior official for the Home Office, officials from two of the three local 
authorities that welcomed refugees resettled through the Gateway Protection Programme at the 
time, and four representatives from the two of the three voluntary sector organisations involved 
in the implementation of the Gateway Protection Programme in December 2014. In addition, 
the author was invited to conduct an in-person observation of the reception and orientation of 
a family of refugees in the Bolton area in January 2015. Given contemporary efforts by the 
European Union to promote responsibility sharing on resettlement, the author also interviewed 
a representative from the European Commission and three prominent voluntary sector 
organisations in Brussels in November 2014. However, the author was advised to eliminate 
these two cases, and so they do not appear in the current study. Nevertheless, the author wishes 
to express her deepest thanks to the individuals who generously gave their time and shared 
their views to support this aspect of the research. Finally, the author would be pleased to share 
this material with anyone who might be interested, in the hope that it may be useful someday.  
1.3.3 Methods 
To obtain a better understanding of the potential reasons why the US and Canada have 
voluntary adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the author conducted semi-
structured interviews with a total of 33 senior government officials and voluntary sector 
representatives from the US and Canada. Field research began with a series of 15 interviews 
conducted in four cities in the US in April 2013. The author approached most individuals 
directly, but obtaining an interview with a representative from the Department of State proved 
more challenging, and the author only secured a meeting thanks to the assistance of another 
interviewee. 
The author then conducted 18 interviews in three Canadian cities in December 2013. 
To arrange interviews with government officials, the author first contacted a senior official 
known to the author through her previous work as a Policy Analyst at Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (now Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada). The author and 
the official met informally before the author began research for this thesis, and the official later 
agreed to a formal interview and helpfully suggested other officials who might be of assistance. 
Reaching private sponsors was more difficult due to the limited contact information available 
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at that time. In addition to cold-calling Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAHs), the author 
contacted an independent consultant for the UNHCR whom she had met at an academic 
conference. This individual generously volunteered to put the author in contact with private 
sponsors in the Toronto, Ontario area. One of these individuals then offered to solicit interest 
among other private sponsors at a regional meeting, and this yielded several more contacts. 
In both the US and Canada, the majority of interviews took place at government 
headquarters or the office of each voluntary agency or SAH. In one interview in Canada, the 
author was kindly invited to meet the interviewee at their home. In another Canadian interview, 
the author and the interviewee spoke over the telephone due to circumstances beyond their 
control. The author took audio recordings of most interviews and supplemented these 
recordings with handwritten notes. The author did not record three interviews out of respect 
for their personal preferences and took handwritten notes instead.  
The author adopted a semi-structured approach to the interviews by posing a 
combination of open and closed questions. The process of formulating the interview questions 
was an iterative one; though the author asked all respondents about the perceived motivations 
for resettlement and its benefits and about the division of responsibilities between the 
government and voluntary agencies or private sponsors, interviewees in the US also expressed 
a keen and unprompted desire to discuss their advocacy efforts on resettlement. This prompted 
the author to include questions about advocacy in subsequent interviews in both the US and in 
Canada. Following the interviews, the author personally transcribed the discussions but lost the 
bulk of the transcripts in a burglary in July 2014. Nevertheless, the author meticulously 
reviewed the original audio files and notes to ensure that the material—including direct 
quotes—is accurate and correctly represents the views of the respondents. 
Though some academics contend that interpretivist research is “undisciplined (Lewis 
2009, 5)” in comparison to quantitative methods, the author has taken deliberate steps to 
attempt to ensure the quality of the research presented in this thesis. Guba and Lincoln (1985, 
294-301; 1989, 245-50) have developed benchmarks to assist in evaluating the ‘quality’ of 
constructivist research, including credibility, transferability, dependability, and authenticity. 
These standards are intended to be comparable to the touchstones of internal and external 
validity, reliability, and objectivity used in other research paradigms (Seale 1999, 45). The 
researcher and the participants construct credibility through the development of a consensus 
between them (Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba 2011, 114). To that end, the author has attempted 
to ensure the credibility of the analysis through the member check method. Guba and Lincoln 
(1985, 236) explain that, in this approach, the researcher shares the provisional analysis with 
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participants so that they can scrutinise the report. Guba and Lincoln (1985, 314) argue that this 
tool is the “most crucial technique for establishing credibility” in interpretivist research. 
Following Cho and Trent (2006, 321-24), the author adopted a transactional approach (that is, 
interactive as opposed to emancipatory) to the member check to achieve a “relatively higher 
level of accuracy and consensus” on the final product. 
In particular, the author asked interviewees to consider whether she had accurately 
represented their views, whether there were any factual errors, or whether the individual had 
any comments about the interpretation or wanted to add anything that they had not already had 
the opportunity to discuss. Given the close relationships between government and voluntary 
sector organisations in resettlement to the US and Canada, the author protected the privacy of 
other respondents during the member check process by assigning each interviewee a generic 
identifier and redacting long quotes to minimise the risk of revealing the identity of the speaker 
at that stage. The member check enabled respondents to clarify their previous statements and 
to correct minor factual errors made by the author. Though one Canadian official indicated that 
the author had initially misinterpreted their perceptions on the nature of relations between the 
government and private sponsors (Deans 2015), none of the other interviewees raised any 
concerns regarding the interpretation. 
However, the use of member checking does not automatically guarantee the validity of 
the analysis (Seale 1999, 66). Therefore, the author also endeavours to enrich the discussion 
by attempting to triangulate and interpret the interview material in relation to the extant 
literature. Seale (1999, 61) argues that triangulation can “enhance the credibility of a research 
account by providing an additional way of generating evidence in support of key claims.” The 
use of triangulation is consistent with other theses on migration that also use qualitative case 
studies (e.g. Boucher 2011). 
 Despite these steps, the author acknowledges that small studies nevertheless have 
certain limitations. In particular, the nature of small-n research means that such studies 
generally have limited external validity (Gerring 2007, 43). Though Guba and Lincoln (1985, 
316) note that academics cannot assess the external validity of ‘naturalistic’ research in the 
same way as in quantitative studies, scholars can offer thick description to enable others to 
ascertain if they can transfer the findings to other cases. Therefore, the author attempts to offer 
rich descriptions of the history and structure of resettlement programmes, government-
voluntary sector relations, and advocacy in the US and Canada. In addition, the author 
endeavours to provide a rich description of the political context surrounding resettlement in 
these two countries, in the hope that it may facilitate future comparative research efforts. 
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That said, LeCompte and Goetz (1982, 35) argue that assuring reliability is one of the 
most difficult tasks confronting qualitative researchers. Though this thesis adopts a subjectivist 
epistemological perspective, the author has nevertheless attempted to ensure that the research 
is dependable by including a detailed and transparent account of the methods used in this thesis 
so that other academics who adopt a more positivist stance can potentially replicate the research 
(Guba and Lincoln 1985, 316-18; Seale 1999, 157-58).  
Finally, the author aims to offer an ‘authentic’ exploration of resettlement admissions 
by demonstrating fairness in the analysis. Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba (2011, 122) explain that 
fairness is “a quality of balance; that is, all stakeholder views, perspectives, values, claims, 
concerns and voices should be apparent in the text,” and they warn that omitting contradictory 
views biases the narrative. In addition, Yin (2014, 36) highlights the importance of analysing 
alternative explanations. Therefore, the author offers both an analysis of rival explanations for 
resettlement admissions (namely cultural theories and foreign policy) and endeavours to 
include a broad range of views. In particular, the author strives to call attention to instances 
where there is a lack of consensus among interviewees and where respondents expressed 
contradictory views. 
1.3.4 Ethics 
Qualitative research often raises questions about the respect for ethics—especially 
when the author uses observational or participatory methods. Hesse-Biber (2010, 58-59) 
identifies a number of questions that researchers should ask themselves before and during the 
research process, such as how to communicate the purpose of the research to participants, how 
to protect their privacy and “emotional well-being” throughout the study, how to obtain 
informed consent, and how the research material will be stored and disseminated. Drawing on 
Hesse-Biber, the author distributed an informed consent sheet to each interviewee. Participants 
were invited to read the document and to ask any questions before giving their consent. The 
document discussed how information gleaned from the interviews would be recorded, stored, 
and disseminated. The sheet offered participants the opportunity to raise concerns related to 
confidentiality, and every effort was made to accommodate and respect these concerns. 
Notably, only one interviewee requested to remain anonymous, though the choice was made 
available to all. Furthermore, the author advised respondents that they could refuse to answer 
any questions or withdraw from the interview at any time without penalty. Notably, the form 
also advised interviewees that the author had been employed at Citizenship and Immigration 
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Canada and that the department had funded her research.20 Following the ethics policy 
developed by the London School of Economics and Political Science (2014, 1-6), the author 
completed the School’s ethics checklist but did not identify any issues that required review by 
the Research Ethics Committee. 
1.4 Originality and Expected Contributions 
This thesis makes three principal contributions to the literature: first, though some scholars 
have explored the nature of refugee protection as a public good, and particularly, as an impure 
public good, no scholar has yet developed a conceptualisation of resettlement as a public good. 
Though this thesis adopts an exploratory approach, it contributes to the literature by 
considering how the perceived motivations for resettlement and the benefits of providing this 
durable solution could be seen as an impure public good in a more concrete way than in the 
existing scholarship, and incorporates qualitative interviews into the analysis. In particular, the 
author suggests that resettlement could be an impure public good that generates joint products 
in the form of private human security benefits for refugees and warm glow, reputational, and 
cultural benefits for receiving countries. In doing so, this thesis deepens the scholarship on 
refugee protection as a public good and extends it to the sphere of cultural public goods—a 
potential benefit that has not been explored in this aspect of the literature to date. Second, this 
thesis adds to our understanding of the structure of government-voluntary sector relations in 
resettlement. Though there is a burgeoning scholarship in this area, especially in the US, no 
scholar has attempted to analyse the structure of government-voluntary sector relations in 
resettlement. Furthermore, this thesis adopts the novel approach of analysing whether and how 
resettlement admissions have been enhanced through domestic responsibility sharing with 
voluntary sector organisations—an issue that has not been explored in the literature to date and 
which could complement existing explanations. Finally, the thesis takes the original approach 
of examining the relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector 
advocacy—an area which is also unexplored in the literature to date despite the potentially 
‘adversarial’ nature of relations and the agency that voluntary sector organisations can exert. 
In these ways, this thesis endeavours to complement existing explanations and shed light on 
why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies.  
                                                 
20 The author was employed as a Policy and Programs Analyst at Citizenship and Immigration Canada (now 
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada) between 2008 and 2010, when she took academic leave. 
Though the department funded the author’s tuition between 2010 and 2013, officials have had no input on any 
aspect of the research, and this thesis does not reflect the views of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship 
Canada or the Government of Canada. 
Page 51 of 361 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: chapter two explores resettlement 
admissions in the US. The chapter first describes the history of resettlement to the US, then 
presents data on the size and composition of resettlement flows. A brief narrative account of 
the current structure of resettlement programmes in the US follows this discussion. This 
descriptive background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout the 
remainder of the chapter, in which the author explores the perceived motivations for 
resettlement and its benefits, the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector relations, 
and perceptions on the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic 
responsibility sharing through interviews with senior government officials and voluntary 
agency representatives. The author then interprets these views in relation to the extant 
literature. Chapter three explores resettlement advocacy in the US. The chapter first describes 
the history of resettlement advocacy in the US, before exploring the perceived relationship 
between resettlement admissions and advocacy through interviews with senior government 
officials and voluntary agency representatives. Once again, the author endeavours to interpret 
the views articulated by interviewees in relation to the existing literature, and also examines 
the recent political context on resettlement in the US. 
The thesis then turns its attention to resettlement in Canada. Chapter four first describes 
the history of resettlement to Canada, then presents data on the size and composition of 
resettlement flows. A brief narrative account of the current structure of resettlement 
programmes in Canada follows this discussion. This descriptive background sets the stage for 
the analytical approach adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter, in which the author 
explores the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, the perceived nature of 
relations between the government and private sponsors, and perceptions on the potential 
relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through 
interviews with senior government officials and private sponsors. The author then interprets 
these views in relation to the extant literature. Chapter five explores resettlement advocacy in 
Canada. The chapter first describes the history of resettlement advocacy in Canada, before 
exploring the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and advocacy through 
interviews with senior government officials and private sponsors. In keeping with the research 
design, the author seeks to interpret the views of interviewees in relation to the existing 
literature, and also explores the recent political context surrounding resettlement in Canada.  
Finally, chapter six summarises the research presented in this thesis and discusses 
certain similarities and differences between perceptions on the motivations and benefits of 
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resettlement, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, the potential relationship 
between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector 
organisations, and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary 
sector advocacy in the US and Canada. The chapter then identifies some similarities and 
differences between the US and Canadian cases, and discusses some potential implications for 
the voluntary sector and the international refugee regime. The chapter concludes by proposing 
some potential hypotheses and other issues for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing in the United 
States 
2.1 Introduction 
 Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning contributions to 
resettlement and the structure of resettlement programmes. Included among those observations 
were figures demonstrating that the US was the largest contributor to resettlement in absolute 
terms between 1980 and 2016, and was also among the largest contributors to resettlement in 
relative terms during this same period. Chapter one also observed that, in addition to the 
considerable cross-national differences in resettlement contributions among members of the 
international community, there are notable differences in how these countries structure their 
resettlement programmes. Finally, chapter one highlighted the need to explore the potential 
relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with 
voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector 
advocacy given the unprecedented scale of human displacement at present, the persistent gap 
between resettlement needs and the number of available places, and the limitations of the 
predominantly state-centric qualitative and quantitative research in this area. 
 This chapter attempts to better understand why the US has voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies. The chapter begins descriptively by offering an overview of 
the history of refugee resettlement in the US in section 2.2. The chapter then presents data on 
the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US in section 2.3, to offer a picture of the 
size and nature of its contribution to resettlement. These empirical observations indicate that, 
though the US is the largest absolute contributor to resettlement, the size and composition of 
resettlement flows has fluctuated over time. This account is followed by a brief narrative 
account of the current structure of the Resettlement Admissions and the Reception and 
Placement programmes in section 2.4—the two main avenues through which the federal 
government, state governments, and voluntary agencies collaborate in the resettlement of 
refugees to the US.  
This descriptive background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted 
throughout the remainder of the chapter. Section 2.5 presents the views of senior government 
officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived motivations for resettling 
refugees in the US and its benefits and, in accordance with the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of this thesis, attempts to interpret these perceptions in relation to the available 
literature. Though the academic literature indicates that governments may have a range of 
reasons for granting protection, as discussed in chapter one, one could interpret the particular 
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views articulated by the government officials and voluntary agency representatives as 
consistent with the scholarship on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the 
economic literature on public goods more generally. Section 2.6 presents their views on the 
perceived nature of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement, and endeavours to 
interpret these perceptions in relation to the extant literature. One could interpret their views 
could be interpreted as consistent with the dominant conceptual frameworks on government-
voluntary sector relations in the US. Furthermore, certain comments could align with academic 
work on the potential perils of government-voluntary sector partnerships. Section 2.7 presents 
the views of government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived 
relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and seeks to 
interpret these perceptions in relation to the existing literature and the political context 
surrounding resettlement in the US. The perception among most interviewees that domestic 
responsibility sharing has enhanced resettlement admissions could be interpreted as consistent 
with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public 
goods and services. However, though voluntary agencies have played an important historical 
and contemporary role in resettlement, the historical literature on resettlement to the US 
demonstrates that admissions have also been influenced by political vagaries. Despite the 
tradition of broad, bipartisan support for resettlement, the election of Republican President 
Donald Trump could indicate increasing political polarisation and discord on resettlement that 
may impact resettlement admissions in the future. Section 2.8 concludes with a summary. 
Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the 
discussion and analysis in this chapter. Due to resource constraints at the time, the author did 
not approach any local affiliates of the nine voluntary agencies interviewed as part of this thesis. 
Therefore, the analysis reflects the views of federal government officials and representatives 
from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception 
and Placement programmes. However, given that some respondents highlighted the local 
character of resettlement (Kekic 2013; Robinson 2013), this could offer a worthwhile avenue 
for future research. 
2.2 History of Resettlement in the United States 
The US has a long history of offering refugee protection. This section offers an 
overview of the history of refugee resettlement to the US, to enrich the discussion and analysis 
that follows in the remainder of this chapter. In general, the literature indicates that the US 
historically adopted an ad hoc approach to resettlement and its attitude towards refugees has 
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wavered between reticence and welcome (Brown and Scribner 2014, 102; Haines 2010, 1; 
Hutchinson 1981, 521; Zucker 1983, 172).  
In the nineteenth century, the US government demonstrated generosity towards certain 
groups of refugees. In particular, the government welcomed German liberals and Polish exiles 
who had been forced to flee due to political oppression and their involvement in failed 
independence movements, respectively (Hutchinson 1981, 522). In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the US government also facilitated the admission of persons in need 
of protection from religious and political persecution by exempting them from existing 
financial and literacy requirements (Hutchinson 1981, 523-24).  
The US also adopted generous resettlement admissions policies for certain groups of 
refugees in the early twentieth century. Following the end of World War I, the government 
adopted liberal admissions policies for those who had been displaced by the conflict and 
established emergency legislation to facilitate the resettlement of particular groups including 
Armenian refugees (Hutchinson 1981, 525-28). However, racism and xenophobia also gained 
ground during this period and the Republican President Calvin Coolidge institutionalised these 
attitudes through the Immigration Act of 1924. This legislation (also known as the Johnson-
Reed Act) barred all immigrants from Asia and established a system of quotas to limit 
immigration from other countries and regions to two per cent of the total number of immigrants 
who were in the US at the time of the 1890 census (Office of the Historian no date, para. 1 of 
8). President Coolidge stated at the time that “America must remain American,” and the 
legislation had a profound impact on immigration from Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe 
(Fisher 2017, para. 8 of 23). 
In this context, it is unsurprising that the US adopted an illiberal approach to the 
admission of Jewish refugees. Though approximately 85,000 Jewish refugees succeeded in 
reaching the US following the German annexation of Austria in March 1938 and the events of 
the Kristallnacht in November of that same year (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date A, 
para. 5 of 13), the US maintained a miserly attitude towards these refugees. In February 1939, 
the Democratic Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Republican Representative Edith Rogers 
introduced a bipartisan bill to admit up to 20,000 (predominantly Jewish) children who had 
fled Germany (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date B, para. 1 and 10 of 22). However, 
the Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to support the bill due in part to the 
popularity of anti-Semitic views at the time, concern that such a decision would lead to an 
“army of people who speak foreign languages” to seek entry into the US, and concerns 
regarding the scale of domestic unemployment at that time (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, xiv).  
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The US persisted in its efforts to restrict the admission of Jewish refugees throughout 
the spring and early summer of 1939. Notably, the US refused to allow approximately 900 
Jewish passengers from the infamous S.S. St. Louis to disembark (US Holocaust Memorial 
Museum no date A, para. 6 of 13).21 Cuba refused the passengers entry (Abella and Troper 
1979, 178), and the ship was forced to proceed onwards to the US in the hopes that it would 
grant the passengers refuge. Following refusals from the governments of both the US and 
Canada, the ship was obliged to return to Europe, and 254 of its passengers were ultimately 
killed in the Holocaust (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date A, para. 6 of 13). 
President Roosevelt appeared to have a change of heart in the summer of 1939 and 
invited other members of the international community to a conference in Evian, France in July 
of that year. Though the US encouraged other governments to make commitments towards 
resolving the crisis, its response was muted. Indeed, the US merely committed to assisting 
Jewish refugees by agreeing to “fill its entire German-Austrian quota of 27,730” for that year 
(Abella and Troper 1979, 195). This approach sent a powerful signal to other governments—
including the Nazi government in Germany—that most of the world had limited interest in 
assisting Jewish refugees (Abella and Troper 1979, 196). 
However, the end of World War II precipitated an important change in the approach of 
the US towards persons in need of protection. The massive influx of displaced persons fleeing 
to West Germany and the unique needs of those who had survived the Holocaust placed 
considerable pressure on the Allied and American forces that occupied West Germany 
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 1-2). In response to this particular situation and out of a 
humanitarian desire to assist the survivors who found themselves in dire straits, President 
Roosevelt and his successor, the Democratic President Harry S. Truman, launched a plan to 
“rescue” the displaced—though ostensibly on a “temporary” basis (Loescher and Scanlan 
1986, 4). President Truman authorised officials to allocate unused quota places to Jewish 
refugees and other displaced persons. This measure enabled approximately 40,000 displaced 
persons (of whom approximately 28,000 were Jewish) to obtain visas to immigrate to the US 
between the spring of 1946 through the summer of 1948 (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 6). 
Though this approach succeeded in expediting the resettlement of those in need of 
protection, the measure soon led to an “untenable” situation as tens of thousands of Jews, 
Eastern Europeans, and German exiles flowed into West Germany (Loescher and Scanlan 
                                                 
21 There appears to be no consensus on the exact number of passengers aboard the S.S. St. Louis; some sources 
indicate that 907 passengers were aboard, others suggest there were 908 or 930 passengers, and still others state 
that 937 passengers were on the ship. 
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1986, 6-8). In response, the American Council on Judaism and the American Jewish Committee 
lobbied for the creation of a special visa programme to facilitate the resettlement of up to 
100,000 Jewish refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 9). Rather than focus on the protection 
needs of Jewish refugees, the American Council on Judaism and the American Jewish 
Committee emphasised the need to assist the displaced as a whole and developed a campaign 
which emphasised their employment skills and integration potential (Loescher and Scanlan 
1986, 11). Though the campaign encountered persistent anti-Semitic attitudes and opposition 
from unions, these advocacy efforts attracted the support of some Congressmen who believed 
the US had “ideological” obligation to be “champions of freedom (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 
11-19).” Their campaign proved partially successful insofar as it influenced the creation of the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 which authorised the admission of up to 202,000 European 
refugees—places which were mortgaged on future annual quotas (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 
19). Subsequent amendments eliminated provisions that privileged the admission of displaced 
persons from Baltic countries and individuals with agricultural skills and extended the number 
of places to 351,000 (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 20). 
Though the number of displaced persons gradually declined, the US soon had another 
opportunity to demonstrate generosity towards refugees. Following the uprisings in Hungary 
in 1956, the government under Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower quickly 
announced the provision of humanitarian assistance and launched a large-scale resettlement 
programme to resettle approximately 30,000 Hungarians to the US in just three months (Pastor 
2016, 199-200).22 Though the revolution failed, President Eisenhower was keen to capitalise 
on reports of Soviet brutality during the revolution as a means of embarrassing the communist 
regime in Moscow (Pastor 2016, 199). President Eisenhower may have also been motivated by 
a sense of responsibility, as agents trained by the Central Intelligence Agency helped ‘instigate’ 
the revolution, and the US also broadcast messages of support to Hungarian listeners through 
Radio Free Europe (Steinbock 2003, 978). Whatever the cause, this generous response to the 
crisis contributed to an emotive response from many members of the American public—the 
renowned Time magazine even awarded its ‘Man of the Year’ title to the “Hungarian Freedom 
Fighter (Pastor 2016, 199).” In total, the US resettled 38,121 Hungarian refugees (Loescher 
and Scanlan 1986, 52). 
Despite adopting a liberal approach towards the resettlement of Hungarian refugees, 
the events of 1956 had an important and unintended impact on refugee admissions policies in 
                                                 
22 In total, the US resettled 38,121 Hungarian refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 52). 
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the US. In particular, the failure of the revolution discouraged the US from continuing to 
promote uprisings as a means of ‘liberating’ European countries still under Soviet control 
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 50). This decision was primarily attributed to the unwillingness 
of President Eisenhower to commit additional military resource to such efforts (Loescher and 
Scanlan 1986, 60). Thus, when the USSR repressed the uprising in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
forcing as many as 60,000 Czechoslovakians to flee in search of asylum, the US government 
adopted a far less public approach to offering protection. Indeed, the government chose not to 
create a special admissions programme for Czechoslovakians—though approximately 12,000 
Czechoslovakians succeeded in entering the US as refugees (thanks to the assistance of 
voluntary agencies) or through more mainstream immigration channels (Loescher and Scanlan 
1986, 87). 
However, as the geopolitical and geostrategic situation between the US, the USSR, and 
their respective allies became increasingly tense, resettlement admissions policies often 
contained a “double standard” that benefited some refugees and disadvantaged others 
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 69 and 85). Though the US no longer encouraged individuals 
living in communist regimes to “vote with their feet” in the same explicit manner as it had in 
Hungary (Zucker and Zucker 1996, 89), many members of Congress continued to support an 
ideological approach to the selection of refugees for resettlement which privileged the 
admission of individuals from communist regimes above those living in authoritarian states 
controlled by right-wing governments (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 69). 
Between the adoption of the Immigration Act of 1952 and the Refugee Act of 1980, 
foreign and refugee policies were so enmeshed that legislation defined a ‘refugee’ as someone 
“from a Communist-dominated country or area, or from any country within the general area of 
the Middle East (Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 203(a)(7) (repealed) cited in 
Teitelbaum 1984, 430).” The privileging of the anti-Communist doctrine in refugee protection 
was further reinforced in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which established 
“preference” categories for the admission of a broad range of immigrants, and allocated up to 
six per cent of all immigrant visas to “Refugees from communist countries or communist-
dominated countries or the general area of the Middle East (Centre for Migration Studies 1992, 
168).” 
The ideological orientation of resettlement admissions policies at the time also 
contributed in part to the voluntary establishment of generous admissions policies for Southeast 
Asian refugees. In 1975 alone, the US resettled approximately 135,000 refugees from Vietnam 
(Robinson 1998, 133). The US subsequently scaled back resettlement efforts and resettled an 
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average of approximately 15,000 Southeast Asian refugees per year between 1976 and 1979, 
when the Democratic President Jimmy Carter authorised the resettlement of 168,000 refugees 
from that region over the next fiscal year (Robinson 1998, 133). In total, the US resettled 
1,287,300 refugees from Southeast Asia between 1975 and 1997 (Robinson 1998, appendix 
two).  
This ideological approach partially explains why the US adopted a restrictive approach 
to the treatment of black Haitians fleeing the repression and violence carried out by François 
Duvalier and his associates, and why the US limited the size of its parole programme for 
Chilean refugees fleeing the widespread human rights violations perpetrated by the government 
of Augusto Pinochet (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 69). In a quest to “eradicate Marxism,” the 
US supported a number of right-wing governments in Central America, even when those 
governments “massacred, tortured, and intimidated” their citizens (Zucker and Zucker 1996, 
90). Indeed, the Republican President Ronald Reagan argued that if the US allowed “anti-
American Marxist dictatorships” in Central America to survive, a “tidal wave of refugees” 
could be “swarming into our country seeking a safe haven from Communist repression to our 
south (Reagan 1983, cited in Teitelbaum 1984, 435).”  
However, one cannot attribute the generosity of the US towards Southeast Asian 
refugees to foreign policies alone. Indeed, there was an influential “symbiosis” between 
ideological and humanitarian considerations that—in combination with ardent advocacy 
efforts—contributed to the decision to establish handsome admissions policies for these 
refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 213). The complementarity between political and 
humanitarian considerations also encouraged the government to be lenient in its treatment of 
other groups of refugees, including Ugandans, Nicaraguans, and Iranians (Loescher and 
Scanlan 1986, 213). The influence of both strategic and humanitarian considerations remains 
in evidence in the new millennium as well, as manifested through the creation of special 
resettlement programmes for Afghan and Iraqi personnel but also the important contributions 
made by the US towards the resettlement of Burmese, Bhutanese, and Burundian refugees 
whose limited knowledge of English and employment experience presented a challenge with 
respect to their orientation and integration into life in the US (Bruno 2011, 19). 
One could partially attribute the shift towards humanitarianism to growing frustration 
with the realpolitik approach advocated by Henry Kissinger, who served as both Secretary of 
State and National Security advisor to Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford 
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86). This realpolitik approach resulted in the privileging of 
admissions asylum seekers from Cuba, but the desire to achieve a détente with the USSR meant 
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the government resisted applying a similar approach to the treatment of Jewish refugees from 
the USSR (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86). During this period, both ‘liberal’ and 
‘conservative’ members of Congress became disillusioned with this realpolitik approach, 
which they deemed to be “morally deficient (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86-88).” 
Consequently, Congress adopted several resolutions to pressure the Department of State to 
adopt a more humanitarian approach to the conduct of foreign policy, and it also became more 
engaged in the “framing of refugee admissions (Loescher and Scanland 1986, 86).” Loescher 
and Scanlan (1986) attribute this change to advocacy efforts by human rights, religious, and 
other advocacy groups, who pressed Congress to consider granting protection to individuals 
whose admission “served no clear foreign policy interest” or even those whose admittance “ran 
counter to the prevailing cold war [sic] ideology (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86).” 
Overall, the history of resettlement admissions in the US suggests that the government 
has, at times, adopted a discriminatory and occasionally hypocritical approach to resettlement 
admissions in which it has chosen to privilege the admission of certain groups above others to 
serve its strategic objectives. Conversely, at other times, the US has pursued a far more 
welcoming approach and sought to welcome refugees from a broad range of origins and 
backgrounds, without any apparent ulterior motive except the desire to ‘rescue’ those in 
greatest need of protection. This narrative account could be interpreted as an affirmation of the 
complex and evolving nature of resettlement admissions policies. In that context, the literature 
also suggests that voluntary agencies have been a constant presence in the lives of refugees 
arriving in the US. For this reason, an exploration of the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies is all the 
more salient. 
2.3 Size and Composition of Resettlement Flows 
 This section presents the available data on the size and composition of resettlement 
flows to the US between 1980 and 2017 to enrich the analysis of its resettlement programmes. 
In particular, this section provides figures on the annual resettlement ceiling determined by the 
President, the total number of admissions in each fiscal year, as well as the available 
information on the nationality, age, and gender of refugees resettled to the US. The author also 
presents some data on the resettlement of unaccompanied minors, though the information on 
the flow of these refugees was limited at the time of research. These empirical observations 
indicate that, though the US is the largest absolute contributor to resettlement, the size and 
composition of resettlement flows have fluctuated over time. 
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Chapter one demonstrated that the US resettled the largest absolute number of refugees 
between 1980 and 2016, and was also among the largest relative contributors to this durable 
solution during the same period. However, global comparisons of resettlement contributions 
mask changes in the resettlement ceilings (or quotas) established each year. Therefore, 
appendix Table 11 shows the annual resettlement ceilings between fiscal years 1980 and 2018. 
Table 11 demonstrates that the resettlement ceilings peaked in fiscal year 1980 and there was 
a net decline in the proposed ceilings between 1981 and 2018. However, this decline masks 
changes in the ceilings over time. Though the annual resettlement ceilings declined from 1981 
to 1986, the ceilings grew in the late 1980s and continued to rise until 1992. Table 11 then 
shows that there was a second period of decline in resettlement ceilings, as they fell from 
142,000 in 1992 to 78,000 in 1997. Nevertheless, the government made another course 
correction in the late 1990s as admissions ceilings resumed their upward trajectory, climbing 
to a peak of 91,000 in 1999 before declining somewhat to 90,000 in 2000 and then experiencing 
a more substantial fall to 70,000 in 2001. The annual resettlement ceilings remained at 70,000 
throughout most of the 2000s, rising to 80,000 in 2008. Table 11 demonstrates that the 
resettlement ceiling remained at this new equilibrium for several years until 2012 when the 
government once again adopted lower ceilings. This decline proved short-lived, as the 
resettlement ceiling rose in 2016 to 85,000, and increased again to 110,000—a figure which 
mirrors the resettlement ceilings adopted in the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, it must be noted that 
the recent decision to reduce the resettlement admissions ceiling to 45,000 in fiscal year 2018 
marks a historic low for the Refugee Admissions Program and is far below the average of 
94,941 during the past 39 years (Martin 2005, 17; Mayorga and Morse 2017, see table 1; US 
Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and 
Human Services 2015, 5; US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and 
US Department of Health and Human Services 2016, 5; US Department of State, US 
Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2017, 
6 own calculation). 
To better understand the scope of resettlement contributions in the US, it is also 
instructive to examine the actual number of refugees resettled since the inception of the 
Resettlement Admissions Program. Appendix Table 12 provides a detailed account of the 
number of refugees resettled between fiscal years 1980 and 2017. Like the data on resettlement 
ceilings, Table 12 demonstrates that there has been considerable variation in the number of 
refugees resettled each fiscal year since 1980 and the number of refugees resettled to the US 
peaked in 1980. There was a steady decline in resettlement admissions throughout most of the 
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1980s, but the flow of resettled refugees grew again between 1988 and 1990. Resettlement 
admissions remained well above 100,000 refugees per year throughout the early 1990s, before 
falling in the latter part of the decade and rebounding again just before the turn of the 
millennium. Nevertheless, Table 12 clearly shows that there was a dramatic decline in 
resettlement admissions in the early 2000s—especially following the terrorist attacks of 11 
September, 2001. Though resettlement admissions gradually increased from 2004 onwards, the 
flow of refugees continued to fluctuate for several years until gradually increasing towards the 
end of the noughties. Finally, there was a marginal decline in resettlement admissions at the 
beginning of the current decade, followed by a steady increase in the flow of resettled refugees 
until 2017 when admissions fell to 53,716. In total, the US welcomed 3,060,295 refugees 
through the Refugee Admissions Program between 1980 and 2017 and an average of 78,469 
refugees per year during this period (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual tables; US 
Department of Homeland Security 2017, table 13). 
The considerable fluctuations observed above raise questions about whether and to 
what extent the annual resettlement ceilings and admissions have evolved in parallel. Appendix 
Chart 1 illustrates the correspondence between resettlement ceilings and admissions between 
fiscal year 1980 and 2017. Chart 1 shows that the annual resettlement ceilings and admissions 
usually followed a similar trajectory between fiscal years 1980 and 2017. One can also observe 
that the US has never met or exceeded its established admissions ceiling in the history of the 
programme.23 The government has occasionally come close to surpassing the ceiling. There 
was less than a two per cent gap between the ceiling and admissions in 1984 and 1990, and less 
than a one per cent gap between 2013 and 2016. There could be many reasons why the US has 
never met or exceeded its resettlement admissions ceilings (Martin 2005, 19-20), the fact that 
the US has never exceeded this threshold is also indicative. Martin (2005, 16) notes that the 
ambitious resettlement ceilings established at the inception of the Refugee Admissions 
Program were “truly a ceiling, not a goal.”  
The data presented above illustrates the broad pattern of resettlement admissions to the 
US but tells us little about the composition of flows. To enrich our understanding of 
resettlement admissions in the US, appendix Table 13 presents the numbers and nationalities 
of the five largest groups of refugees resettled to the US between fiscal years 1980 and 1989. 
Table 13 demonstrates that there was a clear pattern in resettlement admissions during the first 
decade of the programme. Throughout most of the decade, Vietnam represented the largest 
                                                 
23 This takes into account the revised ceilings issued in 1988, 1989, and 1999, respectively. 
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source country for refugees resettled to the US and, in a manner consistent with its obligations 
under the Comprehensive Plan of Action, the US also resettled large numbers of refugees from 
Cambodia and Laos. Other prominent groups include refugees from the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe—namely 
Poland and Romania. Table 13 indicates that resettlement efforts were not limited to these two 
regions alone, as the US also resettled thousands of refugees from countries further afield, 
including Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Iran. Towards the end of the decade, resettlement 
admissions from the USSR increased dramatically and surpassed the flow of refugees from 
Southeast Asia. 
To continue shedding light on the composition of resettlement admissions in the US, 
appendix Table 14 presents the numbers and nationalities of the five largest groups of refugees 
resettled in the US between fiscal years 1990 and 1999. Table 14 demonstrates that the USSR 
remained the top source country for resettled refugees between 1990 and 1994, and again in 
1996 and 1997. The US continued to resettle large numbers of refugees from Southeast Asia, 
including not only those from Vietnam and Laos but also individuals of American and 
Southeast Asian descent who had faced discrimination in Vietnam (Hirayama and Cetingok 
1995, 69). Resettlement admissions then became more diverse as the US resettled tens of 
thousands of refugees from Yugoslavia, as well as Iraqis, Liberians, and Somalis in need of 
this durable solution. 
Appendix Table 15 presents the numbers and nationalities of the five largest groups of 
refugees resettled to the US between fiscal years 2000 and 2009. Table 15 demonstrates that 
despite the collapse of the USSR almost a decade prior, the US continued to resettle large 
numbers of refugees from this region. This could be attributed to the Lautenberg Amendment, 
which was introduced in 1990 to enable the US to resettle individuals from certain religious 
minorities from particular countries who do not meet the formal definition of a refugee but who 
are nevertheless deemed to require protection. The Amendment facilitates the resettlement of 
Jews, evangelical Christians, members of the Ukrainian Catholic church, and members of the 
Orthodox faith (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US 
Department of Health and Human Services 2017, 10). Since 2004, an amendment to the 
Lautenberg Amendment has also enabled the government to resettle religious minorities from 
Iran, including Bahá’ís, Christians, Jews, Mandeans, and Zoroastrians. Table 15 also 
demonstrates that the composition of resettlement flows to the US became even more diverse 
in the new millennium as the country admitted refugees from Bhutan, Iraq, Myanmar, Liberia, 
Somalia, and Sudan, among others. 
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Finally, appendix Table 16 presents the numbers and nationalities of the five largest 
groups of refugees resettled in the US between fiscal years 2010 and 2017. In the period 
between fiscal years 2010 and 2017, the US has resettled substantial numbers of refugees from 
parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Though no country remained the top source for 
resettled refugees for long, refugees from Bhutan and Myanmar comprised a large proportion 
of refugees resettled in the US during this period. Most recently, the US resettled thousands of 
refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, and Syria—reflecting the growing 
protection needs of refugees from those countries. This suggests the consolidation of trends 
from previous decades. 
Information on the age and gender of refugees resettled to the US could add further 
detail to our understanding of the composition of resettlement flows but information was 
limited at the time of research.24 Appendix Table 17 shows the total number of refugees 
resettled alongside the number of adults and children resettled to the US between fiscal years 
2005 and 2015, the most recent period for which data was available. The author calculated the 
figures for children by adding the number of refugees resettled under the age of 16 to the 
number of refugees resettled between the ages of 16 and 20. The figures for adults reflect the 
number of refugees resettled over the age of 21, as given in the source. These figures reflect 
the way in which the data was disaggregated in the source. 
The data presented in Table 17 demonstrates that the US resettled marginally more men 
than women during each year between 2005 and 2015. Though the gap between the number of 
men and women was somewhat larger in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2013, this could perhaps be 
attributed to the unique characteristics of the individuals and groups in need of protection and 
may not necessarily indicate a systematic bias against female refugees. Though the US does 
not have a particular quota for the resettlement of women-at-risk, the Preferred Communities 
programme administered by the Office of Refugee Resettlement and implemented by nine 
voluntary agencies builds capacity in receiving communities to enable them to offer longer-
term support to especially vulnerable refugees, including female heads of household (UNHCR 
2014, 1; US Department of State 2017, 20).  
                                                 
24 Between 1997 and 2004, the Department of Homeland Security published information on the number of 
children resettled as part of its annual statistical yearbooks. Though the number of resettled adults could be 
estimated by subtracting the total number of resettled refugees by the number of resettled children, there were 
considerable discrepancies between the total admissions figures provided in the statistical yearbooks for 1998, 
1999, and 2002 yearbooks and the total admissions figures reported for each of these years in the 2015 
yearbook. Due to these inconsistencies and the unreliability of such estimates, the author opted to exclude this 
data from Table 17. 
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Table 17 also demonstrates that the US resettled more adults than children between 
2005 and 2015. However, the US historically resettled many unaccompanied minors—
especially from Southeast Asia. Though little information on the nationalities of these 
unaccompanied minors was available at the time of research, the US resettled a total of 5,071 
unaccompanied minors from Southeast Asian between fiscal years 1980 and 1985, and also 
welcomed approximately 300 more unaccompanied minors from Southeast Asia in 1986 
(Office of Refugee Resettlement 1981, 14; 1982, ii; 1983, ii; 1984, ii; 1985, 39; 1986, 40; 1987, 
41).25 In 1994, the Office of Refugee Resettlement provided more detailed information on the 
nationalities of the unaccompanied minors, noting that children from Southeast Asia, Bosnia, 
Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sudan were resettled in the US (Office of Refugee 
Resettlement 1995, 26). 
Between 1984 and 1995, the US published information on the sum of unaccompanied 
minors that had been under government care since 1979—that is, children who had not been 
emancipated or reunited with members of their family in the US—as well as the total number 
that remained under care each year. Beginning in 1987, the US offered information on the 
average number of unaccompanied minors resettled each month in a given year. Though these 
figures do not provide an exact account of the flow of unaccompanied minors resettled in the 
US, they nevertheless shed some light on efforts to protect these vulnerable refugees. Appendix 
Table 18 presents the sum of unaccompanied minors under care in the US since fiscal year 
1979, the number that remained under care in a given year, and the average number of 
unaccompanied minors arriving each month (when available) between fiscal years 1984 and 
1995. 
The figures presented in Table 18 demonstrate that the total number of unaccompanied 
minors grew steadily, indicating that unaccompanied minors formed a consistent part of the 
flow of refugees resettled to the US during this period. However, the number of unaccompanied 
minors in care gradually declined—perhaps as these individuals reached the age of majority or 
reunited with members of their extended family. The table also shows that the monthly flow of 
unaccompanied minors remained somewhat steady throughout the mid- to late-1980s, but 
progressively fell before rising again in 1995. Future research could potentially explore 
whether this flow of unaccompanied minors was in some way related to the flow of Amerasian 
refugees resettled in the US. 
                                                 
25 The data on unaccompanied minors did not disaggregate by country. 
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More contemporary efforts to resettle unaccompanied minors have concentrated on 
children from Central America. Though the number of unaccompanied minors detained at the 
border by Customs and Border Protection gradually increased from approximately 15,000 in 
2011 to approximately 40,000 in 2013, the number of arrivals surged in 2014, rising to 
approximately 69,000 (Hipsman and Meissner 2015, 3). To minimise the number of children 
undertaking “dangerous” journeys in order to reach relatives in the US, and as a means of 
responding to the pressure on government services and the considerable level of public 
attention directed towards the issue, the government established the Central American Minors 
programme in November 2014 to process resettlement applications for eligible children from 
the three main source countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Hipsman and 
Meissner 2015, 2 and 4). 
Between December 2014 and November 2017, the US received more than 14,000 
applications for resettlement through the Central American Minors programme, and resettled 
3,238 children under its auspices (Finnegan 2017, para. 6 of 16). However, in November 2017, 
the government announced its intention to eliminate the Central American Minors programme 
in fiscal year 2018, as “the vast majority of individuals accessing the programme were not 
eligible for refugee resettlement (US Department of State 2017, para. 3 of 6; US Department 
of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human 
Services 2017, 43).” Hipsman and Meissner (2015, 1 and 12) note that the US has previously 
introduced in-country resettlement programmes in response to “conditions of extreme danger, 
loss of life, and sizeable numbers” in Cuba, Haiti, and Vietnam. However, these programmes 
proved “controversial” among both proponents and opponents of refugee protection, as the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines refugees as persons outside their 
country of origin or habitual residence, and concerns related to the effectiveness of such 
programmes depending on the admission criteria, the structure and speed of the application 
process, and the ability of such programmes to effectively protect individuals in hard-to-reach 
locations (Hipsman and Meissner 2015, 12). 
In addition to efforts to protect unaccompanied minors, the US does not limit the 
resettlement of refugees with medical needs, and 2,388 refugees with medical needs were 
resettled in the US in 2016 (UNHCR 2017, 74; UNHCR 2017, 2). 
Overall, the data presented above affirms that though the US has made considerable 
contributions to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between fiscal years 1980 and 
2017, its resettlement ceilings and total admissions have fluctuated over time. Nevertheless, 
the figures indicate that the US has been generous in its approach to admissions, resettling 
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refugees from a broad range of countries over time and admitting relatively equal numbers of 
male and female refugees. The US has also voluntarily resettled thousands of the most 
vulnerable of all refugees, including thousands of children (both accompanied and 
unaccompanied) and refugees with medical needs. This descriptive account sets the stage for a 
more detailed exploration of the structure of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and 
Placement programmes in section 2.3. 
2.4 Organisational Structure of Resettlement in the United States 
To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies, a brief discussion of the structure of the Resettlement 
Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes is necessary. The Refugee Act of 1980 
and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 2013 institutionalise resettlement in the US and 
also integrate the UNHCR definition of a refugee, establish the procedure for determining the 
level of admissions, and provide for the admission of refugees “of special humanitarian concern 
to the United States (Immigration and Nationality Act 2013 paragraphs 201(a), 207(a)(2), and 
207(a)(3) 8 USC 1157).” The Immigration and Nationality Act of 2013 also stipulates that the 
government must provide “sufficient resources” for employment training and placement 
programmes, English language classes, and financial assistance to help refugees achieve 
“economic self-sufficiency (Immigration and Nationality Act 2013, 412(a)(1) 8 USC 1157).” 
The Refugee Admissions Program is the channel through which refugees may be 
resettled in the US. The programme has a complex structure based on considerable domestic 
responsibility sharing between the federal and state governments and voluntary agencies. The 
Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration coordinates and manages 
the Refugee Admissions Program (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland 
Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 6). Following consultations 
with the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Refugee Resettlement at the 
Department of Health and Human Services, and voluntary agencies, the Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration develops a proposal on the annual resettlement ceiling and selection 
priorities for approval by the President (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland 
Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 6). 
The US has three horizontal resettlement priorities: the P-1 category was created to 
enable the resettlement of refugees referred by the UNHCR, an American embassy, or a trained 
voluntary agency (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US 
Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 7). The P-2 category is designed to facilitate 
the resettlement of groups of refugees designated by the Department of State in consultation 
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with the Department of Homeland Security, voluntary agencies, and the UNHCR (US 
Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and 
Human Services 2014, 8). Finally, the P-3 category is intended to facilitate the resettlement of 
refugees from certain designated countries who already have relatives in the US (US 
Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and 
Human Services 2014, 11). The Department of State determines the annual list of designated 
countries in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (US Department of State, 
US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 
2014, 11). In 2018, individuals from 15 countries, including Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria are eligible for resettlement through the P-3 category (US 
Department of State 2017, 13). 
Organisations must transmit resettlement referrals to a Resettlement Support Center 
overseas, and Church World Service, HIAS, and the International Rescue Committee operate 
three of these centres, respectively (Cultural Orientation Resource Center 2015, para. 1 to 3 of 
7). There, members of staff pre-screen applications, interview prospective candidates, and enter 
biographical data to initiate the security screening process that is conducted by the departments 
of Homeland Security and State, in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and 
the National Counterterrorism Center (US Department of State 2017, 1; US Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 1). 
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, certain refugees—including those 
from countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism—must undergo further 
intergovernmental security checks known as Security Advisory Opinions (Refugee Council 
USA 2017, 1). In addition, applications from Syrian refugees are subject to an “enhanced 
review” process by the Refugee Affairs division at the US Citizenship and Immigration Service 
(US Department of State 2017, 1). These security screening measures are “recurrent” 
procedures that continue until refugees are ready to travel to the US (US Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 1). The US Citizenship and Immigration Service also conducts 
in-person interviews and assesses the credibility of each claim for protection and the 
admissibility of the refugee to the US (US Department of State 2017, 1). The organisation may 
then issue a ‘conditional approval’ for resettlement which is dependent on the completion of 
three biometric security checks administered by the departments of Defense and Homeland 
Security as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants 2017, 2). Refugees who have received a conditional approval must also pass a 
medical exam to determine whether they suffer from a communicable disease which would 
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render them inadmissible to the US (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 2). 
Given these extensive measures, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Department of States asserts 
that refugees resettled to the US are “screened more carefully than any other type of traveler 
[sic] (US Department of State 2017, 1).” 
Once the US Citizenship and Immigration Service conditionally approves an 
application for resettlement, refugees can participate in a pre-departure cultural orientation 
programme delivered by a Resettlement Support Center (US Department of State 2017, 1). 
Refugees are also matched with one of nine voluntary agencies who determine where they 
settle in the US (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 2). These nine voluntary 
agencies include Church World Service, Episcopal Migration Ministries, the Ethiopian 
Community Development Council, HIAS, the International Rescue Committee, the Lutheran 
Immigration and Refugee Service, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, the US Committee 
for Refugees and Immigrants, and World Relief. 
If refugees pass the security and medical checks, the Department of State issues a final 
approval and the International Organization for Migration begins the process of organising 
transportation to the US (US Department of State 2017, 1). The Department of State, through 
the International Organization for Migration, issues interest-free loans to refugees who cannot 
afford the cost of airfare to the US (US Department of State 2017, 18). Refugees must repay 
the loan in full within a period of 42 months, and both the US Conference of Catholic Bishops 
and the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants are authorised to collect repayments on 
behalf of the International Organization for Migration (US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants 2017, no pagination; US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2018, para. 2 of 4; 
Westcott 2015, para. 4 of 10). Once refugees arrive in the US, the final decision on admissibility 
rests with the US Customs and Border Protection agency (US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants 2017, 2). 
The federal government, state governments, and voluntary agencies collaborate in the 
delivery of financial assistance and reception, orientation, and integration services for refugees 
through the Reception and Placement Program. The Department of State funds the programme 
and the nine aforementioned voluntary agencies are responsible for its implementation (US 
Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and 
Human Services 2014, 17). Through their collective network of 328 local affiliates in 191 
communities located in 49 of 50 states, these voluntary agencies arrange housing for the 
refugees, provide clothing, food, and furniture, and also offer an array of services including 
cultural orientation and employment assistance, among others (US Department of State, US 
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Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 
18; US Department of State 2017, 18). 
In addition to collaborating in the identification, processing, reception, orientation, and 
integration of resettled refugees, the Department of State provides funding to support the work 
of voluntary agencies through a fixed ‘per capita’ grant of US$2,075 for every refugee they 
resettle (Bruno 2017, 4). Voluntary agencies are required to spend US$1,125 of this grant on 
behalf of the refugee (Bruno 2017, 4). Though the grants are designed to help refugees meet 
their basic needs during the first 30 to 90 days following arrival, there is a clear expectation 
that voluntary agencies will draw on their own financial and in-kind resources to help refugees 
fulfil their needs during this period (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland 
Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 18; UNHCR 2014, 10). 
Once refugees have completed the first phase of the orientation and integration process 
through the Reception and Placement programme, they can access employment and English 
language instruction services offered by a number of ethnic community-based organisations 
and funded by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2016, 1). 
The Office of Refugee Resettlement limits funding to voluntary agencies in which at least 60 
per cent of board members are current or former refugees (Office of Refugee Resettlement 
2016, 1). Furthermore, these ethnic community-based organisations can only serve refugees 
who have resided in the US for more than 90 days but less than five years (Office of Refugee 
Resettlement 2016, 1). However, access to these supplementary services is far from universal; 
in 2015, the Office of Refugee Resettlement provided funding to 27 ethnic community-based 
organisations, located in 17 states even though refugees are resettled in 49 states (Office of 
Refugee Resettlement 2015, no para.).26 One ethnic community-based organisation, the 
Ethiopian Community Development Council, is also contracted to provide orientation and 
integration services through the Reception and Placement programme. 
In addition to providing financial support to voluntary agencies and funding some 
integration services, the Office of Refugee Resettlement funds the delivery of up to eight 
months of cash and medical assistance for resettled refugees who are ineligible for mainstream 
social assistance programmes (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, 
and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 19). Though state and municipal 
governments usually allocate these funds, 12 state governments have partially or entirely 
                                                 
26 For a discussion on the “lottery effect” generated by the current approach to refugee placement and by the 
variation in the availability of services, see Brick et al. (2010, 12-13). 
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withdrawn from the provision of these assistance programmes for resettled refugees (US 
Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and 
Human Services 2014, 19).27 Instead, voluntary agencies administer the provision of cash and 
medical assistance through an alternative service delivery model called the Wilson/Fish 
Alternative Programme, which encourages refugees to obtain employment as soon as possible 
Office of Refugee Resettlement 2017, 1). The city of San Diego has also adopted this model, 
making it the only municipality in the country to maintain a resettlement programme that is 
separate from the state.28 Five other state governments provide cash assistance to resettled 
refugees through other forms of public-private partnerships (Office of Refugee Resettlement 
2015, 16).29 
From this, it is apparent that the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement 
programmes feature extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary 
agencies. Voluntary agencies are involved in all phases of the resettlement process, from the 
identification and processing of applications for resettlement to receiving refugees at the airport 
and assisting refugees as they begin the process of orientation and integration in the US. This 
narrative account, in conjunction with the figures presented in section 2.3, set the stage for an 
analysis of the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits in section 2.5. These 
partnerships raise questions about why and how mechanisms for domestic responsibility 
sharing emerged in the US, and whether and to what extent these partnerships have influenced 
resettlement admissions—matters discussed in section 2.6. 
2.5 The Perceived Motivations and Benefits of Resettlement in the United States 
 The data provided in section 2.3 paints a picture of a country that has resettled millions 
of refugees from diverse countries and backgrounds since 1980, though the size and 
composition of these flows have fluctuated over time. Furthermore, the descriptive account 
provided in section 2.4 demonstrates that the US has developed a complex resettlement 
programme founded on extensive domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies 
working in all but the state of Wyoming. 
                                                 
27 The 12 states that have withdrawn include: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont (Office of Refugee Resettlement 
2015, 17). 
28 For a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of resettlement through the San Diego Wilson-Fish 
programme compared to municipal employment programmes, see both Sargent, Hohm, and Moser (1999) and 
Hohm, Sargent, and Moser (1999). 
29 These five states include Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas (Office of Refugee 
Resettlement 2015, 16).  
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This narrative background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout 
the remainder of the chapter. To better understand the potential reasons why the US has 
voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this section presents the views 
of senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the motivations for 
resettling refugees in the US and its benefits. In accordance with the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of this thesis, the author attempts to interpret these perceptions in 
relation to the extant literature. Though academics have proposed a range of explanations for 
the motivations for providing refugee protection, one could interpret the views articulated by 
government officials and voluntary agency representatives as consistent with the scholarship 
on refugee protection and public goods. 
In April 2013, the author travelled to four cities in the US to conduct in-person 
interviews with two senior government officials and 13 representatives from each of the nine 
voluntary sector agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and 
Placement programmes. The author first travelled to New York City to conduct interviews with 
representatives from Episcopal Migration Ministries, HIAS, and the International Rescue 
Committee. The author then travelled to Washington, DC and Arlington, Virginia to meet with 
senior officials from the Department of State and Office of Refugee Resettlement, as well as 
representatives from the Ethiopian Community Development Council, the US Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, and the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. The author 
subsequently returned to New York City to meet with a representative from Church World 
Service. Finally, the author travelled to Baltimore, Maryland to speak with representatives from 
the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service and World Relief. The author conducted the 
interviews at the office of each respondent. The appendices provide biographical information 
about each interviewee. 
To better understand why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies, the author asked interviewees about the perceived motivations for 
resettlement and its benefits. The author deliberately phrased this question in a general manner 
to minimise priming effects and invite a broad range of spontaneous responses. During the 
interviews, government officials and many voluntary agency representatives argued that 
resettlement has a humanitarian function, preserves access to countries of first asylum, and 
contributes to international responsibility sharing (Carey 2013; Gershowitz 2013; Gnaho 2013; 
Mitchell 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Kosten 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013). 
On 10 April, 2013, the author met with Ambassador David M. Robinson, then the 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
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the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. Ambassador Robinson argued that 
resettlement “saves lives” and explained that the provision of this durable solution “meets a 
basic humanitarian goal of the United States government to provide relief and hope and 
assistance to people who find themselves in a dire situation in which they cannot return home 
[…].” Ambassador Robinson (2013) added that resettlement also contributes to international 
responsibility sharing by relieving some of the pressure on countries of first asylum, thereby 
encouraging these states to continue admitting persons in need of protection.  
Numerous voluntary sector representatives also contended that resettlement serves a 
humanitarian purpose and expresses a commitment to international responsibility sharing. On 
9 April, 2013, the author met with Greg Scott, the Associate Director of Grants and Program 
Administration at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops. Mr Scott articulated a similar to 
view to that expressed by Ambassador Robinson, and argued that resettlement has a life-saving 
function and that refugees “are not people coming here for economic benefit, they’re coming 
here to survive. Because if they stay where they are, there’s a good chance they won’t see 
tomorrow.” 
Regarding international responsibility sharing, the author met with Aaron Gershowitz, 
then the Associate Vice President of Global Program Operations at HIAS, on 4 April, 2013. 
Mr Gershowitz argued that resettlement offers a “relief valve” for countries of first asylum and 
asserted that the US derives satisfaction from “knowing that we have the capacity and the 
ability to help people who are in need.” On 5 April, 2013, the author met with Bob Carey, then 
the Vice President of Resettlement and Migration Policy at the International Rescue 
Committee. Mr Carey asserted that resettlement demonstrates a commitment to responsibility 
sharing. Mr Carey (2013) also contended that the strategic use of this durable solution could 
preserve access to asylum by encouraging countries to keep their borders open. In that context, 
Mr Carey (2013) noted that resettlement has been “very helpful in many instances, whether 
you’re talking about Tanzania or Jordan or Turkey or whatever, in ensuring that borders remain 
open for fleeing populations, or in, you know, ensuring that refugees are not refouled, or 
supporting that, and demonstrating international support for not just the resettlement population 
but the entire population of refugees in a given country or region.” One could interpret these 
perceptions as consistent with the norms embedded in the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as contemporary UNHCR efforts to 
strategically use resettlement. One could also interpret these responses as reminiscent of the 
humanitarian desire to ‘rescue’ individuals displaced by World War II. 
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In addition to the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations, a number of 
respondents indicated that contributing to resettlement aligns with the history, identity, and 
values of the US (Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Mitchell 2013; Negash 2013; Robinson 2013; 
Scott 2013; Stein 2013). Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that resettlement reflects “our 
most profound national values,” and that, as a country founded on immigration, resettlement is 
“part and parcel of who we are” and so contributing to this durable solution “sustains who we 
are as a people.” Furthermore, Mr Scott (2013) asserted that the provision of resettlement 
“resonates with the values that the US espouses” in terms of ensuring the protection of human 
rights by granting refuge to the persecuted. In addition, Mr Scott (2013) asserted that providing 
resettlement is consistent with the history of the US as an immigrant-receiving country and 
summarised his view in the following way: “to me, it’s very simple: it’s who we are. It’s how 
this country started. The only people who are from the United States are the Indians. Everybody 
else is from somewhere else.” 
For others, participating in resettlement is also a concrete expression of religious values. 
On 16 April, 2013, the author met with Dan Kosten, then Senior Vice President of US Programs 
at World Relief. Mr Kosten also contended that resettlement reflects the national values of the 
US, stating that resettlement has an “intrinsic value, and one that if lost, would mean that, in 
essence, we call into question our very origin as a country and as a nation.” Furthermore, Mr 
Kosten (2013) explained that resettlement is also an expression of religious conviction, noting 
that, “if I go back to a religious faith basis, there seems to be a direct correlation between 
receiving blessing and receiving others. So what that blessing is, is not necessarily measurable, 
but I believe a nation at large receives blessings through the very act of welcoming others into 
its culture.” One could interpret the particular views expressed by Mr Kosten as consistent with 
the evangelical Christian orientation of the organisation he represented at the time of the 
interview. However, six of the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement 
Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes are faith-based organisations, 
indicating that religious value may underpin and provide a rationale for the involvement of 
these voluntary agencies in resettlement. 
In addition to relating resettlement admissions to matters of history, identity, and 
values, several respondents contended that participating in resettlement and making sizeable 
contributions to the provision of this durable solution demonstrates global leadership 
(Gershowitz 2013; Robinson 2013; Young 2013). Ambassador Robinson (2013) explained, 
“We recognise that there is a need for resettlement as one of the durable solutions. And yet, 
there is greater need than there is availability. So one of our goals has been to increase the 
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number of nations that participate in resettlement. We can’t do that unless we lead the way. 
And so we have seen it as in our interest, in terms of responsibility and burden-sharing […] it’s 
important that the United States put its money where its mouth is.” Ambassador Robinson 
(2013) added that resettling large numbers of refugees “gives us the policy and the moral 
grounding to assert a leadership role in this effort.” 
Some voluntary agency representatives echoed this view. On 9 April, 2013, the author 
met with Ambassador Johnny Young, then the Executive Director of Migration and Refugee 
Services at the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Ambassador Young explained 
that the government encourages its allies to “take a stronger and more active lead in resettling 
refugees.” To that end, Ambassador Young (2013) explained that contributing to resettlement 
“demonstrates leadership, and by demonstrating that leadership, it encourages other countries 
to also take measures to follow the US lead.” For his part, Mr Gershowitz (2013) argued that 
participating in resettlement has clear reputational benefits for the US because it concretely 
demonstrates a commitment to international responsibility sharing with countries of first 
asylum and a commitment to refugee protection. 
Finally, many respondents contended that resettlement has cultural benefits for the US 
(Gershowitz 2013; Gnaho 2013; Kosten 2013; Mitchell 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; 
Robinson 2013; Sok 2013). Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that resettlement “enriches 
communities” and explained that “it brings something unique to the United States in terms of 
diversity, particularly in communities where they have never been in contact with people other 
than those who look like everybody else in those communities.” Though Ambassador Robinson 
(2013) acknowledged that resettlement can have social costs for receiving communities as they 
adapt to newcomers, he nevertheless argued that “it’s the nature of the United States to absorb 
this and to change with it, and to allow ourselves not only to welcome refugees and immigrants 
but to be changed by them. And that’s part of what I think, frankly, is the dynamism of this 
place.” 
Voluntary agency representatives also underscored the cultural benefits of resettlement. 
Mr Gershowitz (2013) asserted that resettlement has a “net benefit” for the US as it brings 
“different perspectives, different skills, different experiences that contribute to the overall 
mix.” Similarly, in an interview on 15 April, 2013, Michael Mitchell, then the Vice President 
for Programs and Protection at the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, contended that 
resettlement “enriches” American society and that “every different culture introduces new 
ways of thinking and problem-solving.” In that same interview, Sovanna Sok, a Placements 
Coordinator and a former resettled refugee, explained that resettlement contributes to greater 
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openness in American society, and noted that “having refugees coming from different 
backgrounds, different ethnic groups, and different views, different ways of thinking, it helps 
open up the community to have a better understanding of other people, other ethnic groups, 
populations other than what we see here in the US.” The responses articulated by interviewees 
indicate that the US is perceived to have a complex and overlapping range of motivations for 
contributing to resettlement, including humanitarian and normative motivations, as well as 
motivations and benefits rooted in the history, identity, and religious values of the US. 
Nevertheless, all respondents acknowledged that resettlement generates financial costs 
for the US (Carey 2013; Famini 2013; Gershowitz 2013; Gnaho 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 
2013; Limón 2013; Mitchell 2013; Negash 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 
2013; Sok 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Still, many interviewees argued that resettlement 
has economic benefits for the US. For example, both Ambassador Robinson (2013) and Mr 
Carey (2013) asserted that resettled refugees had helped “revitalize sic]” economically 
deprived communities such Lewiston, Maine and Utica, New York. Many voluntary sector 
representatives also contended that refugees are highly entrepreneurial (Carey 2013; Kekic 
2013; Kosten 2013; Mitchell 2013; Stein 2013). In an interview on 2 April, 2013, Deborah 
Stein, the Director of Episcopal Migration Ministries, noted that the US “was built on the 
strength of immigrants coming to this country and bringing their talents, their education, their 
initiative, and their drive to succeed and to make a better life for themselves and their families.” 
To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies, this thesis now seeks to interpret the response articulated 
above in relation to the extant literature. First, the responses articulated by government officials 
and voluntary agency representatives appear consistent with the observation from Haines 
(2010, 5-6) that the desire of the US to resettle its “fair share” of refugees represents a moral 
commitment to the principle of international responsibility sharing. 
One could also interpret the responses articulated by interviewees as consistent with the 
literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapter one explained that private 
goods have benefits which are fully excludable and rival, meaning that whoever provides the 
good can prevent others from benefiting from it, and once one actor has enjoyed the good, no 
one else can (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9 and 30). Conversely, public goods are non-
excludable and non-rival, meaning that whoever provides the good cannot prevent others from 
benefiting from it, and one actor can appreciate the good without diminishing the ability of 
others to take pleasure in it as well (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9).  
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However, some economists have attempted to push beyond this binary characterisation 
of goods and instead propose an alternative conceptualisation that views goods along a 
“spectrum” between purely public and purely private, where some of these “impure” public 
goods are more rival and excludable or less rival and excludable than others (Cornes and 
Sandler 1996, 6 and 241). Cornes and Sandler (1996, 9) explain that the provision of impure 
public goods sometimes generates joint products, which are “multiple outputs, some of which 
can be private, others purely public, and still others impurely public.” 
In the context of resettlement, one could interpret this durable solution as excludable 
and rival in certain ways. Resettlement could be seen as excludable because only individuals 
recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol are eligible for resettlement. In this way, resettlement could 
generate excludable and rival humanitarian protection benefits for resettled refugees. 
Furthermore, resettlement is only appropriate for refugees who are unable to integrate locally 
or voluntarily return to their respective countries of origin. In addition, since governments 
(including the US) retain full discretion over admissions, not every refugee referred by the 
UNHCR or other organisations will be offered resettlement. One could also interpret the 
provision of resettlement as rival, since the gap between resettlement needs and admissions 
means that each refugee who obtains resettlement diminishes the availability of resettlement 
places for other refugees. However, the responses articulated by government officials and 
voluntary agency representatives indicate that contributing to resettlement is perceived to 
benefit both refugees and the US more generally, suggesting that resettlement may not be a 
private good. 
If resettlement is not a private good, then one could potentially interpret this durable 
solution as a public good. If the provision of resettlement is perceived to benefit refugees and 
other parties, then it could be non-excludable and non-rival since whoever offers resettlement 
could find it all but impossible to prevent others from benefiting from it, and other actors could 
appreciate the provision of this durable solution without diminishing the ability of others to do 
the same (e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9). However, the theory of public goods predicts 
that actors will not provide a Pareto efficient level of pure public goods because the non-
excludable, non-rival nature of these goods creates an incentive for actors to free ride on the 
anticipated contributions of others (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 22-23; Gruber 2011, 188; 
Samuelson 1954, 388). 
In the context of resettlement, this suggests that governments should face a classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which they have no incentives to provide this durable solution. Instead, 
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governments should have a powerful incentive to free ride on the anticipated contributions of 
other states, confident that they can still benefit from the positive externalities generated from 
others providing this durable solution. Though this could partially explain the underprovision 
of resettlement places, there is little evidence that the US engages in free riding—especially 
since the evidence demonstrates that it made the largest absolute contributions to resettlement 
between fiscal years 1980 and 2016. The US was also among the largest relative contributors 
to resettlement during this period. These observations indicate that the US may have found the 
incentives necessary to overcome the impetus for free riding, suggesting that resettlement is 
not a pure public good.30 
One could interpret the responses articulated by government officials and voluntary 
agency representatives as consistent with the literature on resettlement as a public good (e.g. 
Suhrke 1998). First, as noted in chapter one, Suhrke (1998) develops a general 
conceptualisation of resettlement as a public good and does not elaborate on the nature of this 
good. Nevertheless, the responses concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and 
the norms of international responsibility sharing and the strategic use of resettlement could be 
interpreted as consistent with her argument that governments contribute to refugee protection 
because they believe that international law creates a collective “moral duty” and “obligation” 
to assist refugees and that assisting persons in need of protection reduces global inequality and 
minimises the incentives for economically disadvantaged countries to restrict access to asylum 
(Suhrke 1998, 398). 
Second, these perceptions could be interpreted as consistent with the more recent 
literature on the provision of refugee protection through asylum as an impure public good (e.g. 
Betts 2003; Hatton 2012; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006). The responses 
concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and the norms of international 
responsibility sharing and the strategic use of resettlement could be interpreted as consistent 
with the arguments from Betts (2003, 266-88), who contends that governments could be more 
generous in granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive excludable ‘altruistic’ 
                                                 
30 This does not negate the possibility that other countries engage in free riding or other forms of Pareto 
inefficient behaviour, such as the exploitative behaviour identified by Olson (1965, 29; see also Olson and 
Zeckhauser 1966). However, an examination of these behaviours is beyond the scope of this thesis, given that 
this thesis concentrates exclusively on the US and Canada. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Thielemann and 
Dewan (2006, 358) analyse decisions to grant protection to asylum seekers in 15 OECD countries and found “no 
evidence of systematic exploitation of the big by the small.”  
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benefits from these acts.31 In particular, Betts (2003, 266-88) suggests that these countries may 
be more generous because they derive a “warm glow” from demonstrating a commitment to 
“ethical or legal norms” such as fairness and the protection of human rights. Similarly, 
Thielemann (2003, 255, 257-58, and 265-69) contends that governments may have been more 
generous in their contributions to the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovar 
refugees because of the perceived “excludable” benefits they derived from demonstrating a 
commitment to the norms of international responsibility sharing and solidarity with countries 
of first asylum. 
One could also interpret the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for 
resettlement as consistent with the economic literature on contributions to public goods. 
Historically, many academics argued that actors can overcome the purported incentives for free 
riding and contribute to public goods for purely unselfish reasons (Becker 1974; Coleman 
1966; Collard 1978, chapters one and 10; Margolis 1982, chapter two; Roberts 1984). 
However, other economists later challenged these claims on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds (e.g. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Sugden 1982). 
In response, Margolis (1982) attempted to add nuance to our understanding of altruism 
through his distinction between ‘participation altruism’ and ‘goods altruism.’ Margolis (1982, 
21) argues that individuals could be motivated to contribute to the provision of public goods 
because they derive “satisfaction from helping others,” especially if they believe that they are 
contributing to a “socially useful” cause. Furthermore, Margolis (1982, 23) contends that 
individuals could contribute to public goods if they believe that their contribution made at least 
a marginal impact on the total supply of that good. These behaviours are not mutually exclusive 
but mutually reinforcing, as utility maximisation depends on both the act of giving and the 
amount given (Margolis 1982, 24). 
Similarly, Andreoni (1989, 1448-49) theorises that individuals contribute to public 
goods because they demand a higher level of provision and based on the perception that they 
derive “some private goods benefit from their gift per se, like a warm glow.” On that basis, 
Andreoni (1989, 1449) develops a model in which individuals have impurely altruistic motives 
for contributing to the provision of public goods, and he theorises that “the warm glow is an 
increasing function of what is given.” 
                                                 
31 Some clarification on terminology may be useful here. In his article, Betts appears to use the terms “altruistic 
benefit” and “warm glow” interchangeably. However, a closer reading of the economic literature on impure 
altruism demonstrates that altruism is one of the factors that motivates individuals to contribute to a public good, 
while the warm glow is the benefit they derive from this charitable act (Andreoni 1990, 465-468). 
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These contributions suggest that individuals can derive a partially excludable benefit 
from their contribution, not just the contributions of others. Furthermore, their arguments on 
the interactive relationship between contributions and benefits suggest that the more 
individuals donate, the more of a ‘warm glow’ they receive in return (Andreoni 1989; Margolis 
1982). These contributions are important because the nature of impure public goods can also 
impact their provision. Cornes and Sandler (1984, 595) demonstrate that joint products have a 
privatising effect “not unlike the establishment of property rights.” Given that privatisation is 
one of the strategies that can be used to eliminate free riding, the existence of joint products 
could dissuade actors from free riding (Cornes and Sandler 1984, 589-90; Perloff 2011, 590). 
For this reason, Cornes and Sandler (1984, 589-90) argue that free riding is “not an inevitable 
feature of public goods models.” 
One could interpret the provision of resettlement as an impure public good that 
generates joint products in the form of excludable, rival protection benefits for refugees as well 
as impurely public ‘warm glow’ benefits for the US. This warm glow could be seen as 
excludable but non-rival joint product since only residents of the US could derive a warm glow 
from the decision to welcome refugees into their country or from demonstrating a commitment 
to the norms and principles embedded in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, but one individual may derive a warm glow from this act without diminishing the 
potential ability of other citizens to enjoy this warm glow as well.  
In addition to the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for resettlement, 
one could interpret the perceived reputational benefits of resettlement as consistent with aspects 
of the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapter one mentioned that 
Betts (2003, 276 and 286-87) theorises that some European governments are generous in 
granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive ‘prestige’ benefits from granting 
protection that they can leverage in other policy areas due to issue linkages. Though Betts 
(2003, 287) argues that governments are unlikely to grant protection to asylum seekers for the 
sole purpose of obtaining reputational benefits, his proposition appears consistent with 
functional regime theory, which argues that governments can potentially improve their 
reputations by demonstrating compliance with international regimes—especially when the 
regime creates a perceived moral obligation (Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27). 
Reputational gains are valuable because this quality can provide an actor with essential 
information about the possible behaviour of other actors that, in turn, may influence their own 
actions (Axelrod 1984, 151). Similarly, Keohane (1984, 127) adds that compliance with rules 
and principles that are perceived to create moral obligations can have an especially positive 
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reputational effect because “adhering to a moral code may identify an actor as a political 
cooperator, part of a cluster of players with whom mutually beneficial agreements can be made 
[…].” Conversely, if countries shirk their commitments (particularly those that are perceived 
to be moral obligations) their reputation could suffer and they may find it more difficult to 
secure agreements later on, thus increasing transaction costs (Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-
27). 
In the context of resettlement, participation is not a matter of compliance sensu stricto 
because countries are not obligated to resettle refugees (UNHCR 2011, 36). However, one 
could interpret the participation of the US in resettlement as an expression of voluntary 
compliance with the norms embedded in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement, including refugee 
protection, international responsibility sharing, and solidarity. In addition to citing the 
influence of norms, some respondents mentioned the perceived importance of resettling large 
numbers of refugees and indicated that there is a perceived link between these sizeable 
contributions and the credibility and legitimacy of the US as an international humanitarian 
actor.  
The US could benefit from this demonstration of voluntary compliance and from 
making sizeable contributions to resettlement insofar as it could leverage its reputation for 
compliance to secure concessions such as encouraging other countries to adopt resettlement 
programmes or promoting a more strategic use of this durable solution. Such an approach could 
prove advantageous since Loescher and Milner (2011, 203-04) argue that “resettlement 
represents an important and growing area of cooperation between UNHCR and states [and] an 
important area of future innovation within the global governance of refugees.” One could 
interpret this perceived reputational gain as an excludable, non-rival joint product of 
resettlement because only the US can enjoy the reputational benefits of demonstrating 
voluntary compliance with the norms and principles of the international refugee regime.32 
However, the US can derive reputational gains without diminishing the ability of other 
governments to demonstrate their voluntary compliance and enjoy the same reputational 
benefits. 
Finally, one could also interpret the responses on the perceived cultural benefits of 
resettlement as consistent with literature on culture as a public good. Throsby (2010, 172) 
explains that “the variety of cultures and cultural expressions are seen as […] having qualities 
                                                 
32 For a general discussion of the characteristics of reputation as a public good, see Phelan (2009, 16). 
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that are valued as a part of the ‘human mosaic.’” In this way, Throsby (2010, 172) 
conceptualises cultural diversity as a public good that has “existence value” because 
individuals “gain benefit from the knowledge that biodiversity and cultural diversity in all their 
richness are simply there.”  
Though the current literature on refugee protection as a public good does not discuss 
this benefit, Singer and Singer (1988, 123) argue that residents of a receiving country may 
benefit from the admission of refugees in that they “may enjoy the more cosmopolitan 
atmosphere created by new arrivals from other countries” including new shops and restaurants. 
In addition, Singer and Singer (1988, 123) indicate that the increased cultural diversity resulting 
from resettlement can also have longer-term advantages insofar as refugees may introduce 
“different ideas and ways of living.” One could interpret the perceived cultural benefits 
articulated by interviewees as an excludable, non-rival joint product of resettlement because 
only residents of the US can benefit from increased cultural diversity, but one person’s 
enjoyment of this diversity does not prevent other residents from enjoying these benefits as 
well. 
To be sure, not all Americans welcome cultural diversity. Since the mid-nineteenth 
century, ‘nativists’ have argued that immigrants cannot or will not adopt the democratic values 
of the US (Citrin and Sides 2008, 35). In 1986, a public opinion poll found that one third of 
respondents believed that the “biggest problem” associated with immigration was the “negative 
cultural or personality traits” of immigrants, such as their perceived inability to communicate 
in English and different ideological beliefs (Day 1990, no pagination cited in Espenshade and 
Hempstead 1996, 540). There are also similar concerns at the political level, where some 
officials fear that undocumented immigrants will undermine American culture by maintaining 
their own “private cultures” instead (Cornelius 1982, no pagination cited in Espenshade and 
Calhoun 1993, 192; see also Harwood 1986, 204-05). The 2016 election of Republican 
President Donald Trump and some of the measures he has taken to restrict resettlement in the 
US indicate that participation in resettlement and the perceived benefits of contributing to this 
durable solution remain contested today. 
However, more recent research demonstrates that the US is more accepting of cultural 
and religious heterogeneity than any European country that participated in the European Social 
Survey (Citrin and Sides 2008, 37). One could interpret the disconnect between these views 
and those of the general public as a reflection of the longstanding tension between assimilation 
and pluralism in the US. Though a detailed analysis of this debate is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the US historically adopted an assimilationist conceptualisation of immigrant 
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integration embodied in the Emersonian image of the melting pot, which became a “political 
symbol used to strengthen and legitimize the ideology of America as a land of opportunity 
where race, religion, and national origin should not be barriers to social mobility (Glazer 1993, 
125; Hirschman 1983, 398).” Though Hirschman, Kasinitz, and DeWind (1999, 129) contend 
that the assimilationist approach began to lose credibility during the civil rights movement 
given the mounting empirical evidence that “ethnicity remained an important reference point 
for urban politics,” Brubaker (2001, 533) argues that readers should not be overzealous in 
“consigning assimilation to the dustbin of history” as immigrants may demonstrate assimilation 
in some aspects of their lives and a more pluralist approach to integration in others. 
How could this conceptual approach contribute to our understanding of why the US has 
voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies? Interpreting resettlement as an 
impure public good that generates joint products including private protection benefits and 
perceived excludable, non-rival warm glow, reputational, and cultural benefits could help us 
better understand (a) why the US resettles refugees as opposed to free riding on the 
contributions of others, and (b) why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies. The US could voluntarily contribute to resettlement (as opposed to free 
riding on the contributions of other states) because of an impurely altruistic perception that it 
derives a ‘warm glow’ from ‘rescuing’ or ‘saving the lives’ of persecuted individuals and from 
actively demonstrating its respect for norms and principles such as international responsibility 
sharing and preserving access to asylum. Furthermore, the US could have voluntarily adopted 
generous resettlement admissions policies because making significant contributions to this 
durable solution is perceived to generate an even greater sense of satisfaction. Likewise, the 
US could voluntarily contribute to resettlement because the government believes it derives 
valuable reputational gains that it can leverage in other areas of the international refugee regime 
(especially because of the credibility and legitimacy it derives from resettling large numbers of 
refugees), and excludable cultural benefits for many of its citizens due to its sizeable 
contributions in this area. 
In sum, this section attempted to achieve a better understanding of the potential reasons 
why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an 
exploration of the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits. Interviews with 
senior government officials responsible for resettlement policymaking in the US and with 
representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions 
and Reception and Placement programmes indicated that there is a perceived humanitarian 
motivation for contributing to resettlement, as it can be a lifeline for individuals whose safety 
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and other fundamental rights are at risk in their respective countries of first asylum. 
Furthermore, the responses articulated by these interviewees suggests that there a perceived 
normative motivation for contributing to resettlement, as participating in this durable solution 
is consistent with the norms of international responsibility sharing embedded in the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In addition, some interviewees highlighted the 
important role of resettlement in preserving access to countries of first asylum. One could 
interpret this point of view that as consistent with contemporary UNHCR efforts to strategically 
utilise resettlement. Many of the interviewees also suggested that contributing to resettlement 
is consistent with the history, identity, and the religious and secular values of the US, and 
generates cultural benefits for receiving communities. 
To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies, and in a manner consistent with the epistemological and 
ontological foundations of this thesis, these views were interpreted in relation to the existing 
literature on refugee protection. The author suggested that the perceptions articulated by 
interviewees could be interpreted as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an 
impure public good. Contributing to resettlement and, in the process, demonstrating a 
commitment to the norms embedded in the international refugee regime and gaining cultural 
diversity, could be interpreted as an impure public good which accrues to the US through its 
contributions to this durable solution. One could interpret the generosity of resettlement 
admissions policies in the US as consistent with the literature on participation and goods 
altruism. 
To be sure, not all citizens share the views articulated by these interviewees, and there 
is growing evidence of contestation in resettlement policy. Nevertheless, the responses do offer 
a sense of how senior officials responsible for setting policy and voluntary agencies responsible 
for implementation perceive the motivations for resettlement and its benefits, helping us move 
towards a better understanding of why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies. This discussion sets the stage for an exploration of the perceived nature of 
government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement in section 2.6, and an exploration of the 
potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing 
with voluntary agencies in section 2.7. 
2.6 The Perceived Nature of Government-Voluntary Sector Relations in Resettlement 
In the preceding section, interviewees articulated their perceptions on the motivations 
for resettling refugees in the US and its benefits. Their responses paint a nuanced picture in 
which the humanitarian and normative rationale for providing resettlement complement 
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explanations concerning the history, identity, and values of the US as well as perceived 
reputational and cultural benefits. This section presents the views of senior government 
officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived nature of their relationship in 
resettlement, and endeavours to interpret these perceptions in relation to the literature. One 
could interpret the views articulated by these respondents as consistent with the dominant 
taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical evolution of 
government-voluntary sector relations in the provision of public goods and services in the US. 
However, though government officials and many voluntary agency representatives indicated 
that both parties benefit from collaboration through the Resettlement Admissions Program, 
others suggested that this partnership has certain pitfalls. One could interpret these views as 
consistent with aspects of the literature on the perils of government contracting to voluntary 
sector organisations, and points to the complexity of domestic responsibility sharing 
arrangements in resettlement. 
During the interviews, the author asked respondents to describe the perceived nature of 
government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement to the US. The author asked this 
question to better understand how government officials and voluntary agency representatives 
view their relationship in their own words. In response, many representatives from both 
government and voluntary agencies emphasised the collaborative nature of their relationship 
in the provision of this durable solution (Gershowitz 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 
2013; Negash 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). In an interview on 
10 April, 2013, Eskinder Negash, then the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, 
characterised the nature of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement as a 
partnership. Similarly, Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that voluntary sector 
organisations are “equal partners in the program” and characterised their involvement in 
resettlement as “essential,” adding that “we could not do this without those organizations 
[sic]—that goes without saying.” 
Many voluntary agency representatives described the nature of their relationship with 
the federal government in similar terms. Ambassador Johnny Young (2013) argued that 
government-voluntary agency relations are “truly a partnership. I think that’s why it works so 
well.” Ambassador Young added that voluntary agencies “don’t substitute for what the 
government does, and they don’t substitute for what we do.” In the same interview, Mr Scott 
(2013) articulated a similar view and indicated that there is a fundamental interdependence 
between the government and voluntary sector organisations in resettlement to the US, calling 
their relationship “symbiotic.” Notably, in an interview on 12 April, 2013, Erol Kekic, the 
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Executive Director of Church World Service’s Immigration and Refugee Program, also 
described government-voluntary agency relations as “symbiotic.” He explained that the 
provision of resettlement “really is a joint endeavour,” adding that it “really is something we 
plan for together and we implement together.” 
Despite emphasising the perceived collaborative nature of relations in resettlement, 
government officials and many voluntary agency representatives indicated that the federal 
government has a finite role in the financing and implementation of this durable solution. From 
a financial perspective, Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that the federal government is 
“the largest financial supporter” of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement 
programmes, and that it is “the federal dollar that let’s those services happen, up to a certain 
point.” Nevertheless, Ambassador Robinson acknowledged that voluntary sector organisations 
also contribute financial and human resources or “sweat equity” to the resettlement process.  
Mr Negash (2013) also acknowledged the limited role of government in resettlement, 
though his views diverged somewhat from those expressed by Ambassador Robinson. More 
precisely, Mr Negash argued that because the per capita grant provided to voluntary 
organisations through the Reception and Placement Program is insufficient to cover the full 
costs of resettlement, voluntary agencies contribute more to the resettlement process than they 
receive from the government. 
Many representatives from voluntary sector organisations also argued that they 
contribute additional (and often unique) resources to the resettlement process (Carey 2013; 
Gnaho 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; 
Scott 2013; Sok 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Mr Scott (2013) explained that, though the 
government provides the “overwhelming majority” of funding for resettlement, there is an 
“unofficial expectation that there will be private resources contributed. Simply because if you 
just relied on the federal money, you couldn’t do the job. It just wouldn’t be sufficient.” Mr 
Carey (2013) agreed that “We bring a lot of private resources to the process,” including 
financial resources as well as volunteers who offer tutoring assistance, transportation, language 
instruction, and other essential services. For this reason, Mr Carey (2013) described voluntary 
agencies as the “core” of the Resettlement Admissions Program. Ambassador Young (2013) 
also highlighted the important role of volunteers in the resettlement process and suggested that 
these volunteers play a ‘supplementary’ role insofar as they help local affiliates locate in-kind 
donations such as furniture and assist refugees in finding employment, among other “essential” 
services. 
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In addition to contributing funds and providing services and other forms of assistance 
that are perceived to be beyond the capacity of government, some voluntary agency 
representatives implied that voluntary agencies can deliver more specialised services. Ms Stein 
(2013) argued that the Department of State does not have the human resources to provide 
settlement and social services, nor can they offer “culturally or linguistically appropriate” 
services in the same way as local affiliates, who often employ former refugees. Ms Stein (2013) 
further argued that it was more cost-effective, pragmatic, and better for refugees for the 
government to delegate this function to voluntary agencies as these organisations contribute 
their respective resources to the resettlement process and have a wider reach through their local 
affiliates, who can more effectively build relationships with refugees. This perspective suggests 
that voluntary agencies may be perceived to enjoy a comparative advantage in the provision of 
resettlement thanks to their ability to draw on the knowledge and skills of local affiliates, 
including former resettled refugees. 
These responses suggest that government officials and voluntary agency 
representatives perceive their relationship as a partnership. This partnership appears to be an 
interdependent one in some respects, but there also appears to be a pragmatic acknowledgement 
that government support for resettlement is finite and that voluntary agencies must contribute 
their respective resources in order to support the effective reception, orientation, and 
integration of refugees through the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement 
programmes. 
To better understand the perceived structure of government-voluntary agency relations 
in resettlement, this chapter now seeks to interpret the views articulated by government 
officials and voluntary agency representatives in relation to the literature. Despite the enduring 
and extensive nature of government-voluntary sector relations in the provision of social 
services in the US, few academics have studied this pattern of service provision (Salamon 1987; 
c.f. Kramer 1981). In a widely cited paper, Salamon (1987, 29) laments that, “Few facets of 
the American welfare state have been so thoroughly overlooked or so commonly 
misunderstood as the role of the nonprofit sector and the relationships between nonprofit 
organizations [sic] and government.” Fortunately, many scholars have since taken up the 
challenge of achieving a better understanding of government-voluntary sector relations, and a 
number of taxonomies have emerged in recent years. Though some academics categorise 
government-voluntary sector relations along a unidimensional spectrum (Coston 1998), the 
more common approach has been to create discrete but potentially overlapping taxonomies that 
distinguish between cases in which governments and voluntary sector organisations have no 
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formal relationship, instances in which governments and voluntary sector organisations 
collaborate as partners or situations in which governments and voluntary sector organisations 
have developed an antagonistic relationship (Kramer 1981; Najam 2000; Saidel 1989; Young 
1999; Young 2000). 
One could interpret the responses articulated above as consistent with the dominant 
taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations. In his influential taxonomy, Young (1999; 
2000) argues that government-voluntary sector relations can be ‘complementary,’ 
‘supplementary,’ or ‘adversarial.’33 Drawing on the economic literature and, in particular, the 
seminal work of Burton Weisbrod (1975 [1986]) on the role of voluntary sector organisations 
in the provision of public goods, Young (1999, 33; 2000, 150) suggests that governments and 
voluntary sector organisations may develop complementary relationships when the provision 
of public goods and services would ordinarily require an extensive bureaucratic apparatus, 
when there is a strong likelihood of free riding, and (or) when public opinion supports 
alternative service delivery models. In response to these circumstances, governments and 
voluntary sector organisations can elect to forge a partnership in which the government 
finances the voluntary sector provision of public goods and services (Young 1999, 33; Young 
2000, 150).  
In the process, governments and voluntary sector organisations form a ‘symbiotic’ 
relationship which produces advantages for both partners (Grønbjerg 1987, 66; see also Young 
2000, 150). Though contracting out the provision of public goods and services to voluntary 
sector organisations may be more cost-effective, developing complementary relationships with 
these organisations can also enable government to overcome informational asymmetries and 
enable them (through voluntary sector organisations) to provide goods and services that are 
more tailored to the needs of the individual communities they serve (Young 2000, 154). 
Though Young does not articulate the precise benefits that voluntary sector organisations 
derive from complementary relationships, other scholars have argued that governments can 
provide voluntary sector organisations with a comparatively stable source of funding, thus 
helping to attenuate the ‘resource dependence’ problem that is endemic in the voluntary sector 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 2; Froelich 1999, 247). In the context of immigration, the provision 
of financial support to immigrant-serving community organisations can enhance organisational 
capacity in these groups (Bloemraad 2006, 165-70). 
                                                 
33 Coston (1998), Kramer (1981), and Najam (2000) all use similar conceptual frameworks and terminology. 
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In the supplementary model, voluntary sector organisations fill gaps in the demand for 
provision of public goods and services that are “unsatisfied by government (Young 1999, 33; 
Young 2000, 150).” Consequently, as government funding for a particular public good or 
service declines, private contributions—and thus the level of voluntary sector involvement—
are anticipated to increase (Young 2000, 150). Conversely, as government funding increases, 
the level of private donations and voluntary sector involvement is expected to decline.34 
However, Young (1999, 35) is keen to emphasise that the nature of government-
voluntary sector relations is not necessarily static. In addition, these categories are not mutually 
exclusive. Bremner (1988, 216) argues that the nature of government-voluntary sector relations 
can “shift from time to time to meet changing circumstances and needs,” while Young (2000, 
151) adds that government-voluntary sector relations may be simultaneously complementary, 
supplementary, and (or) adversarial. Government-voluntary sector relations in a particular 
sector are thus perhaps best understood as being potentially dynamic, with overlaps between 
complementary, supplementary, and adversarial. In the case of the US, Young (2000, 150) has 
argued that all three lenses—that is, complementary, supplementary, and adversarial—have 
been continually relevant throughout history, though one lens may dominate over others at 
certain times. 
One could also interpret the characterisation of government-voluntary sector relations 
as ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary’ as consistent with the historical development of 
relations between these parties in the US. The history of government-voluntary sector relates 
dates back to the colonial period when governments began to provide funding for “private 
educational institutions (Salamon 1987, 31-32).” Voluntary sector organisations were so 
pervasive during this period that Alexis de Toqueville (1840 [1969], 513) observed in his 
famous study of American society that “Americans of all ages, all stations of life, and all types 
of dispositions are forever forming associations. […] In every case, at the head of any new 
undertaking, where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial 
magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association.” More than one hundred years 
later, the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs—more commonly known as 
the Filer Commission—made a similar observation concerning the deep-seated role of 
                                                 
34 This is consistent with economic arguments that government funding of public goods can partially ‘crowd 
out’ private contributions (e.g. Abrams and Schmitz 1986; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Bernheim, 
1986; Coates 1998; Kingma 1989; Roberts 1984; Warr 1982; Warr 1983). However, the existence and extent of 
‘crowding out’ remains contested in the literature, as others contend that governments can provide an incentive 
for individuals to contribute to the provision of public goods through mechanisms such as charitable grants (e.g. 
Andreoni 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1986). 
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voluntary sector organisations in the US. In particular, the Commission noted that “Few aspects 
of American society are more characteristically, more famously American than the nation’s 
array of voluntary organizations [sic], and the support in both time and money that is given to 
them by its citizens (Commission 1977, 9 cited in Dobkin Hall 1987, 11).” 
This pattern of government funding for the private, voluntary provision of public goods 
continued into the nineteenth century when both state and local governments increasingly 
sought the assistance of voluntary sector organisations to “help relieve the suffering occasioned 
by rapid urbanization and industrializations [sic] […] (Salamon 1987, 32).” Kramer (1981, 59) 
partially attributes the extensive involvement of voluntary sector organisations in the provision 
of social services during this period to the belief that these organisations “should be 
encouraged” to alleviate the “burden” of government in this sector. In particular, prominent 
nineteenth-century philanthropists like Andrew Carnegie promoted a “powerful ideology of 
voluntarism” based on the belief that private charitable organisations could be a “superior 
substitute” to government action (Salamon 1997, 287). Many philanthropists also believed that 
government-funded social assistance programmes promoted dependence (Smith and Lipsky 
1993, 48-50; Young 1999, 45). In addition, many voluntary sector organisations opposed 
government intervention because they believed that the local community should bear 
responsibility for assisting those in need (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 50). When the government 
did fund voluntary sector organisations, its contribution was limited, and there was an 
expectation that these groups would draw upon their private resources to make up any shortfall 
(Smith and Lipsky 1993, 47-48). 
Voluntary sector organisations maintained a “substantial” role in the provision of social 
services throughout the development and expansion of the welfare state from the Progressive 
era until the Great Depression (Salamon 1987, 33-35; Salamon 1997, 288). Though the 
Republican President Herbert Hoover initially encouraged charitable organisations to assist 
individuals in need, the scale and scope of economic dislocation prompted Democratic 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to intervene in the provision of relief through the enactment 
of the 1935 Social Security Act and the New Deal programme (Kramer 1981, 65; Salamon 
1997, 288; Young 1999, 46). Though these developments did not fully displace the voluntary 
sector, these organisations turned their attention towards identifying needs and developing 
innovative solutions to address those requirements (Kramer 1981, 66; Salamon 1997, 288). 
Following the end of World War II, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations 
began to change as the federal government augmented funding for social services (Smith and 
Lipsky 1993, 50). However, access to entitlement programmes remained “patchy and 
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incomplete” during this period (Anheier 2005, 28). In the face of complaints regarding the 
standard of care and in response to public pressure to expand access to ‘entitlement’ 
programmes, the federal government substantially increased funding for social services during 
the era which later became known as the ‘Great Society’ period (Salamon 1997, 289; Smith 
and Lipsky 1993, 53-54). In the process, the federal government adopted the “novel” approach 
of encouraging states to contract out the delivery of services to voluntary sector organisations 
(Smith and Lipsky 1993, 55). This decision marked a watershed moment in government-
voluntary sector relations in the US and amendments to the Social Security Act of 1967 
institutionalised this approach (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 55). 
Salamon (1997, 289 original emphasis) argues that during the “Great Society” period, 
the links between the government and voluntary sector were so deep that “non-profit 
organisations were delivering a larger share of government-financed human services than all 
levels of government combined, and government support had outdistanced the support these 
institutions received from private charitable organizations by a factor of almost two to one.” 
Though the extensive federal support for voluntary sector organisations benefited many 
organisations that had faced financial struggles, some voluntary sector representatives 
expressed concern that increased federal funding would “compromise and undermine their 
mission” and constrain their ability to engage in advocacy (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 57-58). 
However, extensive federal funding for voluntary sector organisations proved short-
lived. Following his election in 1981, the Republican President Ronald Reagan adopted 
extensive retrenchment measures that had a profound impact on many voluntary sector 
organisations that depended on government funding (Salamon 2001, 23; Smith and Lipsky 
1993, 62-63 and 66). President Reagan pursued this “fundamental reordering of institutions” 
based on the belief that the federal government is a “parasite usurper of the private sector” and 
that control over governance should be given back to state and local governments and 
accompanied by economic deregulation (Dobkin Hall 1987, 12). Though subsequent 
governments have increased federal funding for social services and voluntary sector 
organisations, the current level of financial support remains lower than in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Salamon 2012, 23). 
In the context of the US, Young (2000, 157-58 and 168) argues that government-
voluntary sector relations have been “substantially mixed” relations have been “weighted 
toward the complementary mode” due to the “strong emphasis not only on free speech and 
religious freedom and diversity but also a strong popular predilection toward limiting 
government.” In the context of the US, the supplementary model appears to have dominated 
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during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the government played a “very 
modest” role in social policy and voluntary sector organisations assumed much of the 
responsibility for providing social assistance during this period of large-scale immigration and 
industrialisation (Young 2000, 157). Since the 1980s, government-voluntary sector relations in 
the US have taken on a more supplementary character, as fiscal conservatism has prompted the 
government to assume a more “passive” role in the provision of public goods and services, 
while ‘expecting’ the voluntary sector to fill the gaps by raising funds and supplying volunteers 
(Young 2000, 158).  
He contends that the complementary lens is most useful for understanding the pattern 
of government-voluntary sector relations since the end of World War II when the government 
assumed a more active role in social policy but sought to minimise the size of its administrative 
and operational apparatuses. Though Young (2000, 158) argues that the scope of government-
voluntary sector partnerships in the US has expanded since the 1980s, he contends that the 
nature of this relationship has shifted away from complementary towards supplementary as the 
federal government has withdrawn its financial support for a number of social services. Young 
(2000, 168) concludes that “Thus, despite historical ebbs and flows, the US has always nurtured 
a stream of voluntary activity parallel to and independent of government, as well as a 
substantial adversarial component to its nonprofit sector.”  
The interpretation of current government-voluntary sector relations as moving from 
supplementary to both complementary and supplementary also appears to align with the 
historical evolution of government-voluntary agencies in resettlement. Before World War II, 
the government and voluntary agencies had a clear division of responsibilities insofar as the 
government established admissions policies and voluntary agencies safeguarded against 
refugees becoming a “public burden” following their arrival in the US (Haines 2010, 143). 
However, the onset of World War II proved to be formative for the development of 
partnerships between the government and voluntary agencies. During World War II, President 
Roosevelt created the War Relief Control Board to coordinate efforts by government bodies 
and voluntary agencies to provide humanitarian relief overseas (Brown and Scribner 2014, 
103). In many ways, the activities of the War Relief Control Board simply extended the 
domestic assistance that voluntary agencies had long provided to new immigrants to the US 
(Zucker 1983, 173). Nevertheless, the creation of the Board also precipitated the formation of 
the American Council of Voluntary Agencies in Foreign Service—an interfaith organisation of 
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish groups who coordinated the efforts of participating voluntary 
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agencies and served as an “interlocutor” with the federal government (Brown and Scribner 
2014, 104). 
Despite this new initiative, the federal government and voluntary agencies did not 
immediately form partnerships. Though voluntary agencies lacked sufficient resources to 
effectively address a crisis of this scale, the federal government initially declined to offer 
financial assistance as some “influential government officials” opposed efforts by President 
Roosevelt and President Truman to resettle European refugees in the US (Brown and Scribner 
2014, 104). The Corporate Affidavit Program introduced in 1946 required voluntary agencies 
to fund travel costs for each resettled refuge and to provide financial support to refugees 
following their arrival—a measure which ensured that these refugees could be admitted to the 
US while circumventing requirements designed to ensure that no immigrant would become a 
“public charge (Zucker 1983, 173; see also Brown and Scribner 2014, 104 and Hutchinson 
1981, 529).” Though the division of responsibilities under the Program was less than equal, the 
Corporate Affidavit Program constitutes the first institutionalised form of collaboration 
between the federal government and voluntary agencies on resettlement to the US. In this way, 
the Corporate Affidavit Program sowed the “seeds” which would grow throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century and become fully fleshed out and institutionalised in the Refugee 
Act of 1980 (Brown and Scribner 2014, 103). 
However, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 precipitated a notable change in 
government-voluntary sector relations. The Act established the US Displaced Persons 
Commission to identify and select refugees in need of resettlement in the US (Genizi 1993, 
114-15). The Commission granted 19 voluntary agencies responsibility for locating American 
citizens willing to offer jobs and housing to the refugees (Genizi 1993, 116 and 119). In 
addition, state-level Displaced Persons commissions worked with the voluntary and private 
sectors to raise awareness about the crisis and to facilitate the integration of refugees following 
their arrival (Genizi 1993, 120). Though operational problems hampered the implementation 
of the Act, the Commission nevertheless succeeded in resettling nearly 400,000 refugees 
between 1948 and 1952 (Genizi 1993, 127). 
During the Hungarian refugee crisis, the voluntary sector assumed a more prominent 
role in resettlement (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 59). However, their increased role can be 
attributed more to the lack of federal capacity to respond to the sudden outflow of refugees 
than to a deliberate decision to involve the voluntary agencies more in refugee protection 
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 59). Nevertheless, voluntary agencies took on the responsibility 
of selecting refugees for resettlement, as well as continuing their role in offering reception and 
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integration support to refugees after arrival (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 59). For its part, the 
government funded the transportation of some of the Hungarian refugees, and also assisted 
them in finding employment and housing, as well as raising awareness and building community 
support for resettlement through the President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief 
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 60). 
Though unrelated to resettlement, the increase in Cuban asylum seekers from 1960 
onwards prompted a “major change” in government-voluntary sector relations in refugee 
protection as it marked the first time that the government agreed to provide funding to directly 
support the work of voluntary sector organisations (Haines 2010, 144). In 1960, President 
Eisenhower created the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami, Florida to help voluntary 
agencies coordinate their assistance efforts (García 1996, 21; Sargent, Hohm, and Moser 1999, 
404). The administration characterised the arrival of Cuban asylum seekers as a unique and 
temporary situation, and so it declined to provide any direct financial assistance to voluntary 
agencies, which remained responsible for collecting clothing and food for asylum seekers and 
helping them access health services (García 1996, 21).  
However, the Democratic President John F. Kennedy soon began to characterise 
Cubans as victims of the Cold War and claimed that the US had a duty to admit them (García 
1996, 22). In 1961, President Kennedy established the Cuban Refugee Program which funded 
their resettlement and basic needs including food, medical care, employment training, and adult 
education (García 1996, 23; Sargent, Hohm, and Moser 1999, 404). Gibney (2004, 149) notes 
that federal intervention alleviated state and local budgetary pressures while offering a “level 
of services for Cuban refugees that was at the time unprecedented even for US citizens.” In 
1962, President Kennedy introduced the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. Holman 
(1992, 7-8) notes that this “was the first legislation specifically authorising a broad array of 
domestic assistance and services for refugees within the US and the funds to pay for them.” 
The structure of government-voluntary agency relations which evolved during the 
Cuban ‘asylee’ crisis became a model which the government replicated during the Southeast 
Asian refugee crisis. That is, the government assumed responsibility for the processing of 
resettlement applications for these refugees and offered federal funding to state and local 
governments, while voluntary agencies provided the practical post-arrival assistance and 
services required to help refugees adjust to their new environment (Haines 2010, 145). In 
particular, the federal government contracted nine voluntary agencies to provide “reception and 
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placement” services for these refugees (Robinson 1998, 130).35 In exchange, the federal 
government provided voluntary agencies with a per capita grant of US$500 (Robinson 1998, 
130).  
During this period, voluntary agencies had considerable discretion in how they utilised 
these grants and delivered services. For example, whereas the International Rescue Committee 
allocated the funds on an ad hoc basis in response to particular refugee needs (such as the 
purchase of winter clothing), the US Conference of Catholic Bishops offered refugees an 
upfront payment of US$300, supplemented by in-kind assistance (Robinson 1998, 131). In 
addition, some faith-based organisations secured ‘sponsorships’ from their constituent 
churches, who agreed to undertake “financial and personal responsibility” for refugees for up 
to two years following their arrival in the US (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 115; Robinson 1998, 
131). Other agencies, such as HIAS, “relied on professionally trained social workers and staff 
to do the bulk of the resettlement work (Robinson 1998, 131).” 
However, the increasing scale of resettlement admissions from Southeast Asia to the 
US revealed inconsistencies in both the legislative framework on resettlement and the delivery 
of services for resettled refugees (Haines 2010, 145). Indeed, the legislation and delivery of 
services was a patchwork of policies and programmes that varied by voluntary agency and 
refugee origin (Haines 2010, 145). The absence of a cohesive refugee programme prompted 
Senator Edward Kennedy to organise congressional hearings on the establishment of a new 
legislative basis for resettlement, which became the Refugee Act of 1980 (Haines 2010, 146). 
When interpreted in relation to the dominant typology on government-voluntary sector 
relations, these developments suggest that government-voluntary agency relations in 
resettlement have evolved from supplementary to more complementary over time, though this 
evolution has not always been a linear one, and there are still ‘supplementary’ elements in the 
structure of relations under the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement 
programmes, as evident in both the structure of these programmes and in the statements 
articulated by interviewees. 
The extensive connections between the federal government and voluntary agencies in 
resettlement could facilitate the development of an increasingly complementary relationship 
between these parties. Kramer (1981, 224) notes that there are often close connections between 
the government and voluntary sector organisations in the US. Dobkin Hall (1987, 17) notes 
                                                 
35 Five of the voluntary agencies cited by Robinson (1998, 130) continue to implement the Reception and 
Placement Program today. They include Church World Service, HIAS, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Service, the International Rescue Committee, and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops. 
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that there is often “interpenetration” between the government and non-profit sectors, such that 
government officials often work in the voluntary sector at some point in their career, and vice 
versa. 
In the context of resettlement, there appears to be some “interpenetration” between 
some government officials and voluntary agency representatives who previously held 
leadership positions in this area. In addition to the case of Ambassador Young, Lavinia Limón, 
the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants, is also a former Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Furthermore, Bob 
Carey, the former Vice President of Resettlement and Migration Policy at the International 
Rescue Committee, is currently the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement. In addition, 
Eskinder Negash, the former Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, is now the Acting 
Chief Executive Officer at the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. In a further 
illustration of the close interconnection between the government and voluntary sector 
organisations working on resettlement in the US, former Assistant Secretary Eric Schwartz was 
appointed President of Refugees International in June 2017. Refugees International is a 
charitable organisation based in Washington, DC that advocates for “assistance and protection 
(Refugees International 2018, no pagination).” 
In addition to contributing additional resources, whether financial, in-kind, or services 
provided by volunteers, several respondents indicated that voluntary agencies play a unique 
role in local communities. Mr Carey (2013) described voluntary agencies as “the bridge to the 
communities.” Mr Kekic (2013) underlined the important role of local affiliates in building a 
“crucial link” between resettled refugees and the receiving community, arguing that the 
programme could not function as well as it does without community “engagement” and 
“ownership.” In an interview on 16 April, 2013, Ruth Famini, the Director of National 
Resettlement Programs at World Relief explained that the government has delegated the 
implementation of the Reception and Placement programme to voluntary agencies, who have 
developed a dual role as both as the “agents” of government in resettlement and the “liaison 
between government and receiving communities.” 
For some, voluntary agencies also play an important role in providing social support to 
resettled refugees. Mr Kosten (2013) explained that “I believe from a faith perspective that 
we’re called to welcome people. And welcoming people means also meeting certain needs. 
They may be social needs, just relational, you know? Befriending them. Oftentimes, I think, 
when we think of needs, we think of immediately financial resources, but there are 
psychological, emotional, you know, social needs that society at large can meet that I don’t 
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think that government can meet.” These views are consistent with the views that Mr Kosten 
expressed in the preceding section on the nature of resettlement as an expression of religious 
faith. This perspective suggests that faith not only guides how some representatives at World 
Relief perceive the motivations for resettlement but also how the organisation may perceive its 
role in the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. 
The responses concerning the role of voluntary agencies in creating links to receiving 
communities could be interpreted as consistent with the literature on voluntary sector 
organisations and democracy. Once voluntary sector organisations emerge, they become an 
inalienable component of robust democratic systems. Robert Dahl, the eminent political 
scientist known for his influential theory of power, argued that voluntary associations are 
“necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself,” as organisational pluralism 
preserves political liberty and guards against government coercion (Dahl 1982, 1). Voluntary 
associations also contribute to democratic stability by providing a mechanism through which 
to accommodate divergent citizen preferences, and the interests and values embedded within 
these preferences (Dahl 1982, 42). In this way, Douglas (1987, 47) argues that a robust 
voluntary sector “addresses the central paradox of democracy—that the people are sovereign 
but many: there is not one will of the people but several, sometimes contradictory wills.” 
However, Anheier (2005, 21-22) also contends that the deep involvement of voluntary sector 
organisations is connected to the “cultural self-understanding” of the American people, who 
view their country as an “ongoing ‘experiment’ in civility, community, democracy, and self-
governance.” Kramer (1981, 75) attributes this to the ideological conflict between “Social 
Darwinism, laissez-faire, individualism, free enterprise, and a distrust of government [and] 
human liberalism and a belief in progress and in governmental intervention to achieve security 
and equality,” and to the perception that voluntary sector organisations are a crucial component 
of representative democracy. 
The comments articulated by Ambassador Young (2013) and Ms Famini (2013) on the 
nature of voluntary agencies as “implementers” and “agents” are interesting when contrasted 
against observations from Mr Negash (2013). In particular, Mr Negash (2013) observed that 
government contracting could be ‘hazardous’ for voluntary agencies insofar as it places 
pressure on these organisations and can lead them to become ‘government agents.’ Mr Negash 
(2013) argued that this can lead to mission drift, and noted that voluntary agencies must be 
careful to maintain a balance in their relationship with government and the communities they 
serve. 
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Though none of the voluntary agency representatives interviewed as part of this thesis 
raised concerns about mission drift, some observed that the nature of government-voluntary 
agency relations are fluid and suggested voluntary agencies now have less discretion than they 
once did (Gershowitz 2013; Kekic 2013; Limón 2013). For example, Mr Gershowitz (2013) 
noted that the government has become more “prescriptive” in its approach to resettlement in 
recent years, and voluntary agencies now have less discretion to determine the placement of 
refugees. Mr Gershowitz (2013) added that reporting requirements have also increased due to 
concerns raised by elected officials and members of the press. Similarly, in an interview on 9 
April, 2013, Ms Limón, then the President and Chief Executive Officer of the US Committee 
for Refugees and Immigrants, noted that the programme has become more prescriptive and 
professionalised since the Southeast Asian refugee crisis, and that voluntary agencies have 
much less discretion in how they deliver services today. Indeed, the Department of State 
requires voluntary sector organisations to sign a ‘cooperative agreement’ which establishes the 
resources and services that these organisations must provide through the Reception and 
Placement Program and the standards they must meet in doing so, among other stipulations 
(for an example of this agreement and an oversight report, see Department of State 2001 and 
Lutheran Social Services 2017). However, Ms Limón argued that the detailed nature of the 
cooperative agreements leaves very little discretion for voluntary agencies. Ms Limón asserted, 
“You can’t leave it up to the volunteer to even furnish the apartment—the agreement tells you 
how many forks you have to have and how many chairs you have to have, and you know, it’s 
kind of ridiculous.” Ms Limón argued that these “stringent” requirements had “changed the 
character” of the Reception and Placement program. 
Though government funding generally represents a stable source of revenue for 
voluntary sector organisations, scholars continue to debate whether this source of funding can 
induce “goal displacement” or mission drift (Froelich 1999, 255). Though the empirical 
evidence on mission drift appears mixed and none of the voluntary agency representatives 
interviewed for this thesis raised such concerns, there is “overwhelming evidence” that 
government funding induces “professionalization, bureaucratization, and loss of administrative 
autonomy (Froelich 1999, 256; see also Eikenberry and Kluver 2004 and Kramer 1981, 165).” 
To be sure, some monitoring is necessary as governments must ensure that organisations meet 
the necessary legislative requirements. However, Froelich (1999, 256) notes that 
‘bureaucratization’ can reach extremes, in which “Even minute procedural details are specified, 
leading to high administrative overhead and limited management discretion.” These measures 
can result in “Responsiveness to the needs of clients is subordinated to equitable treatment of 
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the public, effectiveness is superseded by accountability, program [sic] and method variety are 
lost to standardization, and the nonprofit’s discretion is tightly constrained by government 
contract expectations (Froelich 1999, 257).” Ultimately, Froelich (1999, 257) warns there is a 
risk that “procedures rather than outcomes dominate nonprofit actions.” 
In the case of resettlement, voluntary agencies must sign detailed cooperative 
agreements with the Department of State which set standards on the provision of housing and 
furnishings, food, clothing, and other essential items that voluntary agencies must provide 
through the Reception and Placement Program (US Department of State 2001, 1-5). Many of 
these requirements appear designed to ensure that refugees live in safe, affordable 
accommodation and to ensure that all refugees—who may have very few possessions—have 
the necessities to live in a modicum of comfort. 
However, the comments from Mr Negash on the potential ‘hazards’ of government-
voluntary sector partnerships and the observations from Mr Gershowitz and Ms Limón on the 
increasing prescriptiveness and drive towards professionalisation also align with some of the 
literature in this area. In the US, determining voluntary sector reliance on government funding 
can be challenging, but it is not uncommon for voluntary sector organisations to depend more 
on government funding and private charitable donations for their survival than other voluntary 
sector organisations (Boris and Mosher-Williams 1998, 494-95; Froelich 1999, 255; Jenkins 
2006, 310). 
Nawyn (2005, 59) attests to the potential vulnerability of voluntary agencies in 
resettlement. Since federal budget appropriations for resettlement vary according to the 
resettlement ceiling established each fiscal year, the grants and contributions allocated by the 
federal government to voluntary agencies can also vary from year to year. Thus, a decrease in 
the resettlement ceiling and funding may force voluntary agencies to reduce their staff (Nawyn 
2005, 64). Many voluntary agencies also struggled to stay afloat following the decline in 
resettlement admissions after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. The attacks 
precipitated a change in budget priorities and also coincided with a period of economic 
stagnation. These developments further constrained the budget for resettlement and the grants 
and contributions allocated to voluntary agencies, forcing many to downsize their staff (Nawyn 
2005, 65). The introduction of enhanced security screening measures also contributed to a 
backlog in applications, particularly for refugees seeking resettlement from countries in Africa 
and the Middle East, and consequently, voluntary agencies that primarily resettled refugees 
from these regions were particularly affected by these circumstances (Nawyn 2005, 65). This 
change indicates that voluntary agencies may be vulnerable due to their dependence on 
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government grants and contributions, which can change according to changes in spending 
priorities and unexpected events. 
Recent developments in the US illustrate the potentially negative implications of 
voluntary agency dependence on government funding. In February 2017, World Relief 
announced that it was obliged to close the offices of five local affiliates and layoff more than 
140 members of staff as a “direct result” of the executive order issued the previous month 
(World Relief 2017, para. 1 of 4). The potentially negative implications of government-
voluntary agency partnerships have also manifested themselves in the recent cuts to the 
resettlement ceiling and the concomitant reduction in appropriations for the Refugee 
Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. In December 2017, the Department of 
State announced that voluntary agencies that planned to resettle fewer than 100 refugees 
through local affiliates would no longer be permitted to do so, as a means of lowering 
administrative costs (Torbati and Rosenberg 2017, para. 6 and 10 of 21). The decision means 
that “several dozen” local affiliates across the US may be forced to close, and the loss of 
services may adversely affect the integration of refugees and other immigrants already settled 
in those communities (Torbati and Rosenberg 2017, para. 8 and 9 of 21). For this reason, further 
research that examines voluntary agency dependence on government funding in greater detail 
and that considers the potential implications in relation to the broader context of government-
voluntary sector relations could be beneficial. 
In sum, interviews with senior government officials and voluntary agency 
representatives indicate that these parties perceive their relationship as collaborative, with a 
sense of interdependence between them. Government officials and voluntary agency 
representatives also acknowledged that there are constraints on the involvement of the federal 
government in resettlement to the US, and voluntary agencies contribute financial and in-kind 
resources that are perceived to extend beyond what the federal government can offer. These 
views could be interpreted as consistent with categorisations of government-voluntary sector 
relations as ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary,’ and suggests that the structure of the 
Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes enables the federal 
government and voluntary agencies to leverage their respective comparative advantages. 
Despite the positive characterisations conveyed by government and voluntary agency 
representatives alike, some interviewees raised concerns about the impact of government 
funding and the declining discretion afforded to voluntary agencies in the implementation of 
these programmes. This nuanced picture of the perceived nature of government-voluntary 
Page 101 of 361 
 
sector relations sets the stage for an exploration of the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing below. 
2.7 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Domestic 
Responsibility Sharing 
In the preceding section, interviews with senior government officials and voluntary 
agency representatives indicated that government and voluntary sector organisations have a 
collaborative relationship, which one could interpret as both complementary and 
supplementary in nature. This section presents the views of government officials and voluntary 
agency representatives on the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and 
domestic responsibility sharing. Most interviewees indicated that domestic responsibility 
sharing with voluntary agencies has enhanced resettlement admissions, and one could interpret 
this perception as consistent with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector 
organisations in providing public goods and services. Though voluntary agencies have played 
an important historical and contemporary role in resettlement, the literature on resettlement to 
the US indicates that political vagaries have also influenced admissions. Despite the tradition 
of broad, bipartisan support for resettlement, recent developments could indicate increasing 
political polarisation and discord on resettlement that may impact resettlement admissions in 
the future. 
When asked about the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and 
domestic responsibility sharing, the majority of interviewees indicated that the involvement of 
voluntary agencies had enhanced resettlement admissions to the US (Carey 2013; Gnaho 2013; 
Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Scott 2013; 
Stein 2013; Young 2013). Many voluntary agency representatives were unequivocal in their 
responses. Ms Stein (2013) argued that resettlement admissions have “undoubtedly” increased 
through domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations. In a joint 
interview on 11 April, 2013, Anam Gnaho, the Self-Sufficiency Programs Manager, and Emily 
Nesheim Bullock, the Refugee Resettlement Program Manager at the Ethiopian Community 
and Development Council, explained that resettlement capacity is augmented through domestic 
responsibility sharing, as local affiliates help expand the number of receiving communities and 
build community support for the programme. For his part, Mr Kekic (2013) succinctly stated 
that, “Voluntary agencies are the capacity of the US to resettle refugees, period.” 
In addition, both Ms Limón (2013) and Mr Scott (2013) argued that the government 
simply cannot resettle refugees without the involvement of voluntary agencies. Ms Limón 
(2013) argued that “there’s no way that government could do what we do” as individuals who 
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work for voluntary agencies perceive it as a “mission” and so staff demonstrate a unique level 
of commitment to assisting refugees. Mr Scott (2013) reiterated his view that the government 
and voluntary agencies have a partnership in resettlement, explaining, “The government knows 
that it can’t do this on its own. […] One cannot survive without the other. I mean, we couldn’t 
do it because the government has to bring in the refugees, but the government couldn’t bring 
in the refugees without the agencies.” These views appear consistent with the responses 
articulated in section 2.6 on the interdependence of the federal government and voluntary 
agencies, and could be interpreted as consistent with the literature which suggests these parties 
have developed a relationship of “mutual dependence” in which the government depends on 
voluntary sector organisations to deliver social services, while these groups rely on government 
contracts and grants in order to sustain themselves (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 4). 
Furthermore, some interviewees suggested that the US could adopt generous 
resettlement admissions policies due in part to a perception that domestic responsibility reduces 
the federal share of costs for resettlement (Carey 2013; Kekic 2013; Limón 2013; Scott 2013; 
Stein 2013). Mr Carey (2013) argued that resettlement admissions had “absolutely” increased 
through domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations due in part to the 
fact that these organisations “leverage the federal monies to maximum effect.” Similarly, Mr 
Scott (2013) argued, “The agencies certainly stretch that government dollar much further than 
the government could, that’s for sure.” In addition, Mr Kekic (2013) explained that the 
Resettlement Admissions Program is structured “in a way to allow us to do this and to do it at 
the level where we’re doing it. If government had to fund all these services, we would probably 
have an admission program [sic] of five thousand people a year.” 
However, one interviewee stated that he perceived no relationship between resettlement 
admissions and the existence of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing through 
government-voluntary agency partnerships in resettlement to the US. In particular, Mr 
Gershowitz (2013) argued that resettlement admissions decisions are “much more of a political 
decision than it is—I mean, it is to some extent economics now with the budgetary issues—but 
most of the trends that we’ve seen in the program [sic] over the last 20, I would say, or even 
30 years even, are political or also responding to crises overseas.” One could interpret the view 
articulated by Mr Gershowitz as consistent with the literature which highlights the relationship 
between resettlement admissions and foreign policy, as discussed in chapter one. 
Though most respondents argued that resettlement admissions have increased through 
domestic responsibility sharing, some respondents maintained that the US could resettle an 
even larger number of refugees (Kosten 2013; Young 2013). Mr Kosten (2013) argued that 
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“our current numbers are woefully inadequate for the need.” Similarly, Ambassador Young 
(2013) contended that the US should “take a stronger position in admitting more refugees” and 
explained: 
 
“We can do more—a lot more. I mean, it’s a country of 325 million now, or what have you. A vast land. 
And when you travel over this country and you see all the land that’s there, there’s no question in my 
mind that we can take more. You know, people wanted to cut down on the numbers years ago, and we 
brought them in, they integrated, they’ve done well, they’re making their contribution to the US…we 
can do much more, much more.” 
 
The responses articulated indicate that the majority of respondents perceive that 
resettlement admissions have been enhanced through domestic responsibility sharing with 
voluntary agencies and contribute to our understanding of why the US has voluntarily adopted 
generous resettlement admissions policies. However, in the hope of achieving a more 
meaningful understanding of these views, it useful to consider some of the potential 
explanations for why collaboration between the federal government and voluntary sector 
organisations has become such a prominent feature in the delivery of public goods and services 
in the US. This question has attracted the attention of economists, sociologists, and political 
scientists, and there is no consensus in the literature to date. 
 Burton A. Weisbrod (1975 [1986]) was the first economist to develop a theory on the 
emergence of voluntary sector organisations. Kingma (1997, 135) describes his work as “a 
cornerstone in the literature on the economics of non-profit organisations,” and his ideas have 
exerted considerable influence on political scientists and taxonomies on government-voluntary 
sector relations. In his model of a three-sector economy, Weisbrod (1975 [1986], 3 and 8-9) 
assumes that individual characteristics such as income, education, ethnicity, and religion 
influence preferences concerning the provision of private and “collective consumption” goods. 
Because governments provide collective consumption goods at a level that corresponds to the 
preferences of the median voter, Weisbrod (1975 [1986], 8-9) theorises that a segment of the 
population will be dissatisfied with the government provision of a particular collective 
consumption good.36 On that basis, Weisbrod (1975 [1986), 15) theorises that when the 
government or private sector organisations provide collective consumption goods at a level that 
leaves a segment of the population ‘unsatisfied,’ those individuals will seek out additional 
goods from the voluntary sector. 
                                                 
36 Billis and Glennerster (1998), Grønbjerg (1998), Najam (2000), Salamon (1987), Salamon and Anheier 
(1998), and Young (1999; 2000) refer to this as “government failure.” 
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This demand-driven theory is not the only economic theory on voluntary sector 
provision of public goods and services. Drawing on principal-agent theory and the concept of 
‘contract failure,’ Hansmann (1987, 29) theorises that individuals turn to the voluntary sector 
when they have asymmetric information about public goods and services and fear that private 
sector organisations could exploit their ignorance. Hansmann (1987, 29) suggests that 
individuals turn to the voluntary sector because they perceive these organisations as more 
trustworthy due to the ‘nondistribution constraint’—a concept which suggests that voluntary 
sector organisations can pursue profit-oriented activities but do not benefit from their revenue, 
thus minimising the risk of consumer exploitation. 
Steinberg and Gray (1993, 29) build on the “seminal” work of Hansmann and attempt 
to explain why individuals turn to the voluntary sector as opposed to the government, and why 
these organisations respond to public demands to provide goods and services. Steinberg and 
Gray (1993, 299) argue that individuals turn to the voluntary sector when the government fails 
to provide adequate public goods and services due to bureaucratic or political factors, including 
constraints imposed by median voter preferences. In this way, their analysis mirrors the 
arguments advanced by Weisbrod in his renowned 1975 paper. In addition, Steinberg and Gray 
(1993, 300) contend that ‘entrepreneurs’ may be motivated to form voluntary sector 
organisations in response to instances of contract failure for pragmatic reasons or ideological 
reasons, such religious groups who form voluntary sector organisations because their values 
are incongruent with a profit motive. 
However, some political scientists have expressed doubt about these economic 
arguments. Salamon (1987, 36) argues that the fact that governments regulate the behaviour of 
voluntary sector organisations indicates that these organisations are not fundamentally more 
trustworthy than for-profit enterprises. Second, Salamon (1987, 36) argues that governments 
have a strong incentive to maintain public trust and government action is constrained by 
legislation and regulations, so individuals should rely more on government-provided goods and 
services than on those offered by voluntary sector organisations. Though contract failure theory 
may help us understand why private markets fail to provide public goods and services 
(Grønbjerg 1998, 139), Salamon (1987, 35-36) argues that this approach does not explain 
extensive government financing for the voluntary provision of public goods and services. 
In the context of resettlement, it is possible that median voter preferences in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries opposed government provision of public goods and 
services for groups including immigrants, asylum seekers, and (or) refugees. In response, a 
small number of individuals may have approached voluntary sector organisations to request 
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their assistance in this area, believing that voluntary sector organisations would be less likely 
to exploit newcomers to the US. It is also possible that ‘entrepreneurial’ individuals may have 
formed voluntary sector organisations to address these demands, or that existing voluntary 
sector organisations may have responded to these needs for ideological reasons. Given that 
many of the voluntary agencies that originally provided assistance to resettled refugees were 
faith-based organisations, religious beliefs may have been a powerful motivator during this 
period. Though these could be plausible suppositions, further research on public attitudes 
towards government involvement in immigration, asylum, and refugee protection and on the 
origins of the voluntary agencies that first began providing services for immigrants and persons 
in need of protection would be needed to better ascertain the validity of these economic 
explanations. 
Sociologists have also sought to understand the emergence of voluntary sector 
organisations. Much of this literature stems from the work of Helmut K. Anheier, Dean of the 
Hertie School of Governance and a comparative sociologist who has devoted much of his 
career to the study of voluntary sector organisations. In a joint paper, Salamon and Anheier 
(1998, 213) argue that one can best understand the development of voluntary sector 
organisations in the provision of public goods and services by considering how these 
organisations are “embedded” within “broader social, political, and economic realities.” This 
approach can complicate the analysis of voluntary sector organisations, but may also remedy 
the “sweeping and one-dimensional” nature of many influential theories of the voluntary sector 
(Salamon and Anheier 1998, 213). Considering how the broader socio-economic and political 
context shapes voluntary sector organisations is especially important given that many voluntary 
sector organisations are not merely service providers but also centres for the coordination of 
political and social action (Salamon and Anheier 1998, 227). In the context of resettlement, 
Nawyn (2006, 36-39) acknowledges that voluntary sector organisations are “not merely 
extensions of the state social welfare apparatus” and argues that these organisations can act as 
refugee advocates and offer spaces in which refugees can celebrate their respective cultures 
and faiths (Nawyn 2006, 40). 
In contrast to economists and political scientists, sociologists tend to characterise the 
emergence and persistence of government-voluntary sector partnerships in the delivery of 
social goods and services as more of an unintended consequence than a deliberate component 
of institutional design (Moulton and Anheier 2001, 1). More precisely, scholars suggest that 
government-voluntary sector partnerships emerged as a consequence of the demand-driven 
nature of social policy in the US and the “tension” between “deeply seated notions of American 
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individualism and self-reliance” and “commitments to community, formal equality, justice and 
civic virtues […] (Moulton and Anheier 2001, 3).” The comparatively small size of the federal 
government in relation to other countries, as well as the small size of local and state 
governments, means that the US has limited capacity—both in terms of human and financial 
resources—to deliver the services demanded by its citizens (Moulton and Anheier 2001, 3). 
Some scholars further link the emergence of voluntary sector involvement in the 
provision of public goods and services to attitudes on the separation of powers and perceived 
values. Anheier (2005, 22) argues that the rejection of both absolutist rule and close links 
between church and state has fuelled the growth of the voluntary sector since the earliest days 
of the republic. However, Anheier (2005, 21-22) also connects the deep involvement of 
voluntary sector organisations to the “cultural self-understanding” of the American people, 
who view their country as an “ongoing ‘experiment’ in civility, community, democracy, and 
self-governance.” Similarly, Kramer (1981, 75) argues that this can be attributed to the 
ideological conflict between “Social Darwinism, laissez-faire, individualism, free enterprise, 
and a distrust of government [and] human liberalism and a belief in progress and in 
governmental intervention to achieve security and equality,” and to the perception that 
voluntary sector organisations are a crucial component of representative democracy. 
Finally, political scientists have also attempted to understand the emergence of 
government-voluntary sector partnerships in the provision of public goods and services. 
Salamon (1990, 222) argues that the US has developed a peculiar form of “third party 
government” in which the federal government formulates policy and funds the provision of 
services, which are then delivered by other institutions, including the voluntary sector. Salamon 
(1997, 281-83) contends that this organisational structure emerged out of the pragmatic need 
to serve a geographically dispersed population and due to ideological opposition to excessive 
concentrations of power and widespread support for individualism. Therefore, Salamon (1990, 
222) asserts that this approach enables the government to ensure that citizens have widespread 
access to social assistance and services “without unduly enlarging the administrative apparatus 
of the state.” In other words, one could interpret the development of ‘third party government’ 
as a pragmatic response to the realities of governing a large, low-density federal system and to 
ideological views on the appropriate role of government in society (Salamon 1987, 37). 
Other academics adopt a different approach to examining the development of voluntary 
sector involvement in the provision of public goods and services by exploring the role of 
voluntary sector organisations in embodying and giving life to the diverse preferences of 
citizens in democratic societies. In the civil society literature, scholars such (Anheier 2009, 
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1085) characterise the emergence of such organisations as a pre-condition for the development 
of democratic institutions. Anheier (2009, 1085-86) argues that voluntary sector organisations 
act as a locus of civic participation and thus enable individuals to build and further develop the 
inclusive bonds of social trust and reciprocity that constitute the foundation of democratic 
institutions. Furthermore, DiMaggio and Anheier (1990, 151) contend that voluntary sector 
organisations can also serve as extra-governmental centres for organisation and influence 
among the disenfranchised. 
Once voluntary sector organisations materialise, they become an inalienable component 
of robust democratic systems. Robert Dahl, the eminent political scientist renowned for his 
influential theory of power, argued that voluntary ‘associations’ are “necessary to the 
functioning of the democratic process itself,” as organisational pluralism preserves political 
liberty and guards against government coercion (Dahl 1982, 1). In addition to acting as centres 
for civic participation, voluntary sector organisations can serve as a “bulwark” against 
excessive government power by disseminating information and contributing to deliberative 
democracy through the aggregation and representation of a diverse range of public views 
(Anheier 2009, 1086; Warren 2003, 46-47).37 
The role of voluntary sector organisations in representing a variety of public views also 
reflects their role in representing the diverse preferences and interests of citizens. Dahl (1982, 
42) argues that voluntary associations contribute to democratic stability by providing a 
mechanism to accommodate divergent citizen preferences and the interests and values 
embedded within these preferences.38 Douglas (1987, 47) argues that a robust voluntary sector 
“addresses the central paradox of democracy—that the people are sovereign but many: there is 
not one will of the people but several, sometimes contradictory wills.” This representative role 
appears important in the US, where citizens have paradoxical preferences regarding the 
provision of public goods and the size of government (Salamon 1987, 37).  
In light of their role in representing diverse interests, many social scientists have argued 
that voluntary sector organisations also play an important experimental role in developing new 
and innovative approaches (Anheier 2009, 1092; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990, 151; Dobkin 
Hall 1987, 17-18; Douglas 1987, 48; Salamon 1987, 37-38). Of course, if the innovative 
                                                 
37 This complements Young’s (1999; 2000) influential taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, 
which acknowledges the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of relations between these parties. This framework is 
discussed in further detail in chapter three. 
38 There are interesting parallels between Dahl’s view on voluntary associations and Weisbrod’s assumptions 
concerning the heterogeneity of public preferences and the implications for voluntary sector involvement in the 
provision of public goods and services. 
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practices adopted by voluntary sector organisations prove successful and there is sufficient 
public demand for such goods or services, the government is free to institutionalise these 
practices (Douglas 1987, 48). 
However one chooses to interpret the responses concerning the perceived relationship 
between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and regardless of how 
one chooses to view the broader rationale for government-voluntary sector partnerships in the 
US, recent political developments indicate that the provision of resettlement and the 
involvement of voluntary agencies in this process is not uncontested. 
Many academics, members of the media, and voluntary agencies assert that resettlement 
has historically enjoyed ‘bipartisan support’ from both Democrats and Republicans (c.f. Amos 
2017, para. 3 and 18 of 35; International Rescue Committee 2017, 1; Orchard 2017, para. 1 and 
17 of 31; Rhodan 2017, para. 6 of 13; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 
15 of 21). Indeed, the Refugee Act of 1980 was the product of a bipartisan Senate bill (S. 643) 
put forward by Senator Kennedy and co-sponsored by 14 other Senators, including Jacob 
Javits, the Republican Senator for New York and Mark Hatfield, the Republican Senator for 
Oregon (US Congress no date, no pagination). The bill received the unanimous support of all 
85 Senators (US Congress no date, no pagination). Though the House of Representatives was 
more divided on the issue of refugee protection, the House conducted “repeated negotiations” 
that eventually resulted in a coherent bill which was approved by the House of Representatives 
by a vote of 207 to 192 (Kennedy 1981, 144; US Congress no date, no pagination). 
The politics of refugee protection and refugee resettlement in the US are more complex 
than belied by the bipartisan support for the Refugee Act of 1980. In the nearly forty years since 
Democratic President Jimmy Carter enacted this legislation, Republican and Democratic 
presidents have at times adopted a more permissive approach to refugee protection and 
resettlement, and at times pursued more restrictive policies in these areas. Despite his 
unwillingness to grant protection to asylum seekers from the Caribbean Basin and Central 
America, Republican President Ronald Reagan created the Private Sector Initiative to enable 
the US to resettle an additional 10,000 refugees, through the support of private organisations 
(Bier and La Corte 2016, 1). In total, this programme facilitated the resettlement of an 
additional 16,016 refugees between 1988 and 1993 (Bier and La Corte 2016, 12).39  
                                                 
39 The Private Sector Initiative bears strong resemblance to the Canadian PSR programme, which the author 
analyses in detail in chapter four. However, the Private Sector Initiative faltered as many sponsors struggled to 
pay for unexpected medical costs (Bier and La Corte 2016, 13), and as an executive initiative, the programme 
had little grassroots support (van Selm 2003, 39). 
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His successor, the Republican President George H. W. Bush, interdicted and returned 
many Haitians fleeing political instability and violence without ensuring adequate respect for 
the principle of non-refoulement (Frelick 1993, 678). Though legal injunctions forced President 
Bush to cease this practice, he then chose to intern thousands of Haitians in Guantanamo Bay 
rather than allow them to reach American soil (Frelick 1993, 678). Nevertheless, President 
Bush also authorised repeated increases in the resettlement ceiling during each of his four years 
in office, raising the ceiling from 116,500 in 1989 to 142,000 in 1992 (Martin 2005, 17). 
In his campaign for President, Democrat Bill Clinton advocated against the forced 
repatriation of Haitians, but continued this policy following his election and adopted a more 
restrictive approach to the admission of Cuban asylum seekers (Gomez 2017, para. 4 of 20; 
Sciolino 1993, para. 1 and 3 of 22). Furthermore, Clinton refused to intervene in the conflict in 
Rwanda or to support multilateral efforts to stem the genocide against the Tutsi minority (Bon 
Tempo 2008, 198). Nevertheless, the Clinton administration did take action in Kosovo and, in 
addition to engaging in military action, resettled 14,161 Kosovar refugees in 2000—over and 
above the existing resettlement ceiling of 78,000 for fiscal year 1999 (DeYoung 2001, para. 7 
of 8; Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual table; Robinson 2000, 3 and 6-7). 
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, Republican President George W. 
Bush suspended the Resettlement Admissions Program for three months, due in part to a 
perception among officials that resettlement was “particularly vulnerable to security problems 
(Schoenholtz 2005, 324).” However, the administration authorised the resumption of 
resettlement in December 2001, following the introduction of new security screening measures, 
including more detailed background checks and a requirement that all refugees must be 
fingerprinted and photographed (Walsh 2002, para. 14 of 22). Though resettlement admissions 
in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 were the lowest since the formal establishment of the programme 
in 1980, President Bush authorised a resettlement ceiling of 70,000 for fiscal year 2002. This 
decision reduced the ceiling by 10,000 places but reflected a desire to provide better quality 
services to resettled refugees (DeYoung 2002, para. 5 of 8). 
Following his election in 2008, the Democratic President Barack Obama raised the 
annual resettlement ceiling to 80,000 and maintained this level of admissions until 2012 
(Mayorga and Morse 2017, table 1). Between 2012 and 2015, the resettlement ceiling was 
lowered to 76,000 in 2012 and then 70,000 between 2013 and 2015 (Mayorga and Morse 2017, 
table 1). However, in response to the unprecedented number of refugees in need of protection, 
the Obama administration raised the annual resettlement ceiling and dramatically augmented 
its efforts to resettle Syrian refugees, increasing the total from just 31 Syrians resettled in 2012 
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to 12,587 Syrians resettled in 2016 (Zong and Batalova 2017, figure 1). However, the Obama 
administration has also taken actions which have contributed to a slowdown in the resettlement 
of Iraqi refugees. In May 2011, two Iraqi refugees that had been resettled to the US were 
arrested and later convicted of attempting to funnel money and weapons from the US to al 
Qaeda in Iraq, as well as orchestrating terrorist attacks against American military personnel 
stationed in Iraq (Willingham 2017, para. 2 of 10). In response, the Obama administration 
ordered a review of 58,000 Iraqi refugees previously resettled in the US and required new, 
more detailed background checks for all Iraqi refugees destined for resettlement in the US 
(Kessler 2017, para. 5 and 6 of 27). These new measures resulted in a temporary slowdown in 
processing for Iraqi refugees who intended to be resettled in the US which lasted for 
approximately six months (Kessler 2017, para. 3 of 27; Sapong 2017, para. 7 of 10). 
These measures indicate that both Republican and Democratic Presidents have taken 
steps to both facilitate and occasionally restrict the flow of persons in need of protection to the 
US, and that security concerns have been a major fixture of these policies. Nevertheless, Martin 
(2005, 17-18) notes that, historically, “refugee admissions have drawn strong support from a 
coalition that cuts across party lines and across the divisions that mark out competing camps 
on other issues. […] This evolution has come about in significant part because of what this 
nation has learned about the human value of refugee admissions.” 
Despite the long tradition of bipartisan support for resettlement, the rhetoric adopted by 
Republican Donald Trump as part of his campaign to become President (and since assuming 
office) has contributed to the inflammatory tone of discourse on resettlement in certain media 
outlets in the US. Mr Trump campaigned in part on a conservative immigration platform 
centred on three core principles: the construction of a wall along the border between the US 
and Mexico, increased enforcement of existing immigration laws, and an approach to 
immigration that seeks to “improve jobs, wages and security for all Americans (Trump no date, 
1).” During an early campaign speech in Keene, New Hampshire on 30 September, 2015, Mr 
Trump articulated his intent to return Syrian refugees already resettled in the US. Mr Trump 
stated that it “could be possible” that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (commonly known 
as ISIS) is sending agents posing as Syrian refugees in need of resettlement, and stated “[…] if 
I win, they’re going back! (Vitali 2015, para. 4 and 5 of 10).” In a policy statement on 
immigration delivered in Phoenix, Arizona on 31 August, 2016, Mr Trump pledged to 
“suspend” immigration from certain Middle Eastern and North African countries such as Syria 
and Libya, and to “stop the tens of thousands” of Syrian refugees arriving in the US (Trump 
2016, no pagination). During a campaign speech in Minneapolis, Minnesota on 6 November, 
Page 111 of 361 
 
2016, Mr Trump argued that “faulty refugee vetting” had caused “problems” in Minnesota and 
claimed that some Somali refugees resettled in the state had “are joining ISIS and spreading 
their extremist views all over our country and all over the world (Bouie 2016, para. 5 of 11).” 
Mr Trump further claimed that his rival Hillary Clinton “wants virtually unlimited immigration 
and refugee admissions, from the most dangerous regions of the world, to come into our 
country […]. Her plan will import generations of terrorism, extremism, and radicalism into 
your schools and throughout your community (Bouie 2016, para. 4 of 11).”  
These remarks indicate that President Trump views refugee protection and resettlement 
through the lens of securitization. The securitization of discourse on immigration and refugee 
protection in the US is not new, as the previously noted remarks from President Reagan 
concerning forced displacement from Central America.40 However, this paradigm has gained 
increasing salience in public discourse since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 
(Adamson 2006, 165; Castles 2004, 857). Though neither refugees nor Syrians perpetrated 
these attacks, President Trump has associated refugee resettlement with terrorism and claimed 
that “more than 300” resettled refugees are “currently the subject of counterterrorism 
investigations (Lee 2017, para. 1 of 33)” in order to rationalise the decision to temporarily 
suspend the Resettlement Admissions Program and bar travellers from predominantly Muslim 
countries. 
Certain media outlets have also adopted this inflammatory tone on resettlement. 
Breitbart News—the far-right media organisation whose co-founder and former Executive 
Chairman, Steve Bannon, served as Chief Strategist to President Trump until January 2018— 
has long been critical of government funding for voluntary agencies, the role of voluntary 
agencies in resettlement, and the close connection between the federal government and some 
current and former voluntary agency representatives. For example, Breitbart called the Clinton 
and Obama administrations a “revolving door” due to the fact that Ms Limón previously served 
as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement under President Clinton, while Mr Negash 
and Mr Carey both served under President Obama (Leahy 2016, para. 1, 2, 3, and 8 of 41). 
Breitbart attributed the increase in the budget of the Office of Refugee Resettlement to the 
claim that “Democratic appointees Limon [sic], Negash, and Carey have worked tirelessly to 
expand both the budget of ORR and the party’s far-left, pro-refugee agenda (Leahy 2016, para. 
                                                 
40 One could potentially interpret this as consistent with Betts’s (2003) arguments concerning the perceived 
private security benefits from limiting access to refugee protection. 
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17 of 41).”41 The organisation has also referred to refugee resettlement in the US as an “industry 
(Leahy 2016, para. 8 and 36 of 41)” indicating a perception that voluntary agencies profit from 
resettlement. Elsewhere, Breitbart has called federal funding for voluntary agencies a “gravy 
train” and has claimed that voluntary agencies “benefit immensely” from these partnerships 
(Leahy 2015, para. 1 and 24 of 24).42 However, the allegations from Breitbart ignore the fact 
that eight of the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and 
Reception and Placement programmes are registered charities and not for-profit entities. 
As President, Mr Trump has attempted to curb resettlement admissions and to impose 
discriminatory admissions policies. On 27 January, 2017, one week after being inaugurated as 
President of the United States, Republican President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order 
which placed a moratorium on all resettlement admissions for a period of 120 days so that his 
officials could examine the possible introduction of additional security screening measures to 
“ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and 
welfare of the United States (subsection 5(a), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 
February, 2017)).”43 In a separate provision, President Trump declared the admission of Syrian 
refugees “detrimental to the interests of the United States” and therefore also suspended 
resettlement from that country (subsection 5(c), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 
February, 2017)).” The order further stipulated that no more than 50,000 refugees should be 
admitted to the US in fiscal year 2017 (subsection 5(d), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8977 (1 February, 2017)). Much as with the provision blocking the resettlement of Syrian 
refugees, President Trump declared that “the entry of more than 50,000 refugees in fiscal year 
2017 would be detrimental to the interests of the United States […].” Despite the perceptions 
articulated by most interviewees, this suggests that political vagaries can substantively impact 
resettlement admissions. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter began with an overview of the history of resettlement admissions in the 
US. The analysis suggests that the government sometimes adopted a discriminatory and 
contradictory approach to resettlement by privileging the admission of certain groups of 
                                                 
41 Breibart neglects to mention that Republican President George W. Bush appointed Roger P. Winter Assistant 
Administrator of the US Agency for International Development in 2001 (Peters and Woolley 2001, para. 7 of 7). 
Mr Winter previously served as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement under the Carter and Reagan 
administrations (Ronayne 2001, 207), then became Director of the US Committee for Refugees and Director of 
Immigration and Refugees of America before returning to public service. 
42 For an analysis of the relationship between advocacy, resource dependence, and organisational survival, see 
Lowery (2007). 
43 This executive order was only the fifth such order he had issued since taking office and was symbolically 
signed at the Pentagon. 
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refugees above others to serve its strategic objectives. At other times, the government has been 
more welcoming towards refugees and admitted refugees from a broad range of origins and 
backgrounds without any apparent ulterior motive. 
This assessment appears consistent with the data on the size and composition of 
resettlement flows between 1980 and 2017, which demonstrated that the United States has 
resettled thousands of refugees from strategic locations such as the USSR, Southeast Asia, and 
Iraq but also offered a durable solution to refugees from Burma, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria, 
among many others. 
The chapter then adopted a more analytical approach by exploring the motivations for 
resettlement and its benefits through interviews with senior government officials and 
representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions 
and Reception and Placement Programmes. Interviewees indicated that the US has a 
humanitarian motivation for resettling refugees and that contributing to this durable solution is 
perceived as consistent with the norms of international responsibility sharing and efforts to 
preserve access to countries of first asylum. Some respondents further indicated that 
contributing to resettlement—and especially making sizeable contributions to this durable 
solution—enhances the reputation of the US which it can leverage to encourage other 
governments to increase their resettlement admissions. Though interviewees acknowledged 
that resettlement has financial and potentially social costs for the government and receiving 
communities, many interviewees argued that resettlement benefits the US through increased 
cultural diversity. The author suggested that one could interpret these views as consistent with 
the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on 
public goods more generally. 
 The author then explored the perceived nature of relations between the government and 
voluntary agencies. Both government and voluntary agency representatives emphasised the 
collaborative nature of their relationship. Though respondents acknowledged that the 
government has a finite role in resettlement and that voluntary agencies contribute essential 
financial and human resources to the resettlement process, responses also suggest that there is 
an element of interdependence between the government and voluntary agencies insofar as the 
participation of both government and voluntary agencies is necessary to effectively implement 
the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. The author suggested 
that one could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-
voluntary sector relations, which indicates that relations can be complementary and (or) 
supplementary in nature. However, some voluntary agencies argued that relations with the 
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federal government had become more prescriptive over time and they had less discretion than 
they once did. One could interpret these concerns as consistent with aspects of the literature on 
the potential perils of government contracting, including ‘bureaucratization.’ 
 Finally, this chapter explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies. Though 
a representative from one voluntary agency indicated that foreign policies are the main 
determinant of resettlement admissions, the majority of respondents indicated that domestic 
responsibility sharing had enhanced resettlement admissions to the US. Though scholars 
continue to debate the reasons why government-voluntary sector partnerships are such a 
prominent feature in the US, the author nevertheless suggested that one could interpret this as 
consistent with the longstanding role of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of 
public goods and services in the US. However, the election of Republican President Donald 
Trump and his efforts to suspend the Resettlement Admissions Programme and the subsequent 
limits he imposed on resettlement admissions could undermine the longstanding bipartisan 
consensus on resettlement in the US. Overall, the discussion and analysis in the chapter indicate 
that resettlement admissions could be influenced by a range of factors, possibly including 
domestic responsibility sharing. However, the analysis also highlights the importance of a 
contextualised, nuanced approach to the analysis of resettlement admissions policies. 
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Chapter Three: Resettlement Admissions and Voluntary Advocacy in the United States 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning resettlement admissions, 
government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement, and current resettlement needs. In 
particular, chapter one highlighted the absolute and relative cross-national differences in 
resettlement admissions and the widespread existence of government-voluntary sector 
relationships in resettlement, as well as the cross-national variations in the scope of these 
relationships. The chapter also highlighted the need to better understand the relationship 
between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through government-
voluntary sector partnerships given the unprecedented number of persons in need of protection 
at present, including the extensive need for resettlement. Moreover, the chapter identified 
several limitations and lacunae in the existing literature, focusing particularly on observations 
that much of the scholarship ignores the influence of domestic factors such as the extensive 
mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies and the potential 
capacity of these agencies to influence resettlement admissions through advocacy. 
Chapter two offered an overview of the history of resettlement in the US and provided 
detailed figures on the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US between 1980 and 
2017. To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies, the chapter also explored perceptions on the motivations for 
resettlement and its benefits, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, and the 
potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing 
with voluntary sector organisations, through interviews with senior government officials and 
representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions 
and Reception and Placement programmes. Interviewees indicated that the US is perceived to 
engage in resettlement for humanitarian and normative reasons, and the provision of this 
durable solution is also thought to be consistent with the history and values of the US and to 
confer reputational and cultural benefits for the US. The author suggested that one could 
interpret these perceptions as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure 
public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Interviews also 
indicate that the federal government and voluntary agencies in the US are perceived to have a 
relationship that is both complementary and supplementary nature. These perceptions could be 
interpreted as consistent with the historical development of government-voluntary sector 
relations in the US, and the dominant taxonomy in this area. Furthermore, the overwhelming 
majority of respondents indicated that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies 
Page 116 of 361 
 
had enhanced resettlement admissions. Given that academics continue to debate the reasons 
why government-voluntary sector partnerships have become such a significant feature of the 
provision of public goods and services in the US, further research in this area is required to 
more fully understand the origins and implications of government-voluntary agency 
partnerships in resettlement within the broader context of social service provision. 
Though these findings may help us better understand why the US has voluntary adopted 
generous resettlement admissions policies, resettlement admissions may also be shaped by 
advocacy efforts. Indeed, as noted in chapter one, many interviewees expressed a keen and 
unprompted interest in discussing their advocacy work on resettlement. This chapter first offers 
an overview of the history of voluntary sector advocacy on resettlement in the US in section 
3.2. It then adopts a more analytical approach by exploring the perceived relationship between 
resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy in section 3.3 through interviews with 
senior government officials and representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that 
implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. During 
the interviews, a federal official indicated that the government is open to advocacy efforts and 
voluntary agency representatives stated that they actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement 
issues. These efforts were perceived to have contributed to a rebound in resettlement 
admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 and were also thought to have 
prevented funding cuts to resettlement programmes in the US. One could interpret the 
perception of government being open to advocacy efforts and the active role of voluntary 
agencies in advocacy on resettlement as consistent with the literature on the structure of interest 
representation in the US,44 and the dominant taxonomy of government-voluntary sector 
relations which suggests that voluntary sector organisations are not merely service providers 
but can also take on an “adversarial” role in which they press governments to enact policy 
changes (Young 2000, 151). 
Whereas voluntary agencies were actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues, 
preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community-based organisations may pursue 
advocacy in this area. Though this assessment could be interpreted as consistent with the small 
literature in this area, it may also reflect limitations in current academic knowledge and 
understanding of ethnic community-based organisations in the US. That said, the changing 
                                                 
44 The literature uses the terms ‘advocacy,’ ‘interest representation,’ and ‘lobbying’ interchangeably, and the 
author follows this established practice. 
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issue context since the election of President Trump may have a deleterious impact on voluntary 
agency advocacy efforts on resettlement to the US. 
Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the 
discussion in this chapter. The analysis on advocacy is limited insofar as it does not capture the 
views of representatives from Refugee Council USA, a coalition of voluntary sector agencies 
that engages in advocacy on asylum and refugee issues and also serves as the “principal 
consultative forum for the national refugee resettlement and processing agencies as they 
formulate common positions, conduct their relations with the U.S. government and other 
partners, and support and enhance refugee service standards (Refugee Council USA 2015, para. 
3 of 3).” Though the author requested to meet with a representative from the organisation, no 
response was received. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter is limited to the efforts of the 
nine voluntary agencies responsible for the implementation of the Resettlement Admissions 
and Reception and Placement programmes. 
3.2 History of Resettlement Advocacy in the United States 
Many voluntary sector organisations in the US have long served as advocates for their 
constituents. This section offers an overview of the history of voluntary sector advocacy on 
resettlement to the US to enrich the discussion and analysis that follows in the remainder of 
this chapter. Though few academics have directly explored this topic, the available literature 
indicates that voluntary sector organisations and agencies only occasionally succeeded in their 
efforts to augment resettlement admissions. 
Voluntary sector involvement in advocacy dates back to at least the nineteenth century 
when philanthropic organisations drew on their experiences as service providers to ‘attest’ to 
the need for government action (Kramer 1981, 213). However, interest groups did not become 
“methodically” involved in lobbying until the end of World War II (Wilson 1993, 131). Though 
voluntary sector organisations appear to adopt a range of strategies to advance their views, 
interest groups often direct their efforts towards Congress, as a large proportion of legislation 
related to social services is formulated by the federal government (Kramer 1981, 71). The 
emphasis on targeting Congress is also a pragmatic decision as the federal structure in the US 
offers interest groups multiple competing channels for access and contributes to a weaker party 
system which means that legislators are particularly open to representations from their 
constituents (Wilson 1993, 139-43). 
Historical accounts of voluntary sector advocacy efforts on resettlement are limited, 
and much of the available evidence comes from Loescher and Scanlan, whose 1986 book 
Calculated Kindness provides a comprehensive account of American asylum and refugee 
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policies since the end of World War II. Though they do not focus on voluntary advocacy efforts 
specifically, they weave many accounts of these efforts into their book. Loescher and Scanlan 
(1986, 213) argue that the US Congress has occasionally paid “considerable heed to 
humanitarian organizations [sic] like Amnesty International and lobbying groups like the 
American-Israel Public Affairs Committee [sic]” and has gone so far as to establish 
resettlement programmes despite White House opposition. Following the end of World War II, 
voluntary sector organisations and agencies, the media, and sympathetic officials pressed the 
government to adopt a more liberal approach to the admission of defectors from the USSR 
(Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 35-37). In that respect, Leo Cherne, then the Chairman of the 
International Rescue Committee, played a particularly influential role in advocacy on the 
admission of Hungarian refugees. Following reports of the uprisings, Mr Cherne travelled to 
Budapest to meet with prominent figures in that city (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 54). Upon 
returning to the US, Mr Cherne began to build financial and “moral” support for the “freedom 
fighters” through appearances on the popular television programme The Ed Sullivan Show and 
at a rally in Madison Square Garden in New York City (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 54). 
Though Loescher and Scanlan (1986, 54) argue that President Eisenhower would have resettled 
Hungarian refugees regardless, they conjecture that “the scope of the U.S. resettlement program 
[sic] might have been smaller” in the absence of pressure. These efforts—especially appeals 
from the International Rescue Committee—contributed to the decision to resettle 38,121 
Hungarian refugees following the failed revolution in 1956 (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 52). 
In the 1970s, voluntary sector organisations played an influential role in convincing the 
government to resettle more Jewish refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), despite executive concerns that criticising the human rights situation in the USSR 
could threaten the détente in their relations at the time (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 85-95). In 
particular, representatives from the influential American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
leveraged their relationships with senior congressional aides and adopted adversarial strategies 
such as threatening to mount hostile election campaigns against opponents to secure policy 
changes in this area (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 93). In addition, their efforts to raise public 
awareness about the plight of Soviet Jewish refugees helped minimise public opposition to 
their admission, even as annual admissions climbed into the tens of thousands (Loescher and 
Scanlan 1986, 94). 
The International Rescue Committee also proved to be an influential advocate during 
the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, when Mr Cherne called on both the President and Congress 
to demonstrate global leadership by dramatically increasing the number of resettlement 
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admissions and encouraging other countries to do the same (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 142-
43). Loescher and Scanlan (1986, 144) argue that, “President Carter bowed to appeals by 
religious and refugee groups, as well as by many members of Congress, his own administration, 
and the international community, and took several important initiatives prior to the Geneva 
meeting to insure [sic] that the major industrialized nations would assume responsibility for 
the resettlement of large numbers of the refugees.” Voluntary sector pressure also proved 
influential in convincing the government to resettle Cambodian refugees fleeing persecution 
by the Khmer Rouge regime during this period (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 152-53 and 162-
66). 
However, voluntary sector organisations were less successful in convincing the 
government to resettle Chilean refugees following the 1973 coup d’état by General Augusto 
Pinochet (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 95). Though churches, secular organisations like 
Amnesty International, and sympathetic members of Congress such as Senator Edward 
Kennedy convinced the government to establish parole programmes for these refugees, 
admissions remained low due to the political imperatives of the time (Loescher and Scanlan 
1986, 95-100). 
Haines (2010, 3 and 7) suggests that various “constituencies” have persuaded the 
government to admit particular groups of refugees and argued that “this theme of rejecting or 
accepting refugees based on their specific identity has been a continuing one in the U.S. refugee 
program. Those refugees with strong constituencies have fared better. Those who could unite 
multiple constituencies have fared best of all, for example, by appealing to the humanitarian 
impulses of the left, the anticommunist impulses of the right, and the communitarian impulses 
of co-ethnics and co-religionists. […] Without strong constituencies, the numbers admitted are 
likely to drift downward.” For example, Haines (2010, 145) suggests that the “political heft” 
voluntary sector organisations such as HIAS ensured that the government continued to fund 
programmes for the resettlement of refugees from the USSR. 
3.3 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Advocacy 
The history of advocacy on resettlement in the US indicates that voluntary agencies and 
other advocacy groups have long pressed the government to augment resettlement admissions 
or to consider resettling particular groups in need of protection, but these efforts have not 
always been successful. Nevertheless, during the first series of interviews conducted among 
voluntary sector representatives in the US, interviewees expressed a keen and unprompted 
desire to discuss their involvement in advocacy on resettlement issues. In response, the author 
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amended the original interview questions to accommodate this organic theme and enable 
respondents to share their views in a more fulsome manner. 
Therefore, this section presents the views of senior government officials and voluntary 
agency representatives on the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and 
voluntary agency advocacy. The responses reveal a perception that the federal government is 
open to interest representation efforts by voluntary agencies—a view which one could interpret 
as consistent with the literature on interest representation in the US. Furthermore, there is a 
perception among voluntary agency representatives that their advocacy efforts contributed to 
the gradual recovery in resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 
2001. Some voluntary sector representatives also indicated that their advocacy efforts 
prevented substantial reductions in appropriations for resettlement programmes in the US. 
Though voluntary agencies are not the only organisations to engage in advocacy on 
resettlement issues, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community-based 
organisations may pursue advocacy in this area. While one could interpret this assessment as 
consistent with the small literature in this area, it may also reflect limitations in current 
academic knowledge and understanding of ethnic community-based organisations in the US. 
Despite the ardent efforts described by voluntary agency representatives, issue salience and 
context may condition the impact of advocacy efforts on resettlement to the US. 
During the interviews conducted as part of this case study, government officials and 
voluntary agency representatives spoke at length about the perceived impact of advocacy on 
resettlement admissions (Carey 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; 
Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Among government officials, 
Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that the federal government is “particularly open to 
advocacy groups and folks.” Ambassador Robinson (2013) explained that the Department of 
State determines the annual resettlement admissions ceiling based in part on input from 
voluntary agencies. Ambassador Robinson (2013) added that the process involves a 
“negotiation” that takes into consideration the number of refugees that voluntary agencies 
believe they can resettle, the number of refugees that the Department of State feels that 
voluntary agencies can resettle, and the capacity of the receiving communities, from which the 
Department of State also solicits input.45 In addition, Ambassador Robinson (2013) asserted 
that voluntary agencies can influence resettlement priorities by calling attention to groups in 
                                                 
45 Ambassador Robinson (2013) noted that, in some cases, the Department of State encourages voluntary 
agencies to resettle more refugees than they had originally requested based on the department’s assessment of 
the organisation’s capacity. 
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need of resettlement, and explained that the Department of State engages in a “real dialogue” 
with voluntary sector organisations on the implementation of the Resettlement Admissions 
Programme. 
Though the structure of interest representation in resettlement (and refugee protection 
more generally) may change over time, interviewees attested to the active role of voluntary 
agencies in advocating on resettlement issues in the US. Indeed, several voluntary sector 
representatives indicated that their organisations have endeavoured to influence the 
composition of refugee flows in this way (Kekic 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). 
Ms Stein (2013) affirmed that Episcopal Migration Ministries offers input to the Department 
of State and the UNHCR on populations that could benefit from resettlement. Furthermore, Mr 
Kekic (2013) explained that Church World Service advocates for the resettlement of particular 
groups of refugees that it identifies through its international development and relief work 
overseas. Elsewhere, Mr Scott (2013) and Ambassador Young (2013) explained that the US 
Conference of Catholic Bishops had successfully lobbied the government to resettle Burmese 
and Bhutanese refugees. 
Many interviewees also spoke of their role in lobbying legislators to increase 
resettlement admissions and funding for the Resettlement Admissions Programme (Carey 
2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). For example, Mr Scott 
(2013) explained that the US Conference of Catholic Bishops has a dedicated Government 
Relations department that is responsible for advocacy. In that context, Ambassador Young 
(2013) explained that his organisation advocates for the “highest number” of resettlement 
admissions possible, explaining, “We think that this country can absorb a lot more refugees 
than made by the annual Presidential determination.” 
In addition to advocating for increased admissions, some voluntary agencies stated they 
have also pressed the government to augment funding for resettlement. Ambassador Young 
(2013) and Mr Scott (2013) explained that their organisation appeals for more funding for the 
Resettlement Admissions Program. Mr Scott (2013) noted that government agencies cannot 
advocate for funding themselves and so they encourage voluntary sector agencies to utilise 
their agenda-setting influence to lobby members of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate to increase funding for the programme. Ambassador Young (2013) elaborated on this 
point, stating, “We’ll actually get calls for assistance from the federal government where they 
will say to us, ‘We hear you,’ or ‘This is what we need, and we need you to help us on this.’ 
That means, ‘We want you to go to the Hill, we want you to go to [the Office of Management 
Page 122 of 361 
 
and Budget], we want you to, you know, use whatever influence you can to help us get what 
we need on a particular issue.” 
Ambassador Young (2013) added that his organisation had successfully lobbied to 
prevent budget cuts to the Resettlement Admissions programme and explained that: 
 
“We learned that we were going to lose US$110 million out of the refugee budget for this year because 
of the increased number of unaccompanied children who are coming into the United States. […] So, you 
know, we all got together and did our marches to the White House and to the Congress and to OMB, and 
on and on and on, and it was a success. The money was found to continue the refugee program [sic] at 
the levels that had been projected for this year, and to obtain the increased funding to take care of these 
children who are coming in.” 
 
However, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops is not the only voluntary sector 
organisation that has engaged in advocacy on resettlement admissions or funding. Ms Famini 
(2013) explained that World Relief has actively appealed for the government to resettle more 
refugees and noted that, in the absence of such efforts, the government could theoretically 
choose to determine resettlement admissions ceiling based on budgetary considerations alone. 
In the case of the International Rescue Committee, Mr Carey (2013) argued that the voluntary 
sector has advocated “very passionately” for federal funding for resettlement, both directly and 
through their local affiliates. Mr Carey (2013) explained that the organisation and its local 
affiliates lobbied members of Congress and White House officials to appropriate funding for 
the Department of State and the Department of Health and Human Services, while also 
endeavouring to communicate the “humanitarian imperative” and global implications of 
resettlement in order to “put a human face” on appropriations. 
In addition to describing their advocacy efforts on resettlement admissions and 
appropriations, some respondents argued that resettlement admissions have increased due to 
voluntary sector advocacy (Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Young 2013). Both Ambassador Young 
(2013) and Mr Kekic (2013) argued that voluntary sector organisations energetically lobbied 
for increased admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 (see also Eby et 
al. 2011, 601). Indeed, Haines (2010, 20 endnote 1) notes that the Refugee Admissions Program 
“effectively shut down for four months” following the attacks, and admissions declined from 
69,886 in 2001 to 27,131 the following year (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual 
tables). Resettlement admissions did not begin to recover until 2004, when 52,873 refugees 
were resettled (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual tables). In that context, 
Ambassador Young (2013) argued: 
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“The numbers of admissions made by the Presidential determinations would not be as high as they are if 
we had not continued our strong advocacy for high numbers. All you have to do is look at the numbers 
following 9/11 when they dropped down to a very, very low number. […] It was only—I hate to use the 
word agitation, I think advocacy is a cleaner word—but it was only through our advocacy individually 
and as a group as part of this Refugee Council USA that we continued the pressure on the government 
to up, and up, and up.” 
 
Ambassador Young (2013) noted that the US Conference of Catholic Bishops had also 
engaged in advocacy on security screenings and stated that “we worked with all the government 
agencies on coming to an understanding on this security concern, but those numbers wouldn’t 
be there if we as a group of resettlement offices and others who advocate on behalf of refugees 
hadn’t kept the pressure on.” 
Similarly, Mr Kekic (2013) argued that voluntary sector organisations “single-handedly 
saved the program [sic] after 9/11,” and added that “the program [sic] would have been dead 
without voluntary agencies.” Mr Kekic (2013) explained that the attacks sent “waves of panic 
through the federal government” and fed public xenophobia towards immigrants. Mr Kekic 
(2013) explained that voluntary sector organisations like Church World Service engaged in 
“vigorous, vigorous, vigorous advocacy” with members of Congress and the administration, 
and also sought to raise awareness about the resettlement process to assuage concerns regarding 
the security of the Resettlement Admissions Program. Though Mr Kekic (2013) acknowledged 
that admissions declined dramatically following the attacks, he noted that resettlement arrivals 
have gradually increased and concluded that the progressive recovery in admissions is “really 
a testament to how strong this community is.” Mr Kosten (2013) attested to the perceived 
influence of voluntary agencies following the terrorist attacks and argued, “I think this program 
[sic] would have died long ago in the US if it wasn’t for the advocacy of the likes of resettlement 
agencies and like organizations that find it to be of extreme value. Or perhaps not lost, but 
minimized. I think it would have shrunk significantly in terms of its size.” 
In addition to pressing the government to augment admissions and preserve funding for 
resettlement, several voluntary agency representatives indicated that they work to build 
community awareness and support for resettlement (Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Scott 2013; 
Stein 2013; Young 2013). Ms Stein (2013) explained that part of the mission of Episcopal 
Migration Ministries is to raise awareness about refugee issues and to help communities 
become more “welcoming” towards refugees. Ms Stein (2013) explained that the organisation 
strives to “strengthen communities to be receptive and welcoming of refugees.” To achieve 
this, Ms Stein (2013) explained that staff “go out and talk to people about who refugees are, 
and why they should care, and why they’re important to this country, and what they contribute.” 
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Mr Kosten (2013) also underscored the importance of building community support for 
resettlement. Mr Kosten (2013) described “constituency engagement” as a “critical” element 
of voluntary agency work on resettlement, and explained “[…] The more we engage churches, 
the more we explain the value of such a program, the reason why we think it’s of such value, 
we also increase our capacity within those areas.” In addition to building capacity in receiving 
communities, Mr Kosten (2013) indicated that these efforts may be fundamental to the survival 
of the Resettlement Admissions Program. Mr Kosten (2013) suggested that “if the public at 
large doesn’t advocate, then the legislators can say you know, ‘We’re going to reduce our 
appropriations, we’re going to cap the number of people resettled,’ and the only people 
screaming about it would be, you know, us, the resettlement agencies, who then it would like 
we’re in this simply because of the financial benefit or whatever […].” This view suggests that 
voluntary agencies endeavour to build support for resettlement due in part to their 
aforementioned belief in the local character of resettlement, but also as a means of aggregating 
and leveraging support for their advocacy efforts on admissions and funding. 
One voluntary agency representative connected advocacy and building community 
support for resettlement to democratic values. In particular, Mr Kekic (2013) explained that 
“we feel that it’s our place to exercise our democratic rights to ask our elected officials to—
what their constituency want them to do—and in our instance that is to continue to grow and 
enhance the refugee resettlement program. And the best way to show how committed they are 
to growing and enhancing this program [sic] here is to really appropriate adequate funding for 
it.” One could interpret Mr Kekic’s statement as consistent with the argument from Sherry 
(1971), who characterises voluntary sector involvement in advocacy as fundamental. 
 However, Ms Limón (2013) suggested that voluntary sector organisations have fewer 
opportunities to engage in advocacy than they once did. More precisely, Ms Limón (2013) 
explained that voluntary agencies historically played a greater role in overseas processing than 
they do today. Ms Limón (2013) explained that voluntary agencies were “advocates for the 
refugees, both in individually and collectively. In other words, their representatives, whoever 
they were, would feed information back to the headquarters who would then advocate on the 
Hill, or with the State Department or whatever, on behalf of a given group of refugees. […] 
When they did the processing, they were looking for ways that the refugee actually met the 
criteria of being a refugee, promoting those people for approval into the United States by the 
immigration authorities.” However, Ms Limón (2013) contended that there may have been a 
perception among some Department of State officials that voluntary agencies had a “financial 
interest” in resettling refugees (due to the provision of per capita grants), and suggested that 
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the Department began contracting out overseas processing to the International Organization for 
Migration in order to “sever that relationship.”46 
To achieve a better understanding of the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this thesis now seeks to interpret the 
responses articulated above in relation to the extant literature. Interpreting the potential 
relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary agency advocacy efforts is 
challenging as few authors have explored this dynamic, and those that have tend to discuss 
advocacy as an aside rather than as a central feature of their analysis (e.g. Winkler 1981; Wright 
1981; c.f. Eby et al. 2011; Nawyn 2005; Nawyn 2006).  
Nevertheless, the active involvement of voluntary agencies in advocacy on resettlement 
issues appears consistent with some scholarly works that attest to the perceived importance of 
such efforts—especially following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. Nawyn (2005) 
explains that most of the voluntary agencies she interviewed as part of her study of faith-based 
and secular resettlement organisations identified advocacy as an essential component of their 
work. Indeed, Nawyn (2005, 43) states that “Every NGO in my sample valued refugee 
advocacy to some extent” and “nearly every interview participant mentioned the importance of 
advocacy for refugees.” In addition to advocating for the admission of particular groups of 
refugees and calling on officials to complete security screening procedures faster, Nawyn 
(2005, 46) finds that many voluntary agencies in her sample devoted a “great deal” of their 
advocacy efforts towards augmenting resettlement admissions. Notably, Nawyn (2005, 146) 
observes that many of the voluntary agency representatives “considered low admissions as the 
top problem in the resettlement system.” Nawyn (2005, 66-68) particularly finds that voluntary 
agencies ‘substantially increased’ their advocacy efforts on resettlement in response to the 
dramatic decline in admissions following the terrorist attacks in September 2001. However, 
Nawyn (2005, 73-74) indicates that, for many voluntary agencies, the increase in advocacy had 
a perceived impact on their relationship with government officials, noting that while “nearly 
all” of her interviewees indicated their relationship with the federal government was “still 
amicable,” the increase in advocacy had also rendered their relationship more “adversarial” 
than it once was.47 
Eby et al. (2011, 587) also affirm the importance of advocacy among voluntary 
agencies, and describe faith-based voluntary agencies as “powerful advocates for the 
                                                 
46 These comments are interesting when evaluated in relation to the aforementioned articles from Breitbart—
some of which have attacked Ms Limón in particular. 
47 This finding parallels the taxonomy developed by Young (1999; 2000). 
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development and improvement of policies that affect refugees domestically and internationally, 
including expanding access to resettlement for refugees in countries of first asylum […].” Eby 
et al. (2011, 601) argue that voluntary agencies have conducted “extensive advocacy” to 
augment the annual resettlement ceiling, and that an “intensive advocacy campaign” by 
voluntary agencies coupled with grassroots mobilisation within the Catholic, Protestant, and 
Jewish communities was “successful in raising admissions” following the terrorist attacks of 
11 September, 2001. Though their account does offer some support to the accounts given by 
interviewees and to the findings presented by Nawyn (2005), it is limited insofar as Eby et al. 
(2011) primarily examine the involvement of Church World Service. Nevertheless, the 
responses articulated by interviewees, combined with the arguments advanced by Eby et al. 
could provide a useful basis for a more detailed analysis that seeks to trace the process of 
developing the annual resettlement ceiling and the junctures at which voluntary agencies could 
potentially exert influence. 
The perceptions articulated by Ambassador Robinson concerning the openness of the 
federal government appears consistent with the literature on interest representation in the US. 
However, scholars and political leaders have long debated the appropriateness of interest 
representation in policymaking. Informed by the work of French philosopher Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Republicans conceptualised society as a single, unified body and characterised 
interest groups as a threat to popular democracy (Erne 2017, 247-48). Though Republicans 
acknowledged that interest groups have a role in the political process—especially as the 
political system grows—they favoured strict regulations on interest group behaviour to ensure 
that no one group could exert a dominant influence (Erne 2017, 248). Conversely, liberals 
perceived interest groups as an “essential source of liberty” and guard against the tyranny of 
the majority (Erne 2017, 248-49). Consequently, liberals believed that the state should 
guarantee the right of association and so they supported limited government regulation of 
interest groups (Erne 2017, 249). 
 There have been concerns regarding the potential influence of interest groups since the 
earliest days of the republic. In the November 1787 edition of The Federalist Papers, James 
Madison Junior, a founding father and the fourth president of the United States, expressed 
concern about the potential influence of “factions” in the legislative process (Madison 1787, 
para. 15 of 23). However, Madison (1787 para. 7 of 23) also believed that interest groups are a 
natural consequence of the human condition and the differing opinions, interests, and 
“passions” that each individual possesses. Madison (1787, para. 1 of 23) further noted that 
“measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor 
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party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.” In order to balance 
the desire to preserve the freedom of association and the perceived risks of interest group 
influence, Madison firmly believed that a republican form of government that delegated 
decision-making authority to a small number of elected representatives would ensure that no 
one interest would dominate and ultimately lead to policies that are in the public good (Berry 
and Wilcox 2016, 3). In this way, one could interpret the pluralist nature of interest 
representation in the US as a legacy of institutional design. 
Despite government efforts to constrain the influence of interest groups, academics 
have long debated the structure of interest representation in the US and the dominant 
perspectives on this issue have evolved. Following the end of World War II, Truman (1951, 
65) advanced the group theory of interest representation, which conceptualised group politics 
as a “dynamic process” that is “constantly changing” according to the degree of relative 
influence that each group enjoys. Truman and other group theorists envisioned politics as 
“balanced, active, and responsive” contest between interest groups, and argued that the proper 
role of government should be “limited to acting as a neutral arbiter (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998, 48).” This more holistic, behavioural approach to the study of politics marked an 
important departure from the “narrow institutionalism” of extant literature, which ignored 
interest group influence based on the assumption that the state is sovereign, not the people 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 44 and 47-48). 
However, the influence of group theory proved relatively short-lived. In his seminal 
book Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, Dahl (1961, chapter one) 
argued that group theorists placed too much emphasis on the influence of interest groups, and 
so they failed to capture the intricacies of the American political system. In response, Dahl 
presented his theory of power, in which he distinguished between direct and indirect spheres 
of influence and contended that though only a small group of individuals can exercise direct 
agenda-setting influence, many constituents can exert indirect influence on their elected leaders 
who can also respond to (and shape) these interest representation efforts in return (Dahl 1961, 
163-65). 
His theory soon became the leading theoretical lens on interest representation and 
governance in democratic systems more generally (Levi 2009, 1; McFarland 2010, 40). His 
book also stimulated the development of new literature on a form of interest representation that 
has since become known as pluralism. Pluralists believed that interest groups advocated for the 
“narrow interests of their members,” but that these groups could also represent the broader 
interests of constituents in the name of the public good (Berry and Wilcox 2016, 4). The active 
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competition between interest groups prevented any single group from exerting disproportionate 
influence, and also served as an important check upon executive power (Hix 1999, 188-89). 
These scholars thought that the competitive nature of interest representation would lead to 
policies “produced by compromise and consensus (Berry and Wilcox 2016, 4).” In short, many 
pluralists saw interest groups as integral components of the Madisonian ideal—aggregating 
and representing democratic interests and acting as countervailing forces against excessive 
state power (Berry and Wilcox 2016, 4; Hix 1999, 188-89). 
However, pluralists soon faced a barrage of criticism on a range of grounds. Though 
the broad heading of ‘pluralism’ subsumed many academic contributions during this period, 
there was considerable conceptual and theoretical diversity in the literature, and many scholars 
rejected this label (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 50). Indeed, the scholarship at the time 
resembled more of a “set of ideas” about the characteristics of the political system of the US 
than a coherent theory on politics and the policymaking process (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 
50). 
Second, critics challenged the assumption that groups naturally mobilised in response 
to “threats” to the status quo (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 54-55). In his renowned 1965 
book The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Olson (chapter 
two) articulated the barriers that can frustrate mobilisation and collective action—especially 
among large groups pursuing public benefits as opposed to private returns. In response, many 
academics began to explore the issue of interest group mobilisation in earnest to explain the 
apparent (and contradictory) proliferation of non-economic interest groups (Hojnacki et al. 
2012, 383; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008, 1254). In that context, some scholars argued that 
individuals could be motivated to mobilise and engage in collective action for non-material 
reasons (e.g. Clark and Wilson 1961; Salisbury 1969).48 
Scholars also lambasted pluralism for the common assumption that all groups had 
“equal access to the political system (Hix 1999, 188-89).” In particular, the American civil 
rights movement and empirical observations concerning the unequal resources of different 
interest groups demonstrated that not all groups have equal representation in American politics, 
and not all groups enjoy the same level of influence in policymaking, thereby undermining the 
validity of the pluralist theory (Berry and Wilcox, 11). Notably, Lowi (1964, 680 and 694-95) 
                                                 
48 Olson (1971, 160n) later acknowledged that selective incentives do not necessarily need to be material in 
nature. Much of the contemporary literature on mobilisation now acknowledges that individuals can also derive 
“psychological” benefits from participating in collective action (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 71). This could 
be interpreted as consistent with the literature on altruism and public goods. Further research could explore the 
incentives and barriers to collective action among resettlement advocates. 
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argued that pluralists do not adequately appreciate the importance of elites in the policymaking 
process—particularly in the development of distributive policies—which are often 
characterised by stable coalitions. Lowi (1979, 31-42 and 50-63) later revised his elite-driven 
perspective on policymaking to argue that government expansion has proceeded despite the 
relative weakness of executive leadership due to the considerable discretion granted to the 
bureaucracy, which enables interest groups to exert influence in both policymaking and 
implementation. 
Though these criticisms prompted many pluralists to turn their attention away from 
interest groups and focus instead on the study of political institutions, others attempted to 
develop new, more refined theories of interest representation (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 
64). In particular, neo-pluralists adopt a much more “contingent” approach to the study of 
interest representation and attempt to account for the influence of “contextual factors” such as 
the nature, size, and relative strength of interest groups, the institutional and political 
environment, the extent to which governments are receptive to interest representation efforts, 
and the salience of the issue at hand (Hojnacki et al. 2012, 383-89; Lowery and Gray 2004, 164 
and 171). Similarly, though neo-pluralists maintain that multiple interest groups shape the 
policymaking process, they acknowledge that there may be barriers to collective action which 
mean that some interest groups may be overrepresented and others underrepresented in the 
policymaking process (McFarland 2007, 54 and 59). In this way, neo-pluralist scholarship 
departs from its pluralist origins insofar as interest representation efforts are no longer 
necessarily seen as fully representative but rather “imperfectly constrained by democratic 
politics (Lowery and Gray 2004, 171).” Thus, the neo-pluralist scholarship recognises that 
democratic societies grant everyone the common right to participate, but not all groups 
necessarily have the ability to do so. 
Though there is an extensive body of academic literature on interest representation in 
political science, few scholars have analysed the involvement of voluntary sector organisations 
in advocacy (Berry with Arons 2003, 25). However, several scholars have made implicit 
references to the ‘pluralist’ nature of the political system. Indeed, for many of these scholars, 
it is the pluralist nature of the political system which has provided the foundation for extensive 
collaboration between the government and voluntary sector organisations. Salamon (1987, 37) 
argues that the extensive pattern of government-voluntary sector collaboration in the provision 
of social services is “also encouraged by the country’s pluralistic political structure.” Similarly, 
Moulton and Anheier (2001, 4) argue that government-voluntary sector partnerships partially 
reflect the “pluralistic tenets of the political structure.” In the particular context of advocacy, 
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Anheier (2009, 1091) suggests that when one views government-voluntary sector relations 
through the lens of accountability, voluntary sector organisations act as a “countervailing 
force” that “reflects the diversity, pluralism, and dynamism of modern society.” Similarly, 
DiMaggio and Anheier (1990, 151) argue that voluntary sector organisations “contribute to 
pluralism by creating centers [sic] of influence outside the state and provide vehicles through 
which disenfranchised groups may organize [sic].” 
Given the ‘embeddedness’ of voluntary sector organisations in the pluralist institutional 
structure of the political system, one could interpret these two features as fundamentally 
inseparable and mutually reinforcing. More precisely, government-voluntary sector 
partnerships might not exist—at least not to the same extent that they do—without an 
acceptance of pluralism, and the pluralist political structure might potentially not exist or be as 
strong without the deep involvement of voluntary sector organisations, who fulfil a vital role 
as service providers but who also reinforce the pluralist nature of the political system and 
structure of interest representation through their advocacy efforts. 
Sherry (1971, no pagination quoted in Kramer 1981, 212) conveys the essentialness of 
interest representation through his argument that the raison d’être of voluntary sector 
organisations is to advocate for social change. Sherry (1971, no pagination quoted in Kramer 
1981, 212) explains: 
 
“The primary role of voluntary associations in American life is to continually shape and reshape the 
vision of a more just social order, to propose programs [sic] which might lead to the manifestation of that 
vision, to argue for them with other contenders in the public arena, and to press for adoption and 
implementation. For voluntary associations to do less than that is to abdicate their civic responsibility.” 
 
Similarly, Rothschild and Milofsky (2006, 137) argue that “Nonprofit organizations 
[…] are the organizational expression of their members’ ethical stance toward the world: 
nonprofit organizations, by way of their very existence and practices, convey a public statement 
of what their members see as a better, more caring, or more just world. This is why they come 
into being in the first place (Rothschild and Milofsky 2006, 137).” When considered in relation 
to the humanitarian and normative motivations that many voluntary agency representatives 
articulated in chapter two, section 2.5, and the perceived links between resettlement admissions 
and the history and values of the US as well as the perceived reputational and cultural benefits, 
the argument advanced by Rothschild and Milofsky (2006) may shed further light on why 
voluntary agencies have been such ardent advocates on resettlement to the US. 
Though the neo-pluralist paradigm dominates the current literature on interest 
representation in the US and many academics also appear to perceive the structure of politics 
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as pluralist in nature, some immigration scholars suggest that the picture is more complex. In 
his influential 1995 paper, Freeman (886-87) argues that interest representation efforts on 
immigration in “settler societies” like the US are characterised by an “expansionary bias” that 
does not accurately reflect the “restrictionist” preferences of the broader public. Building on 
the influential classification of interest representation developed by political scientist James Q. 
Wilson (1980), Freeman (1995, 885) attributes this to the fact that office-seeking politicians 
have a powerful incentive to follow the preferences of interest groups, and to the “antipopulist 
norm” prevalent in the US that discourages politicians from attempting to “exploit racial, ethnic 
or immigration-related fears in order to win votes.”49 Freeman (1995, 886-87) argues that 
interest groups enjoy outsized influence in immigration policymaking due to the poorly 
“articulated” nature of public opinion on immigration and to the clientelistic nature of interest 
representation on immigration policy.  
Freeman (1995, 887) explains that in this model, “small and well-organized [sic] groups 
intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships with those officials 
responsible for it.” Freeman (1995, 887) further adds that “These interactions take place largely 
out of public view and with little outside interference.” In a 2006 paper, Freeman attempts to 
develop a more nuanced approach that distinguishes between different models of interest 
representation and different kinds of immigration policies, including resettlement. Freeman 
(2006, 239) argues that resettlement has strong distributive characteristics, and argues that 
humanitarian organisations are the main beneficiaries of these policies, thus contributing to the 
development of “client politics.” Freeman (2006, 239) claims that these organisations “enjoy 
privileged access to the policy formulation process” but “exert less influence than those actors 
organised around migrant streams where significant material interests are at stake.” 
One could perhaps interpret some features of resettlement policymaking as 
‘clientelistic’ in nature. Federal officials and voluntary agency representatives regularly meet 
to discuss how to allocate resettlement files to each voluntary agency and where to resettle 
refugees in the US (Kekic 2013; Robinson 2013). Furthermore, as Ambassador Robinson 
(2013) noted, the Department of State consults with voluntary agencies as part of the process 
of formulating the annual resettlement admissions ceilings. One could potentially interpret the 
close and frequent interaction between federal officials and voluntary agencies could facilitate 
communication and enable voluntary agencies to influence resettlement admissions as 
                                                 
49 Freeman’s 1995 statement is striking when evaluated in relation to the contemporary political context in the 
US. 
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‘clientelistic.’ However, as Ambassador Robinson (2013) explained, the Department also 
consults state governments and local communities before submitting its recommendation on 
the annual resettlement admissions ceiling. In other words, the Department of State welcomes 
input from voluntary agencies alone but it also solicits input from state and local governments 
as well as providers of public goods including education and healthcare.  
Moreover, though Freeman (1995) describes immigration policymaking as 
‘clientelistic,’ he does not offer any empirical evidence to concretely support the implication 
that politicians receive electoral benefits from listening to immigration advocates. Since eight 
of the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and 
Placement programmes are registered charities, the US tax code bars these organisations from 
endorsing or opposing candidates for political office (paragraph (c)(3) of 26 USC 501). This 
constraint calls into question his characterisation of the nature of interest representation on 
immigration (and resettlement) in the US.50 
Irrespective of how one characterises the nature of interest representation in the US and 
in resettlement in particular, the active involvement of voluntary agencies in advocacy on 
resettlement issues appears consistent with elements of the academic literature on government-
voluntary sector relations that acknowledge that voluntary sector organisations may not 
exclusively be service providers, but can also be independent agents in their own right (e.g. 
Young 1999; Young 2000). Though governments and voluntary sector organisations are not 
always in conflict, Young (1999, 33) argues that relations between the government and 
voluntary sector organisations can be ‘adversarial’ when these organisations advocate for 
policy changes. In this model of government-voluntary sector relations, governments regulate 
the behaviour of voluntary sector organisations but also respond to voluntary sector advocacy 
efforts, such as campaigns to create new government policies and programmes or calls to 
improve the efficiency or expand current programmes and services (Young 2000, 151). For 
example, voluntary sector organisations can call on the government to introduce policy changes 
or seek to convey the views of minority groups whose needs have not been fully met by the 
government (Young 1999, 33 and 38). In addition, Young (2000, 155) envisions cases in which 
                                                 
50 In a separate paper, Freeman and Birrell (2004, 538) argue that the ‘clientelistic’ nature of interest 
representation on immigration had faced “serious challenges” in the US. Much of their analysis indicates that 
throughout much of the 1990s, there was a high degree of competition between groups who favoured a more 
liberal approach to immigration policy, and those who pressed for more restrictive measures (Freeman and 
Birrell 2004, 538-40). Freeman and Birrell (2004, 539) therefore conclude that interest representation efforts 
were more “contested” during this period, though they claim that this phenomenon was temporary and limited to 
“a few issues.” Nevertheless, the authors do not indicate when interest representation on immigration policy 
supposedly returned to its clientelistic roots. 
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governments themselves could potentially become advocates by attempting to “encourage, 
prod, and stimulate private, voluntary activity in support of social goals” or circumstances in 
which governments and voluntary sector organisations collaborate to build support for new 
legislation or to raise public awareness about a particular issue. Thus, though government-
voluntary relations can be antagonistic, these two actors can also be united as advocates. 
 The federal government regulates the interest representation efforts through the US 
Internal Revenue Code, which allows voluntary sector organisations registered as charitable 
organisations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to engage in advocacy 
(National Council of Nonprofits 2018, para. 1 of 16). The Code also allows charitable 
organisations to engage in certain forms lobbying, provided that organisations do not devote a 
“substantial part of its overall activities” to such efforts or spend more than US$500,000 on 
lobbying activities in a given fiscal year (Internal Revenue Service 2018, para. 1 of 4; Internal 
Revenue Service 2018, see table). As mentioned above, the Johnson Amendment bars 
charitable organisations from proclaiming their endorsement of—or opposition to—candidates 
for political office (paragraph (c)(3) of 26 USC 501).51 
The views articulated by Ms Limón concerning the perceived constraints of 
government-voluntary sector partnerships on advocacy has been the subject of considerable 
debate in the scholarly literature, and there is no consensus at present on whether and to what 
extent government funding and regulatory regimes for voluntary sector organisations exert a 
deleterious effect on voluntary sector advocacy (c.f. Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; 
Guo and Saxton 2010; Mosley 2012; Neumayr, Schneider, and Meyer 2015; Reid 2006; 
Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008; Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008; Silverman and 
Patterson 2011). For example, in a 2007 survey of 174 charitable organisations in the state of 
Arizona, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find a negative, statistically significant relationship 
between the percentage of government funding allocated to charitable organisations and the 
scope of advocacy efforts by charitable organisations, indicating that the provision of 
government funding may narrow the number and range of advocacy activities undertaken by 
these groups. However, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find no statistically significant relationship 
between government funding and the intensity of advocacy activities. In a longitudinal study 
of advocacy efforts by 229 registered charitable organisations in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area 
                                                 
51 In a February 2017 speech at the annual National Prayer Breakfast, President Trump pledged to repeal the 
Johnson Amendment (Trump 2017, para. 16 of 28). Though President Trump issued an executive order 
directing the Department of Treasury to be ‘lenient’ in its interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code (Valverde 
2017, para. 13 of 31), the Internal Revenue Code remained unchanged at the time of submission. 
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between 1984 and 1994, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004, 305-12) find mixed 
evidence concerning the potential relationship between government funding and voluntary 
sector advocacy; in some models, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004, 309-12) found 
a positive, statistically significant relationship between the provision of government funding 
and voluntary sector engagement in advocacy, but in other models, the inclusion of additional 
control variables neutralised the significance of the effect. In a national survey of the advocacy 
and lobbying activities of 311 registered charitable organisations, Salamon and Lessans Geller 
with Lorentz (2008, 8) found that only a quarter of organisations surveyed reported no 
engagement in lobbying or advocacy due to concerns about contravening laws or regulations 
governing such activities, while only 20 per cent expressed concern that engaging in such 
activities could jeopardise the receipt of public funding. Conversely, 70 per cent of 
organisations they surveyed indicated that they did not engage in advocacy or lobbying due to 
time constraints, while 45 per cent did not engage in such activities due to the absence of 
organisational expertise amongst staff (Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008, 8). The 
diversity of findings highlights the absence of consensus on the potential impact of government 
funding on voluntary sector advocacy, though this does not obviate the possibility that some 
organisations may view regulations surrounding voluntary sector advocacy and the receipt of 
public funds as a constraint on their desire to engage in advocacy and their choice of strategies. 
The active involvement of voluntary agencies in advocacy on resettlement appears 
consistent with the literature on government-voluntary sector relations, this form of 
engagement, alongside with efforts to disseminate information and build grassroots support, 
also align with the literature that views voluntary sector organisations as fundamental 
components of civic life in democratic societies. In particular, Warren (2003, 46) argues that 
voluntary sector organisations can “develop the democratic capacities of citizens” through 
information dissemination and educational outreach activities which can help develop “civic 
virtues such as tolerance, reciprocity, and trust.” In addition, voluntary sector organisations 
may give different groups a “public voice” and “providing representations of difference and 
commonality in ways that underwrite and focus public deliberation (Warren 2003, 46-47).” 
Furthermore, voluntary sector organisations may serve an “institutional” purpose by offering 
“representation and voice” within government institutions or, at times, a “means of resistance” 
when interest representation efforts prove unsuccessful (Warren 2003, 46-47). In these ways, 
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voluntary sector organisations contributed to the development of an “active, self-confident, and 
informed citizenry” that is essential for good democratic governance (Warren 2003, 48).52 
 That said, the nine voluntary agencies responsible for the administration and 
implementation of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes are 
not necessarily the only organisations to engage in advocacy on resettlement issues. Chapter 
two noted that the Office of Refugee Resettlement contracts out the provision of follow-on 
employment and English-language instruction services to refugees that have completed the 
initial period of settlement through the Reception and Placement programme to 27 ethnic 
community-based organisations. 
 Preliminary research indicates few ethnic community-based organisations may include 
advocacy as part of their respective organisational missions. Indeed, this research suggests that 
only seven of the 27 ethnic community-based organisations contracted by the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement prioritise advocacy in this way.53 Of these seven organisations, only the Arab 
Community Center for Economic and Social Services of Dearborn, Michigan published any 
statements on resettlement issues. In December 2015, the Arab Community Center for 
Economic and Social Services issued a press release alerting the media of an event featuring 
local and state representatives as well as other ethnic community-based organisations and civil 
liberties groups opposed to House Resolution 4038. The Center organised the event to raise 
awareness of existing efforts to challenge the resolution, and called on members of the public 
to “contact local, state and national elected leaders to keep doors open to refugees (Arab 
Community Center for Economic and Social Services published its views on resettlement 
issues 2015, para. 3 of 10).” The organisation subsequently issued a press release in which it 
expressed its opposition to “the anti-refugee rhetoric and legislation that is causing Michigan 
and local communities to deny humanitarian efforts to refugees,” and argued that House 
Resolution 4038 “only serves to further divide us and increases unfounded fears of refugees 
and immigrants (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services 2015, para. 2 and 
4 of 9).” 
                                                 
52 For a discussion of the role of voluntary sector organisations in facilitating the mobilisation and political 
participation of immigrants or refugees, see Bloemraad (2006), Bloemraad and Gleeson (2012), and Nawyn 
(2005). 
53 The seven organisations include the Pars Equality Centre, the Somali American Community Center, the 
Burmese American Community Institute, the Ethnic Minorities from Burma Advocacy and Resource Center, the 
Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services, the Somali American Parent Association, and the 
Bhutanese Nepali Community of Columbus. 
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 Though the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services appears to be 
the only ethnic community-based organisation to include advocacy as part of its mission, a 
preliminary analysis indicates that a further four organisations contracted by the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement have used their online presence to express their views on recent 
developments in this area.54 In 2017, the Iraqi Mutual Aid Society of Chicago, Illinois issued 
two press releases in response to the executive orders which placed a moratorium on 
resettlement admissions and the admission of travellers from certain predominantly Muslim 
countries. The Society called the measures “inhumane, unnecessary, and counterproductive,” 
and further argued that the orders “will have harmful consequences for tens of thousands of 
innocent individuals seeking refuge from war, persecution, and terrorism (Iraqi Mutual Aid 
Society 2016, para. 10 of 18).” Similarly, in response to the executive orders, the Immigrant 
and Refugee Community Organization of Portland, Oregon, urged residents to “remain 
supportive of those who are persecuted internationally and seek peace, safety and freedom in 
the United States” and called on supporters to contact their representatives and convey their 
support through social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook (Immigrant and Refugee 
Community Organization 2018, para. 2 and 5 and of 9).  
 One cannot interpret the preliminary research presented above as conclusive evidence 
on the level of engagement of ethnic-community based organisations in advocacy on 
resettlement. Representatives from these 27 organisations and their allies could engage in other 
forms of advocacy, such as drafting petitions, meeting local, state, and federal officials, or they 
may pursue forms of direct action that they cannot document as easily online. These 
organisations could also potentially lack the human and financial resources necessary to 
maintain an active presence online and to raise awareness of their advocacy efforts through 
these channels. Though it seems reasonable to assume that the 27 ethnic-community based 
organisations contracted by the Office of Refugee Resettlement could well have views on 
resettlement matters, this does not obviate the possibility that other ethnic community-based or 
voluntary agencies are not actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement in the US.  
 Determining and interpreting the potential role of ethnic community-based 
organisations in advocacy on resettlement is also challenging due to the dearth of academic 
scholarship in this area (Vu et al. 2017, 200; c.f. de Leon et al. 2009, Hung 2007, and Newland, 
Tanaka, and Barker 2007). De Leon et al. (2009, 20) argue that ethnic community-based 
                                                 
54 In addition to the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services, Women Watch Afrika, the Iraqi 
Mutual Aid Society, the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization, and EMBARC have also issued 
press releases on resettlement issues. 
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organisations are “uniquely positioned to represent their constituents and propose policy and 
programmatic responses, being attuned to the needs and concerns of individuals and families.” 
However, their analysis of the activities of 533 ethnic community-based organisations located 
in the Washington, DC area found that despite their proximity to the Capitol, only 13 
organisations (or 2.4 per cent) primarily engaged in the promotion of civil rights or advocacy 
(de Leon et al. 2009, 9). 
Though de Leon et al. (2009) document a range of advocacy efforts undertaken by other 
organisations in their sample, their analysis indicates that many of these organisations have 
multifaceted missions and few ethnic community-based organisations have staff dedicated to 
the pursuit of advocacy. De Leon et al. (2009, 21-22) observe that “many nonprofit 
organizations [sic] do not have the capacity, resources, or opportunity to participate in direct 
advocacy” and those that many senior representatives “do most direct advocacy-related 
activities themselves, often on their own time and using social capital within their networks.”55 
Furthermore, de Leon et al. (2009, 24) observed that the Latino community was more engaged 
in advocacy and had been established longer than the Asian and African community-based 
organisations in the Washington, DC area. Thus, factors including human and financial 
resources, the length of time an ethnic community has been established in a given area, and 
cultural differences may condition the advocacy efforts of ethnic community-based 
organisations. 
However, other scholars suggest that ethnic community-based organisations may be 
more engaged in advocacy on resettlement than it appears at first glance. Nawyn (2005) 
conducted a mail-in survey of 188 resettlement agencies in the US, including 152 local 
affiliates of the nine voluntary agencies interviewed as part of this thesis, and eight “mutual 
assistance associations” representing a range of ethnic communities.56 Of those eight mutual 
assistance organisations, six engaged in advocacy (Nawyn 2005, 39). Though Nawyn does not 
document the advocacy efforts of these eight mutual assistance associations in detail, she notes 
(2005, 131) that these associations are “not as tightly connected to federal and state government 
agencies” as voluntary agencies, which gives them more “freedom to act without government 
                                                 
55 This finding parallels an observation from Vu et al. (2017, 2000), who find that ethnic community-based 
organisations tend to have fewer staff and lower revenues than ‘mainstream’ community organisations (Vu et al. 
2017, 200). 
56 The Office of Refugee Resettlement now refers to mutual assistance associations as ethnic community-based 
organisations (California Department of Social Services, 2016, 1). 
 
Page 138 of 361 
 
restrictions.”57 Though these eight organisations represent only a fraction of the total number 
of mutual assistance organisations, and there may be a self-selection bias in terms of which 
organisations elected to respond to the mail-in survey, it is clear that further research is needed 
to better ascertain the nature and level of engagement in advocacy among ethnic community-
based organisations in resettlement. 
In the time since the author conducted interviews in the US, voluntary agencies have 
been active advocates on a range of issues related to resettlement, opposing efforts to impose 
further security screening requirements on refugees bound for resettlement, pressing for 
increased resettlement admissions, and vigorously campaigning for the repeal of the executive 
orders issued by President Trump in 2017. Many voluntary agencies have also expressed their 
opposition to the decision to limit resettlement admissions to a historic low of 45,000 in fiscal 
year 2018. The Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service condemned the move as “callous 
and tragic” and out of alignment with the history and values of the US (Lutheran Immigration 
and Refugee Service 2017, para. 2 of 8). The International Rescue Committee also derided the 
“drastic” reduction in the resettlement ceiling and argued that this “arbitrary” decision was a 
“tragic and misguided error” that would both ruin and cost lives (International Rescue 
Committee 2017, para. 1 and 2 of 9). The US Conference of Catholic Bishops argued that 
resettled refugees “bring strength and richness” to American society and pressed the 
government to “restore America's historic leadership as a refuge for those fleeing persecution 
(US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 5 and 6 of 6).” For their part, the US 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants argued the decision “signals the U.S. retreat from 
global leadership (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 1 and 2 of 4).” 
The executive orders adopted by President Trump in both January and March 2017 
prompted a range of responses from voluntary agencies, including open letters and press 
releases to public demonstrations and legal advocacy. In February 2017, World Relief 
published an open letter to President Trump and Vice President Mike Pence in the Washington 
Post in response to the first executive order which established a moratorium on resettlement to 
the US. Co-signed by evangelical leaders from 50 states, the letter argued that the ‘dramatic’ 
decrease in resettlement admissions would deprive refugees of “hope and a future” and could 
also “cost them their lives (World Relief et al. 2017, para. 5 of 6).” 
                                                 
57 If one accepts Freeman’s (1995; 2006) characterisation of the ‘clientelistic’ nature of interest representation 
on immigration policymaking in the US, then the absence of a close relationship with federal officials could 
potentially hamper the effectiveness of ethnic community-based advocacy efforts. 
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HIAS has consistently spoken out against the executive orders issued by President 
Trump to stem the flow of refugees to the US. For example, Mark Hetfield, President and Chief 
Executive Officer of HIAS, released a statement arguing that “With the stroke of a pen, Donald 
Trump has abdicated American values and American leadership on welcoming refugees,” and 
further noting that “to deprive refugees of safe haven is to scapegoat vulnerable human beings, 
and to confuse those who flee terror with terror itself (HIAS 2017, para. 2 of 5).” Mr Hetfield 
particularly highlighted the “deep and tragic irony” of issuing the executive order on 
International Holocaust Remembrance Day, recalling the ‘dark period’ when the US “shut their 
doors to millions of innocent people (HIAS 2017, para. 5 of 5).”  
The US Conference of Catholic Bishops has also been an outspoken critic of the 
executive orders issued by President Trump on refugee resettlement. In response to the 
executive order issued in January 2017, the organisation issued a press release in which it 
expressed its ‘strong disagreement’ with the decision to impose a moratorium on resettlement, 
calling resettlement “an act of love and hope (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 
3 of 7).” However, the organisation was careful to note that it was not attempting to “enter the 
political arena” but merely seeking to remind Christians of biblical teachings concerning the 
protection of refugees (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 6 of 6).  
In response to the second executive order issued in March 2017, the organisation issued 
a press release in which it noted that the US has historically demonstrated “leadership” in 
refugee protection and argued “Resettling only 50,000 refugees a year, down from 110,000, 
does not reflect the need, our compassion, and our capacity as a nation. We have the ability to 
continue to assist the most vulnerable among us without sacrificing our values as Americans 
or the safety and security of our nation (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 8 of 
8).” Similarly, the US Committee for Refugees issued a press release in which it stated that the 
decision had “shattered” the history of the US as a “nation of refugees and immigrants (US 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 1 of 6).” 
World Relief has expressed its opposition to the recent executive orders on a number 
of occasions through both press statements and open letters signed by other evangelical leaders. 
For example, in January 2017, the organisation issued a press release in which it expressed its 
“dismay” at the decision to suspend the Refugee Admissions Program, and called on the 
administration to rescind the executive order and restore a programme which “represents the 
historic compassion and courage of the American people (World Relief 2017, para. 4 and 5 of 
8).” The organisation also castigated the third executive order issued in October 2017 and 
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argued that the order represents a “further abdication” of the country’s history as “the global 
leader in compassion (World Relief 2017, para. 4 of 4). 
However, the organisation was forced to defend its public position on the executive 
order, noting that it had been both “praised and criticized [sic] for taking a public stand” on the 
matter (World Relief 2017, para. 1 of 14). The organisation stated that they “never have and 
never will” endorse a particular political party or candidate, but that they believe they have an 
“obligation” and a “biblical call” to engage in advocacy (World Relief 2017, para. 4 and 5 of 
14).” In a religious context, the organisation argued that Christians have helped advance 
numerous social movements and social policy changes in the history of the US, and argued that 
“our Christian faith [does not excuse] us from the public policy discourse but in fact demands 
it (World Relief 2017, para. 6 of 14).” 
The language used in these statements appears to parallel the language used by 
government officials and voluntary agencies to describe the motivations for resettlement and 
its benefits, as set out in chapter two. These statements could indicate that voluntary agencies 
continue to perceive humanitarianism, norms, history, values, and leadership as motivations 
for resettling refugees in the US today. 
That said, any discussion of advocacy would be incomplete without considering two 
important, non-institutional factors that condition the impact of advocacy efforts: issue context 
and issue salience. Issue context relates to both the scope of the policy and the degree of 
contestation surrounding this policy (Mahoney 2007, 40). Groups are more likely to exert 
influence in the policymaking process when the scope of the issue is relatively narrow and 
uncontested (Mahoney 2007, 40). 
Evaluating the issue context surrounding the Resettlement Admissions and Reception 
and Placement programmes is somewhat challenging. On the one hand, as previously noted, 
Freeman (2006, 239) characterises resettlement as a distributive policy that has concentrated 
benefits for resettled refugees and diffuse costs for the country of resettlement. However, once 
the federal government discharges its financial responsibility under the Reception and 
Placement Program, states and local communities must absorb the ongoing costs of 
resettlement and provide education and access to any other entitlements for which resettled 
refugees may be eligible. Though the US resettles the largest absolute number of refugees and 
is among the largest contributors to resettlement in relative terms, resettled refugees constitute 
a small proportion of the total US population, as tables 7 to 9 in the appendix demonstrated. 
Nevertheless, given that resettled refugees may have unique needs related to their refugee 
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experience, it seems plausible that the scope of resettlement and the impact on receiving 
communities and state governments may be somewhat larger than Freeman (2006) envisioned.  
Evaluating the degree of contestation surrounding resettlement is also challenging. As 
previously noted, academics, voluntary agencies, and the media have argued that there has 
traditionally been a bipartisan consensus surrounding resettlement to the US Republicans (c.f. 
Amos 2017, para. 3 and 18 of 35; International Rescue Committee 2017, 1; Orchard 2017, para. 
1 and 17 of 31; Rhodan 2017, para. 6 of 13; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 
para. 15 of 21). However, public opinion polls demonstrate that members of the public have 
rarely supported resettlement. Historically, the US adopted policies that conformed to public 
attitudes on refugee protection, whether these were more liberal or more restrictive (Harwood 
1986, 201-2). However, governments gradually began to pursue a more permissive approach 
to refugee protection despite public opposition (Harwood 1986, 210-11). The divergence 
between government policies and public attitudes on resettlement is apparent when one 
examines public opinion polls on this issue. In 1948, a Gallup poll found that 57 per cent of 
respondents opposed a proposal to resettle approximately 10,000 displaced persons from 
Europe, but the US House of Representatives and Senate authorised the resettlement of 415,000 
individuals under the auspices of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (Desilver 2015, para. 6 of 
13 but c.f. Gibney 2004, 135). Similarly, a 1958 Gallup poll found that 55 per cent of 
respondents disapproved of a proposal to resettle 65,000 Hungarian refugees (Desilver 2015, 
para. 7 of 13), yet the government adopted the Hungarian Refugee Act which eventually 
facilitated the resettlement of 38,121 Hungarian refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 52). 
Public opinion polls also demonstrate that there was a deep divide in public attitudes 
towards refugees from Southeast Asia; a 1975 Harris poll found 49 per cent of respondents 
opposed the government’s decision to admit refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 
while 37 per cent supported their resettlement and 14 per cent did not know (Desilver 2015, 
para. 8 of 13). In 1979, a CBS/New York Times poll found that a full 62 per cent of respondents 
opposed subsequent plans to increase resettlement of Indochinese refugees to 14,000 
individuals a month, but Democratic President Jimmy Carter nevertheless approved the 
decision to double the monthly admissions of Indochinese refugees in July of that year 
(Desilver 2015, para. 9 of 13). 
This is not to say that the American public has never supported resettlement. One 
notable exception to the pattern of divergence between government policy and public opinion 
occurred during the conflict in Kosovo. In an unusual reversal of circumstances, the 
Department of State and the UNHCR opposed the resettlement of Kosovar refugees at first 
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(Robinson 2000, 2 and 4-6). However, extensive domestic media coverage of the US bombing 
campaign in Kosovo fuelled public support for a humanitarian response, and a 1999 Gallup 
poll found that 66 per cent of respondents supported the decision to resettle several hundred 
Kosovar Albanian refugees (Desilver 2015, para. 13 of 13; Robinson 2000, 3). Though 
congressional advocacy efforts by voluntary agencies also exerted some impact, a research 
paper by Ambassador Robinson suggests that public opinion had an important influence on the 
decision to resettle 14,161 Kosovar refugees in 2000 (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see 
annual table; Robinson 2000, 3 and 6-7). 
Though the Kosovar case marks a noteworthy exception to the pattern of opposition to 
resettlement, there are indications that public opinion on the resettlement of particular groups 
of refugees remains divided. Such divisions are apparent in American public attitudes towards 
Syrian refugees. In September 2015, a national NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll of 1,000 
randomly selected adults found that 35 per cent of respondents agreed that President Obama’s 
proposal to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees constituted the “right amount,” while 24 per cent 
favoured resettling no refugees, 21 per cent believed that the US should resettle more Syrian 
refugees and 17 per cent thought that the government should resettle fewer Syrians (Hart 
Research Associates 2015, 22). Conversely, a national ABC News/Washington Post survey of 
1,004 randomly selected adults found that 54 per cent of respondents opposed resettling Syrian 
refugees while 43 per cent supported the provision of this durable solution (Langer Research 
Associates 2015, 5). Similarly, a national Quinnipiac University poll of 1,140 registered voters 
found that 51 per cent opposed resettling Syrian refugees while only 43 per cent supported 
resettling these refugees (Quinnipiac University 2015, 5).58 
However, a slightly different picture emerges when exploring polls that employed more 
complex questions which incorporated references to the security screening process for resettled 
refugees. In November 2015, a national CBS News poll of 1,205 randomly selected adults 
found that 50 per cent believed that the US should not resettle any Syrian refugees, while 47 
per cent responded that the US should resettle Syrian refugees provided they undergo a 
“security clearance process (CBS News 2015, 1).” Conversely, a December 2015 national 
Public Religion Research Institute poll of 1,003 randomly selected adults found that 53 per 
cent favoured resettling Syrian refugees provided that refugees are screened, while 41 per cent 
responded that the US should not resettle any Syrian refugees (Public Religion Research 
Institute 2015, 7). Similarly, a May 2016 national Brookings Institute survey of 1,580 
                                                 
58 Quinnipiac University is among the largest independent, academic polling centres in the US. 
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individuals found that 56 per cent of respondents agreed the US should resettle Syrian refugees 
provided that the government conducts “extensive background checks” to eliminate the risk of 
terrorism, while 43 per cent expressed that no Syrian refugees ought to be resettled even with 
such measures in place (Brookings Institute 2016, 10). 
One must also place these attitudes in the broader context of the increasing political 
polarisation of the US electorate on immigration. Between 1994 and 2017, the nonpartisan Pew 
Research Center conducted repeated polls which revealed a net increase in positive attitudes 
towards immigrants. In 1994, 63 per cent of respondents agreed that immigrants “burden [the] 
country by taking jobs, housing, [and] health care,” compared to 31 per cent who believed that 
immigrants “strengthen [the] country with their hard work and talents (Pew Research Center 
2017, 38). Conversely, in 2017, only 26 per cent of respondents agreed that immigrants were 
a burden, compared to 65 per cent who believed that immigrants strengthened the US (Pew 
Research Center 2017, 38). 
Though their survey indicates that public attitudes towards immigrants have improved, 
current views among Democrats and Republicans (or those who lean Democrat or Republican) 
may be more polarised than ever before. In 1994, 32 per cent of Democrats and those who lean 
Democrat agreed immigrants strengthen the country, compared to 30 per cent of Republicans 
or those who lean Republican (Pew Research Center 2017, 38). The proportion of Democrats 
and Republicans who held positive views of immigrants followed a similar trajectory between 
1994 and 2006 but began to diverge thereafter. In 2017, 84 per cent of Democrats or those who 
lean Democrat agreed immigrants strengthen the US, compared to 42 per cent of Republicans 
or those lean Republican (Pew Research Center 2017, 38). During the 2016 Presidential 
election, only 32 per cent of individuals who supported the Democratic candidate Hillary 
Clinton believed that immigration was the “most important issue” for the US, compared to 64 
per cent of those who voted for Donald Trump (Huang et al. 2016, no pagination). These 
attitudes indicates that Democrats hold far more favourable views of immigrants than 
Republicans at present and that immigration is a far less salient issue for Democrats than it is 
for Republicans.59 
                                                 
59 Though public opinion polls indicate that Democrats and Republicans are divided in some aspects of 
immigration, the disparity should not be overstated. Though Gallup polls conducted between 2001 and 2008 and 
again between 2012 and 2016 indicate that a smaller percentage of Democrats support reducing the overall 
number of immigrants admitted to the US than Republicans, there was a net decline in the percentage of both 
Democrats and Republicans that supported lower admissions between 2002 and 2008 (Gimpel 2017, 2). There 
was also a dramatic decline in the percentage of both Democrats and Republicans favouring lower admissions 
from 2012 to 2013, though attitudes have since diverged (Gimpel 2017, 2). 
Page 144 of 361 
 
There are indications that public attitudes towards resettlement are also politically 
polarised. In a May 2016 poll of 1,580 Americans conducted by Nielsen International for the 
Brookings Institute and the University of Maryland, 59 per cent of respondents agreed the US 
should resettle refugees from Syria and other countries in the Middle East, provided the 
government “screens refugees for security risks (University of Maryland 2016, 2).” However, 
77 per cent of Democrats agreed the government should resettle these refugees, whereas 63 per 
cent of Republicans and 77 per cent of those who identified themselves as supporters of 
President Trump opposed such a decision (University of Maryland 2016, 2). 
Though one could interpret these findings as evidence of party sorting rather than 
political polarisation (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008), there are also indications that the 
strength and direction of public sentiment towards resettlement are diverging according to 
political affiliation. In a poll conducted among 660 residents of the state of Pennsylvania 
between August and October 2016, the University of Pennsylvania found that 54 per cent of 
respondents agreed that the US should resettle Syrian refugees “after screening them for 
security” and 39 per cent of respondents disagreed with that statement (University of 
Pennsylvania 2016, 1). Of those who agreed with that statement, 29 per cent strongly agreed, 
and 25 per cent somewhat agreed (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). Conversely, among 
those who disagreed with that statement, 27 per cent strongly disagreed, and 12 per cent 
somewhat disagreed (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). However, 43 per cent of Democrats 
strongly agreed that the US should resettle Syrian refugees, whereas only 10 per cent of 
Republicans felt the same way (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). In contrast, 45 per cent 
of Republicans strongly opposed the statement, while only 12 per cent of Democrats expressed 
the same sentiment (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). These findings indicate that a 
majority of respondents expressed a ‘strong’ opinion about the question and that a plurality of 
Democrat and Republican respondents held ‘strong’ but opposing views on the issue. The small 
size and limited geographic scope of this particular poll make it difficult to draw generalisations 
regarding the implications of its findings. Nevertheless, Democrat and Republican attitudes 
towards Syrian refugees appear to diverge in strength and direction in this poll, raising the 
spectre of polarisation in certain districts. 
Issue salience can also impact the degree of influence exerted by interest groups, insofar 
as policymakers are more likely to consider the views of a range of groups when issues are 
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high salience (Mahoney 2007, 40; see also Klüver 2011).60 While public opinion polls suggest 
that the American public has rarely supported refugee resettlement efforts, the general domain 
of immigration has usually held modest salience for the electorate (Newport and Brands 2016). 
Longitudinal data on public attitudes towards immigration is rare—particularly polls which ask 
the same question over a sustained period. However, an analysis of Gallup polls that have 
repeatedly asked respondents to identify the “most important problem facing this country 
today” indicates that only a small percentage of respondents identified immigration as the 
“most important” issue between 1994 and 2016 (Newport and Brands 2016, para. 3 of 26). 
Indeed, immigration only appeared in the top five “most important” issues in 52 of the 190 
months over which these polls were conducted (Newport and Brands 2016, para. 3 of 26).  
However, there are indications that the salience of immigration has increased since the 
turn of the millennium (Newport and Brands 2016, figure 1). On average, five per cent of 
respondents identified immigration as the “most important” issue each month between January 
2001 and February 2018 (Newport 2018, para. 7 of 17). However, this belies occasionally 
peaks in the salience of immigration. For example, in April 2006, 19 per cent of respondents 
identified immigration as the “most important” issue (Newport 2018, para. 9 of 17). This poll 
was taken in the same month that a Republican-controlled Congress introduced the 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, which provoked widespread protests against 
its perceived restrictive measures (Newport 2018, para. 9 of 17). Similarly, there was a marked 
increase in the percentage of respondents who identified immigration as the “most important” 
issue, rising from 5 per cent in May 2007 to 15 per cent in June 2007 (Newport 2018, para. 10 
of 17). This change coincided with Congressional debates on the Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Act of 2007 (Newport 2018, para. 10 of 17), a revised version of the bill introduced the 
previous year. One can observe a similar change in 2014, when the percentage of respondents 
who identified immigration as the “most important” issue rose from just 2 per cent in the spring 
to 17 per cent in July 2014, when large numbers of unaccompanied minors from Central 
America began to arrive in search of asylum (Newport 2018, para. 11 of 17). On average, there 
appears to have been a marginal increase in the salience of immigration since 2014, which has 
persisted so far in 2018 (Newport 2018, para. 12 of 17). 
These developments highlight the potential influence of “focusing” events, which can 
draw attention to a particular issue and can help or hinder advocates, depending on their 
                                                 
60 Mahoney (2007, 40) notes that, ironically, this could undermine the influence of groups which have sought to 
augment the salience of that particular issue. 
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perspective and the response the focusing event generates among the wider public (Kingdon 
1995, 94-99). However, focusing events are unlikely to fuel policy change in and of themselves 
(Kingdon 1995, 94-99). Though recent academic research indicates that the framing of media 
discourse on refugee protection can have a powerful positive (or negative) impact on public 
attitudes towards those in need of protection (De Poli, Jakobsson, and Schüller 2017; Ferwerda, 
Flynn, and Horiuchi 2017; Hickerson and Dunsmore 2016; see also Gabrielatos and Baker 
2008), public opinion polls in the US indicate that events such as the drowning of three-year-
old Syrian Alan Kurdî and the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2016, precipitated a shift 
in attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Following the global circulation of images of Alan Kurdî, 
who drowned on 2 September, 2015 along with his brother Galib and mother Rehana after his 
family attempted to travel to the Greek island of Kos in search of asylum, a majority of 
respondents to a CNN/ORC poll conducted between 4 and 6 September, 2015 found that 55 
per cent of respondents supported the idea of resettling some refugees in response to the 
“migrant crisis in Europe.” Following President Obama’s decision to resettle 10,000 Syrian 
refugees, a Pew Research Center poll conducted between 22 and 27 September, 2015 found 
that 51 per cent of respondents approved of the decision, with a plurality (44 per cent) believing 
that the US should do even “more” in this regard (Pew Research Center 2015, 1).  
However, multiple public opinion polls indicate that public attitudes shifted in the 
weeks immediately following the attacks in Paris on 13 November, 2015 (see Neufeld 2017, 
figure 1). For example, a CBS News/New York Times poll conducted between 19 and 22 
November, 2015 found that 50 per cent of respondents agreed the US should not resettle Syrian 
refugees who had undergone security screening, compared to 47 per cent who favoured 
resettling refugees (CBS News 2015, 1). Of those who opposed resettlement, 68 per cent 
identified as Republican and 36 per cent identified as Democrat (CBS News 2015, 1). 
Conversely, among those who expressed support for resettlement, 63 per cent identified as 
Democrat and 27 per cent as Republican (CBS News 2015, 1). Similarly, a Quinnipiac 
University poll conducted between 16 and 20 December, 2015 found that 51 per cent opposed 
resettling Syrian refugees in the US, compared to 43 per cent who supported resettlement 
(Quinnipiac University 2015, 5). Of those who opposed resettling these refugees, 82 per cent 
identified as Republican and 22 per cent identified as Democrat (Quinnipiac University 2015, 
5). Conversely, among those who supported resettlement, 74 per cent identified as Democrat 
and 13 per cent as Republican (Quinnipiac University 2015, 5).  
While voluntary agencies spoke of their efforts to raise awareness and build community 
support for resettlement, pinpointing the influence of issue salience can be challenging due to 
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its endogeneity. In short, issues rarely become salient naturally—they are frequently made 
salient directly as a result of advocacy efforts (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 121). However, 
advocates are more likely to respond to a change in the salience of a particular issue than they 
are to succeed in making an issue prominent in the public sphere, and advocates cannot fully 
control the level of salience that a particular issue ultimately achieves (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 
121). Furthermore, interest groups do not necessarily perceive salience in the same way; 
whereas some advocates might want to raise the profile of an issue, others would prefer to keep 
the profile of the matter low (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 121). 
The success of advocacy efforts may also depend to an extent on whether advocates are 
appealing to preserve the status quo or whether such groups are pressing for policy change 
(Mahoney 2007, 41). In particular, advocates who favour the “current regulatory environment” 
are “more likely” to succeed in their efforts than groups who path dependence makes it “more 
likely” that advocates who favour the “current regulatory environment” will be successful than 
those attempting to move to a new “equilibrium,” so to speak (Mahoney 2007, 41). In the 
context of resettlement admissions, recent changes in the resettlement ceiling have been 
relatively modest, and constitute an attempt to amend an existing policy, rather than an effort 
to abolish a policy or create a new one. Voluntary agencies may have been successful in 
lobbying for recovery in admissions post-9/11 and preserving funding because this is 
essentially returning to the status quo. However, this suggests that voluntary agencies may find 
it more difficult to advocate for increased admissions. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a discussion of the history of advocacy on resettlement in the 
US. Though few scholars have directly explored this topic, the available literature indicates 
that voluntary sector organisations such as the International Rescue Committee successfully 
advocated for the government to resettle large numbers of Hungarian refugees. However, 
voluntary organisations struggled to convince the government to adopt similarly generous 
resettlement admissions policies for Chilean refugees. 
The chapter then explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy through interviews with government 
officials and representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement 
Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. A federal official indicated that the 
government is open to advocacy efforts and voluntary agency representatives stated that they 
actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues. These efforts were perceived to have 
contributed to a rebound in resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 
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September, 2001 and were also thought to have prevented funding cuts to resettlement 
programmes in the US. The author suggested that one could interpret these responses as 
consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations which argues 
that relations between these parties can be adversarial in nature. The author further suggested 
that one could interpret these responses as consistent with the neo-pluralist structure of interest 
representation in the US, which suggests that organisations have a common right to influence 
the policymaking process, though not all groups are necessarily represented equally in this 
process. Some elements of the structure of relations between the government and voluntary 
agencies could also be interpreted as clientelistic in nature, though this approach has certain 
notable limitations. Nevertheless, some respondents indicated that advocacy could not only 
help build community support for resettlement but also reflected the democratic values of the 
US. While preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community-based organisations may 
be engaged in advocacy, the limitations of the existing literature create a strong rationale for 
further research to better ascertain efforts by ethnic community-based organisations in this area. 
Though voluntary agencies perceived success in some of their advocacy efforts on 
resettlement, the analysis indicated that issue context and salience could condition the impact 
of voluntary sector advocacy efforts. Though the potentially narrow scope of resettlement could 
facilitate voluntary sector advocacy efforts in this area, public opinion polls suggest that the 
American public has rarely supported resettlement in the US, and that attitudes towards 
resettlement may be becoming more polarised—especially given the resurgence in securitised 
discourse on refugee protection since Donald Trump was elected President in November 2015. 
Though the US was among the largest contributors to resettlement in absolute and relative 
terms between 1980 and 2016, the contested nature of resettlement could potentially constrain 
the impact of advocacy efforts, even though immigration has rarely been a salient issue for 
voters outside focusing events. 
Overall, though the perceived openness of the government to interest representation 
and the positive outcomes identified by voluntary agency representatives offer an indication of 
the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy, 
further research that traces the process through which the US develops its annual resettlement 
ceilings and appropriates funding, and which considers the influence of issue context and 
salience, is required. 
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Chapter Four: Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing in Canada 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning contributions to 
resettlement and the structure of resettlement programmes. Included among those observations 
were figures demonstrating that Canada was among the largest contributors to resettlement in 
both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016. Chapter one also observed that, in 
addition to the considerable cross-national differences in resettlement contributions among 
members of the international community, there are notable differences in how these countries 
structure their resettlement programmes. Finally, chapter one highlighted the need to explore 
the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing 
with voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector 
advocacy given the unprecedented scale of human displacement at present, the persistent gap 
between resettlement needs and the number of available places, and the limitations of the 
predominantly state-centric qualitative and quantitative research in this area. 
 This chapter continues to pursue the themes explored in chapter two and attempts to 
better understand why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions. The 
chapter begins descriptively by offering an overview of the history of refugee resettlement in 
Canada in section 4.2. The chapter then presents data on the size and composition of 
resettlement flows to Canada in section 4.3, to offer a picture of the size and nature of its 
contribution to resettlement. These empirical observations indicate that, though Canada is 
among the largest contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms, the size and 
composition of resettlement flows have fluctuated over time. The author follows this account 
with a description of the current structure of resettlement programmes in Canada in section 4.4. 
This descriptive background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted 
throughout the remainder of the chapter. Section 4.5 presents the views of senior government 
officials and private sponsors on the perceived motivations for resettling refugees in Canada 
and its benefits and, in accordance with the ontological and epistemological foundations of this 
thesis, attempts to interpret these perceptions in relation to the extant literature. Though the 
academic literature indicates that governments may have a range of reasons for resettling 
refugees, one could interpret their perceptions as consistent with the academic literature on 
refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more 
generally. Section 4.6 presents the views of government officials and private sponsors on the 
perceived nature of their relationship and suggests that one could interpret their views as 
consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations as well as 
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the historical pattern of public service delivery in Canada. Furthermore, one could also interpret 
comments from certain interviewees as consistent with scholarly work on the potential perils 
of government-voluntary sector partnerships in Canada. Section 4.7 presents the views of 
government officials and private sponsors on the potential relationship between resettlement 
admissions and domestic responsibility sharing and seeks to interpret these perceptions in 
relation to the literature. One could interpret the perception among most interviewees that 
domestic responsibility sharing has enhanced resettlement admissions as consistent with the 
academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public goods and 
services. Section 4.8 concludes with a summary. 
Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the 
discussion and analysis in this chapter. Though of the four resettlement programmes in Canada 
features some degree of domestic responsibility sharing, the author concentrates on analysing 
whether domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme enhances resettlement 
admissions due to time and resource constraints. Though few scholars have discussed this 
programme in their analyses of resettlement, none have analysed the potential relationship 
between this form of domestic responsibility sharing and resettlement admissions in an explicit 
manner. Since the principle of ‘additionality’ is a core component of the PSR programme, this 
initiative could offer useful insights into the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. The decision to focus on the PSR 
programme is also topical given current UNHCR efforts to promote private sponsorship as a 
complementary mechanism for the protection of Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2014, 1). 
Nevertheless, the author acknowledges that an analysis of the perceived relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the Government Assisted 
Refugees (GAR), Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS), and Blended Visa Office-Referred 
(BVOR) programmes could offer an interesting avenue for further research. 
4.2 History of Refugee Resettlement in Canada 
Canada has a long history of offering refugee protection. This section offers an 
overview of the history of refugee resettlement to Canada, to enrich the discussion and analysis 
that follows in the remainder of this chapter. In general, the literature that the country has long 
been a destination for refugees, but it has not always welcomed these immigrants with open 
arms. In the late nineteenth century, the government adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards 
immigration and admitted numerous groups of refugees, including Doukhobor, Jewish, and 
Mennonite refugees fleeing persecution in the Russia Empire (Knowles 2007, 71-78 and 94). 
During this period, the government was so unconcerned with the arrival of refugees that the 
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first Immigration Act adopted in 1869 contained no provisions on refugees (Canadian Council 
for Refugees 2009, no pagination). 
However, the government soon abandoned this laissez-faire approach. In the early 
twentieth century, Canada was reluctant to make any formal commitments towards refugees, 
and in some cases, even enacted legislation designed to restrict migration (Canadian Council 
for Refugees 2009, no pagination). Following the conclusion of World War I, Canada declined 
to resettle the displaced because the government would then be unable to deport stateless 
persons if they later committed a crime and it refused to admit any person who possessed a 
Nansen passport for the same reason (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 205-6). In 1923, Canada 
adopted a regulation which denied entry to persons of Asian descent and resettled fewer than 
1,300 Armenian refugees because the government categorised these individuals as Asian 
(Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 205). 
Though Canada admitted more than 20,000 Mennonite refugees between 1923 and 
1930 (Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination), the government generally 
maintained a restrictive approach towards refugee protection during the interwar period due to 
the Great Depression, growing concerns about communism, and undisguised anti-Semitism 
(Adelman 1991, 188; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, chapter six; Knowles 2007, 135). This 
approach sometimes had dire consequences for those in need of protection. In 1938, Canadian 
representatives attended the conference convened by US President Theodore Roosevelt in 
Evian, France but they declined to establish a formal resettlement programme and ultimately 
resettled far fewer Jewish refugees than other members of the international community 
(Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination). 
The following year, the government refused to admit any passengers from the infamous 
S.S. St. Louis despite direct appeals from prominent members of society (Abella and Troper 
1979, 179; Knowles 2007, 144). Frederick Blair, then the Director of the Immigration Branch, 
advised Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King that allowing passengers disembark in 
Canada would precipitate the arrival of other ships (Abella and Troper 1979, 180.” Mr Blair 
argued that no country could accommodate the “hundreds of thousands of Jewish people who 
want to leave Europe,” and stated that “the line must be drawn somewhere (Abella and Troper 
1979, 180).” As noted in chapter two, following refusals from the governments of both the US 
and Canada, the ship was obliged to return to Europe, and 254 of its passengers were ultimately 
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killed in the Holocaust (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date, para. 6 of 13).61 This 
decision prompted Knowles (2007, 144) to conclude that “When she was most required to show 
compassion, Canada shut herself off from the world and strenuously fought any attempt by 
desperate refugees, especially Jewish refugees, to breach the wall of restrictive legislation 
[…].” 
Following the end of World War II, the government gradually adopted a more liberal 
approach to immigration and refugee protection due in large part to increased public pressure 
to relax existing restrictions. Between 1946 and 1962, the government admitted almost 250,000 
European refugees and introduced the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme to assist those who could 
not otherwise afford the journey (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 342; Knowles 2007, 171). 
Nevertheless, the government remained reluctant to make any formal commitments on refugee 
protection, including through international law. Indeed, the government instructed delegates to 
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries not to sign the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees due to concerns that the document would prevent authorities from deporting “bona 
fide” refugees if these individuals presented security concerns (Dirks 1977, 180). Due to these 
concerns, Canada did not accede to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol until 4 June, 1969 (UNHCR 2015, 2).  
Nevertheless, this stance did not prevent the government from resettling tens of 
thousands of refugees—including Palestinian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Ugandan Asian, 
Chilean, and Tibetan refugees—on an ad hoc basis until the adoption of the 1976 Immigration 
Act, which established the legislative basis for asylum and refugee protection in Canada 
(Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 353-54; Knowles 2007, 171-76). Two years later, the government 
introduced the Immigration Regulations, which provided a framework for the government to 
designate the groups of refugees eligible for resettlement in Canada, including those from the 
former Indochina, Latin America, and individuals forced into exile from countries such as 
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, among others (Indochinese Designated 
Class Regulations 1978; Latin American Designated Class Regulations 1978; Self-Exiled 
Persons Designated Class Regulations 1978). 
The Regulations also provided the framework for the PSR programme. More precisely, 
the regulations enabled groups of at least five Canadian citizens or permanent residents and 
corporations to become sponsors, provided they signed a written undertaking with the Minister 
                                                 
61 As noted in chapter two, there appears to be no consensus on the exact number of passengers aboard the S.S. 
St. Louis; some sources indicate that 907 passengers were aboard, others suggest there were 908 or 930 
passengers, and still others state that 937 passengers were on the ship. 
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in which they agreed to provide “lodging, care, maintenance and resettlement assistance” for 
the refugees for at least one year (Immigration Regulations 1978, 7(2)(c)). Furthermore, 
sponsors were required to organise the reception of the refugees, to demonstrate “sufficient 
financial resources and expertise to fulfil the undertaking,” and to prove they had never 
defaulted on a previous sponsorship (Immigration Regulations 1978, 7(2)(d) and 7(2)(e)(ii)). 
Though the government eventually deemed the designated classes regulations impractical and 
inefficient, this regulatory framework enabled the government and private sponsors to resettle 
more than 60,000 Southeast Asian refugees between 1979 and 1980 alone (Kelley and 
Trebilcock 2010, 398). 
Since then, Canada has resettled refugees from a broad range of countries, including 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Iraq, and Nepal, among many others (Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada 2007, para. 1 of 9; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, para. 2 of 18; Foreign 
Affairs, Trade, and International Development Canada 2015, para. 13 of 19; Kelley and 
Trebilcock 2010, 400). 
4.3 Size and Composition of Resettlement Flows to Canada 
This section presents the available data on the size and composition of resettlement 
flows to Canada 1980 and 2016 to enrich the analysis of its resettlement programmes. In 
particular, this section provides figures on resettlement admissions through the Government 
Assisted, PSR, and Blended Visa Office-Referred programmes. This section also presents data 
on the annual resettlement targets established by the Canadian government, and the available 
information on the nationality, age, and gender of resettled refugees. These empirical 
observations indicate that though Canada ranked as the second- or third-largest resettlement 
country each year between 1980 and 2016, the size and composition of resettlement flows has 
fluctuated over time. 
Chapter one demonstrated that Canada was among the largest contributors to 
resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016, global comparisons 
of resettlement contributions mask changes in its annual resettlement targets. Therefore, 
Appendix Table 19 shows the annual resettlement targets for the GAR programme between 
1990 and 2019 and demonstrates that targets for the GAR programme have fluctuated at times 
and been remarkably stable at other times. Between 1990 and 1995, resettlement targets 
remained constant at 13,000 refugees per year. Resettlement targets then fell to 7,000 refugees 
per year, but the government maintained this target between 1996 and 2001. In 2005, the 
government abandoned the practice of establishing a single target and adopted ranges instead. 
Between 2005 and 2009, the established target for resettlement through the GAR programme 
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ranged from 7,300 to 7,500. Citizenship and Immigration Canada then increased the upper 
bound of the range to 8,000 refugees between 2010 and 2012. The table further demonstrates 
that the government subsequently lowered the targets between 2013 and 2015 to reduce its 
share of the costs for resettlement. However, the government substantially increased its targets 
in 2016, reflecting Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s commitment to resettle Syrian refugees. 
However, targets for 2017 through 2019 appear to have returned to the status quo. 
Appendix Table 20 shows the annual resettlement targets for the PSR programme 
between 1990 and 2019 and demonstrates that resettlement targets for this programme have 
evolved at times and been stable at other times. Between 1990 and 1995, targets were high but 
gradually decreased. In 1996, the government introduced ranges for this programme and 
substantially lowered the target to between 2,700 and 4,000 refugees. The range for 
resettlement admissions remained relatively stable, ranging from approximately 3,000 refugees 
to approximately 4,500 refugees until 2009. In 2010, the government increased the upper bound 
to 6,000 refugees per year, and the upper bound for the targets has grown since then. In 2019, 
the government plans to admit up to 21,000 refugees through the PSR programme.  
It is also important to capture targets for resettlement through the Blended Visa Office-
Referred programme launched by the Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper in 2012. In 2013, the government established a modest target of 200 to 300 refugees 
resettled through this programme (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). The 
following year, the government augmented the target to between 400 and 500 refugees 
(Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In 2015, the target ranged from 700 to 1,000 
refugees (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In 2016, the target ranged from 
2,000 to 3,000 refugees (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, no pagination). Most 
recently, the government has established targets of between 1,000 and 3,000 for each year 
between 2017 and 2019 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2016, no pagination; 
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 2017, no pagination). 
To better understand the scope of resettlement contributions in Canada, it is also 
instructive to examine the actual number of refugees resettled since the inception of the GAR, 
PSR, and BVOR programmes. Appendix Table 21 shows the total number of refugees resettled 
through the GAR programme between 1980 and 2016 and demonstrates that resettlement 
admissions through the GAR programme progressively declined from their peak of 19,233 
refugees in 1980. Nevertheless, the level of admissions remained stable throughout the 1980s, 
before declining to approximately 7,000 refugees per year in the mid- to late-1990s. Though 
resettlement admissions increased to 10,671 refugees in 2000, this was a temporary 
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phenomenon as admissions once again declined to approximately 7,000 refugees per year for 
most of the first decade of the new millennium—a trend which persisted between 2010 and 
2013. However, Table 21 demonstrates that there was a notable decline in resettlement through 
the GAR programme in 2012 and 2013, due in part to government austerity measures discussed 
in greater detail in section 4.7. The demonstrable increase in admissions in 2015 and 2016 
could potentially be attributed to government commitments to resettle Iraqi and Syrian 
refugees, as noted above. 
Appendix Table 22 shows the total number of refugees resettled through the PSR 
programme, between 1980 and 2016 and demonstrates that private sponsors resettled a large 
number of refugees in 1980, but resettlement admissions through this programme subsequently 
declined and remained comparatively low throughout the first half of this decade. However, 
resettlement admissions rose again towards the end of the 1980s and reached their peak in 
1991, when private sponsors resettled 35,893 refugees. Resettlement admissions then 
precipitously declined in the early- to mid-1990s and remained stable until the end of the first 
decade of the new millennium. Thereafter, resettlement admissions through the PSR 
programme increased to between 4,000 and 6,000 refugees per year and remained at this new 
equilibrium until 2015 and 2016, when admissions rose yet again.  
 It is also important to capture the small number of refugees resettled through the 
Blended Visa Office-Referred programme. In 2013, the government and private sponsors 
resettled 155 refugees through this programme (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship 
Canada 2018, no pagination). The following year, resettlement arrivals increased to 177 
refugees (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination). In 2015, the 
number of refugees resettled through the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme increased 
substantially to 811 refugees (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no 
pagination). The most recent data indicates that the government and private sponsors resettled 
4,434 refugees under the auspices of this programme in 2016 (Immigration, Refugees, and 
Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination). Though statements from certain private sponsors 
indicate that the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme is controversial, these figures 
indicate that the programme is increasingly popular. 
Finally, Appendix Table 23 shows the total number of refugees resettled to Canada each 
year between 1980 and 2016. Total resettlement admissions peaked at 40,344 refugees resettled 
in 1980 and then fell dramatically in 1981. The flow of resettled refugees remained steady 
throughout the early 1980s, before rising steadily between 1986 and 1991. Thereafter, 
resettlement admissions declined once again, dropping to 9,699 in 1998 before rising again in 
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1999 and the early 2000s. Resettlement admissions remained steady throughout most of the 
first decade of the new millennium, but as the data in Table 23 demonstrates, there was a slight 
increase in resettlement admissions in most years between 2009 and 2014 (excluding 2012). 
The most recent data indicates that there has been a substantial increase in the number of 
refugees resettled in 2015 and 2016. One could attribute this development in part to the 
commitment made by Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau—initially made as a campaign 
promise—to resettle up to 25,000 Syrian refugees (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2015, 
para. 2 of 28). In total, the federal government resettled 21,751 Syrian refugees through the 
GAR program, 14,274 Syrians through the PSR programme, and 3,923 Syrian refugees through 
the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Government of Canada 2017, see section 2). 
The considerable fluctuations observed above raise questions about whether and to 
what extent the annual resettlement ceilings and admissions have evolved in parallel. Appendix 
Chart 2 illustrates the correspondence between resettlement ceilings and admissions between 
1990 and 2016, the only period for which information was available at the time of research.62 
Chart 2 shows that resettlement targets and admissions through the Government Assisted, PSR, 
and Blended Visa Office-Referred programmes were quite close during this period. Though 
resettlement targets for the GAR programme were far above actual admissions between 1991 
and 1993, targets and admissions have grown closer in recent years. Conversely, targets for the 
PSR programme were far below actual admissions in 1991, when private sponsors resettled 
35,893 refugees through this programme. 
To shed further light on the composition of resettlement flows to Canada, Appendix 
Table 24 illustrates the number of refugees resettled in Canada according to the top five 
countries of nationality, between 1981 and 1989 and demonstrates that Canada predominantly 
resettled refugees from Asia and Europe during the early 1980s. This pattern continued 
throughout most of the decade, as the government resettled thousands of Vietnamese and Polish 
refugees. However, the table demonstrates that Poland became the top source country for 
resettled refugees in 1987, moving Vietnam to second place. In addition, Canada welcomed 
thousands of refugees from El Salvador, Cambodia, and Laos during this period. Towards the 
mid- to late-1980s, the flow of resettled refugees grew more diverse, when the government 
began resettling Ethiopian and Iranian refugees. 
Appendix Table 25 illustrates the number of refugees resettled in Canada according to 
the top five countries of nationality, between 1990 and 1999 and demonstrates that Canada 
                                                 
62 From 2005 onwards, the table shows the upper bound of the target for each programme. 
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continued to resettle thousands of Polish and Vietnamese refugees in the early 1990s. However, 
in 1992, Canada dramatically increased the admission of Sri Lankan refugees and continued 
resettling large numbers of refugees from this South Asian country throughout the decade. In 
1994, Canada began resettling thousands of refugees from Bosnia, which remained the top 
source country for resettled refugees until 1999. In addition, the figures show that the Canadian 
government resettled large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia in the 
latter part of the decade. 
Appendix Table 26 shows the number of refugees resettled to Canada by the top five 
countries of nationality and year, between 2000 and 2009. Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
ceased to provide disaggregated data on the nationalities of most refugees resettled (except 
those from the US) in 2003 so only information on the regions of origin of resettled refugees 
is presented from this year onwards.63 Nevertheless, the table indicates that some of the trends 
which emerged in the 1990s persisted in the new millennium. In particular, Canada continued 
to resettle thousands of refugees from South Asian countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka, and also welcomed substantial numbers of refugees from Iran and Colombia. 
Table 26 also shows that Canada increased its commitment to resettling refugees from the Asia 
and Pacific region in the middle of the noughties. However, Canada continued to accept 
refugees from countries in the Americas, Africa and the Middle East, Europe, and the US 
during this decade. 
Finally, Appendix Table 27 shows the number of refugees resettled to Canada by the 
top five regions of origin between 2010 and 2016. The most recent figures indicate that the 
Asia and Pacific region remains an important source of refugees resettled to Canada. However, 
Canada has augmented resettlement admissions from the Americas, and this region represents 
the top source region for resettlement in 2011 and between 2013 and 2016. In addition, Canada 
has continued to resettle several hundred refugees from countries in Africa and the Middle 
East, Europe, and from the US during this period. Overall, these tables indicate that Canada 
has long resettled refugees from a diverse range of countries, resettlement admissions have also 
been characterised by periods of stability, as when the government consistently resettled large 
numbers of refugees from Vietnam, Poland, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and other countries in the Asia 
Pacific region. 
                                                 
63 The figures on resettlement from the US likely refer to children born in the US to parents of other 
nationalities. 
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In addition to examining the origins of refugees resettled to Canada, one can also 
explore the limited data on the number of men and women, as well as the number of adults and 
children, resettled to Canada. Since 1994, the Canadian government no longer provides data 
that disaggregates resettlement flows resettlement programme, gender, and age. Nevertheless, 
the available figures contribute to a greater understanding of the populations arriving in 
Canada.  
Appendix Table 28 shows the total number of refugees resettled to Canada by year, age, 
and gender, between 1980 and 1994 and demonstrates that Canada has generally resettled more 
male refugees than female refugees. Though a detailed analysis how Canada selects refugees 
for resettlement is beyond the scope of this thesis, could one link this pattern in resettlement 
admissions to the use of selection criteria? Paragraph 139(1)(g) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulations establishes the criteria which government officials consider when 
determining whether to accept an application for resettlement to Canada. The decision is 
predicated in part on a determination of whether the principal applicant and their family 
members will be able to become “successfully established” in Canada, based on factors 
including their “resourcefulness,” family members present in the community in which the 
refugee would like to settle, their “potential for employment in Canada” which is related to an 
assessment of their education, professional experience and skills, and their ability to learn one 
of Canada’s two official languages. These criteria do not apply to asylum seekers, to recognised 
refugees deemed to be “vulnerable” or in “urgent need of protection,” or to refugees admitted 
through the One-year Window family reunification programme (UNHCR 2016, 4).64  
Though Canada uses selection criteria to ensure that refugees can become “self-
sufficient” approximately three to five years following their arrival, such policies could 
privilege the selection of male refugees given that men and women do not always have equal 
access to educational and employment opportunities. In that context, it must be noted that 
though Canada accepts applications from women-at-risk, it has “no specific allocation” for 
such cases (UNHCR 2016, 2) and has no programmes which proactively facilitate the 
resettlement of female refugees. 
In addition, Table 28 also shows that Canada consistently resettles a substantially larger 
number of adults than children. This observation is unsurprising given that Canada generally 
does not resettle unaccompanied minors unless they already have family in Canada (UNHCR 
                                                 
64 In an interview on 5 December, 2013, Shelley Duffin, then a Senior Policy Analyst in Refugee Affairs, 
suggested that these criteria are applied on a “sliding scale,” according to the vulnerability of the refugee. 
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2016, 2). As noted above, the use of selection criteria may also further discourage Canadian 
officials from resettling unaccompanied minors, as these children may not yet have had the 
opportunity to acquire the education or experience that would enable them to demonstrate their 
ability to become self-sufficient in Canada.  
Though information on the number of disabled refugees resettled to Canada would add 
further nuance to the picture of resettlement flows to Canada, this data was unavailable at the 
time of research. Canada accepts referrals for refugees with medical needs but stipulates that 
no more than five per cent of all referrals should be for these individuals (UNHCR 2016, 2). In 
2016, Canada resettled 724 refugees with medical needs (UNHCR 2017, 74). 
4.4 Organisational Structure of Resettlement to Canada 
To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted 
generous resettlement admissions policies, a brief discussion of the structure of its resettlement 
programmes is necessary. Canada has a complex resettlement programme structure that 
involves extensive responsibility sharing between the government, voluntary sector 
organisations, and members of civil society.65 The lead federal department is Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada, known as Citizenship and Immigration Canada until 2015. 
The department develops resettlement policies and admissions targets in consultation with the 
provinces and territories, the public, and stakeholders. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
Canada also administers the four resettlement programmes described below. The Canada 
Border Services Agency conducts criminal and security checks in collaboration with the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service. Provincial 
governments also fund education and health care for all residents. Under the 1991 Canada-
Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and the Temporary Admission of Aliens (section II, 
subsections 17 through 20), the ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and Inclusion Québec 
(Immigration, Diversité et Inclusion Québec) assumes a unique role in deciding which 
immigrants and refugees can settle in the province—so long as these individuals are admissible 
in accordance with federal legislation. 
Canada has four resettlement programmes at present: the GAR, PSR, JAS Sponsorship, 
and Blended Visa Office-Referred programmes. The GAR programme is designed to facilitate 
                                                 
65 The civil society groups permitted to sponsor refugees for resettlement include Constituent Groups, Groups of 
Five, and Community Groups (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 6-7). SAHs can designate Constituent 
Groups, who are then generally responsible for the sponsorship and providing resettlement assistance to the 
refugee following arrival (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 6-7). For example, an Anglican diocese 
could be a SAH but may designate one or more churches as Constituent Groups. However, the SAH remains 
solely (or jointly) liable for the sponsorship, and criteria for designating Constituent Groups may vary by SAH 
(Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2014, 6). 
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the resettlement of Convention refugees (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 1). The 
federal government is responsible for the selection, screening, and processing of applications 
for resettlement through this programme, as well as destining refugees to one of 23 
communities across the country (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 4). The 
International Network branch at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada allocates 
targets for the GAR programme based on consultations with UNHCR and operational capacity 
overseas (Duffin 2013). In the case of the PSR programme, targets are allocated based on 
sponsor demand and operational capacity (Duffin 2013). 
Refugees who are not financially independent receive income assistance through the 
Resettlement Assistance Program for up to one year or until they become self-sufficient, 
whichever occurs first (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 4). Refugees receive the 
same level of income assistance as Canadian residents on social assistance, though a 
government evaluation questioned whether this level of support was adequate given that 
refugees may have additional needs (Citizenship and Immigration 2011, 54-55). The 
Resettlement Assistance Program also funds the delivery of reception, orientation, and 
integration services through voluntary sector organisations known as Service Provider 
Organizations (SPOs) (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 7).  
The PSR programme exists to facilitate the resettlement of Convention refugees as well 
as members of the Country of Asylum Class (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 5).66 
SAHs, one of their designated Constituent Groups, a for-profit or non-profit Community 
Sponsor, or a group of five Canadian citizens or permanent residents over the age of 18 are 
eligible to sponsor refugees through this programme (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
2015, 6-8). Sponsors can nominate the refugee(s) they wish to sponsor, thus enabling them to 
play a direct role in the identification of refugees for resettlement (Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada 2015, 11). Sponsors play an integral role in orientation and integration and must also 
bear the full cost of resettlement, including any costs for food, accommodation, and utilities, 
among other expenses (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 9).67 Sponsors are normally 
expected to support the refugee for one year or until the refugee becomes self-sufficient, but in 
                                                 
66 The Country of Asylum Class is intended to facilitate the resettlement of refugees who have fled their 
countries of citizenship or habitual residence because they are “seriously and personally affected” by civil war, 
armed conflict, or human rights violations (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 5). 
67 In 2018, the estimated cost of resettling a refugee through the PSR programme ranged from CAD$16,500 per 
year for a single refugee to CAD$35,500 per year for a family of six, plus an estimated CAD$2,700 for each 
additional refugee (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2018, 1). 
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exceptional circumstances, they may extend the period of sponsorship up to 36 months 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 9). 
Canada also has two smaller resettlement programmes which also involve partnerships 
between the government and voluntary sector organisations. The Blended Visa Office-Referred 
Program is intended to facilitate the resettlement of Convention refugees from priority groups 
or countries (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 25). Under this programme, the 
UNHCR refers refugees to a Canadian embassy or High Commission and the federal 
government then matches refugees with a SAH or a designated Constituent Group (Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada 2015, 25). The federal government provides financial support for up 
to six months through the Resettlement Assistance Program, while private sponsors provide 
another six months of financial support plus emotional and social support to the refugee for up 
to one year (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 25). 
Similarly, the JAS programme is designed to facilitate the resettlement of especially 
vulnerable Convention or Country of Asylum refugees, such as the elderly, the disabled, and 
refugees with large families, among others (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 28). 
The federal government is responsible for the identification and selection of refugees and also 
matches refugees with a SAH or Constituent Group (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
2015, 28). The government also provides income assistance to refugees resettled through the 
JAS programme, while SPOs deliver reception and orientation services through the 
Resettlement Assistance Program (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2004, 29). For their 
part, private sponsors offer emotional support to the refugees and may also provide reception, 
orientation, and integration assistance (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2004, 6). In this 
case, sponsors usually support JAS refugees for two years, but this can be extended up to 36 
months in exceptional circumstances (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 27). 
From this, it is apparent that Canada has developed extensive mechanisms for domestic 
responsibility sharing in all four of its resettlement programmes. Voluntary sector organisations 
are involved in all phases of the resettlement process, from the identification and processing of 
applications for resettlement to receiving refugees at the airport and assisting refugees as they 
begin the process of orientation and integration in Canada—especially through the PSR 
programme. This narrative account, in conjunction with the figures presented in section 4.3, 
set the stage for an analysis of the motivations for resettlement and its benefits in section 4.5. 
These partnerships raise questions about why and how mechanisms for domestic responsibility 
sharing emerged in Canada, and whether and to what extent these partnerships have influenced 
resettlement admissions—matters discussed in section 4.6. 
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4.5 The Perceived Motivations and Benefits of Resettling Refugees in Canada 
The data provided in section 4.3 demonstrates that Canada has resettled hundreds of 
thousands of diverse origins and backgrounds since 1980, though the size and composition of 
these flows have fluctuated over time. Furthermore, the descriptive account provided in section 
4.4 demonstrates that Canada has developed a complex resettlement programme founded on 
extensive domestic responsibility sharing with SPOs, SAHs, and private sponsorship groups 
alike. 
This narrative background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout 
the remainder of the chapter. To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has 
voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this section presents the views 
of senior government officials and private sponsors on the perceived motivations for resettling 
refugees in Canada and its benefits. In accordance with the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of this thesis, the author attempts to interpret these perceptions in relation to the 
extant literature. Though academics have proposed a range of explanations for the motivations 
for providing refugee protection, one could interpret the views articulated by government 
officials and private sponsors as consistent with the scholarship on refugee protection as an 
impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally. 
In December 2013, the author travelled to three Canadian cities in order to interview 
four senior government officials, 13 representatives from 12 SAHs, and a representative from 
a Constituent Group called Hospitality House Refugee Ministry.68 The author first travelled to 
Ottawa, Ontario to meet representatives from Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 
(then Citizenship and Immigration Canada), as well as representatives from the Incorporated 
Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa and World University Service Canada. The author then 
travelled to Toronto, Ontario to meet with representatives from the Afghan Women’s 
Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization, the Anglican United Refugee 
Alliance, the Christian and Missionary Alliance in Canada, Christie Refugee Welcome Centre, 
the Governing Council of the Salvation Army, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, and World 
Renew. Finally, the author travelled to Winnipeg, Manitoba to meet with representatives from 
Hospitality House Refugee Ministry, the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council, the 
                                                 
68 Hospitality House Refugee Ministry sponsors refugees for resettlement under the auspices of the Sponsorship 
Agreements held by the Anglican Diocese of Rupert’s Land and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Winnipeg 
(Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). 
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Mennonite Central Committee Canada, and the Anglican Diocese of Rupert’s Land.69 The 
author conducted most interviews in person at the office of each respondent. However, the 
author conducted an interview with one senior government official over the telephone in 
Ottawa. In addition, the author was generously invited to meet the representative from the 
Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa at his home. The appendices provide biographical 
information about each interviewee. 
To better understand why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies, the author asked interviewees about the perceived motivations for 
resettling refugees in Canada and its benefits. As mentioned in chapter two, the author 
deliberately phrased this question in a general manner in order to minimise priming effects and 
invite a broad range of spontaneous responses. During the interviews, many government 
officials and private sponsors argued that resettlement has a humanitarian function and enables 
Canada to demonstrate its commitment to the international norms of refugee protection and 
responsibility sharing (Boxhill 2013; Chahal 2013; Deans 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; 
Duffin 2013; Manks 2013; Niazi 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 
2013). On 5 December, 2013, the author conducted a joint interview with Derrick Deans, then 
the Assistant Director of Refugee Affairs at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and Shelley 
Duffin, who was then a Senior Policy Analyst in Refugee Affairs. Speaking in a personal 
capacity, Mr Deans (2013) shared his belief that Canada resettles refugees based on a desire to 
assist those in need of protection, rather than to derive particular benefits. Ms Duffin argued 
that resettlement is a humanitarian instrument that saves lives, and agreed that Canada is not 
motivated to resettle refugees for self-interested reasons. In a separate interview on 5 
December, 2013, Wally Boxhill, the Director of Functional Guidance and Policy Engagement 
at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, affirmed that Canada’s participation in resettlement is 
consistent with its “humanitarian tradition.” However, Mr Boxhill (2013) suggested that 
Canada does derive some benefits from resettling refugees, noting that “we feel good when we 
help others.” 
Numerous private sponsors articulated similar views concerning the humanitarian 
motivation for contributing to resettlement. On 4 December, 2013, the author met Don Smith, 
the Chair of the Refugee Working Group at the Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa. 
Mr Smith (2013) explained that resettlement expresses a commitment to humanitarian 
                                                 
69 The author organised interviews with two further SAHs, but one representative did not attend the interview 
and the other indicated they were unable to answer the author’s question given the organisation’s limited 
experience in resettlement. 
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protection and enables Canada to meet its international obligations in a manner that is 
consistent with its “humanitarian tradition.” Mr Smith (2013) added that Canadians derive 
“satisfaction” and a “moral high ground” from the provision of this durable solution, though 
he noted that the Conservative government rhetoric on “bogus refugees” which prevailed at the 
time might have undermined this sentiment. In an interview on 9 December, 2013, Ellen 
Woolaver, the Refugee Sponsorship Administrator at the Christie Street Refugee Welcome 
Centre, explained that though resettlement is not an obligation under the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, providing this durable solution nevertheless enables Canada 
to “fulfil its humanitarian obligations.” In an interview on 17 December, 2013, Tom Denton, 
the Executive Director of Administration and Sponsorship for Hospitality House Refugee 
Ministry, argued that resettlement enables Canada to ‘rescue’ individuals in need of protection. 
In addition, in an interview on 16 December, 2013, Ed Wiebe, then the National Refugee 
Program Co-ordinator for the Mennonite Central Committee Canada, contended that Canadian 
participation in resettlement expresses its commitment to international responsibility sharing. 
However, some interviewees indicated that Canada participates in resettlement for 
reasons beyond humanitarianism. More precisely, two government officials indicated that 
contributing to resettlement is perceived to enhance the reputation of the Canadian government 
(Boxhill 2013; Deans 2013). Mr Deans (2013) observed, “We’re well regarded internationally 
in terms of what we do for refugees, and that stands us in good stead in terms of other efforts 
we might be making internationally. We’re looked at as caring for people.” Similarly, Mr 
Boxhill (2013) contended that resettlement “shows that Canada cares,” and added that the 
provision of this durable solution, “also fosters that notion of Canada being concerned, being 
a compassionate nation.” 
In addition to the perceived humanitarian motivation for engaging in resettlement, 
several private sponsors argued that contributing to resettlement enables Canada to demonstrate 
global leadership in the provision of this durable solution (Chahal 2013; Dyck 2013; Niazi 
2013). On 16 December, 2013, the author met Rita Chahal, the Executive Director of the 
Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council. Ms Chahal (2013) argued that Canada is a “global 
leader in terms of understanding and responding to the human need that’s out there,” adding, 
“that kind of commitment isn’t seen globally as much as could or should be seen.” Similarly, 
in an interview on 16 December, 2013, Brian Dyck, then the National Migration and 
Resettlement Program Coordinator for the Mennonite Central Committee Manitoba and Chair 
of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association, asserted that Canada has previously shown 
“tremendous leadership” on resettlement and expressed hope that the country will remain a 
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forerunner in this area. Mr Dyck (2013) also contended that Canadian involvement in 
resettlement shapes how citizens perceive their place in the world and suggested that these 
programmes are “an important part of the Canadian identity.” 
Finally, many respondents contended that resettlement generates cultural benefits for 
Canada (Deans 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Duffin 2013; Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; 
McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013; Wiebe 2013). 
Ms Duffin (2013) argued that resettlement through the PSR programme contributes to greater 
openness in Canadian society, explaining, “I think because we have such a unique program, 
with the sponsors engaged, it gives a really Canadian connection to people that are coming, 
and creates more openness to the ‘other,’ to immigration, to refugees, and I think that’s a really 
important component of Canada’s program.” 
Similarly, many private sponsors argued that resettlement ‘enriches’ Canadian society 
and enables citizens to learn about other cultures as well as refugee issues (Dekker 2013; Manks 
2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013). On 12 December, 2013, 
the author met Paula Marshall, the Consultant for Immigrant and Refugee Services at the 
Salvation Army of Canada. Ms Marshall (2013) argued that resettlement enhances cultural 
diversity in Canada, explaining, “Because we’re supposed to be a multicultural country, and 
our whole identity seems to be around welcoming and helping, it just makes sense to bring 
those people who need our help—who need to be resettled and find a permanent, safe place to 
live.” In addition, Mr Wiebe (2013) asserted that the close connection between sponsors and 
resettled refugees promotes greater openness and enables sponsors to draw on their experiences 
in working with resettled refugees to challenge negative stereotypes about immigrants. In an 
interview on 17 December 2013, Gail Schnabl, the Refugee Coordinator for the Diocese of 
Rupert’s Land, explained, “I personally think diversity is of value. It’s something to—it’s a 
good outcome. And I think, because refugees come from a variety of backgrounds, it opens 
Canadians’ minds to different ways of thinking and different ways of living, different cultures, 
and it enhances our lives.” 
To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted 
generous resettlement admissions policies, this thesis now seeks to interpret the responses 
articulated above in relation to the extant literature. First, one could interpret the views 
articulated by government officials and private sponsors as consistent with the literature on 
refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapters one and two explained that private goods 
have benefits which are fully excludable and rival, meaning that whoever provides the good 
can prevent others from benefiting from it, and once one actor has enjoyed the good, no one 
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else can (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9 and 30). Conversely, public goods are non-excludable 
and non-rival, meaning that whoever provides the good cannot prevent others from benefiting 
from it, and one actor can appreciate the good without diminishing the ability of others to take 
pleasure in it as well (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9).  
However, chapter two noted that some economists have attempted to push beyond this 
binary characterisation of goods and instead propose an alternative conceptualisation that views 
goods along a “spectrum” between purely public and purely private, where some of these 
“impure” public goods are more rival and excludable or less rival and excludable than others 
(Cornes and Sandler 1996, 6 and 241). Cornes and Sandler (1996, 9) explain that the provision 
of impure public goods sometimes generates joint products, which are “multiple outputs, some 
of which can be private, others purely public, and still others impurely public.” 
In the context of resettlement, chapter two suggested that one could interpret this 
durable solution as excludable and rival in certain ways. Resettlement could be seen as 
excludable because only individuals recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol are eligible for 
resettlement. In this way, resettlement could generate excludable and rival humanitarian 
protection benefits for resettled refugees. Furthermore, resettlement is only appropriate for 
refugees who are unable to integrate locally or voluntarily return to their respective countries 
of origin. In addition, since the Canadian government (and others) retain full discretion over 
admissions, it may not offer resettlement to every refugee referred by the UNHCR or other 
organisations. One could also interpret the provision of resettlement as rival, since the gap 
between resettlement needs and admissions means that each refugee who obtains resettlement 
diminishes the availability of resettlement places for other refugees. However, the responses 
articulated by government officials and private sponsors indicate that contributing to 
resettlement is perceived to benefit both refugees and Canada more generally, suggesting that 
resettlement may not be a private good. 
Chapter two also suggested that if resettlement is not a private good, then one could 
potentially interpret this durable solution as a public good. If the provision of resettlement is 
perceived to benefit refugees and other parties, then it could be non-excludable and non-rival 
since whoever offers resettlement could find it all but impossible to prevent others from 
benefiting from it, and other actors could appreciate the provision of this durable solution 
without diminishing the ability of others to do the same (e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9). 
However, the theory of public goods predicts that actors will not provide a Pareto efficient 
level of pure public goods because the non-excludable, non-rival nature of these goods creates 
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an incentive for actors to free ride on the expected contributions of others (Cornes and Sandler 
1996, 22-23; Gruber 2011, 188; Samuelson 1954, 388). 
In the context of resettlement, this suggests that governments should face a classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which they have no incentives to provide this durable solution. Instead, 
governments should have a powerful incentive to free ride on the anticipated contributions of 
other states, confident that they can still benefit from the positive externalities generated from 
others providing this durable solution. Though this could partially explain the underprovision 
of resettlement places, there is little evidence that Canada engages in free riding—especially 
since the evidence presented in the appendix and discussed in chapter one demonstrates it has 
made significant contributions to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms. These 
observations indicate that Canada may have found the incentives necessary to overcome the 
impetus for free riding, suggesting that resettlement may not be a pure public good.70 
One could interpret the responses articulated by government officials and private 
sponsors as consistent with the literature on resettlement as a public good (e.g. Suhrke 1998). 
As noted in chapter one, Suhrke (1998) develops a general conceptualisation of resettlement as 
a public good and does not elaborate on the nature of this good. Nevertheless, one could 
interpret the responses concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and the norms 
of international responsibility sharing as consistent with Suhrke’s (1998) argument that 
governments contribute to refugee protection because they believe that international law 
creates a collective “moral duty” and “obligation” to assist refugees and that assisting persons 
in need of protection reduces global inequality and minimises the incentives for economically 
disadvantaged countries to restrict access to asylum (Suhrke 1998, 398). 
Second, these perceptions could be interpreted as consistent with the more recent 
literature on the provision of refugee protection through asylum as an impure public good (e.g. 
Betts 2003; Hatton 2012; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006). The responses 
concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and the norms of international 
responsibility sharing and the strategic use of resettlement could be interpreted as consistent 
with the arguments from Betts (2003, 266-88), who contends that countries could be more 
generous in granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive excludable ‘altruistic’ 
                                                 
70 As noted in chapter two, the fact that certain countries have succeeded in overcoming the incentives for free 
riding does not negate the possibility that other countries engage in free riding or other forms of Pareto 
inefficient behaviour, such as the exploitative behaviour identified by Olson (1965, 29; see also Olson and 
Zeckhauser 1966). 
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benefits from these acts.71 In particular, Betts (2003, 266-88) suggests that these countries may 
be more generous because they derive a “warm glow” from demonstrating a commitment to 
“ethical or legal norms” such as fairness and the protection of human rights. Similarly, 
Thielemann (2003, 255, 257-58, and 265-69) contends that governments may have been more 
generous in their contributions to the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovar 
refugees because of the perceived “excludable” benefits they derived from demonstrating a 
commitment to the norms of international responsibility sharing and solidarity with countries 
of first asylum. 
One could also interpret the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for 
resettlement as consistent with the economic literature on contributions to public goods. 
Historically, many academics argued that actors can overcome the purported incentives for free 
riding and contribute to public goods for purely unselfish reasons (Becker 1974; Coleman 
1966; Collard 1978, chapters one and 10; Margolis 1982, chapter two; Roberts 1984). 
However, chapter two noted that other economists later challenged these claims on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds (e.g. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Sugden 1982). 
In response, Margolis (1982) attempted to add nuance to our understanding of altruism 
through his distinction between ‘participation altruism’ and ‘goods altruism.’ Margolis (1982, 
21) argues that individuals could be motivated to contribute to the provision of public goods 
because they derive “satisfaction from helping others,” especially if they believe that they are 
contributing to a “socially useful” cause. Furthermore, Margolis (1982, 23) contends that 
individuals could contribute to public goods if they believe that their contribution made at least 
a marginal impact on the total supply of that good. These behaviours are not mutually exclusive 
but mutually reinforcing, as utility maximisation depends on both the act of giving and the 
amount given (Margolis 1982, 24). 
As noted in chapter two, Andreoni (1989, 1448-49) theorises that individuals contribute 
to public goods because they demand a higher level of provision and based on the perception 
that they derive “some private goods benefit from their gift per se, like a warm glow.” On that 
basis, Andreoni (1989, 1449) develops a model in which individuals have impurely altruistic 
motives for contributing to the provision of public goods, and he theorises that “the warm glow 
is an increasing function of what is given.” 
                                                 
71 As noted in chapter two, Betts appears to use the terms “altruistic benefit” and “warm glow” interchangeably. 
However, a closer reading of the economic literature on impure altruism demonstrates that altruism is one of the 
factors that motivates individuals to contribute to a public good, while the warm glow is the benefit they derive 
from this charitable act (Andreoni 1990, 465-468). 
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Chapter two noted that these contributions suggest that individuals can derive a partially 
excludable benefit from their contribution, not just the contributions of others. Furthermore, 
their arguments on the interactive relationship between contributions and benefits suggest that 
the more individuals donate, the more of a ‘warm glow’ they receive in return (Andreoni 1989; 
Margolis 1982). These contributions are important because the nature of impure public goods 
can also impact their provision. Cornes and Sandler (1984, 595) demonstrate that joint products 
have a privatising effect “not unlike the establishment of property rights.” Given that 
privatisation is one of the strategies that can be used to eliminate free riding, the existence of 
joint products could dissuade actors from free riding (Cornes and Sandler 1984, 589-90; Perloff 
2011, 590). For this reason, Cornes and Sandler (1984, 589-90) argue that free riding is “not 
an inevitable feature of public goods models.” 
One could interpret the provision of resettlement as an impure public good that 
generates joint products in the form of excludable, rival protection benefits for refugees as well 
as impurely public ‘warm glow’ benefits for Canada. This warm glow could be seen as 
excludable but non-rival joint product since only Canadian residents could derive a warm glow 
from the decision to welcome refugees into their country or from demonstrating a commitment 
to the norms and principles embedded in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, but one individual may derive a warm glow from this act without diminishing the 
potential ability of other residents to enjoy this warm glow as well.  
In addition to the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for resettlement, 
one could interpret the perceived reputational benefits of resettlement as consistent with aspects 
of the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapters one and two 
mentioned that Betts (2003, 276 and 286-87) theorises that some European countries are 
generous in granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive ‘prestige’ benefits from 
granting protection that they can leverage in other policy areas due to issue linkages. Though 
Betts (2003, 287) argues that governments are unlikely to grant protection to asylum seekers 
for the sole purpose of obtaining reputational benefits, his proposition appears consistent with 
functional regime theory, which argues that governments can potentially improve their 
reputations by demonstrating compliance with international regimes—especially when the 
regime creates a perceived moral obligation (Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27). 
As suggested in chapter two, reputational gains are valuable because this quality can 
provide an actor with essential information about the possible behaviour of other actors that, in 
turn, may influence their own actions (Axelrod 1984, 151). Similarly, Keohane (1984, 127) 
adds that compliance with rules and principles that are perceived to create moral obligations 
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can have an especially positive reputational effect because “adhering to a moral code may 
identify an actor as a political cooperator, part of a cluster of players with whom mutually 
beneficial agreements can be made […].” Conversely, if countries shirk their commitments 
(particularly those that are perceived to be moral obligations) their reputation could suffer and 
they may find it more difficult to secure agreements later on, thus increasing transaction costs 
(Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27). 
As previously noted, participation in resettlement is not a matter of compliance sensu 
stricto because countries are not obligated to resettle refugees (UNHCR 2011, 36). However, 
one could interpret Canadian participation in resettlement as an expression of voluntary 
compliance with the norms embedded in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement, including refugee 
protection, international responsibility sharing, and solidarity.  
Canada could benefit from this demonstration of voluntary compliance and from 
making sizeable contributions to resettlement insofar as it could leverage its reputation for 
compliance to secure concessions such as encouraging other countries to adopt resettlement 
programmes or promoting a more strategic use of this durable solution. Such an approach could 
prove advantageous since Loescher and Milner (2011, 203-04) argue that “resettlement 
represents an important and growing area of cooperation between UNHCR and states [and] an 
important area of future innovation within the global governance of refugees.” One could 
interpret this perceived reputational gain as an excludable, non-rival joint product of 
resettlement because only the Canadian government can enjoy the reputational benefits of 
demonstrating voluntary compliance with the norms and principles of the international refugee 
regime.72 However, Canada can derive reputational gains without preventing other members 
of the international community from demonstrating their voluntary compliance and enjoying 
the same reputational benefits. 
Though section 4.2 noted that Canada did not sign the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol until 1969, it has since become an active contributor to 
the international refugee regime. In 2003, Canada and the UNHCR co-chaired the resettlement 
“strand” of the Convention Plus initiative that attempted to develop a “normative framework 
for global burden-sharing” that would enable the international refugee regime to better address 
protection needs through the creation of “generic multilateral agreements” covering a range of 
                                                 
72 As mentioned in chapter two, Phelan (2009, 16) offers a general discussion of the characteristics of reputation 
as a public good. 
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issues, including the strategic use of resettlement (UNHCR no date, 1; UNHCR 2003, 1; Zieck 
2009, 387). In that capacity, Canada led the development of the non-binding Multilateral 
Framework of Understandings on Resettlement which “intended to strengthen the international 
refugee protection system through a more strategic use of resettlement for the benefit of a 
greater number of refugees (UNHCR 2004, 1).” Though some scholars have called the 
Convention Plus initiative a “futile attempt at piecemeal engineering” that was “doomed to fail 
from the outset” as it did not articulate a clear motivation for responsibility sharing, the 
Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement also proved to be the most 
developed document to emerge from the process (Zwieck 2009, 387 and 405). 
Contemporary developments indicate that Canada has continued to develop its position 
as a global leader in resettlement since the author conducted these interviews. Chapter one 
noted that the Government of Canada and the UNHCR launched the Global Refugee 
Sponsorship Initiative in December 2016, in collaboration with academia and philanthropic 
foundations. As previously mentioned, this Initiative seeks to augment the number of 
resettlement places and the quality of resettlement programmes, as well strengthen receiving 
communities and promote a more positive discourse on refugee protection, through training 
and information dissemination, “championing” the adoption of private sponsorship 
programmes outside Canada, and the provision of capacity building and technical assistance 
services (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, para. 11 and 14 of 14). Though 
further research and analysis is required, one could potentially interpret these developments as 
examples of Canada leveraging its longstanding leadership role in resettlement to attempt to 
augment the availability of resettlement places. 
Finally, one could also interpret the responses on the perceived cultural benefits of 
resettlement as consistent with the literature on culture as a public good. As explained in 
chapter two, Throsby (2010, 172) explains that “the variety of cultures and cultural expressions 
are seen as […] having qualities that are valued as a part of the ‘human mosaic.’” In this way, 
Throsby (2010, 172) conceptualises cultural diversity as a public good that has “existence 
value” because individuals “gain benefit from the knowledge that biodiversity and cultural 
diversity in all their richness are simply there.”  
Though the current literature on refugee protection as a public good does not discuss 
this benefit, chapter two referred to the work of Singer and Singer (1988, 123) who argue that 
residents of a receiving country may benefit from the admission of refugees in that they “may 
enjoy the more cosmopolitan atmosphere created by new arrivals from other countries” 
including new shops and restaurants. In addition, Singer and Singer (1988, 123) indicate that 
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the increased cultural diversity resulting from resettlement can also have longer-term 
advantages insofar as refugees may introduce “different ideas and ways of living.” One could 
interpret the perceived cultural benefits articulated by interviewees as an excludable, non-rival 
joint product of resettlement because only Canadian residents can benefit from increased 
cultural diversity, but one person’s enjoyment of this diversity does not prevent other residents 
from enjoying these benefits as well. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that many interviewees identified cultural diversity as a 
benefit of resettlement given that the Canadian government has endeavoured to promote and 
protect multiculturalism since 1971 and has entrenched this policy in the 1982 Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act (Kymlicka 2007, 
138). These efforts appear to have been successful, as public opinion surveys affirm that 
Canadians have adopted the “ethos” of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2007, 140). A 2010 study 
found that 86 per cent of respondents believed that multiculturalism was a “very important” or 
“somewhat important” component of national identity (Environics Institute 2010, cited in Reitz 
2011, 15). The same survey also found that there is a strong positive correlation between 
support for immigration and the importance accorded to multiculturalism which was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, ceteris paribus (Environics Institute 2010, cited in 
Reitz 2011, 12). 
Though Bloemraad (2012, 1-3) argues that there is an element of “Canadian 
exceptionalism” in public support for immigration and multiculturalism, some members of the 
public dispute this policy. Public opinion surveys associate support for immigration with 
support for assimilation rather than support for maintaining cultural distinctiveness. In the same 
public opinion study cited above, 80.0 per cent of respondents agreed that “Ethnic groups 
should try as much as possible to blend into Canadian society and not form a separate 
community (Environics Institute 2010, cited in Reitz 2011, 15).” Lukewarm attitudes towards 
multiculturalism are not new; a 1976 survey found that respondents supported immigrants 
maintaining their respective cultures, so long as this did not displace Canadian culture (Reitz 
2011, 16). The tension between multiculturalism and assimilation in immigration could be 
rooted in the broader debate on whether and how Canada can or should attempt to reconcile 
the ‘two solitudes’ of English Canadian federalism and French Canadian (and specifically 
Québécois) nationalism (e.g. Taylor 1993, chapter two).  
Some scholars have also castigated the treatment of immigrants and visible minorities 
in multiculturalism legislation. Bissoondath (2004, 372-79) argues that the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act “treats newcomers as exotics and pretends that it is both proper and 
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sufficient” and has contributed to the oversimplification and marginalisation of cultures in 
Canadian society. Bannerji (1994, 105-08) argues that multiculturalism imposes a “binary 
cultural identity” and ignores the influence of colonialism, class, and race in the development 
of nationhood and renders visible minorities, “an ambiguous presence, our existence a question 
mark in the side of the nation […].” In a similar and equally notable vein, MacDonald (2014, 
66-67) notes that the Canadian Multiculturalism Act failed to acknowledge the cultural 
distinctiveness and rights of Canada’s many Aboriginal, First Nations, Inuit, and Métis 
communities, and thus implicitly privileged the incorporation of immigrants into the 
“dominant” English and French colonial legacies and cultures. Consequently, some Aboriginal, 
First Nations, Inuit, and Métis community leaders have expressed ‘suspicion’ towards 
multiculturalist policies that reinforce the “power dynamics” of the colonial state (MacDonald 
2014, 78).  
Thus, though Mr Dyck (2013) argued that private sponsors serve as “cultural bridges” 
for resettled refugees, these critiques suggest that the perceived cultural benefits of migration 
(including resettlement) are perhaps more easily captured by some Canadian residents than 
others. Though one could interpret his view and those of other respondents as expressions of 
the “existence value” of cultural diversity in Canada (Throsby 2010, 172), these views must 
also be seen in the light of a “multicultural ideology which both needs and creates ‘others’ 
while subverting demands for anti-racism and political equality (Bannerji 1994, 110).” 
While interviewees articulated a range of perceived motivations for resettlement and a 
variety of benefits, some respondents acknowledged that resettlement generates costs for 
receiving communities. Nevertheless, respondents appeared divided on the degree to which 
financial costs are perceived to impact Canada’s participation in resettlement. Though Mr 
Deans (2013) and Ms Duffin (2013) believe that the government does not view its contribution 
to resettlement through the lens of costs and benefits, they both acknowledged that the 
government incurs costs in all managed migration programmes. Nevertheless, Mr Deans (2013) 
highlighted the importance of cost-effectiveness in refugee protection, stating, “You want to 
stretch your dollar as far as it can go, because there are so many people in need.” From this 
perspective, one could interpret domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme 
as a mechanism for extending value for money in resettlement which may thus enable the 
Canadian government to resettle more refugees. 
Likewise, many voluntary sector representatives affirmed that resettlement generates 
both short- and long-term costs (Chahal 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Dyck 2013; Manks 
2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith 
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2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 2013). For example, several respondents noted that governments 
and private sponsors incur some costs in resettlement, such as financing the cost of housing 
and delivering language classes (Chahal 2013; Dyck 2013; Niazi 2013; Shrosphire 2013). In 
the longer term, Mr Smith (2013) explained that while private sponsors usually cover the full 
costs of resettlement for up to one year, provinces and municipalities are responsible for any 
subsequent costs related to education, medical care, and social care. Nevertheless, in an 
interview on 11 December, 2013, Adeena Niazi, the Founder and Executive Director of the 
Afghan Women’s Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization, 
characterised these costs as an “investment,” a sentiment echoed by Ms Dekker (2013). Many 
respondents also indicated that resettlement has long-term economic benefits for Canada 
(Chahal 2013; Deans 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Dyck 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 
2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013). 
Overall, the responses articulated by interviewees indicate that Canada is perceived to 
have a complex and overlapping range of motivations for contributing to resettlement. In 
particular, many interviewees suggested Canada contributes to resettlement as it is perceived 
to be consistent with its “humanitarian tradition”—a perception that invokes the influence of 
history and commitments to international humanitarian norms. Furthermore, several 
government officials and private sponsors suggest that resettlement confers reputational 
benefits on Canada, while others suggested that participation has cultural benefits for Canada.  
4.6 The Perceived Nature of Government-Voluntary Sector Relations in Resettlement 
In the preceding section, interviewees articulated their perceptions on the motivations 
for resettling refugees in Canada and its benefits. Their responses paint a nuanced picture in 
which the humanitarian rationale for providing this durable solution is accompanied by 
perceived reputational and cultural benefits. This section presents the views of senior 
government officials and private sponsors on the perceived nature of government-voluntary 
agency relations in resettlement, and endeavours to interpret these perceptions in relation to the 
literature. Many of the interviews indicate that relations between the federal government and 
private sponsors are characterised by elements which are both complementary and 
supplementary in nature, and one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the 
dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical evolution of 
government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. However, some interviewees perceived deep 
tensions between the federal government and certain private sponsors, indicating that relations 
may be collaborative but not necessarily cordial. Certain interviewees also expressed concern 
that the introduction of the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme may constitute an 
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example of burden shifting, and one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with aspects 
of the literature on power dynamics in government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. 
During the interviews, respondents were asked to describe how they perceive the nature 
of relations between the government and private sponsors in resettlement to Canada. The author 
asked this question to better understand how these two groups perceive their relationship in 
their own words. Government officials characterised their relationship with private sponsors as 
a partnership (Boxhill 2013; Deans 2013, Duffin 2013). For example, Mr Deans (2013) shared 
his belief that, “this as a partnership. I don’t see it as one doing one and another doing another, 
or one replacing another. It’s a partnership where we work together.” Similarly, Mr Boxhill 
(2013) characterised government-voluntary sector relations as complementary and indicated 
that sponsors play “crucial” role in resettlement—especially in the orientation phase—and 
added that their involvement in the provision of this durable solution “relieves some of the 
burden from the government.” However, Ms Duffin (2013) indicated that private sponsors play 
a more supplementary role in resettlement, noting that they can offer more personalised support 
than the government. Ms Duffin explained, “It’s a unique program [sic] that we have and they 
do provide an impressive range of services and support to the refugees that they receive, but 
it’s not necessarily that all the things they’re doing are something that we think the government 
should—or can—realistically do.” 
In addition, there was no consensus among private sponsors on the nature of 
government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement. Indeed, most interviewees indicated that 
their organisations complement the functions of government and SPOs in the GAR programme, 
but suggested that private sponsors also supplement the role of government and other voluntary 
sector organisations in other respects (Chahal 2013; Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Manks 2013; 
McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 2013). In 
the pre-arrival phase of resettlement, many interviewees argued that since private sponsors are 
involved in the identification of refugees for resettlement through the PSR programme, they 
complement the role of the federal government and UNHCR in identifying and referring 
refugees for resettlement through the GAR, BVOR, and JAS programmes (Dekker 2013; Dyck 
2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013).  
However, private sponsors appeared more divided when discussing the perceived 
nature of relations in the post-arrival phase of resettlement. Certain private sponsors asserted 
that their involvement in the delivery of orientation and integration services to privately 
sponsored refugees complemented the role of government-funded SPOs in this area (Chahal 
2013; Dyck 2013; McBride 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013). Conversely, other interviewees 
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contended that private sponsors have a supplementary role in the orientation and integration 
process—especially when private sponsors are involved in the resettlement of particularly 
vulnerable refugees or when the government ‘destines’ refugees outside major urban centres 
where fewer government-funded services are available (Dekker 2013, Marshall 2013; Niazi 
2013; Richardson 2013; Shropshire 2013; Woolaver 2013). 
Interviewees also expressed a range of views concerning the perceived nature of 
relations in the provision of financial and in-kind assistance to refugees—another important 
element of the orientation and integration process and a feature that differentiates resettlement 
programmes in Canada at present. Though the federal government does not fund resettlement 
through the PSR programme, certain private sponsors argued that private sponsors complement 
the role of the federal government in cases where the two groups collaborate in the resettlement 
of refugees through the JAS Program, as the government provides financial assistance through 
the Resettlement Assistance Program and private sponsors offer in-kind assistance (Chahal 
2013; Wiebe 2013). Other respondents asserted that private sponsors have both a 
complementary and a supplementary role in the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme, as 
the federal government provides six months of financial support for the refugee followed by 
six months of private support (Marshall 2013; McBride 2013; Shropshire 2013). Still others 
contended that private sponsors have an exclusively supplementary role as the federal 
government does not provide any direct funding to them, and private sponsors play a unique 
role in the delivery of in-kind assistance to resettled refugees (Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Manks 
2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Smith 2013; Woolaver 2013). 
Though many interviewees suggested that relations between the federal government 
and private sponsors are complementary in some ways, several private sponsors spontaneously 
questioned whether the government and private sponsors have a genuine partnership (Dekker 
2013; Marshall 2013; Niazi 2013). Ms Marshall (2013) argued that, in principle, the two groups 
should have a partnership because this form of collaboration is the most effective way to 
maximise resettlement admissions. However, Ms Marshall (2013) noted that, in practice, this 
partnership was not “played out in its fullest potential.” Ms Niazi (2013) argued that the 
government has far “more power” than private sponsors in resettlement. In addition, in an 
interview on 10 December, 2013, Rose Dekker, then the Refugee Coordinator at World Renew 
and member of the Overseas Protection and Sponsorship Working Group at the Canadian 
Council for Refugees, exclaimed, “It’s not a partnership if one partner makes all the rules, and 
the other one just has to do what they say!” 
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To better understand the perceived structure of government-voluntary agency relations 
in resettlement, this chapter now seeks to interpret the views articulated by government 
officials and voluntary agency representatives in relation to the literature. First, one could 
interpret the comments regarding the perceived ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary nature 
of relations between the government and private sponsors as consistent with the dominant 
taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations. As mentioned in chapter two, Young 
(1999, 33; 2000, 150) draws on the work of Burton Weisbrod (1975 [1986]) to suggest that 
governments and voluntary sector organisations may develop complementary relationships 
when the provision of public goods and services would ordinarily require an extensive 
bureaucratic apparatus, when there is a strong likelihood of free riding, and (or) when public 
opinion supports alternative service delivery models. In response to these circumstances, 
governments and voluntary sector organisations can elect to forge a partnership in which the 
government finances the voluntary sector provision of public goods and services (Young 1999, 
33; Young 2000, 150).  
In the process, governments and voluntary sector organisations form a ‘symbiotic’ 
relationship which produces advantages for both partners (Grønbjerg 1987, 66; see also Young 
2000, 150). Though contracting out the provision of public goods and services to voluntary 
sector organisations may be more cost-effective, developing complementary relationships with 
these organisations can also enable government to overcome informational asymmetries and 
enable them (through voluntary sector organisations) to provide goods and services that are 
more tailored to the needs of the individual communities they serve (Young 2000, 154). 
Though Young does not articulate the precise benefits that voluntary sector organisations 
derive from complementary relationships, other scholars have argued that governments can 
provide voluntary sector organisations with a comparatively stable source of funding, thus 
helping to attenuate the ‘resource dependence’ problem that is endemic in the voluntary sector 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 2; Froelich 1999, 247). In the context of immigration, the provision 
of financial support to immigrant-serving community organisations can enhance organisational 
capacity in these groups (Bloemraad 2006, 165-70). 
In the supplementary model, voluntary sector organisations fill gaps in the demand for 
provision of public goods and services that are “unsatisfied by government (Young 1999, 33; 
Young 2000, 150).” Consequently, as government funding for a particular public good or 
service declines, private contributions—and thus the level of voluntary sector involvement—
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are anticipated to increase (Young 2000, 150). Conversely, as government funding increases, 
the level of private donations and voluntary sector involvement is expected to decline.73  
In the Canadian context, the federal government does not provide direct funding to 
private sponsors. However, the responses from government officials and private sponsors 
suggest that the perceived nature of relations in resettlement may not depend on the structure 
of funding arrangements sensu stricto, but perhaps more on whether the government funds the 
delivery of similar services in other resettlement channels. One could also potentially link the 
diversity of responses among government and private sponsors to the increasing range of 
resettlement programmes, such as the JAS and BVOR programmes, which have augmented 
opportunities for collaboration between the federal government and private sponsors but also 
rendered the division of responsibilities more complex. 
The heterogeneous nature of the responses concerning the perceived nature of relations 
between the government and private sponsors also triangulates with the academic literature. 
Chapter two noted that scholars do not assume that the nature of government-voluntary sector 
relations is static (Young 1999, 35), nor do scholars perceive these categories as mutually 
exclusive. Furthermore (Bremner 1988; Young 2000). Bremner (1988, 216) argues that the 
nature of government-voluntary sector relations can “shift from time to time to meet changing 
circumstances and needs,” while Young (2000, 151) adds that government-voluntary sector 
relations may be simultaneously complementary, supplementary, and (or) adversarial. 
Similarly, one could interpret the perception among certain respondents that relations 
between the government and private sponsors are both complementary and supplementary as 
a feature of institutional design intended to leverage their respective comparative advantages 
(Coston 1998; see also Billis and Glennerster 1998). Whereas the government has a 
comparative advantage in raising revenue and also has democratic legitimacy in setting policy 
priorities, private sponsors have an informational advantage that gives them an edge when 
delivering goods and services to resettled refugees (see Coston 1998, 371).  
However, certain government officials and private sponsors indicated that relations 
between the two groups had evolved (Boxhill 2013; Denton 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 
2013). Notably, Mr Boxhill (2013) argued that relations between the government and private 
                                                 
73 As noted in chapter two, this assertion is consistent with economic arguments that government funding can 
partially ‘crowd out’ private contributions (e.g. Abrams and Schmitz 1986; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; 
Bernheim, 1986; Coates 1998; Kingma 1989; Roberts 1984; Warr 1982; Warr 1983). However, as previously 
noted, the existence and extent of ‘crowding out’ remains contested in the literature, as others contend that 
governments can provide an incentive for individuals to contribute to the provision of public goods through 
mechanisms such as charitable grants (e.g. Andreoni 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1986). 
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sponsors have become more formalised over time, and that the resettlement process has become 
more “bureaucratic” in order to preserve programme integrity and the safety of refugees. In a 
letter to SAHs on file with the author, the Honourable Jason Kenney (2011, 2), the former 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, argued, “The ongoing viability of the PSR program 
[sic] continues to face serious challenges. Large backlogs have developed as we continue to 
face spikes in applications submitted that are not in line with the number of resettlement places 
available.” In response, Minister Kenney (2011, 2) announced his intention to limit the number 
of private sponsorship applications each SAH can submit, excluding those located in Québec 
(Manks 2013). In addition, Citizenship and Immigration Canada restricted the number of 
applications which SAHs can submit to the Canadian High Commissions in Nairobi, Kenya, 
Pretoria, South Africa, and Islamabad, Pakistan as well as to the Canadian Embassy in Cairo, 
Egypt, among other changes (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, 1-2). 
Many private sponsors denounced these changes due to the perception that it violates 
the right of private sponsors to identify (or ‘name’) refugees in need of resettlement, 
irrespective of their location (Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; 
Woolaver 2013; for a brief discussion of the naming principle, see Canadian Council for 
Refugees 2015, 1). In an interview on 6 December, 2013, Michelle Manks, Manager of the 
Student Refugee Program at the World University Service of Canada, noted that most private 
sponsors had opposed these restrictions and argued that the changes had reduced the flexibility 
of sponsors. Similarly, Ms Woolaver (2013) also commented that the cap on private 
sponsorship applications had restricted the flexibility of private sponsors in identifying 
refugees in need of resettlement. Elsewhere, Ms Dekker (2013) contended that the changes had 
contributed to the development of a more “adversarial” relationship between the government 
and private sponsors, while Ms Marshall (2013) argued, “Sponsorship Agreement Holders are 
definitely being limited in our ability to help those that we want to help. And the government 
seems to be restricting us more and more.” Though the Liberal government eliminated the cap 
following its election in 2016, the limitations on individual private sponsors—and thus the 
perceived constraints on them—persist (Canadian Unitarian Council 2018, para. 4 and 7 of 28; 
see also Citizens for Public Justice 2017, 11-12). 
One could interpret the perceived changes in the relationship between the federal 
government and private sponsors as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-
voluntary sector relations. Chapter two noted that, according to Bremner (1988, 216), the nature 
of government-voluntary sector relations can “shift from time to time to meet changing 
circumstances and needs,” while Young (2000, 151) adds that government-voluntary sector 
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relations may be simultaneously complementary, supplementary, and (or) adversarial. One 
could thus interpret the relationship between the federal government and private sponsors as 
possibly dynamic, with potential overlaps between complementary, supplementary, and 
adversarial relations. 
One could also interpret the potential shift in government- private sponsor relations as 
consistent with the broader historical pattern of government-voluntary sector relations in 
Canada, including in resettlement. During the colonial period, authorities delivered social 
assistance and services in accordance with the dominant models in France and the United 
Kingdom at the time (Elson 2011, 17-25). Authorities in New France adopted a paternalistic 
approach to the provision of social assistance and services, and the Catholic Church 
monopolised the provision of public goods and services until the Quiet Revolution (la 
Révolution tranquille) in the 1960s (Elson 2011, 19-21). In the British colonies in Eastern 
Canada and Upper Canada, governments adopted a two-pronged approach to the provision of 
social assistance and services which differentiated between the ‘deserving’ and ‘underserving’ 
poor (Elson 2011, 17-18). The government limited assistance to deserving individuals and 
during emergencies, and contracted out the provision of relief for the undeserving to charitable 
organisations, which it perceived as “more efficient and cost-effective (Elson 2011, 18-26).” 
In keeping with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations (Young 
1999; Young 2000), one could interpret the use of contracting as an indication that voluntary 
sector organisations had a more complementary role in the delivery of social assistance and 
services in Eastern and Upper Canada at the time. 
Following confederation, the federal government maintained a laissez-faire approach 
to social policy until the Great Depression, when it began offering financial assistance to the 
unemployed and consigned voluntary sector organisations to a supplementary role focused on 
the provision of in-kind assistance (Elson 2011, 39). However, Elson (2011, 60) indicates that 
the federal government and voluntary sector soon forged a more complementary relationship 
that was driven by the development of a universal welfare state following the end of World 
War II.  
Government-voluntary sector relations began to shift following the election of a 
Progressive Conservative government led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1984, which 
attempted to address the fiscal crisis and recession by cutting “government waste” through the 
introduction of New Public Management principles and a considerable reduction in social 
spending (Elson 2011, 89-90). Concurrently, the federal government encouraged voluntary 
sector organisations to assume a more active role in the delivery of social assistance and 
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services by expanding competitive bidding for contracts that were firmly linked to government 
priorities (Elson 2011, 74 and 89-92). 
In the 1990s, the Liberal government led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien embarked on 
a “historically unique” programme of retrenchment at all levels of government in order address 
ongoing fiscal problems (Stanford 2001, 147). During this period, the government cut funding 
to a broad range of organisations but also increased the use of contracts for voluntary sector 
organisations, which it perceived as “dedicated and low-cost” service providers (Elson 2011, 
103-04; Pross and Webb 2003, 66-67 and 80). The government also assumed that the voluntary 
sector would naturally take on a supplementary role in delivering the social assistance 
programmes and services no longer funded by the government, without considering whether 
these organisations had the capacity to meet the increased demand (Elson 2011, 104; Phillips 
2003, 26-27; Pross and Webb 2003, 65). 
These decisions caused government-voluntary sector relations to reach a “low point” 
characterised by “considerable suspicion” and “marked antagonism (Phillips 2003, 26).” In 
1995, a coalition of voluntary sector organisations established the Voluntary Sector Roundtable 
and later commissioned a Panel on Accountability and Governance to analyse how 
government-voluntary sector relations could be ameliorated, among other issues (Phillips 2003, 
24). In 1999, the Panel issued a series of recommendations that drew on the findings of the 
Deakin Commission in the United Kingdom, including the suggestion to create a government-
voluntary sector compact (Phillips 2003, 24). 
During that period, the government also expressed interest in improving government-
voluntary sector relations as part of a broader effort to move away from a model of 
‘government’ towards a paradigm of ‘governance’ that favoured closer and more horizontal 
collaboration between the government and voluntary sector (Phillips 2003, 17-18 and 25; 
Phillips 2011, 230). The 2000 launch of the Voluntary Sector Initiative constituted one attempt 
to strengthen government-voluntary sector relations and also marked the first time that the 
federal government had attempted to engage the voluntary sector on a “more strategic level 
(Brock and Banting 2001, 10).” However, participants focused more on operational and 
procedural issues rather than broader matters such as those related to financing and advocacy 
(Phillips 2011, 230). Furthermore, though the process produced an Accord, there were few 
enforcement mechanisms attached to the agreement (Phillips 2011, 230). Following the 
election of a Conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006, the 
government “abandoned” the Accord and continued to pursue the same neoliberal policies 
implemented by the preceding Liberal governments, which further institutionalised the contract 
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culture and led to the “commodification of the voluntary sector (Elson 2011, 107 and 113; 
Phillips 2011, 230).” 
In the context of resettlement, the academic literature on the involvement of voluntary 
sector organisations in resettlement—especially detailed accounts of the role of voluntary 
sector organisations—was limited at the time of research. However, interviewee responses 
appear to be consistent with the available evidence concerning the history of government-
voluntary sector relations in this area, which indicates that their relationship has evolved from 
supplementary to complementary over time. During World War II, it appears that government-
voluntary sector relations in resettlement may have been more supplementary in character. For 
example, the government agreed to resettle up to 100 families from Portugal and Spain—but 
only on the condition that voluntary sector groups such as the Canadian Jewish Congress and 
the Canadian National Committee on Refugees assumed full responsibility for their care and 
maintenance (Dirks 1977, 96).  
In the post-war period, it appears that government-voluntary sector relations may have 
gradually assumed a more complementary nature. Initially, the federal government expressed 
reluctance to enter into formal partnerships with voluntary sector organisations (Dirks 1977, 
161-62). However, this did not prevent umbrella organisations such as the Canadian Christian 
Council for the Resettlement of Refugees and the Canadian Council of Churches from sending 
representatives to Europe in order to identify and refer refugees for resettlement (Dirks 1977, 
161-62; Hawkins 1988, 303-04). In 1951, the government relented and granted the Canadian 
Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees CAD$10,000 per month to support their 
work until the end of that year (Dirks 1977, 161-62; Hawkins 1988, 304). The government also 
began providing grants to other voluntary sector organisations to support the delivery of 
services such as those related to reception (Hawkins 1988, 308-10). Two years later, as part of 
a broader effort to professionalise its approach to migration management, the federal 
government created the Approved Church Program, which gave four religious organisations 
the unprecedented authority to select and process applications of resettlement (Hawkins 1988, 
304-5; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 344). In 1986, the UNHCR offered the people of Canada 
the Nansen award in recognition of their contribution to refugee protection, marking the first 
time the organisation bestowed the award on an entire country (Knowles 2007, 223). 
During the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956, the World University Service played an 
important role in the selection of Hungarian refugees in Austria (Dirks 1977, 206). 
Furthermore, the federal government and voluntary sector organisations collaborated in finding 
accommodation and employment as well as in the delivery of integration assistance to the 
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37,718 Hungarian refugees resettled between 1956 and 1957 (Dirks 1977, 202; Knowles 2007, 
176). Similarly, during the Ugandan Asian refugee crisis, the federal and provincial 
governments funded ‘assistance committees’ composed of both paid employees and 
volunteers, who collaborated in helping the refugees to find accommodation and employment 
and also offered integration assistance (Dirks 1977, 243-44). 
Perhaps the best-known example of government-voluntary sector partnerships occurred 
during the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. In a comprehensive account of the early history of 
Canadian efforts to resettle refugees from this region, Adelman (1982, especially chapters 3, 7, 
and 8) attributes the success of resettlement efforts from this region to a combination of 
government leadership (at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels), media interest, and 
support from grassroots and religious organisations who provided direct reception, orientation, 
and integration services for resettled refugees. These efforts enabled Canada to resettle a total 
of 202,178 refugees from Southeast Asia between 1975 and 1997 (Robinson 1998, appendix 
two). 
Finally, one could also interpret the concerns expressed by some interviewees regarding 
the balance of power between the federal government and private sponsors as consistent with 
aspects of the (small) literature on government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. Owen 
(2000, 132) notes that the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and 
Development allocated an entire chapter to the merits of government-voluntary sector 
partnerships, and acknowledged the “comparative advantage” of voluntary sector 
organisations, as well as their “innovative, flexible, and responsive” approach to programme 
implementation and design and the close connection between these organisations and the 
“constituencies” they serve. Owen (2000, 132) notes that, in this way, voluntary sector 
organisations can act as effective “bridge-builders” between the host community and 
“traditionally disenfranchised” populations such as immigrants and refugees. Conversely, 
governments have a “comparative advantage” in raising revenue, ensuring accountability and 
quality, and balancing both “complementary and competing” priorities (Owen 2000, 133). 
However, governments and voluntary sector organisations that have contracts for 
service delivery do not necessarily have an equitable partnership. Indeed, Owen (2000, 134) 
suggests that there a fundamental imbalance in power between the government and voluntary 
sector organisations. From an organisational perspective, the federal government is orders of 
magnitude larger than voluntary sector organisation, commands far more financial and human 
resources, and dictates the terms of accountability and reporting requirements (Owen 2000, 
134). In the context of migration, the government also controls admissions and decides who is 
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permitted to remain in the country (Owen 2000, 134). Though voluntary sector organisations 
are an “important bridge between those with power and those without,” they also 
fundamentally hold far less power than the federal government (Owen 2000, 134). In addition 
to the fundamental imbalance between the federal government and voluntary sector 
organisations, the latter do not always make ‘effective’ use of their memberships in coalitions, 
and even when voluntary sector organisations do seek to leverage this such forms of ‘power,’ 
it is not always recognised (Owen 2000, 134). For these reasons, Owen (2000, 134) argues that 
“there has to be some semblance of equity in the relationship between partners” in order for 
the government and voluntary sector organisations to forge a genuine partnership. 
The concerns expressed by certain interviewees regarding the perceived imbalance in 
power relations between the federal government and private sponsors—as well as the 
comments concerning perceived responsibility shifting through the Blended Visa Office-
Referred programme—also aligns with elements of the work Richmond and Shields, who 
analyse government-voluntary sector relations in the delivery of orientation and integration 
services in Canada. Richmond and Shields (2005, 514) note that though the Canadian 
government and voluntary sector organisations have endeavoured to promote the country’s 
“distinct” approach to the delivery of orientation and integration services through government-
voluntary sector partnerships, this ‘model’ is in crisis and merits critical examination. In 
particular, Richmond and Shields (2005, 518) argue that the government has followed a 
neoliberal, New Public Management-driven approach to contracting in which, “The 
community-based service providers are deliberately underfunded, supposedly to allow the 
public to choose which services to support through their charitable giving and voluntary 
activities. […] The whole system also depends on new “partnerships,” which are not true 
alliances, but rather alternate funding and service delivery relationships, the terms and 
conditions of which are dictated largely by the terms of funding contracts).”74 In addition, 
decades of “government downloading” has placed further pressure on voluntary sector 
organisations and had a potentially deleterious effect on integration outcomes (Richmond and 
Shields 2005, 518-20). 
Though Richmond and Shields (2005) concentrate on the provision of orientation and 
integration services by government-funded SPOs, the perceptions articulated by some 
                                                 
74 For a detailed analysis of Canadian government retrenchment measures under both Conservative and Liberal 
governments, and the concomitant impact of these policies on voluntary sector capacity, see Brock (2003), 
Brock and Banting (2001), Elson (2011, chapter five); Evans, Richmond, and Shields (2005), Hall and Banting 
(2000), Phillips (2003; 2003; 2011), and Pross and Webb (2003). 
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interviewees regarding the impact of government-imposed caps on applications for 
resettlement through the PSR programme suggests that governments can potentially constrain 
private sponsors even though they do not receive government funding. Given contemporary 
efforts to promote the Canadian PSR programme, further research that critically examines the 
perceived structure of relations between the government and private sponsors, the formal 
mechanisms through which these relations are constituted, and the real and perceived 
constraints imposed upon private sponsors may be beneficial and contribute to a better 
understanding of the implications of government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement. 
4.7 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Domestic 
Responsibility Sharing 
In the previous two sections, interviewees articulated their perceptions on motivations 
for resettlement and its benefits and the perceived nature of relations between the federal 
government and private sponsors. Their responses paint a nuanced picture in which the 
humanitarian rationale for providing this durable solution is accompanied by perceived 
reputational and cultural benefits. Though many government officials and private sponsors 
expressed similar views concerning the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, 
respondents appeared divided in their opinions on the perceived nature of relations with one 
another. In addition, a government official acknowledged that relations between the federal 
government and private sponsors had been tense in the recent past, and several private sponsors 
spoke of a perceived power imbalance and raised concerns about efforts to constrain their 
ability to identify refugees in need of resettlement and to maximise their contributions to this 
durable solution. 
This important contextual information sets the stage for an exploration of the potential 
relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing. This section 
presents the views of government officials and private sponsors on the perceived relationship 
between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR 
programme. One could interpret the perception among most interviewees that domestic 
responsibility sharing through the PSR programme has enhanced resettlement admissions as 
consistent with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in 
providing public goods and services. 
During the interviews, three of the four federal government officials expressed the 
belief that resettlement admissions have been augmented through domestic responsibility 
sharing through the PSR Programme (Boxhill 2013; Deans 2013; Duffin 2013). Mr Deans 
(2013) and Ms Duffin (2013) were unequivocal in their agreement that this form of 
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responsibility sharing had increased resettlement admissions. In particular, Ms Duffin (2013) 
explained that, without private sponsors, “there is no program, there are not these additional 
refugees that come to Canada.” Similarly, Mr Boxhill (2013) argued resettlement capacity had 
“beyond a doubt” increased through this form of domestic responsibility sharing. 
The overwhelming majority of private sponsors also indicated that the contributions of 
private sponsors enhanced resettlement admissions (Chahal 2013; Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; 
Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; Niazi 2013; Schnabl 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 
2013). Ms Marshall (2013) suggested that the contribution of private sponsors is rooted in the 
principle of additionality, and stated, “We’re able to add to that total number by a significant 
amount, whereas if it was all left up to the government to handle, we wouldn’t be able to bring 
in as many people as we are because they wouldn’t have the means to help them settle.” Ms 
Woolaver (2013) also asserted that resettlement admissions have increased through domestic 
responsibility sharing because private sponsors must fund the costs of resettlement themselves. 
In addition, Ms Woolaver (2013) highlighted the mutually beneficial nature of collaboration 
between the federal government and private sponsors, explaining that, “I think it’s a program 
[sic] that Canada—the governments—have generally seen as a win-win situation. You know, 
they get people here and somebody else pays for it.” Nevertheless, Mr Denton (2013) argued 
that the demand for resettlement through this programme “far exceeds the supply of places.” 
At the time of the interview, Mr Denton (2013) explained that his organisation had been obliged 
to decline requests to sponsor approximately 5,000 refugees in the past year. 
That said, not all respondents agreed that domestic responsibility sharing through the 
PSR programme had enhanced resettlement admissions. In an interview on 4 December, 2013, 
a senior official from Citizenship and Immigration Canada argued that certain private sponsors 
had intentionally submitted large numbers of applications. By 2012, a backlog of 23,200 
applications for resettlement through the PSR application had accumulated (Alboim and Cohl 
2012, 37), and the official noted that this strategy had consequently compelled the government 
to introduce the aforementioned cap on private sponsorship applications and had thus decreased 
the capacity of the programme.75  
A Constituent Group representative confirmed this perception. Mr Denton (2013) 
affirmed that his organisation had “deliberately” adopted this approach and “wrecked the 
program [sic] by putting too many cases in” in an attempt to force the government to increase 
                                                 
75 To clarify, it would appear these actions decreased the capacity of the government to process applications for 
resettlement through the PSR programme. 
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admissions targets for privately sponsored refugees. Mr Denton (2013) and Ms Schnabl (2013) 
also argued that a municipal assurance programme for private sponsors in Winnipeg might 
have contributed to the issue by allowing organisations to “sponsor with impunity,” as they 
could recoup any financial losses if the sponsor-refugee relationship disintegrated. 
Nevertheless, Mr Denton (2013) maintained that his strategy had been successful as large 
numbers of resettled refugees were arriving in Winnipeg.76 
Though private sponsors agreed domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR 
programme enhanced resettlement admissions, many also expressed concern that some recent 
policy changes constitute examples of responsibility shifting. Concerns about responsibility 
shifting have been present from the beginning. As Adelman (1982, 85) explains, “[…] many 
of the large church organizations [sic] disliked the legal status of the private sponsorship 
agreement and suspected that the government intended to use the plan as a means of dumping 
its responsibilities for refugees onto the private sector.”  
During the interviews, many interviewees expressed concerns about two issues: 
healthcare for resettled refugees and the introduction of the BVOR programme. First, several 
interviewees were concerned about the curtailment in Interim Federal Health coverage for 
privately sponsored refugees (Dekker 2013; Manks 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith 2013; 
Woolaver 2013). In Canada, individuals are generally required to reside in a province or 
territory for a prescribed period (up to three months) before they are eligible for government-
funded health insurance. Though resettled refugees are exempt from this requirement, the 
federal government established the Interim Federal Health programme in 1957 to ensure that 
immigrants received medical care while awaiting their documentation (Enns et al. 2017, 27).  
In June 2012, the Conservative government attempted to curtail the cost of the Interim 
Federal Health programme by introducing changes to the level of coverage given to refugees 
and other persons in need of protection. These changes occurred in an environment in which 
the Conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper attempted to address and 
mitigate “perceived fraud” in refugee admissions and an increasing emphasis and distinction 
between ‘bogus’ and ‘genuine’ asylum seekers, refugees, and other persons in need of 
protection (Barnes 2013, 1). Before 2012, all asylum claimants, recognised refugees, and other 
                                                 
76 Historical evidence suggests that this approach has been effective in the past. Following the end of World War 
II, many Canadians appealed to the government to resettle their ethnic German relatives living in the USSR 
(Dirks 1977, 137). Though the government was initially reluctant to do so, Dirks (1977, 137-38) explains, “[…] 
the Canadian relatives of European refugees continued to make application until an enormous backlog forced 
the government into announcing a program [sic] beneficial to both the recognized displaced persons and the 
Volksdeutsch whose refugee status was problematical.”  
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persons in need of protection received the same coverage under the Interim Federal Health 
programme, regardless of their status in Canada or their country of origin (Norquay 2013, 3). 
The changes enabled refugees resettled through the GAR, JAS, and BVOR programmes to 
continue to access ‘basic’ and ‘expanded’ forms of coverage under the Interim Federal Health 
programme, including treatment by family physicians and hospitals and supplemental services 
not usually covered by the provinces and territories such as dental and vision care, 
prescriptions, and psychotherapy, among others (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, 1; Enns 
et al. 2017, 27).77 Conversely, refugees resettled through the PSR programme (alongside certain 
asylum seekers and other persons in need of protection) could only access ‘basic’ services if 
the government deemed their needs “urgent or essential,” and these individuals could only 
obtain prescription medications and vaccinations if they presented a “risk” to public health or 
safety (Enns et al. 2017, 27).78 
The changes prompted a deluge of opposition from a broad cross-section of Canadian 
society, including private sponsors, medical professionals, academics, and members of the 
general public, amongst others (Enns et al. 2017, 28-32). Ms Woolaver (2013) argued that this 
measure constituted a “huge blow” that has made it “much more precarious” for groups and 
organisations to participate in resettlement due in part to the prospect that sponsors may be 
obliged to bear unforeseen costs if resettled refugees develop health issues in the immediate 
period preceding or following arrival. In July 2014, the Federal Court invalidated the changes 
as they were “inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian 
Doctors for Refugee Care et al. v. Attorney General of Canada and Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration 2014, at para. 1089 original emphasis).” Citizenship and Immigration appealed 
the ruling (Ireton 2015, para. 7 of 13), but benefits were eventually restored following the 
election of a Liberal government in 2016 (CBC News 2016, para. 11 and 12 of 28). 
One could interpret the concerns articulated by these private sponsors as consistent with 
some of the findings from a survey conducted by Citizens for Public Justice, a national coalition 
of Christian organisations and registered charity. In 2017, the organisation reported that 
“many” of the 32 SAHs that participated in the survey were “very concerned” about the 
decision to eliminate Interim Federal Health coverage for refugees resettled through the PSR 
                                                 
77 In principle, refugees resettled through these three programmes maintained their eligibility for both ‘basic’ 
and ‘expanded’ services. However, the Canadian Council for Refugees (2015, 7-8) documented a range of cases 
in which Government Assisted Refugees were denied partial or total access to both ‘basic’ and ‘expanded’ 
services. 
78 For a more detailed description and critical analysis of the changes as they relate to different categories of 
persons in need of protection, see Enns et al. (2017, 27). 
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programme (Citizens for Public Justice 2017, 3). Furthermore, some SAHs reported that the 
decision had contributed to a “decline in sponsorship interest” in their communities (Citizens 
for Public Justice 2017, 3). This development suggests that while the federal government 
provides no funding to SAHs or their constituent groups, and plays a limited role in the 
operation of the PSR programme, the broader regulatory environment surrounding resettlement 
could directly or indirectly constrain voluntary sector organisations operating in this sphere.  
In addition to expressing concerns about the changes in health coverage for refugees 
resettled through the PSR programme, some private sponsors expressed concern about the 
impact of the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Marshall 
2013; Woolaver 2013). Both Ms Woolaver (2013) and Ms Marshall (2013) argued that the 
government was “pushing” private sponsors to participate in the Blended programme.79 Ms 
Woolaver (2013) added that she felt the government was “directly downloading” responsibility 
for resettlement onto sponsors. Ms Dekker (2013) also argued that the government was 
“downloading” costs onto private sponsors through the new programme, and contended that 
this had undermined the principle of additionality, stating, “I really feel that, particularly with 
the Blended program, it’s limiting and decreasing—shrinking—the program.” Similarly, Mr 
Dyck (2013) expressed concern that the Blended programme could contribute to the ‘erosion’ 
of additionality, stating, “There is certainly concern that this is something of an offloading of 
Canada’s commitment to the UNHCR numbers onto the private sector.” 
However, officials explained that the programme was introduced to help cut 
departmental expenditures as part of a government-wide effort to reduce spending (Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada 2012, see section entitled ‘Deficit Reduction Action Plan’). To that 
end, the department reallocated 1,000 resettlement places from the GAR programme to the 
Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2014, 45). Mr 
Deans (2013) explained, “It was felt that if the government was only providing half of the 
Resettlement Assistance Program or support for half the time, we could still bring in the same 
number of people without, you know—by stretching those dollars. So that’s one example of 
where there is a link between targets and financial cost. […] This program [sic] was created to 
                                                 
79 In a resettlement programme for Ismaili refugees from Afghanistan, the government provided three months of 
financial assistance and orientation services, while the Ismaili Council for Canada and FOCUS Humanitarian 
Canada provided assistance for the subsequent nine months (Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 189). In total, 
approximately 1,800 Ismailis benefited from this “cost-effective” programme between 1994 and 1998 
(Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 189). The government also employed the same ‘3/9’ model during the crisis in 
the former Yugoslavia, and this approach enabled the government to increase the number of refugees resettled 
from 90 to 198 (Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 190). 
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sort of see how can we stretch those settlement dollars further by encouraging sponsors to step 
up to the plate while the government still provides some support.” 
Though some private sponsors expressed reservations about this programme, two of 
their colleagues support the programme. In an interview on 13 December, 2013, Rob 
Shropshire, the Program Coordinator for Refugee Sponsorship and Special Projects at the 
Presbyterian Church in Canada, argued that the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme may 
be attractive for some sponsors due to the division of financial responsibility and faster 
processing times which mean that refugees arrive in a matter of months, rather than years. Mr 
Shropshire (2013) explained that the programme was attractive for his organisation, as church 
attendance has declined and the average age of churchgoers has also increased, making it more 
difficult to fundraise and to convince members of the congregation to wait several years for the 
refugee to arrive. In a separate interview on 13 December, 2013, Ian McBride, Manager of the 
Anglican United Refugee Alliance, explained that he supported the Blended Visa Office-
Referred programme and had personally lobbied the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
in support of its creation. Mr McBride (2013) argued that, while his organisation sponsored 
refugees through a variety of programmes, he felt that the BVOR programme was a more 
efficient use of their limited organisational resources. 
Nevertheless, concerns about responsibility shifting persist, and some politicians and 
advocacy organisations have suggested that the government has shifted most of the 
responsibility for resettling Syrian refugees onto private sponsors without their consent 
(Campion-Smith 2015, para. 16 and 19 of 22). In 2015, the Conservative government led by 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper committed to resettling an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees, 
but indicated that the government would only assume responsibility for 40 per cent of these 
refugees (Mas 2015, para. 1 and 3 of 26)—placing most of the responsibility for resettlement 
on private sponsors. During the 2015 federal election campaign, the Liberal Party pledged to 
resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees through the GAR programme by the end of 2015, and stated its 
intent to “work with private sponsors” to augment admissions further (Liberal Party of Canada 
2015, 2). The Liberal government subsequently adjusted their commitment and promised to 
resettle 25,000 refugees through both the Government Assisted and PSR programme by 
February 2016, including a pledge to support the resettlement of 15,000 refugees (The 
Canadian Press 2016, para. 5, 19, and 21 of 27). In addition, the Liberal government pledged 
to resettle an additional 10,000 refugees through the GAR programme by the end of 2016, 
raising their total commitment to 25,000 refugees (The Canadian Press 2016, para. 26 of 27). 
In total, Canada resettled 40,081 Syrian refugees between 4 November, 2015 and 29 January, 
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2017, including 21,876 refugees resettled through the GAR programme, 14,274 refugees 
resettled through the PSR programme, and a further 3,931 refugees resettled through the 
Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Government of Canada 2017, no pagination). 
These perceptions also raise broader questions about the reasons that voluntary sector 
organisations and government-voluntary sector partnerships have emerged in the first place in 
Canada. Such a task is made more difficult by the limited nature of academic scholarship on 
government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. Indeed, Hall and Banting (2000, 4) explain 
that “Despite the growing interest in the nonprofit sector, we know surprisingly little about it 
and the role that it plays in our society. Research on the nonprofit sector lags well behind that 
on the public and private sectors in virtually all countries, but this is especially true in Canada.” 
The academic literature on government-voluntary sector relations in Canada 
concentrates on two themes: first, a small number of academics have analysed efforts to 
increase accountability in the voluntary sector following controversies in the 1990s and early 
2000s (e.g. Phillips 2003; Phillips and Graham 2000; Phillips and Levasseur 2004). Though 
this aspect of the literature demonstrates how accountability regimes can impact voluntary 
sector capacity, at best, these works only offer tangential insight into whether domestic 
responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations can influence policy outcomes such 
as resettlement admissions. 
That said, most scholars have examined how attempts by Progressive Conservative 
(now Conservative) and Liberal governments to address deep fiscal problems have impacted 
the nature and structure of government-voluntary sector relations since the 1980s (e.g. Brock 
2003; Brock and Banting 2001; Elson 2011, chapter five; Evans, Richmond, and Shields 2005; 
Hall and Banting 2000; Phillips 2003; Phillips 2003; Phillips 2011; Pross and Webb 2003). 
This segment of the literature illustrates how the federal government engaged in an extensive 
programme of public sector restructuring that combined profound cuts in social spending and 
significant responsibility shifting onto the voluntary sector, thereby reducing its capacity. 
This literature suggests that one could interpret the current pattern of relations between 
the federal government and private sponsors as an emblem of the legacy of federal government 
retrenchment efforts. However, the progressive reshaping of relations between the federal 
government and the Canadian voluntary sector more generally could also potentially be seen 
as a broader attempt by the federal government to encourage the “entrepreneurship of 
autonomous actors” including individuals, groups, and corporations (all of whom are eligible 
to sponsor refugees under the PSR programme) in order to build “stronger, more resilient” 
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communities through the pursuit of ‘community government’ (Cappe 1999, 2 cited in Ilcan and 
Basok 2004, 135; Rose 1999, 139 cited in Ilcan and Basok 2004, 131).  
To achieve this, governments in advanced liberal democracies like Canada retreat from 
their prototypical role in the provision of social services and instead focus on “enabling, 
inspiring, and assisting citizens to take responsibility for social problems in their communities 
(Ilcan and Basok 2004, 132).” Whereas the Canadian government historically assumed 
responsibility for the collective well-being of Canadian society through the establishment of 
national health and social assistance programmes, Ilcan and Basok (2004, 133) argue that the 
pursuit of community government through contracting out to voluntary sector organisations 
has placed responsibility for caring for “disadvantaged people” on voluntary sector 
organisations and volunteers. This process of “responsibilization” has re-oriented the basis of 
citizenship away from the government downwards to the community level, but this role has 
also constrained the capacity of voluntary sector organisations to engage in advocacy (Ilcan 
and Basok 2004, 132-33). 
In the context of resettlement to Canada, the regulations which established of the PSR 
programme predate the retrenchment measures introduced by the Progressive Conservative 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and adapted by his some of his Conservative and Liberal 
successors. Nevertheless, the “governmentality” lens adopted by Ilcan and Basok (2004, 130) 
could offer an insightful paradigm through which to critically assess the organisation, 
implementation, and implications of the PSR programme, especially given the extensive 
involvement of volunteers and the concerns articulated by some private sponsors concerning 
perceptions of responsibility shifting. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter began with an overview of the history of resettlement admissions in 
Canada. The analysis suggests the government adopted a discriminatory approach to 
resettlement admissions and declined to resettle Jewish and Armenian refugees during the 
interwar period due to the prevailing anti-Semitic and racist views at the time. Though the 
government adopted a more generous approach to the admission of some groups including 
Hungarian, Ugandan Asian, and Chilean refugees, its approach to resettlement remained ad 
hoc until the introduction of the 1978 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. This 
legislation provided the framework for the PSR programme and facilitated the resettlement of 
thousands of Southeast Asian refugees as well as persons in need of protection from Central 
and Latin America. This assessment appears consistent with the data on the size and 
composition of resettlement flows between 1980 and 2016, which demonstrated that Canada 
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resettled refugees from a diverse range of countries including Bosnia, El Salvador, Iran, Poland, 
Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, among many others. 
The chapter then adopted a more analytical approach by exploring the perceived 
motivations for resettlement and its benefits through interviews with senior government 
officials and 14 private sponsors in Ottawa, Toronto, and Winnipeg. Interviewees indicated 
that Canada has a humanitarian motivation for resettling refugees and that contributing to this 
durable solution is perceived as consistent with the norms of international responsibility 
sharing. Some respondents further indicated that contributing to resettlement enhances the 
reputation of Canada as a humanitarian actor, and is also perceived to confer cultural benefits 
for Canada. The author suggested that one could interpret these views as consistent with the 
literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on public 
goods more generally. However, though interviewees identified perceived cultural benefits, an 
analysis of the literature suggests not all Canadians welcome multiculturalism in the same way. 
 The author then explored the perceived nature of relations between the government and 
private. Both government and private sponsors indicated that they perceived their relationship 
as both complementary and supplementary in certain respects, though there was no consensus 
on which aspects of their relationship were complementary and which were supplementary. 
The author suggested that one could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy 
on government-voluntary sector relations, which indicates that relations can be complementary 
and (or) supplementary in nature. One could also interpret this assessment as consistent with 
the broader evolution in government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. However, some 
private sponsors expressed concern about responsibility shifting through the introduction of 
the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme, while others questioned whether their 
relationship with the federal government is a genuine partnership. 
Finally, this chapter explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme. 
Though a senior government official indicated that some private sponsors had created a large 
backlog in applications and ultimately undermined the capacity of the PSR programme, the 
majority of respondents perceived that this form of domestic responsibility sharing enhanced 
resettlement admissions in Canada. Despite these views and the fact that the programme is 
founded on the principle of ‘additionality,’ statements from some private sponsors suggest that 
this principle may not be sacrosanct and that the government is perceived to have engaged in 
responsibility shifting during periods of fiscal retrenchment and through the creation of the 
Blended Visa Office-Referred programme. One could interpret these concerns as consistent 
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with the historical literature on government-voluntary sector relations, which indicated that the 
government previously engaged in responsibility shifting during periods of austerity. These 
concerns are arguably important to bear in mind given contemporary efforts by the Canadian 
government and the UNHCR to promote private sponsorship. These views suggest that the 
introduction of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing could be insufficient to 
augment admissions. Instead, a genuine increase in resettlement admissions might only be 
achieved through an active, ongoing commitment to ‘additionality’ from both the government 
and members of civil society. 
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Chapter Five: Resettlement Admissions and Voluntary Advocacy in Canada 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning resettlement admissions, 
government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement, and current resettlement needs. In 
particular, chapter one highlighted the absolute and relative cross-national differences in 
resettlement admissions and the widespread existence of government-voluntary sector 
relationships in resettlement, as well as the cross-national variations in the scope of these 
relationships. The chapter also highlighted the need to better understand the relationship 
between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through government-
voluntary sector partnerships given the unprecedented number of persons in need of protection 
at present, including the extensive need for resettlement. Moreover, the chapter identified 
several limitations and lacunae in the existing literature, focusing particularly on observations 
that much of the scholarship ignores the influence of domestic factors such as the extensive 
mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies and the potential 
capacity of these agencies to influence resettlement admissions through advocacy. 
Chapter four offered an overview of the history of resettlement in Canada and provided 
detailed figures on the size and composition of resettlement flows to Canada between 1980 and 
2016. To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies, the chapter also explored perceptions on the motivations for 
resettlement and its benefits, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, and the 
potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing 
with voluntary sector organisations, through interviews with senior government officials and 
private sponsors. Interviewees indicated that Canada is perceived to engage in resettlement for 
humanitarian and normative reasons, such as contributing to international responsibility 
sharing. In addition, interviewees suggested that resettlement is perceived to have reputational 
and cultural benefits for Canada. The author suggested that one could interpret these 
perceptions as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good, 
and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Interviews also indicate that the 
federal government and Sponsorship Agreement Holders perceive their relationship as 
complementary in some aspects and supplementary in other ways. The author proposed that 
one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on 
government-voluntary sector relations and the historical pattern of public service delivery in 
Canada. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that resettlement 
admissions had been enhanced through domestic responsibility sharing with Sponsorship 
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Agreement Holders. Though one could interpret this perception as consistent with the academic 
literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public goods and services, 
some private sponsors also raised concerns about responsibility shifting. 
Though these findings may help us better understand why Canada has voluntary 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, advocacy efforts could also shape 
resettlement admissions. This chapter first offers an overview of the history of voluntary sector 
advocacy on resettlement in Canada in section 5.2. It then adopts a more analytical approach 
by exploring the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector 
advocacy in Canada through interviews with senior government officials and representatives 
from 13 Sponsorship Agreement Holders. During the interviews, a federal official spoke at 
length about perceived tensions between the government and certain private sponsors. This 
official also suggested that the SAH Council does not speak with a “single voice.” Though 
some private sponsors actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement admissions and perceived 
some success in this area, efforts by other organisations appeared less successful. Furthermore, 
interviewees indicated there are some tensions among private sponsors on whether and how 
they should engage in advocacy, and whether the SAH Council should pursue advocacy as 
well.  
One could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on 
government-voluntary sector relations, which suggests that voluntary sector organisations are 
not merely service providers but can also take on an “adversarial” role in which they press 
governments to enact policy changes (Young 2000, 151). However, one could also question 
whether the perceived absence of a “single voice” among private sponsors could impact the 
effectiveness of their advocacy efforts. These questions appear especially salient when 
considered in relation to the potential structure of voluntary sector interest representation in 
Canada. While there appears to be no consensus in this area, one could potentially interpret the 
structure of relations between the government and private sponsors as a policy community, 
which are exclusive groups situated in a broader policy network. 
In addition, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations in 
Canada may engage in advocacy on resettlement issues. However, this initial assessment could 
reflect limitations in capturing certain forms of advocacy or limitations in the financial and 
human resources of these organisations, which could constrain their ability to publicise their 
advocacy efforts. Given the gradual inclusion of ethnic minorities in Canadian politics, further 
research is needed to more fully ascertain their involvement in resettlement advocacy. 
Page 197 of 361 
 
Finally, the analysis highlights the potential influence of issue context and salience on 
the effectiveness of advocacy efforts. Though the scope of resettlement admissions policies in 
Canada is relatively limited (especially regarding admissions through the PSR programme) and 
public attitudes towards immigration and refugee protection have improved somewhat over 
time, public opinion polls indicate that Canadians have not always welcomed persons in need 
of protection. However, some public opinion polls suggest that many Canadians have adopted 
more favourable views towards the resettlement of Syrian refugees—a salient issue in 2015. 
This context may have created an environment conducive to advocacy on resettlement 
admissions, though further research is required. 
Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the 
discussion and analysis presented below. In particular, this chapter does not capture the views 
of representatives from the Canadian Council for Refugees, a leading advocate on migration, 
asylum, and refugee issues that also acts as an umbrella organisation for many groups involved 
in asylum and refugee protection, including in resettlement (Canadian Council for Refugees 
2013, para. 1 of 24). Though the author twice requested to meet with a representative from the 
organisation, the organisation declined both requests. Therefore, the discussion of their 
advocacy efforts on resettlement is limited to secondary source information. 
5.2 History of Resettlement Advocacy in Canada 
The academic literature on the relationship between resettlement admissions and 
advocacy efforts indicates that voluntary sector organisations have occasionally succeeded and 
struggled in their quest to augment resettlement admissions. During the interwar period, groups 
such as the Canadian National Committee on Refugees (CNCR) could not convince the 
government to adopt a more generous admissions policy for refugees (Dirks 1977, 56-58 and 
61-65; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 256-60; Knowles 2007, 148). Following the 1973 coup 
d’état in Chile, organisations such as the Canadian Council of Churches struggled to induce 
the government to resettle Chilean refugees due to concerns related to the perceived 
“ideological stance of many of the refugees” and the fact that the UNHCR favoured local 
integration for refugees from that region at the time (Dirks 1977, 250; Treviranus and Casasola 
2003, 186). However, mounting public pressure eventually forced the government to relax 
admissions criteria and to resettle refugees more expediently (Dirks 1977, 247-49). 
Despite these failures, voluntary sector organisations occasionally succeeded in their 
quest to augment resettlement admissions. During the interwar period, the CNCR convinced 
the government to resettle Thomas Bata, a shoemaker who fled Czechoslovakia following 
German annexation and later became a renowned entrepreneur in Canada (Knowles 2007, 148). 
Page 198 of 361 
 
During the war, the organisation also induced the government to abandon the “rigid 
exclusiveness” of its immigration regulations in order to resettle refugees from Portugal and 
Spain (Dirks 1977, 95-96; Knowles 2007, 148). 
In the postwar period, the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees 
(CCCRR) persuaded the government to expand the categories of refugees eligible for 
resettlement in order to facilitate the admission of ethnic Germans who were outside the 
mandate of the International Refugee Organization (Dirks 1977, 163-64; Kelley and Trebilcock 
2010, 344). In 1956, extensive political and public pressure from organisations such as the 
Canadian Council of Churches and the Jewish Immigration Aid Service convinced the 
government to resettle nearly 40,000 Hungarian refugees with remarkable expediency (Dirks 
1977, 195-97; Knowles 2007, 173-75). Pressure from the Jewish Immigrant Aid Service to 
resettle larger numbers of refugees from the USSR was also instrumental in the creation of the 
designated classes system, which provided the foundation for the PSR programme (Adelman 
1982, 85). 
During the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, increased media coverage of the situation 
led to a dramatic rise in public interest in assisting these refugees, and organisations such as 
the Canadian Medical Association called on the government to increase resettlement 
admissions from 8,000 to 30,000 refugees per year (Adelman 1982, 37). However, grassroots 
organisations such as Operation Lifeline, which was formed with the explicit intention of 
pressuring the government to resettle more Southeast Asian refugees, gradually found 
themselves co-opted into government (Adelman 1982, 96). Instead, the organisation 
discovered that the government did not need to be persuaded to increase admissions; indeed, 
the federal government dispatched two officials to attend the first meeting of Operation 
Lifeline, and civil servants continued to attend meetings “in order to provide information, 
advice, and assistance (Adelman 1982, 97).” Over time, the organisation assumed more of a 
role as a government liaison than as a pressure group, though it resisted full co-optation by 
declining to join the Ontario government’s Settlement Planning Group (Adelman 1982, 97). 
The organisation also declined to use traditional advocacy strategies such as raising awareness 
of the issue in the media—even once it became clear that the Conservative government would 
not fulfil its pledge to match every private sponsorship application—due to concerns that this 
could elicit opposition from anti-immigrant groups (Adelman 1982, 97). 
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5.3 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Advocacy 
The history of advocacy on resettlement in Canada indicates that voluntary sector 
organisations have long been engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues, but these groups 
have only occasionally succeeded in augmenting resettlement admissions. Nevertheless, this 
section presents the views of senior government officials and private sponsors on the perceived 
relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Though some 
private sponsors discussed their advocacy efforts, some federal government officials and 
several private sponsors spoke more generally about the quality of their relationship. The 
responses indicate that were perceived tensions between the federal government and certain 
private sponsors until recently, and there also appear to be tensions among private sponsors 
concerning the pursuit of advocacy efforts and the nature of strategies employed when 
engaging in advocacy. Though one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the 
dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, these views also raise questions 
about the potential effectiveness of advocacy efforts on resettlement. As noted in the 
introduction, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations may 
engage in advocacy on resettlement in Canada, but further research is required to better 
ascertain the involvement of ethnic community organisations in this area, especially given the 
growing inclusion of ethnic minorities in Canadian politics. Finally, an analysis of the literature 
and public opinion data indicates that issue context and salience may condition the impact of 
advocacy efforts on resettlement. 
Chapters one and three noted that during the interviews in the US, voluntary agencies 
expressed a keen and unprompted desire to discuss their advocacy efforts. Therefore, the author 
also enquired about advocacy efforts by private sponsors and the perceived impact of these 
measures in Canada. However, when asked about the perceived impact of voluntary sector 
advocacy efforts on resettlement, government officials spoke mainly about their relationship 
with private sponsors. More precisely, two government officials indicated that relations 
between the federal government and certain private sponsors had been tense in the recent past. 
In an interview on 5 December, 2013, Derrick Deans explained that relations between officials 
from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and representatives from the SAH Council had not 
always been positive.80 In an interview on 6 December, 2013 Wally Boxhill elaborated on this 
                                                 
80 The SAH Council is composed of eight elected members of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association 
(Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1). Members of the Council are elected annually and must 
have at least two years of experience as SAHs (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1). The 
Council has the “overall responsibility to work towards the fulfillment [sic] of the mission and mandate” of the 
SAH Association (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1).  
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perceived issue, and explained that officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and 
some members of the SAH Council were frequently “at loggerheads.” Mr Boxhill (2013) 
indicated that tensions emerged during a period of programmatic change, and explained that 
“[…] folks weren’t comfortable with the direction and the nature of the changes that they were 
starting to see.” Mr Boxhill (2013) added “Sometimes you’d sit and they’d be playing ‘gotcha 
politics,’ looking for the one thing that CIC might not be doing right, waiting for that to come 
up, and then pounce on that.” Mr Boxhill (2013) suggested that the tensions had a perceived 
impact on the resettlement through the PSR programme insofar as they made “[…] the 
management of the program [sic] somewhat challenging […].” 
Mr Boxhill (2013) explained that relations became so fraught during this period that 
Jason Kenney, then the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism, offered 
conflict resolution training for both government officials and private sponsors. However, Mr 
Boxhill (2013) indicated that relations had improved since 2009, and officials from Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada once again enjoy a good relationship with private sponsors. Mr Deans 
(2013) affirmed that relations between government officials and private sponsors had improved 
over time and commented that the two groups have since developed a “constructive 
relationship” built on “frank, honest communications.” 
When the author asked private sponsors about their advocacy efforts, some 
interviewees explained that their organisations engaged in advocacy but few indicated that they 
had appealed for increased resettlement admissions (Denton 2013; Wiebe 2013). Of those who 
indicated they advocated for increased admissions, Mr Wiebe (2013) explained that he and 
other sponsors spent two years calling on the government to resettle Palestinian refugees living 
in Iraq, and eventually succeeded in bringing some of these refugees to Canada through the 
PSR programme. In addition, Mr Denton (2013) explained that, as a former journalist, part of 
his approach to advocacy involves media engagement through writing letters and publishing 
articles and editorials on asylum and refugee protection in local media outlets. In 2011, Mr 
Denton prepared two editorials which called on the government to increase resettlement 
admissions from the Horn of Africa and to remove the caps on private sponsorship applications, 
respectively (Denton 2011; Denton 2011). 
In addition to these efforts, the Canadian Council for Refugees is one of the few 
organisations that has openly appealed for greater resettlement admissions. Formed in 1978, 
the Council is an umbrella organisation that represents approximately 170 voluntary sector 
organisations across the country (Canadian Council for Refugees 2008, 1; Office of the 
Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada 2015, see section entitled ‘In-house Organization 
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Details’). The Council operates according to a set of five core beliefs, including the conviction 
that “Canada and Canadians have responsibilities for the protection and resettlement of 
refugees from around the world (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, para. 3 of 24).”  
To that end, the Council has engaged in a broad range of advocacy efforts on 
resettlement, including advocating for increased admissions. In 2003, the Council called on the 
government to allocate at least eight per cent of its total immigration targets to resettlement 
(Canadian Council for Refugees 2003, para. 6 of 7). In 2013, the Council called on the 
government to dedicate at least 10 per cent of its overall admissions targets to resettlement 
(Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, para. 1 of 2). Furthermore, the Council has pressed the 
government to resettle more Burmese refugees living in Thailand and more Iraqi refugees, 
among other efforts (Canadian Council for Refugees 2008, 6 and 8-9; Canadian Council for 
Refugees 2008, 1). 
Since 2013, the Canadian Council for Refugees has called on the government to 
facilitate the resettlement of Syrian refugees. In a 2013 press release, the organisation pressed 
the government to resettle more Syrian refugees through the GAR programme and, in light of 
the large number of Syrians living in Turkey, to eliminate the ban which prevented private 
sponsors from submitting applications for refugees living in Turkey (Canadian Council for 
Refugees 2013, para. 4 of 5). In July 2014, the organisation called on the government to 
increase the number of Syrian refugees resettled through the GAR Programme by 5,000 
individuals (Canadian Council for Refugees 2014, para. 4 of 7). Following the death of three 
members of the Kurdî family, including three-year-old Alan, the Council issued a press release 
which lambasted the Canadian government for its “inaction” and argued the government should 
resettle at least 10,000 Syrians through the GAR programme and lower barriers to private 
sponsorship (Canadian Council for Refugees 2015, para. 1 and 4 of 5). 
The public information available at the time of research suggests that these efforts have 
produced results. In 2009, Minister Kenney announced that Canada planned to resettle a total 
of 12,000 Iraqi refugees over a period of two years and later agreed to resettle a further 8,000 
Iraqi refugees between 2012 and 2013 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010, para. 6 and 
9 of 18). In January 2015, Chris Alexander, then the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 
announced that the government planned to resettle an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees—but 
as noted in chapter four, the government only intended to resettle 40 per cent of these 
individuals through the GAR Programme (Mas 2015, para. 1 and 3 of 26). The government has 
also increased the proportion of immigration targets allocated to resettlement; in 2019, the 
government announced plans to resettle up to 33,000 refugees through the GAR, Blended Visa 
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Office-Referred, and PSR programmes, representing 9.4 per cent of all immigration places 
(Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, no pagination own calculations). 
However, most private sponsors indicated that the bulk of their advocacy efforts focus 
on raising awareness about refugee issues and campaigning for operational and policy changes. 
Many interviewees explained that they disseminate information about refugee issues in their 
local communities or raise awareness about the PSR programme among their constituents 
(Dekker 2013; Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; 
Schnabl 2013). Furthermore, some respondents lobbied their Members of Parliament and 
officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada on matters related to the age of dependents 
eligible for resettlement, health care for privately sponsored refugees, and processing times for 
resettlement applications, among other matters (Dekker 2013; Niazi 2013; Schnabl 2013; 
Shropshire 2013; Woolaver 2013). 
In addition to these strategies, some private sponsors used legal advocacy in an attempt 
to secure policy changes. Ms Schnabl (2013) explained that she and Mr Denton sued the federal 
government following changes to Interim Federal Health Coverage for privately sponsored 
refugees. Ms Schnabl (2013) explained, “the diocese initiated a lawsuit against the government 
on the basis that a contract had been breached with Sponsorship Agreement Holders—that 
when Sponsorship Agreement Holders signed on, they understood that these benefits were part 
of the package, and now, the government had stopped this.”  
The applicants further charged that the changes were inconsistent with immigration 
legislation and regulations, and not only “breached the duty of fairness owed to them” but also 
violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Hospitality House Refugee Ministry 
Incorporated and Synod of the Diocese of Rupert’s Land v. Attorney General of Canada 2013, 
at para. 2). However, the Honourable James W. O’Reilly dismissed the lawsuit (with costs) on 
the basis that the agreement between the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and SAHs 
does not require the government to offer a particular level of health care for resettled refugees 
(Hospitality House Refugee Ministry Incorporated and Synod of the Diocese of Rupert’s Land 
v. Attorney General of Canada 2013, at para. 10). Furthermore, Justice O’Reilly ruled that the 
changes were not ultra vires and did not breach a duty of fairness given the relatively small 
number of affected individuals, among other findings (Hospitality House Refugee Ministry 
Incorporated and Synod of the Diocese of Rupert’s Land v. Attorney General of Canada 2013, 
at para. 13 and 19). 
Though some private sponsors engaged in advocacy on resettlement, other responses 
suggest that not all private sponsors agree on how best to conduct advocacy. In particular, 
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responses indicate that whereas some private sponsors were comfortable using conspicuous 
advocacy strategies, others appeared to prefer a less ‘public’ approach to advocacy. For 
example, though some interviewees indicated at their organisations had endeavoured to engage 
the media on refugee issues (Dekker 2013; Shropshire 2013), others were more hesitant (Dyck 
2013; Wiebe 2013). Mr Wiebe (2013) explained that the Mennonite Central Committee Canada 
is on the call list for local and national media outlets. However, Mr Wiebe (2013) noted that 
his organisation does not deliberately seek out such opportunities and is mainly interested in 
ensuring that media professionals have accurate background information. Mr Dyck (2013) 
affirmed that the Mennonite Central Committee “rarely” engages with the media on 
resettlement issues and always exercises caution when doing so in order to avoid “burning 
bridges.” One could interpret these views as consistent with the approach adopted by many 
other Canadian voluntary sector organisations who tend to favour an inconspicuous approach 
to advocacy to ensure they continue to have a seat at the table (Pross 1992, 82). 
Mr McBride (2013) also took issue with the advocacy strategies adopted by some 
private sponsors. In particular, Mr McBride (2013) contended that some private sponsors 
viewed resettlement as a form of advocacy in itself and contended that this approach “came 
close to destroying the program.” Mr McBride (2013) noted that his organisation favours a 
gradual, consistent, and less adversarial approach to advocacy. In that context, Mr McBride 
(2013) described his approach to advocacy in the following way: “I believe effective advocacy 
is researched, it’s thought through, it’s mindful of the needs of both sides—if there are only 
two—or three or four if there are more, but still brings forth a point of view in a reasoned 
fashioned. That’s advocacy.” 
One could interpret the diversity of views on advocacy as consistent with an October 
2014 report from the Centre for Public Justice, a nonpartisan Christian organisation formed in 
1977. The Centre surveyed members of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association and found that 
while a majority of respondents were engaged in some form of advocacy, there are divisions 
between sponsors who prefer a “cooperative approach” to advocacy and those who pursue 
“adversarial” strategies (Chapman 2014, 12). 
Other interviewees indicated that they prefer not to engage in advocacy at all (Chahal 
2013; Manks 2013). During the interviews, a SAH representative indicated that her 
organisation prefers not to engage in advocacy. In an interview on 16 December, 2013, Rita 
Chahal, Executive Director of the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council, explained that her 
organisation prefers to maintain a collaborative relationship with the federal government 
because they are working towards the same goals. A representative from another SAH 
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indicated that her organisation also avoided advocacy—though for a far different reason. In an 
interview on 6 December, 2013, Michelle Manks indicated that the World University Service 
of Canada generally does not press for changes in resettlement policies or targets since they 
are a development organisation that “depends on funds for programming.” 
Though the view articulated by Ms Manks suggests that some private sponsors are 
concerned that advocacy could negatively impact the government funding they receive, Ms 
Schnabl (2013) and Mr Denton (2013) argued that private sponsors have an advantage when 
engaging in advocacy because the absence of government funding means that there are no 
constraints on their advocacy efforts. Ms Schnabl (2013) explained, “There’s conditions, in 
that only a very small amount of your budget can be spent on advocacy, the role of advocacy, 
so if you don’t actually get federal money, you’re not in that position.” Mr Denton (2013) 
argued that receiving federal funding “compromises” private sponsors, while operating without 
such funding offers organisations “much more freedom of action.” 
In addition to these views, there appears to be a perception among certain government 
officials that private sponsors do not necessarily share the same views on resettlement issues. 
In particular, Mr Boxhill (2013) observed that there appears to be “dissent” among members 
of the SAH Council on operational and policy issues related to resettlement, and suggested that 
the Council does not always speak with a “single voice.” Mr Boxhill (2013) contended that this 
raises questions about whether the SAH Council genuinely represents the views of the 
sponsorship community. 
The concerns articulated by Mr Boxhill could potentially have broader implications for 
advocacy efforts on resettlement in Canada. First, the perception that the SAH Council does 
not speak with a “single voice” could potentially undermine its advocacy efforts. Given that 
there were 108 SAHs in Canada at the time of submission, it does not appear unreasonable to 
assume that members of the sponsorship community have diverse preferences and attitudes. 
Indeed, in an interview on 9 December, 2013, Ellen Woolaver characterised private sponsors 
as a “motley group” with different objectives, though it is important to note that she did not 
express any concerns about this. However, there is an implicit assumption in the literature that 
advocacy organisations engage in interest representation in order to achieve a clear objective 
(e.g. Hojnacki et al. 2012; Owen 2000, 133-34). The potential absence of a cohesive stance on 
matters such as the controversial Blended Visa Office-Referred programme could impact the 
effectiveness of advocacy efforts among those concerned about responsibility shifting. 
On the matter of representativeness, the SAH Council could be representative in both 
the descriptive and formal sense of the term (Guo and Musso 2007, 312) given that the SAH 
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Council is elected annually. However, the concerns articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013) indicate 
that some government officials might not see the SAH Council as representative in the 
substantive sense of the term—that is, these government officials may not perceive the 
concerns raised by the SAH Council as “congruent” with the views of the wider sponsorship 
community (Guo and Musso 2007, 312). If some government officials do not view the SAH 
Council as substantively representative or as the “legitimate” representative of the sponsorship 
community (Guo and Musso 2007, 312), members of the Council may find it challenging to 
effectively advance their agenda. 
The perceptions articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013) could parallel disagreements among 
private sponsors regarding the purpose of the Council. The official mission of the Canadian 
Refugee SAH Association is to be a “collective voice” for members of the sponsorship 
community (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1). The Association has a 
broad mandate, which includes raising awareness about the PSR programme, ensuring the well-
being of refugees resettled through the programme, as well as developing “cohesiveness and 
collective approaches” between SAHs, representing their views, and collaborating with 
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada to “further the goals of the PSR program [sic] 
(Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 2 of 2). 
Despite this clear mission, some private sponsors disagree on whether and to what 
extent the Council should engage in advocacy. Several interviewees contented that the Council 
is not a forum for advocacy (Shropshire 2013; Dyck 2013; Wiebe 2013). In an interview on 13 
December, 2013, Rob Shropshire characterised the Council as a “forum for policy dialogue.” 
Similarly, in an interview on 16 December, 2013, Ed Wiebe explained that the Council enables 
SAHs to better understand the government’s perspective on policy issues. Others indicated that 
the Council has a more pragmatic purpose; in a separate interview on 16 December, 2013, 
Brian Dyck explained that the Council is useful for addressing “nuts and bolts” issues to ensure 
that the government and private sponsors effectively implement existing policies. 
Conversely, some respondents argued that the SAH Council should become more 
involved in advocacy on resettlement (Manks 2013; Richardson 2013; Shropshire 2013). In an 
interview on 12 December, 2013, Serena Richardson, the representative for the Christian and 
Missionary Alliance in Canada, argued that the SAH Council should assume “a bigger 
responsibility for advocacy,” particularly on accountability issues such as application 
processing times. However, if members of the Association are unable to agree on the core 
mission of the Association, the organisation may struggle to effectively advance concerns and 
other issues raised by its members. 
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These issues aside, some interviewees expressed scepticism about their ability to exert 
influence on resettlement policies and programmes (Manks 2013; Woolaver 2013). Ms Manks 
(2013) commented that the government had implemented the aforementioned cuts to Interim 
Federal Health coverage for privately sponsored refugees and limited the number of private 
sponsorship applications despite widespread opposition and advocacy against these measures. 
Similarly, though Ms Woolaver (2013) argued that the SAH Council advocates for changes to 
the PSR programme and to identify and raise awareness of changes which could affect private 
sponsors, she noted, “sometimes it feels like it doesn’t really go anywhere.” 
To obtain a more meaningful understanding of the responses articulated by 
interviewees, the author now seeks to interpret the responses provided above in relation to the 
literature. First, one could interpret the perceived tensions highlighted by Mr Boxhill and Mr 
Deans as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations. 
Chapters one and three noted that some academics have pressed other scholars to move beyond 
taxonomies that categorise voluntary sector organisations as service providers alone. In 
particular, Young (2000, 151) argues that government-voluntary sector relations may be 
adversarial in nature. As explained in chapters one and three, governments regulate the 
behaviour of voluntary sector organisations but also respond to voluntary sector advocacy 
efforts, which may include campaigns to create new government policies and programmes or 
calls to improve the efficiency or expand current programmes and services (Young 2000, 151). 
Though Young (2000, 151) describes this relationship as ‘adversarial,’ he acknowledges that 
governments and voluntary sector organisations are not necessarily always at odds with one 
another; in the ‘complementary’ lens, governments and voluntary sector organisations may 
collaborate with one another to build support for new legislation or to raise public awareness 
about a particular issue (Young 2000, 155). Furthermore, governments themselves may assume 
an ‘advocacy’ role by attempting to “encourage, prod, and stimulate private, voluntary activity 
in support of social goals (Young 2000, 155).” Similarly, as noted in chapter one, Seibel (1990, 
46) has encouraged scholars to move beyond the conceptualisation of voluntary sector 
organisations as service providers and to acknowledge that these groups can also serve as 
“important factors of social and political coordination.” 
In the Canadian context, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada regulates the 
responsibilities of SAHs in subsection 152(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations, which enables the Minister to establish sponsorship agreements with approved 
organisations. These agreements encompass provisions on a range of pertinent issues, 
including assistance offered by the federal government, expectations concerning the conduct 
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of sponsors, the financial and reporting requirements that private sponsors must fulfil, and a 
‘settlement’ plan for refugees resettled through the PSR programme (Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulations 152(2)). Though Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 
monitors the conduct of SAHs, the agreement is the product of “years of consultation” and 
negotiations between the federal government and members of the sponsorship community 
(Canadian Council for Refugees 1998, 20; for a more detailed historical review of preceding 
agreements between the federal government and private sponsors, see Janzen 2011). 
The federal government also regulates charities through the Income Tax Act (subsection 
149(1)). In 1978, the Canada Revenue Agency (the federal organisation responsible for 
administering tax law and regulating charities) published an information circular which warned 
that voluntary sector organisations risked losing their charitable status if they expressed support 
for a political party, lobbied officials, or participated in public demonstrations, among other 
activities (Elson 2011, 64-65). This circular, alongside other regulatory and political changes, 
contributed to an “advocacy chill” among voluntary sector organisations in the 1980s and 
1990s (Elson 2011, 107; Harvie 2002, 15-17; Phillips 2003, 37).  
 Under the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, 
the government amended the regulations on advocacy to allow charitable organisations to 
engage in a broader range of political activities (Elson 2011, 70-72). Today, charities are 
exempt from income tax requirements so long as they have “exclusively charitable purposes” 
and do not serve “political purposes (Canada Revenue Agency 2003, see section 4).” Though 
charities can engage in some political activities, these efforts must advance its charitable 
mission (Canada Revenue Agency 2003, see section 6). To that end, charities can communicate 
their view about a certain decision, law, or policy, urge members of the public to contact 
politicians or officials regarding a particular decision, law, or policy, and publish materials 
about a specific decision, law, or policy—provided that these efforts are nonpartisan and 
“subordinate to the charity’s purpose (Canada Revenue Agency 2003, see section 6).” 
Though the federal government permits some nonpartisan political activities, Phillips 
(2003, 36-37) suggests that the government still maintains a “much greater aversion to 
advocacy and tighter restrictions on it than most other countries” because interest 
representation is “interpreted and understood based on tax rules, rather than according to 
broader principles of democracy.” Consequently, the regulatory environment surrounding 
advocacy continues to create a “difficult terrain” for many voluntary sector organisations today 
(Pross and Webb 2003, 64). Though the concerns articulated by Ms Manks relate to the 
potential impact of advocacy on government funding for other WUSC programmes rather than 
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concerns about running afoul of income tax regulations, this regulatory framework could 
nevertheless discourage some private sponsors and other stakeholders from pursuing advocacy 
on resettlement issues. 
However, one could interpret the concerns voiced by Ms Manks as consistent with 
aspects of the literature on voluntary sector advocacy. As noted in chapter three, there is no 
consensus at present on whether and to what extent government funding and regulatory regimes 
for voluntary sector organisations exert a deleterious effect on voluntary sector advocacy (c.f. 
Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Guo and Saxton 2010; Mosley 2012; Neumayr, 
Schneider, and Meyer 2015; Reid 2006; Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008; 
Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008; Silverman and Patterson 2011). In a 2007 survey of 174 
charitable organisations in the state of Arizona, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find a negative, 
statistically significant relationship between the percentage of government funding allocated 
to charitable organisations and the scope of advocacy efforts by charitable organisations, 
indicating that the provision of government funding may narrow the number and range of 
advocacy activities undertaken by these groups. However, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find no 
statistically significant relationship between government funding and the intensity of advocacy 
activities. 
In a longitudinal study of advocacy efforts by 229 registered charitable organisations 
in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area between 1984 and 1994, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 
(2004, 305-12) find mixed evidence concerning the potential relationship between government 
funding and voluntary sector advocacy; in some models, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 
(2004, 309-12) found a positive, statistically significant relationship between the provision of 
government funding and voluntary sector engagement in advocacy, but in other models, the 
inclusion of additional control variables neutralised the significance of the effect. In a national 
survey of the advocacy and lobbying activities of 311 registered charitable organisations, 
Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz (2008, 8) found that only a quarter of organisations 
surveyed reported no engagement in lobbying or advocacy due to concerns about contravening 
laws or regulations governing such activities, while only 20 per cent expressed concern that 
engaging in such activities could jeopardise the receipt of public funding. Conversely, 70 per 
cent of organisations they surveyed did not engage in advocacy or lobbying due to time 
constraints, while 45 per cent did not engage in such activities due to the absence of 
organisational expertise amongst staff (Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008, 8). 
Though political scientists debate the impact of government funding on advocacy by 
voluntary sector organisations, the literature on immigrant- and refugee-serving voluntary 
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sector organisations indicates that government funding need not “crowd out” these groups nor 
constrain the ability of these organisations and their clients to “resist” the state (Bloemraad 
2005, 866; Nawyn 2010, 150). Indeed, government provision of material and symbolic support 
through funding and legislation on multiculturalism can not only encourage ethnic 
communities to form organisations but also help sustain their activities (Bloemraad 2005, 
872).81 Given the range of views found in the literature, one cannot reach a definitive conclusion 
concerning the impact of advocacy on government funding. Nevertheless, the response from 
Ms Manks suggests that this is perceived to be a concern and highlights the need for further 
research in this area. 
The perceptions articulated by government officials and private sponsors and the 
potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of their relations in resettlement also raise questions about the 
broader structure of interest representation on resettlement in Canada. Scholarly interest in 
advocacy in Canada is a recent phenomenon, and the scope of the literature on interest 
representation remains limited at present (Kobayashi 2000, 233; Pross 1992, 67). Though there 
is some evidence that the neo-pluralist mode of interest representation characterises interest 
representation in some sectors in Canada (see the chapter from Skogstad 2014 on agricultural 
politics in Canada), the policy communities approach has gained particular traction among 
Canadian political scientists and academics who study the voluntary sector (e.g. Pross 1992; 
Skogstad 2008). 
The policy communities approach holds that Canadian government policies are 
formulated through “regularized patterns of interaction between state actors and representatives 
of societal interests,” known as policy communities or networks (Skogstad 2008, 207-8). 
Traditionally, academics have not conceptualised policy communities and networks as discrete 
structures but as opposing poles on a spectrum, in which policy communities are “integrated, 
stable, and exclusive” and policy networks are more “loosely connected” and potentially 
“conflict-ridden” (Skogstad 2008, 209). However, scholars have adapted these terms to the 
Canadian context, such that the term ‘policy communities’ carries the connotation of actors 
who share an interest in the development of policy in a given issue area, while the term ‘policy 
networks’ encompasses the uneven structure of power between members of the network and 
individuals and groups excluded from this sphere of influence for whatever reason (Skogstad 
2008, 208). 
                                                 
81 This argument appears consistent with Pross’s (1992) work on policy communities, and with the views 
articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013). 
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From a historical perspective, the development of advocacy groups mirrors the growth 
of the federal government (Pross 1992, 66). In the 1960s, the rapid expansion in the size of 
government contributed to the diffusion of power from the Cabinet to the civil service, thereby 
creating additional space for interest representation (Pross 1992, 66). In the 1970s, business 
groups, social movements, and trade unions took advantage of the “tug-of-war” between the 
executive and the civil service in order to exert considerable influence in policymaking (Pross 
1992, 67-70). 
During this period, the government also encouraged the participation of 
underprivileged groups and “considered it in the public interest to take a hand in group 
formation, identifying latent and solidary interests and encouraging them to organize [sic] 
themselves […] (Pross 1992, 68).” To that end, many government departments endeavoured to 
build ‘policy communities’ through the provision of financial and “moral” support or, in some 
cases, outright coercion (Pross 1992, 71). 
The active role of government in building and supporting policy communities had a 
profound impact on advocacy. As Pross (1992, 82) explains: 
 
“As government expanded and the role of the bureaucracy in policy formation became more pronounced, 
restrained behind-the-scenes lobbying became the norm. Mass meetings, marches on Ottawa, 
demonstrations, and appeals to the media occurred but they came to be seen as the last resort of groups 
that had exhausted every other avenue of persuasion, or did not understand the policy process. The most 
influential groups eschewed publicity, accepting instead the norms of acceptable behaviour laid down by 
government.” 
 
Despite this, politicians began to worry that the close relationship between the civil 
service and advocacy groups had undermined their neutrality as well as the democratic 
legitimacy of the public policymaking process (Pross 1992, 73-75). 
In the 1980s, the Progressive Conservative government led by Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney government attempted to build a “more effective relationship” with the voluntary 
sector but fiscal retrenchment negatively affected advocacy capacity (Elson 2011, 90). 
Furthermore, the pursuit of a contract culture accorded greater importance to the role of the 
voluntary sector as service providers than as advocates (Elson 2011, 92). In addition, the 
Liberal Party eliminated funding for ‘special interest’ groups—that is, groups whose views did 
not align with those of the government (Elson 2011, 103; Phillips 2003, 22-23). Consequently, 
organisations that did not share the same views as the government were “ostracized [sic]” from 
the policymaking process (Elson 2011, 104). When the government did consult voluntary 
sector organisations, meetings frequently devolved into “show and tell” sessions rather than 
opportunities for genuine dialogue (Phillips 2003, 39). 
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In the context of resettlement, one could interpret the relationship between Immigration, 
Refugees, and Citizenship Canada and private sponsors a policy community existing in a 
broader policy network. Much as the government sought to build and support advocacy efforts 
by underrepresented groups in the 1960s, Mr Boxhill (2013) explained that Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada spent “a lot of time and energy trying to create a community of interest” 
in resettlement.  
The department has also established and funded dedicated forums through which SAHs 
can offer input on resettlement policies and issues. In particular, the department organises an 
annual conference for government officials and members of the Canadian Refugee SAH 
Association (Chapman 2014, 10). The department provides funding to ensure that these 
geographically dispersed organisations can participate in the conference and also pays for the 
ongoing administrative expenses of the Association (Chapman 2014, 10; Kenney 2011, 1-2). 
One could view the Canadian Refugee SAH Association as an integral part of the resettlement 
policy community due to its representative mission and mandate, and the formal role of the 
SAH Council in advocating and communicating with Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship 
Canada (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 3 of 7). Though SAHs only formally 
incorporated the Association in 2011, the Association has persisted throughout the intervening 
seven years and is the product of periodic discussions since 2000 (Canadian Refugee SAH 
Association 2018, para. 7 and 10 of 11). Furthermore, the Association welcomes organisations 
representing all faiths and ethnicities, and currently counts 86 of the 113 SAHs as members at 
present (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 5 of 5; Canadian Refugee SAH 
Association 2018, para. 3 of 7), indicating that it enjoys a broad membership base. However, 
membership is also exclusive insofar as only organisations that have been designated as SAHs 
by the Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship are eligible for membership 
(Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 3 of 7). 
Furthermore, departmental officials and the eight elected members of the SAH Council 
meet several times per year under the auspices of the NGO-Government Committee on the 
PSR, which examines operational issues related to the programme and provides a forum to 
“exchange ideas, address areas of concern, and develop suitable solutions (Chapman 2014, 10; 
Humanitarian Designated Class Regulations 1997, 30).”82 In addition, government officials 
                                                 
82 Treviranus and Casasola (2003, 188) explain that the NGO-Government Committee was established in 1994 
following an appeal from the Canadian Council for Refugees, and they note that the Committee has been 
“closely involved in every significant aspect of the policy developments and legislative review process relating 
to private sponsorship since 1994.” 
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and SAH Council representatives hold a monthly teleconference which offers further 
opportunities for dialogue on resettlement (Chapman 2014, 10; Deans 2013; Dyck 2013). 
Though one could interpret the connections between Immigration, Refugees, and 
Citizenship Canada, private sponsors, the Canadian Refugee SAH Association, and the SAH 
Council as a policy community thanks to their active interest and role in the formulation and 
implementation of resettlement policies and programmes in Canada, it is also worth reflecting 
on the possible existence of a broader policy network. Indeed, as explained in chapter four, 
resettlement to Canada involves a broad range of actors, including not only Immigration, 
Refugees, and Citizenship Canada and other federal and provincial governments but also 
voluntary sector organisations including SAHs, SPOs, and, in the case of the PSR programme, 
the constituent groups who have a hands-on role in assisting resettled refugees in the orientation 
and integration process.  
The department holds annual consultations in which members of the public and other 
stakeholders can offer input on the level and composition of annual admissions targets, 
including for resettlement (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012, 1). In this way, the 
resettlement policy network in Canada could also potentially encompass the “attentive 
public”—that is, individuals who attempt to influence resettlement policies but do not actually 
participate in the policymaking process (Skogstad 2008, 208). However, the department solicits 
“input” on a pre-determined levels plan and it rarely releases the results of these annual 
consultations to the public.83 Furthermore, while Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship 
Canada acknowledges that it consults provinces and territories and seeks “input” from 
stakeholders in its annual report to parliament, it is unclear whether and to what extent feedback 
from these consultations have a substantive impact on the actual levels plan adopted by the 
department. 
In his influential 1995 paper, Freeman (886-87) argues that interest representation 
efforts on immigration in “settler societies” like Canada are characterised by an “expansionary 
bias” that does not accurately reflect the “restrictionist” preferences of the broader public. 
Chapter two explained that Freeman (1995) builds on the influential classification of interest 
representation developed by political scientist James Q. Wilson (1980) and attributes this 
divergence to the fact that office-seeking politicians have a powerful incentive to follow the 
                                                 
83 Only the results of the 2014 and 2017 consultations were available at the time of submission (see 
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017 and Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 
2017). 
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preferences of interest groups, and to the “antipopulist norm” prevalent Canada that 
discourages politicians from attempting to “exploit racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears 
in order to win votes (Freeman 1995, 885).”84 Freeman (1995, 886-87) argues that interest 
groups enjoy outsized influence in immigration policymaking due to the poorly “articulated” 
nature of public opinion on immigration and to the clientelistic nature of interest representation 
on immigration policy. 
As explained in chapter two, Freeman (1995, 887) argues that interest representation 
on immigration policymaking is dominated by, “small and well-organized [sic] groups 
intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships with those officials 
responsible for it.” Freeman (1995, 887) further adds that “These interactions take place largely 
out of public view and with little outside interference.” In a 2006 paper, Freeman attempts to 
develop a more nuanced approach that distinguishes between different models of interest 
representation and different kinds of immigration policies, including resettlement. Freeman 
(2006, 239) argues that resettlement has strong distributive characteristics, and argues that 
humanitarian organisations are the main beneficiaries of these policies, thus contributing to the 
development of “client politics.” Freeman (2006, 239) claims that these organisations “enjoy 
privileged access to the policy formulation process” but “exert less influence than those actors 
organised around migrant streams where significant material interests are at stake.” 
In the Canadian context, Freeman (2006, 222) argues that advocacy organisations in 
Canada are “directly integrated into the elaborate, if relatively formalistic, consultative 
processes at each stage of policy formulation.” As previously noted, Immigration, Refugees, 
and Citizenship Canada does seek out the input of stakeholders and members of the public on 
the annual number of immigrant and refugee admissions each year. However, the regular 
contact that SAHs enjoy by virtue of their participation in the NGO-Government Committee 
on the PSR suggests they could potentially have “privileged access” (Freeman 2006, 239) and 
thus potentially more opportunities to exert influence than other advocacy groups or members 
of the “attentive public (Skogstad 2008, 208).” That said, though Freeman (1995) describes 
immigration policymaking as ‘clientelistic,’ he does not offer any empirical evidence to 
concretely support the implication that politicians receive electoral benefits from listening to 
immigration advocates. Furthermore, given the responses articulated by private sponsors and 
                                                 
84 Freeman’s 1995 statement is striking when evaluated in relation to the contemporary political context in the 
US. 
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the aforementioned constraints on political activities by charitable organisations, the 
resettlement policymaking process may not be clientelistic in nature. 
Though some private sponsors indicated they were active advocates on resettlement 
issues, these groups do not necessarily have a monopoly over advocacy in this area. However, 
preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations may be engaged in 
advocacy on resettlement. A survey of the 33 members of the Canadian Ethnocultural Council 
in 2015 found that only 21 members had an online presence and only 12 included advocacy as 
part of their respective organisational missions.85 Of these 12 organisations, only the Christian 
Cultural Association of South Asians mentioned advocacy for immigrants as part of its mission, 
stating that it seeks to “promote positive recognition of immigrants and their contributions to 
Canadian society (Christian Cultural Association of South Asians 2009, no para.).” None of 
the other organisations referred to serving or advocating on behalf of asylum seekers or 
refugees. However, in December 2015, the Vietnamese Canadian Federation organised a 
fundraiser in Calgary, Alberta for Syrian refugees, with the proceeds going towards assisting 
recently resettled Syrian refugees with housing and living expenses, as well as the provision of 
employment and other integration services (Vietnamese Canadian Federation 2015, no para.). 
 The author also conducted preliminary research on advocacy among SPOs located in 
Ottawa, Toronto, and Winnipeg. These organisations are contracted by Immigration, Refugees, 
and Citizenship to provide orientation and integration services to immigrants, including 
refugees resettled through the GAR, PSR, JAS, and BVOR programmes. There were 229 SPOs 
in Toronto alone at the time of research, and 13 of these organisations are ethnic community 
organisations.86 Of these, seven organisations mentioned advocacy or synonyms such as 
‘represent’ or ‘promote’ as part of their respective organisational missions.87  
                                                 
85 This is the most recent year for which membership information was available. The 12 organisations that 
included advocacy as part of their respective missions were: the Armenian National Committee of Canada, the 
Canadian Hispanic Congress, the Canadian Hellenic Congress, the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, the 
Canadian-Polish Congress, the Christian Cultural Association of South Asians, the Latvian National Federation 
in Canada, the National Association of Japanese Canadians, the Jamaican Canadian Association, the Ukrainian 
Canadian Congress, the United Macedonians Organization of Canada, and the Vietnamese Canadian Federation. 
86 The 10 organisations were: the Afghan Women’s Organization, the Black Coalition for AIDS Prevention, the 
Canadian Ukrainian Immigrant Aid Society, Chinese Family Services of Ontario, COSTI, the Jewish Vocational 
Service of Metropolitan Toronto, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, the Kababayan Multicultural Centre, KCWA 
Family and Social Services, the Somali Immigrant Aid Organization, the Arab Community Centre of Toronto, 
the Vietnamese Association Toronto and VWAT Family Services. 
87 The seven organisations were: the Afghan Women’s Organization, COSTI, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, 
Kababayan Multicultural Centre, the Somali Immigrant Aid Organization, the Arab Community Centre of 
Toronto, and the Vietnamese Association Toronto. 
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Though three of these organisations—COSTI, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, and the 
Arab Community Centre of Toronto—had organised events for Syrian refugees, there was little 
indication that these groups had engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues.88 Indeed, the only 
example available at the time of research was a press statement issued by Jewish Immigrant 
Aid Services in response to developments in the US. In the undated statement, the organisation 
argued that governments have an “imperative” to show “compassion for the most vulnerable, 
including refugees […] (Jewish Immigrant Aid Services no date, para. 2 of 3).” The 
organisation praised Prime Minister Trudeau’s “principled statement” on the issue and argued 
that there was a “Canadian consensus” on the importance of offering protection to Syrian 
refugees (Jewish Immigrant Aid Services no data, para. 3 of 3). 
In Ottawa, there were 33 SPOs at the time of research, of which four were ethnic 
community organisations.89 Of these organisations, only the Jewish Family Services of Ottawa 
and the Lebanese and Arab Social Services Agency mention advocacy as part of their 
organisational missions. However, though Jewish Family Services of Ottawa offers counselling 
services for Syrian refugees (Jewish Family Services of Ottawa 2018, no pagination), an 
assessment of its website revealed no indication of any advocacy efforts on this issue or other 
matters related to resettlement. 
In Winnipeg, there were 49 SPOs at the time of research, of which only one—the Jewish 
Child and Family Service—was an ethnic community organisation. However, its mission does 
not include advocacy. 
 Given the preliminary nature of this research, one cannot reach a definitive conclusion 
on whether and to what extent Canadian ethnic community organisations engage in advocacy 
on resettlement. As noted in chapter three, ethnic community organisations could engage in 
forms of advocacy, such as drafting petitions, meeting local, state, and federal officials, or they 
may pursue forms of direct action that they cannot document as easily online. These 
organisations could also potentially lack the human and financial resources necessary to 
maintain an active presence online and to raise awareness of their advocacy efforts through 
these channels. In addition, the academic literature offers little insight as there has been 
precious little research on advocacy by ethnic community organisations. Chapter three noted 
that academics have found it difficult to even identify the number of immigrant-serving 
voluntary sector organisations and the representation of immigrants on the governing boards 
                                                 
88 Jewish Immigrant Aid Service is also a SAH. 
89 The five organisations were: Jewish Family Services of Ottawa, the Lebanese and Arab Social Services 
Agency, the Ottawa Chinese Community Service Centre, and the Somali Centre for Family Services. 
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of voluntary sector organisations, with clear implications for our understanding of the ability 
and capacity of these organisations to engage in advocacy (Gleeson and Bloemraad 2012, 347). 
 However, the history of ethnic minorities in Canada suggests that the political inclusion 
of these groups has gradually improved over time. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, ethnic communities exerted limited political influence in Canada due to the structure 
of the political environment and prevailing public attitudes towards immigration. In the late 
nineteenth century, many immigrant groups including Russian Jews and immigrants from 
Finland and Ukraine were small in size and geographically diffuse, which constrained their 
ability to organise and mobilise (Palmer 1991, 3-5). In other cases, the poverty and geographic 
isolation of groups such as the Africans living in Nova Scotia limited their capacity to exert 
political influence (Palmer 1991, 4). Over time, as the number of Jewish immigrants and 
arrivals from Finland and Ukraine grew and individuals increasingly congregated in urban 
centres in Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec, members of these groups began to organise and 
mobilise to campaign for improved labour rights—including participating in forms of direct 
action such as the influential Winnipeg General Strike (Palmer 1991, 8-9). 
However, ideological orientation and race also shaped opportunities for political 
engagement. The participation of some European immigrants in “socialist” campaigns 
contributed to a souring of public attitudes towards these “un-Canadian” immigrants in the 
early twentieth century, and led to the deportation of some “immigrant radicals” from Central 
and Eastern Europe and to the introduction of restrictive admissions policies for individuals 
from these regions (Palmer 1991, 8-9). Furthermore, during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the Canadian government denied economic, civil, and political rights to 
many immigrants from China, Japan, and India (Palmer 1991, 10). Though these restrictions 
did not prevent some immigrants from participating in forms of direct advocacy such as 
boycotts and strikes, others chose to focus their attention on diaspora politics in an attempt to 
influence developments in their respective countries of origin (Palmer 1991, 8-10). 
During the interwar period, many immigrants became more politically engaged and 
some groups of immigrants including those of Jewish and Ukrainian origin gained political 
representation in the House of Commons in constituencies where there was a geographic 
concentration of immigrants from these groups (Palmer 1991, 11). However, Palmer (1991, 
11) argues that “nativist attitudes continued to have a strong impact on public policy” during 
this period. Consequently, representatives from these ethnic groups exerted limited influence 
in parliament on issues such as immigration and failed to convince the federal government to 
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adopt more permissive, less discriminatory immigration policies or to admit Jewish refugees 
(Palmer 1991, 11).  
Though some fascist groups made inroads among both ‘native’ Canadians and 
immigrants during the interwar period, a larger proportion of European immigrants began to 
express support for socialist and Communist parties in Canada (Palmer 1991, 13-15). 
Following the outbreak of World War II, Canadians and the government became suspicious of 
immigrants who originated from “enemy” countries—particularly those from Germany, Italy, 
and Japan (Palmer 1991, 17). The government responded to these concerns by banning Nazi 
and fascist groups, and also outlawed many left-wing publications in June 1940 (Palmer 1991, 
17). In addition, the government arrested and interned hundreds of German and Italian 
Canadians and, following the attack on Pearl Harbour in the US, the government also 
expropriated the assets of more than 22,000 Japanese Canadians living on the coast of British 
Columbia before forcing them into internment camps elsewhere in the country (Palmer 1991, 
17). 
However, World War II and the Holocaust prompted a change in public attitudes 
towards immigration. More precisely, the public began to favour extending political rights to 
immigrants and adopting more liberal immigration policies (Palmer 1991, 17-18). Business 
groups also joined members of the public in pressing for more liberal immigration policies, 
while ethnic and religious groups called on the government to adopt more generous 
resettlement policies for refugees in Europe (Palmer 1991, 18). This more permissive public 
and political environment facilitated a surge in the admission of immigrants and refugees. 
Between 1945 and 1961, Canada admitted more than 2.1 million immigrants and immigrants 
soon comprised a full 25 per cent of the population (Palmer 1991, 18).  
The dramatic change in the composition of Canadian society also impacted the structure 
of Canadian politics. Though the Liberal Party had cultivated relations with immigrant 
communities since Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier led the country between 1896 and 1911, the 
Progressive Conservative Party had historically attracted little support from these communities 
due to their emphasis on “British-Canadian nationalism (Palmer 1991, 5).” The Liberal Party 
continued to attract the support of many immigrants throughout the postwar period, and 
immigrant support solidified following the introduction of the Citizenship Act in 1947 (Palmer 
1991, 20), which created the first legal basis for Canadians to take up their own distinct 
nationality.  
The increasing diversity of the Canadian population forced the Progressive 
Conservatives to reconsider their approach towards immigrants. In 1957, a plurality of 
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Canadians elected the Progressive Conservative candidate John Diefenbaker Prime Minister 
due in part to his experience as Member of Parliament for the multicultural constituency of 
Prince Albert, Saskatchewan (Palmer 1991, 20-21). In 1960, the Diefenbaker government 
passed the Canadian Bill of Rights, which institutionalised a broad range of human rights and 
freedoms, and barred “discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex 
(SC 1960, C. 44, section 1).” During this period, a small but growing number of individuals 
representing immigrant communities gained political representation, including Douglas Jung, 
the first Chinese-Canadian Member of Parliament Cabinet (Palmer 1991, 20-21). In addition, 
politicians of Jewish and Ukrainian descent gained positions of political influence as Senators 
or members of Cabinet (Palmer 1991, 20-21). 
Though the growing number of immigrants, their increasing incorporation into politics, 
and an improvement in the socio-economic status of many immigrants enabled members of 
these groups to exert greater political influence, the role of immigrant communities in the 
political sphere did not consolidate until the late 1960s, when the federal government began to 
pursue multiculturalism in tandem with efforts to entrench recognition of bilingualism (Palmer 
1991, 22). In pursuit of its multicultural agenda, the federal government assisted Chinese, 
Italian, and South Asian Canadians in forming ethnic community organisations, and provided 
funding to support specific activities which also legitimated these organisations (Palmer 1991, 
23-24).90 However, acceptance of multiculturalism and the increasing diversity of the Canadian 
population did not proceed evenly across the country. In Québec, immigration—and in 
particular, the growing number of non-Francophone immigrants—presented a dilemma for the 
province, as the governing Parti Québecois was intent on defending the province’s sociéte 
distincte yet needed immigration due in part to the declining birth rate occurring within the 
broader context of la Révolution tranquille (Palmer 1991, 23-24). 
The context surrounding the politics of immigration at the federal level continued to 
change throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and political parties made a more concerted 
effort to engage with ethnic groups during leadership contests and election campaigns (Palmer 
1991, 23). The pursuit of multiculturalism also offered another avenue through which 
individuals could voice their views on immigration policies. As Canada welcomed immigrants 
from further afield, including from low- and middle-income countries and states with both left-
wing and right-wing governments such as Chile, Ethiopia, India, and Vietnam, Canadians 
pressed the government to adapt its resettlement admissions policies to reflect a more balanced 
                                                 
90 One could interpret this as consistent with Pross’s (1992) work on policy communities. 
Page 219 of 361 
 
approach that did not discriminate by political ideology (Palmer 1991, 24). Though political 
engagement by ethnic groups has varied according to group, class and across space and time 
in Canada, the historical evidence indicates that the political context surrounding immigration 
and the political integration of non-British, non-French immigrants has shifted and become 
more welcoming, thus offering a more conducive environment for these groups to exert 
influence on immigration and refugee policies. These observations provide a strong rationale 
for conducting further research into the potential engagement of ethnic community 
organisations in advocacy on resettlement. 
However, as noted in chapter three, any discussion of advocacy would be incomplete 
without considering two important, non-institutional factors that condition the impact of 
advocacy efforts: issue context and issue salience. Issue context relates to both the scope of the 
policy and the degree of contestation surrounding this policy (Mahoney 2007, 40). Groups are 
more likely to exert influence in the policymaking process when the scope of the issue is 
relatively narrow and uncontested (Mahoney 2007, 40). 
Evaluating the scope of resettlement in Canada is challenging due to the complexity of 
its resettlement programmes. On the one hand, as noted in chapter three, Freeman (2006, 239) 
characterises resettlement as a distributive policy that has concentrated benefits for resettled 
refugees and diffuse costs for the country of resettlement. However, once the federal 
government discharges its financial responsibility for resettlement, provinces and 
municipalities must absorb the ongoing costs of resettlement and provide education, health 
care, and access to any other social services to which resettled refugees may be eligible. Though 
chapter one indicated that Canada was among the largest contributors to resettlement in 
absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2015, resettled refugees form a small proportion 
of its total population, as appendix tables 7 to 9 demonstrated. Nevertheless, given that resettled 
refugees may have unique needs related to their refugee experience, the scope of resettlement 
and the impact on provinces and municipalities could be larger than Freeman (2006) 
envisioned. Conversely, in the case of the PSR programme, private sponsors bear the full costs 
for resettlement, so while the government still incurs costs related to the processing of 
resettlement applications, the post-arrival costs are more concentrated than in other 
programmes, which could narrow the scope of the issue and potentially facilitate advocacy 
efforts. 
On the matter of issue context, chapter four noted that Bloemraad (2012, 1-3) argues 
that there is an element of “Canadian exceptionalism” in public support for immigration and 
multiculturalism. In addition, Bloemraad (2012, 2) argues that “Canada is a striking outlier” 
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with respect to public attitudes towards immigration and that “Canadians are by far the most 
open to and optimistic about immigration.” However, while the government has constructed 
the country as a “safe haven, peacekeeper, and supporter of human rights (Krishnamurti 2013, 
139), chapter four and section 5.2 in this chapter indicate that the admission of refugees has 
long been contested and public opinion on immigration, asylum, and refugee issues appears 
complex. 
Chapter four noted that the Liberal government under Prime Minister William Lyon 
Mackenzie King adopted a staunchly restrictionist approach to the admission of Jewish 
refugees in the early 1930s, driven in part by the moribund state of the national economy, 
existing legislation which prioritised the admission of immigrants by ethnicity, and outright 
anti-Semitism (Abella and Troper 1979, 182-85). While the small number of Jewish Members 
of Parliament and civil society organisations including the Canadian Jewish Congress and the 
Jewish Immigrant Aid Society persistently called on the government to relax its admissions 
criteria for Jews fleeing Austria and Germany, large segments of the news media and 
population firmly opposed any such decision (Abella and Troper 1979, 186). In Québec, where 
multiple newspapers expressed their opposition to the resettlement of Jewish refugees, and 
more than 128,000 members of the nationalist Société St-Jean-Baptiste signed a petition calling 
on parliament to end all forms of immigration and bar the admission of Jews from Europe 
(Abella and Troper 1979, 188-89). Québécois opposition to immigration was politically salient 
at the time as the province elected a Union Nationale government in 1936, ending the 
longstanding dominance of the Liberal Party (Abella and Troper 1979, 180). Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King feared that acquiescing to the Jewish community could further threaten 
national unity, so his government remained steadfast in its desire to limit the admission of 
Jewish refugees until the catastrophic events of the Kristallnacht prompted a change of heart 
(Abella and Troper 1979, 190 and 198). The controversy surrounding the admission of Jewish 
refugees meant that Canada only resettled approximately 4,000 Jewish refugees in the period 
between 1933 and 1939—a derisory figure when compared to the 10,000 resettled in Australia 
or the 140,000 admitted to the US during that same period (Abella and Troper 1979, 181). 
Public opinion polls indicate that immigration remained a contested issue through the 
1990s. In a longitudinal study of public opinion polls, Simon and Lynch (1999, 459) indicate 
that a larger percentage of Canadians surveyed between 1975 and 1993 favoured increasing 
immigration than Americans, but no more than 17 per cent of respondents expressed this view 
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at any one time.91 In addition, the percentage of respondents who supported reduced admissions 
declined in the mid-to-late 1980s and early 1990s, bottoming out at 32 per cent in 1990 before 
rising again to 45 per cent in 1991, 46 per cent in 1992, and 45 per cent in 1993 (Simon and 
Lynch 1999, 461). These findings indicate that while the percentage of Canadians who wanted 
to reduce immigration fluctuated during this period, a sizeable proportion of the Canadian 
population nevertheless supported a restrictive approach to admissions during this period. 
Other studies have also pointed to the variability in public attitudes towards migration 
in Canada. Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011) conduct a longitudinal analysis of Environics 
polls asking Canadians for their views on the level of immigration and the perceived 
characteristics of refugees between 1987 and 2008. The results of the analysis by survey period 
indicate that until the late 1990s, a majority of Canadians believed “there is too much 
immigration to Canada (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83).” Public opinion began to shift 
around the turn of the millennium, and the more recent surveys in their panel indicate that fewer 
than 40 per cent of Canadians expressed such views (Wilkes Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83). In 
addition, the data indicates that a majority of Canadians consistently believed that “too many 
refugees are coming in as fake refugees (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83).” Between the 
late 1980s until the late 1990s, at least 80 per cent of respondents believed that “fake refugees” 
were a problem in Canada (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83). Though attitudes began to 
soften around the turn of the millennium, at least 50 per cent of the population held negative 
views about refugees during each survey period (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83). While 
the authors find evidence of an “ideological shift” in Canadian attitudes towards immigration, 
immigrants, and refugees, negative attitudes persist among a sizeable proportion of the 
population (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 89 and 94).  
Contemporary developments indicate that public attitudes towards persons in need of 
protection remain complex. In 1999, four boats carrying 599 Chinese passengers arrived on the 
coast of British Columbia. A public opinion poll conducted in the days immediately following 
the arrival of the Chinese “boat people” indicated that 97 per cent of respondents in Victoria, 
British Columbia favoured repatriating them to China without delay (Greenberg 2000, 518). 
Many also expressed concern that these individuals could strain federal and provincial social 
support services at the expense of Canadian users whom they perceived as “legitimate 
(Greenberg 2000, 518).” The news media played an important role in framing these events and 
reports became “increasingly critical and hyperbolic” as subsequent ships arrived (Greenberg 
                                                 
91 Disaggregated data on attitudes towards refugees was not included in their research. 
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2000, 518; see also Greenberg and Hier 2001). Some reports resurrected the characterisation 
of Chinese people as carriers of disease and portrayed them as “bogus” asylum seekers who 
constituted threats to national security (Mountz 2004, 324 and 335). Of the 599 individuals 
who arrived, 492 lodged claims for asylum, and 429 of these asylum claimants were kept in 
long-term detention for up to 18 months as their claims were processed and adjudicated 
(Mountz 2004, 335). The subsequent deportation of at least 321 individuals who were refused 
refugee protection constituted one of the largest mass deportations in recent Canadian history 
(Mountz 2004, 337). 
The second contemporary example concerns a group of Tamil asylum seekers from Sri 
Lanka who arrived in British Columbia in August 2010. The arrival of a boat carrying asylum 
seekers from South Asia was not unprecedented; in 1914, the Komagata Maru attempted to 
land in Vancouver carrying 376 passengers—most of whom were Sikh (Global News 2016, 
para. 4 of 18). In an illustration of the racist character of Canadian immigration policy at the 
time, the government refused to allow the passengers to disembark as they did not meet the 
“continuous journey” requirement which effectively barred the entry of travellers from India 
due to the absence of direct travel routes between India and Canada at the time (Global News 
2016, para. 5 of 18). Following a two-month “stand-off,” the ship was escorted out of Canadian 
waters and forced to return to Calcutta, India (Global News 2016, para. 13 of 18). Upon arrival 
in Calcutta, British officials boarded the ship in search of “Sikh radicals,” and 19 of the 
passengers were killed when the British opened fire on them (Lewis 2016, para. 6 of 8).92 
In August 1986, two lifeboats carrying 155 Tamil men, women, and children were 
found adrift off the coast of Newfoundland, where human traffickers abandoned them 
(Anandasangaree 2016, para. 1 of 19). Many of the passengers had originally travelled to 
Germany in search of protection from the Sri Lankan civil war, but the perceived “draconian” 
nature of German asylum policies at the time prompted these individuals to seek protection 
elsewhere (Anandasangaree 2016, para. 11 of 19). This revelation prompted many members of 
the Canadian public to denounce the Tamils as ‘fraudsters’ and ‘queue jumpers 
(Anandasangaree 2016, para. 11 of 19).’ 
These negative characterisations also appeared following the arrival of 492 Sri Lankan 
asylum seekers aboard the M.V. Sun Sea in August 2010. Canadians were familiar with the 
conflict in Sri Lanka due in part to a sizeable diaspora and multiple protests held in Toronto in 
                                                 
92 Prime Minister Trudeau finally issued a formal apology for the incident on 18 May, 2016. 
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2009 (Bradimore and Bauder 2011, 638).93 However, many Canadians were unreceptive to the 
arrival of these asylum seekers. In a representative poll of 1,007 Canadians conducted by 
Angus Reid between 2 and 3 September, 2010 found that 50 per cent of Canadians agreed that 
the passengers should be ‘deported’ to Sri Lanka, while 32 per cent indicated the government 
should grant them refugee protection and 17 per cent of respondents were unsure (Angus Reid 
2010, 7). Much of the media discourse about these asylum seekers was negative, and both 
centrist and right-wing mainstream publications characterised the Sri Lankans as ‘queue 
jumpers,’ ‘terrorists,’ and since some of the women aboard the ship were pregnant, as 
‘breeders’ (Krishnamurti 2013, 146-52). Statements from Conservative politicians like Monte 
Solberg, a former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, reinforced the perceived 
illegitimacy of these asylum seekers. Despite his experience and presumed knowledge of 
customary and international law on refugee protection, Mr Solberg complained that “The 
Tamils will now butt in ahead of thousands of others who have applied to come to Canada 
through the normal legal means (Solberg 2010 cited in Krishnamurti 2013, 146).” These 
attitudes may have also been conditioned by broader Conservative government efforts at the 
time to distinguish between ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and the adoption of the 
Balanced Refugee Reform Act in June 2010, which introduced expedited processing measures 
for asylum claimants from ‘designated countries of origin.’ 
Negative characterisations of asylum seekers and refugees are not uncommon in the 
Canadian media. In a discourse analysis of five large Canadian English-language news media 
outlet reports on immigration between 1996 and 2004, Bauder (2008, 300) finds that ‘danger’ 
is a common theme in much of the news coverage on immigration in Canada, with many 
articles using concerns about security to convey opposition to immigration.94 However, 
humanitarianism was also a prominent theme in the media, used in both a positive and negative 
context (Bauder 2008, 300). While the publication of a December 1997 Auditor General’s 
report raised concerns about the asylum adjudication process for being “slow and open to 
abuse,” the provision of humanitarian protection is closely intertwined with Canada’s identity 
as a “compassionate and caring” country (Bauder 2008, 292 and 295; Dauvergne 2005, 75). 
                                                 
93 The arrival of the M.V. Sun Sea was preceded by the M.V. Ocean Lady, which landed in British Columbia in 
October 2009 with 76 Sri Lankan asylum seekers aboard. 
94 While Bauder (2008) examines ‘danger’ as one of several frames in his analysis, Esses, Medianu, and Lawson 
(2013) highlight how Canadian news organisations regularly contribute to the ‘dehumanization’ of immigrants 
and refugees by characterising these individuals as terrorists and carriers of disease. Their experimental 
approach offers important insights into the impact of media framing on public attitudes towards immigrants and 
refugees. 
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This aspect of the discourse also links to another prominent theme of media attention, 
namely, Canada’s international reputation as a humanitarian actor. This theme has been 
invoked both at times when the government sought to restrict access to asylum, as when it 
announced that it would no longer accept Somali passports as proof of identity for asylum 
seekers, or at times when Canada’s asylum and refugee policies were perceived to be a “soft 
touch,” and as a result, attracted “economic migrants” from the US, Europe, and other non-
traditional source countries (Bauder 2008, 87). In this way, media discourse on immigration, 
asylum, and refugee protection has been instrumental in “constructing” both the boundaries of 
compassion in Canada and characterisations of members of these groups (Bauder 2008, 87-
90).  
Other prominent themes of discourse in these publications include the role of culture, 
which was historically associated with expressions of racism but is more contemporarily 
associated with discussions and debates on multiculturalism, both from those who express 
support for immigration due to its capacity to diversify Canadian culture, and those (including 
immigrants) who express concerns about the divisiveness of this policy (Bauder 2008, 293; see 
also Breton 2015 and Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012). One must also acknowledge the 
influence of economic considerations and, in particular, longstanding government efforts to 
emphasise the need for immigrants in order to improve the competitiveness of the (neoliberal) 
Canadian economy (Abu-Laban 1998, 205; Bauder 2008, 291-92). Given the role of media 
discourse in ‘reformulating’ established norms in society (Bauder 2008, 290), it could be that 
these modes of discourse could be linked in some way to the shift in attitudes identified by 
Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011). 
Though the Canadian Council for Refugees has pressed the government to facilitate the 
resettlement of Syrian refugees since September 2013, public opinion surveys conducted in the 
summer of 2015 revealed that Canadians remained divided in their attitudes towards refugees. 
In a national survey conducted by Environics in June 2015, only 11 per cent of respondents 
indicated that they “strongly” favoured resettling refugees in Canada, while an additional 29 
per cent indicated that they “somewhat” favoured such a policy (Gravelle 2017, 7). Conversely, 
25 per cent of respondents stated they “somewhat” opposed the admission of refugees, while 
25 per cent expressed “strong” opposition to the question (Gravelle 2017, 7).  
Since the government scheduled a federal election for autumn 2015, the Environics 
survey also captured voting intent, and probabilistic models suggest that there a correlation 
between attitudes towards refugees and voting intention. More precisely, Gravelle (2017, 10) 
finds that the predicted probability of supporting the acceptance of refugees (either moderately 
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or strongly) was 0.31 for those who intended to vote for the Conservative Party, 0.38 who 
planned to vote for the Liberal Party, and 0.48 for those who signalled their desire to cast a 
ballot for the New Democratic Party. In other words, those intended to vote for a right-wing 
party were the least likely to support resettlement, compared to those who intended to vote for 
a centrist or left-wing party. 
However, the images of three-year-old Syrian Alan Kurdî, his brother Galib, and his 
mother Rehana shocked the Canadian public and attracted considerable public attention, due 
in part to the revelation that the Kurdî family had a connection to Canada. Following the release 
of the images, it was revealed that Abdullah Kurdî has a sister, Tima Kurdî, who lives in the 
small city of Coquitlam, British Columbia (CBC News 2015, para. 3 of 22). Ms Kurdî applied 
to resettle another brother through the PSR programme, but the government rejected the 
application and Ms Kurdî did not have the financial resources to apply to sponsor Abdullah 
and his family (CBC News 2015, para. 6 of 22). She appealed for assistance from Fin Donnelly, 
her Member of Parliament, and Mr Donnelly agreed to write to the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration on her behalf. Unfortunately, the effort proved fruitless (CBC News 2015, para. 
9 to 11 of 22). 
In response to these events and the Syrian crisis more generally, a representative online 
poll of 1,447 Canadians conducted on 3 September, 2015 by the Angus Reid Institute found 
that 54 per cent of respondents agreed the Canadian government should “take in more refugees 
(Angus Reid Institute 2015, 15).” However, 63 per cent of respondents felt that private 
sponsorship groups should take a more active role in resettling Syrian refugees (Angus Reid 
Institute 2015, 15). The Angus Reid poll also revealed a divergence in attitudes according to 
voting intention for the 2015 general election. When asked whether the Canadian government 
should admit more refugees, only 39 per cent of those who expected to vote for the 
Conservative Party agreed, compared to 62 per cent of those who intended to vote for the 
Liberal Party and 62 per cent of those who planned to vote for the New Democratic Party 
(Angus Reid Institute 2015, 15). When asked about increasing admissions through the PSR 
programme, 55 per cent of those who expected to vote Conservative favoured the idea, 
compared to 69 per cent of those who intended to vote Liberal and 69 per cent of those who 
planned to vote for the New Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 15). 
Though a majority of Canadians expressed openness to the idea of welcoming 
“boatloads of migrants” if the country found itself in the same position as Europe (Angus Reid 
Institute 2015, 17), respondents appeared divided on the best response to the situation at hand. 
In response to the question of “how many refugees should Canada sponsor and resettle over 
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the next year?” a plurality of respondents (25 per cent) indicated that the country should resettle 
between 5,000 and 10,000 refugees (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 19). In addition, 21 per cent 
of respondents favoured resettling between 1,000 and 5,000 refugees, while 16 per cent of 
respondents supported the third most popular option of resettling no refugees (Angus Reid 
Institute 2015, 19). Of those who indicated that Canada should resettle between 5,000 and 
10,000 refugees, 30 per cent expressing support for this option compared to 23 per cent of those 
who planned to vote for the Liberals and 24 per cent of respondents who planned to vote for 
the New Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 19). 
In addition to the heterogeneity in responses about the preferred level of resettlement 
admissions, respondents were also divided about a specific proposal to augment resettlement 
through the GAR programme. When asked whether the government should resettle 20,000 
refugees at the cost of CAD$100 million (or CAD$3 per person), a plurality (29 per cent) of 
respondents indicated that they “moderately support” this idea, while 25 per cent indicated they 
“strongly oppose” this suggestion (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 20). In addition, 24 per cent of 
respondents stated that the “moderately oppose” this notion, while only 22 per cent of 
respondents stated that they “strongly support” this idea (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 20). Of 
those who expressed ‘moderate support’ for increased government involvement in 
resettlement, 32 per cent were Liberal voters, 29 per cent of New Democratic voters choosing 
this option, and 28 per cent intended to vote for the Conservatives (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 
20). 
The desire of Canadians to provide assistance through resettlement was also evident in 
a representative poll of 2,506 Canadians conducted between 4 and 6 September, 2015 by the 
Mainstream polling firm. When asked to evaluate Conservative Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper’s existing response to the Syrian crisis, 48 per cent of respondents indicated that they 
“somewhat” or “strongly” disapproved of the government’s approach (Mainstreet 2015, 5). 
Conversely, 35 per cent of respondents stated that they “somewhat” or “strongly” approved of 
the government’s response at the time (Mainstreet 2015, 5). Of the four age cohorts used in the 
survey, respondents aged 50 to 64 expressed the most disapproval of the Harper government’s 
response, with 22 per cent indicating that they “somewhat disapprove” of the response and 29 
per cent stating that they “strongly disapprove (Mainstreet 2015, 5).” However, examining 
attitudes by gender presents a marginally different picture than the findings of the Angus Reid 
Institute poll. More precisely, the largest plurality of men (29 per cent) indicated that they 
“strongly disapprove” of the government’s response, though a further 25 per cent stated they 
“strongly approve (Mainstreet 2015, 5).” Though men appeared divided in their view of the 
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government’s response, 52 per cent of women either “somewhat” or “strongly” disapproved of 
the response at the time (Mainstreet 2015, 5). In addition, a plurality of respondents favoured 
generous admissions policies for Syrian refugees. When given information on the number of 
refugees resettled from Hungary, Uganda, Southeast Asia, and Kosovo, 48 per cent of 
respondents agreed that Canada should resettle more than 30,000 Syrian refugees (Mainstreet 
2015, 6). 
The support for generous resettlement admissions policies for Syrian refugees also 
appears consistent with Mainstreet’s findings concerning perceived roles and responsibilities 
in the crisis. When asked whether Canada is “doing its fair share,” 48 per cent of respondents 
indicated that Canada is not bearing adequate responsibility for the impact of the conflict in 
Syria (Mainstreet 2015, 10). The sense that Canada could assume more responsibility and be 
more generous in responding to the humanitarian crisis emanating from Syria could also be 
interpreted as consistent with the views articulated by many federal government officials and 
private sponsors in the discussion in chapter 4 on the perceived motivations for resettlement 
and its benefits. 
However, subsequent polls indicate that the liberal attitudes expressed by many 
Canadians towards the admission of Syrian refugees were short-lived. In a representative poll 
of 909 Canadian adults conducted by Forum Research on 18 November, 2015, 51 per cent of 
respondents stated they did not approve of newly elected Liberal Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau’s plan (and campaign promise) to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees (Forum Research 
2015, 8). Given that Forum Research conducted the poll in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
in Paris, France on 13 November, 2015, it is perhaps unsurprising that a clear majority (58 per 
cent) of respondents agreed that “there is a security risk in settling [sic] Syrian refugees in 
Canada (Forum Research 2015, 9).” 
Notably, as with the Angus Reid Institute poll conducted in September 2015, the Forum 
Research poll identified a clear partisan divide regarding the Liberal government’s plan to 
resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees, and in the views of many respondents on the perceived security 
threat presented by these refugees. Indeed, 80 per cent of respondents who supported the 
Conservative Party in the 2015 general election opposed the plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian 
refugees, compared to 39 per cent of respondents who voted for the Green Party, 36 per cent 
of New Democratic Party supporters, and 30 per cent of respondents who cast their ballots for 
the Liberal Party (forum Research 2015, 8). Opposition was also strong among those who voted 
for the Bloc Québécois (Forum Research 2015, 8). In response to the question on security and 
Syrian refugees, 85 per cent of Bloc supporters and 77 per cent of Conservative voters agreed 
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that there is a perceived security risk in resettling Syrian refugees, compared to 52 per cent of 
Green and New Democratic Party supporters (respectively) and 46 per cent of Liberal voters 
(Forum Research 2015, 8). These findings appear consistent with the broad pattern of 
partisanship identified in the Angus Reid Institute survey conducted in September 2015. 
However, a different survey suggests that Canadians favoured the plan to resettle 
25,000 refugees. In a random poll of 1,000 Canadian adults conducted between 21 and 24 
November, 2015 by Nanos, 65 per cent of respondents said they “support” or “somewhat 
support” the Liberal government’s plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees as one among several 
possible responses to the crisis (Nanos 2015, appendix page 5). Respondents aged 18 to 29 
favoured the plan the most, with 69.8 per cent of individuals in that cohort expressing their 
support, compared to 67.1 per cent of persons over 60, 65.5 per cent of respondents aged 50 to 
59, 61.4 per cent of those aged 30 to 39, and 56.4 per cent of individuals aged 40 to 49 (Nanos 
2015, appendix page 5). When examining the findings by gender, the survey found that 60.6 
per cent of men and 67.7 per cent of women supported the measure (Nanos 2015, appendix 
page 5).  
Though Bloemraad (2012, 5) suggests that immigration has rarely been salient in 
Canada, the Syrian crisis appears to have attracted public attention. In a representative online 
poll of 1,447 Canadians conducted on 3 September, 2015, the Angus Reid Institute asked 
respondents “how closely” they had followed the Syrian crisis (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). 
In response, a plurality (38 per cent) indicated that they had seen “some coverage” on the issue 
and had “the odd conversation” about the developments (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). 
Furthermore, 27 per cent of respondents stated that they had actively followed the issue and 
had discussed the matter with both family and friends (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). 
Conversely, 26 per cent of respondents had only ‘scanned the headlines’ on the issue, while 10 
per cent of respondents had not “seen or heard anything about it (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 
10).” Those who expected to vote Conservative in the 2015 general election also appeared 
highly informed, with 31 per cent of those voters indicating that they had actively followed the 
issue, compared to 30 per cent of those who intended to vote for the Liberals and 23 per cent 
of those who planned to support the New Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). Though 
only a small proportion of respondents had no knowledge of the issue, the largest plurality of 
those respondents included women, millennials, and those who expected to vote for the New 
Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10).  
The salience of the Syrian issue was also apparent in a representative poll of 2,506 
Canadians conducted between 4 and 6 September, 2015 by the Mainstream polling firm. When 
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asked “how closely have you been following stories involving Syria’s refugee crisis?” a 
plurality (37 per cent) of respondents indicated that they had watched the news on this topic 
“very closely,” while an additional 33 per cent stated that they had watched the news 
“somewhat closely (Mainstreet 2015, 3).” Conversely, 15 per cent responded that they had not 
followed the news “too closely” and 13 per cent stated that they had followed the news “not at 
all closely” on this topic (Mainstreet 2015, 3). Only 3 per cent of respondents indicated that 
they were wholly unaware of the issue (Mainstreet 2015, 3). Of those who indicated that they 
were “very closely” following the issue, the largest plurality (40 per cent) were respondents 
aged 65 and older. However, similar percentages of other age cohorts indicated that they had 
“very closely” followed the issue, with 32 per cent of those aged 50 to 64, 31 per cent of those 
aged 35 to 49, and 30 per cent of those aged between 18 and 34 responding in this way 
(Mainstreet 2015, 3). However, the poll suggests that the issue was more salient for men than 
women, as 38 per cent of men indicated they followed the issue “very closely” compared to 28 
per cent of women (Mainstreet 2015, 3). 
Given the relatively positive attitudes expressed by many Canadians, the extensive 
support for resettlement, and the salience of the Syrian issue, one could interpret the conflict in 
Syria and the deaths of the Kurdî brothers and their mother Rehana as a “focusing” event 
(Kingdom 1995, 94-99). As explained in chapter three, these events can draw attention to a 
particular issue and can help or hinder advocates, depending on their perspective and the 
response the focusing event generates among the wider public (Kingdon 1995, 94-99). 
However, as previously noted, focusing events are unlikely to fuel policy change in and of 
themselves (Kingdon 1995, 94-99). Therefore, further research on the potential impact of this 
focusing event on Canadian public opinion and government policy could be advantageous. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The discussion and analysis in this chapter indicate that voluntary sector organisation 
have a long history of advocacy on resettlement issues, including efforts to augment 
resettlement admissions. Though the literature and empirical observations suggest that these 
efforts have produced mixed results, one could interpret the active involvement of voluntary 
sector organisations in advocacy on resettlement as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on 
government-voluntary sector relations which highlights the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of 
relations between these parties. 
Interviews with government officials and private sponsors indicate that relations 
between government officials and some private sponsors have occasionally been adversarial in 
the literal sense of the term. Though government officials indicated that tensions with certain 
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private sponsors had abated, the perceptions articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013) in particular 
concerning cohesion and representation in the SAH Council raise questions about whether such 
views could impact of the effectiveness of advocacy efforts. 
Interviews with private sponsors also revealed tensions among these stakeholders 
concerning whether and how best to engage in advocacy. Though some interviewees indicated 
that they were actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement, others indicated that they 
preferred not to engage in interest representation due to perceived concerns that such activities 
could impact their relationship with government officials or funding for other programmes. 
Though academics continue to debate the impact of government funding on voluntary sector 
advocacy and some scholars suggest that government funding might even encourage advocacy 
on immigration issues, there are indications that the regulatory environment governing charities 
in Canada could dissuade some groups from pursuing activities that could be perceived as 
inconsistent with their charitable status. Though the 108 SAHs that currently participate in the 
PSR programme likely have diverse origins, missions, preferences, and opinions on 
resettlement, the views articulated by private sponsors raise questions about whether these 
disagreements could impact the effectiveness of any such efforts. 
Though there is no consensus regarding the structure of interest representation in 
Canada, one could interpret the relationship between the government and private sponsors as a 
policy community existing within the broader policy network on immigration in Canada. 
Interviews indicate that the government long encouraged the development of a sponsorship 
community and continues to support the SAH Association in a variety of ways. However, the 
exclusive nature of policy communities also raises questions about the potential impact of 
perceived tensions (past or present) and disagreements within the sponsorship community 
itself. 
In addition, the discussion highlighted the potential influence of issue context and 
salience. Public opinion polls indicate that there has been an “ideological shift” in Canadian 
attitudes towards persons in need of protection (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 89 and 94). 
However, polls also suggest that a considerable proportion of the Canadian population favours 
a restrictive approach to refugee protection. Despite the perceived humanitarian and normative 
motivations articulated by government officials and private sponsors in chapter four, alongside 
the perceived reputational and cultural benefits of resettlement, many Canadians have 
expressed less than welcoming views on certain persons and groups in need of protection, such 
as Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution and asylum seekers from China and Sri Lanka. The 
analysis also indicates that media outlets and politicians have also expressed negative attitudes 
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towards persons in need of protection. Furthermore, there could be an association between 
focusing events such as the deaths of Alan, Galib, and Rehana Kurdî and the November 2015 
terrorist attacks in Paris, France and public attitudes on the resettlement of Syrian refugees. In 
addition, the Syrian refugee crisis appeared salient for many Canadians, especially among those 
who intended to vote Conservative in the 2015 general election. 
Overall, the discussion and analysis indicate that interest representation on resettlement 
is a complex topic, and ascertaining the perceived impact of interest representation efforts is 
far from straightforward. However, given the exploratory nature of this thesis, one cannot reach 
any definitive conclusions concerning the perceived or substantive impact of the efforts 
described in this chapter. In addition to the potential avenues for further research identified 
above, research that further explores the ‘adversarial’ nature of governments and voluntary 
sector organisations could be beneficial—especially given the limited size of the current 
literature and particularly given the dearth of information and studies on the involvement of 
ethnic community groups in advocacy on resettlement and refugee protection more generally. 
Scholars could also consider exploring potential issues related to representation and legitimacy 
in the sponsorship community as a means of better understanding the factors which can 
condition the impact of advocacy efforts. Similarly, studies that attempt to situate advocacy on 
resettlement in the broader context of the structure of interest representation in Canada appear 
sorely needed. However one chooses to approach the topic, it appears to be a complex, 
contested, and engaging subject for analysis. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
6.1 Summary 
 To better understand why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admissions policies, this thesis explored a broad range of potential factors, 
including perceptions concerning the motivations and potential benefits of resettlement, the 
nature of government-voluntary sector relations, the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and the potential relationship 
between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Given the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of this thesis, the author attempted to obtain a more meaningful 
understanding of the responses provided by senior government officials and voluntary agency 
representatives in the US and senior government officials and private sponsors in Canada by 
interpreting their responses in relation to the existing literature. Though much of the academic 
scholarship on refugee protection and voluntary sector organisations is rooted in political 
science, the author also drew on scholarship from economics and sociology in an effort to 
obtain an ‘authentic’ understanding of the topic in a ‘fair’ and ‘balanced’ way (Lincoln, 
Lynham, and Guba 2011, 122). On that basis, this section summarises the research, discussion, 
and analysis presented in the preceded five chapters, and this discussion sets the stage for a 
comparative analysis of resettlement in the US and Canada in section 6.2. 
 Chapter one presented a range of observations concerning the current number of 
persons in need of protection, the number and nationalities of refugees in need of resettlement, 
and cross-national differences in resettlement contributions. These observations indicate that 
the US and Canada were among the largest—if not the largest—contributors to resettlement 
between 1980 and 2016. The author suggested that there is both an academic and a 
humanitarian rationale for obtaining a better understanding of why the US and Canada have 
voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, given that resettlement is 
neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international law. The chapter explored 
potential explanations in the existing literature, including studies on the influence of ‘partialist’ 
and ‘impartialist’ ideologies, foreign policies, perceived public and (or) private benefits, and 
structural factors, among other possible explanations. The author suggested that some of these 
works could help us understand how the US and Canada determine which refugees to resettle 
but that they offer an incomplete understanding of why these two countries have voluntarily 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. In that context, the author suggested the 
state-centric focus found in much of the literature limits the existing scholarship because it 
ignores observations concerning the longstanding mechanisms for domestic responsibility 
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sharing in the US and Canada, and fails to acknowledge the burgeoning scholarship on 
government-voluntary sector relations and the potential involvement of these organisations in 
advocacy. The chapter then discussed the research design for the thesis, including its relativist 
ontology and subjectivist epistemology, and presented the methodology and methods used as 
well as ethical issues. The chapter concluded with a discussion of expected contributions and 
an overview of the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter two explored resettlement admissions in the US and began with an overview 
of the history of resettlement admissions in the US, which suggested that the government 
adopted a discriminatory approach at times in order to serve its strategic objectives but also 
demonstrated a more welcoming and humanitarian approach to resettlement at other times. One 
could interpret this as consistent with data on the size and composition of resettlement flows to 
the US and its contributions regarding the resettlement of unaccompanied minors and refugees 
with medical needs. The chapter then attempted to understand why the US has voluntarily 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an exploration of the perceived 
motivations for resettlement and its benefits. Interviewees cited humanitarian and normative 
motivations for contributing to this durable solution and identified perceived reputational and 
cultural benefits which one could interpret as consistent with the literature on refugee 
protection as an impure public good and the economic literature more generally. Respondents 
perceived their relationship as collaborative, with elements of mutual interdependence. One 
could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector 
relations and the historical evolution of relations between these parties. One could also interpret 
the perceived interdependence as an example of governments and voluntary sector 
organisations leveraging their respective comparative advantages. However, perceptions of 
increasing prescriptiveness could be consistent with the literature on the potential perils of 
government contracting, including the prospect of ‘bureaucratization.’ Finally, chapter two 
explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions 
and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies. Though a representative from one 
voluntary agency indicated that foreign policies are the main determinant of resettlement 
admissions, the majority of respondents indicated that domestic responsibility sharing had 
enhanced resettlement admissions to the US. While there is no consensus on why government-
voluntary sector partnerships are such a prominent feature in the US, one could interpret the 
perceptions articulated by interviewees as consistent with the longstanding role of voluntary 
sector organisations in the provision of public goods and services in the US. Though the 
securitisation of discourse on refugee protection in the US is not new, contemporary political 
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developments could erode the longstanding bipartisan consensus on resettlement and impact 
its contributions to this durable solution. 
Chapter three began with a discussion of the history of advocacy on resettlement in the 
US, which indicated that such efforts produced mixed results. Though the International Rescue 
Committee convinced the government to resettle large numbers of Hungarian refugees, 
voluntary organisations struggled to convince the government to be generous towards Chilean 
refugees. The chapter then explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between 
resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. A federal official highlighted 
government openness to advocacy efforts, and voluntary agency representatives perceived that 
their ardent advocacy efforts were consistent with democratic values and contributed to a 
rebound in resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 and 
prevented funding cuts to resettlement programmes. One could interpret these responses as 
consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations which argues 
that relations between these parties can be adversarial in nature. One could also interpret these 
responses as consistent with the neo-pluralist structure of interest representation in the US, 
though some aspects could be clientelistic in nature. Though preliminary research indicates 
that few ethnic community-based organisations may be engaged in advocacy, one cannot reach 
any definitive conclusions at this stage due to the limitations of the existing literature. The 
chapter concluded by examining the potential influence of issue context and salience of 
resettlement and suggested that the contested nature of resettlement could potentially constrain 
the impact of advocacy efforts. 
Chapter four explored resettlement admissions in Canada and began with an overview 
of the history of resettlement admissions in Canada, which suggested that the government 
adopted a discriminatory approach at times due in part to the influence of anti-Semitism and 
racism but also demonstrated a more welcoming and humanitarian approach to resettlement at 
other times. One could interpret this as consistent with data on the size and diversity of 
resettlement flows to Canada. The chapter then attempted to understand why Canada has 
voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an exploration of the 
perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits. Government officials and private 
sponsors cited humanitarian and normative motivations for contributing to this durable solution 
and suggested that resettlement generates reputational and cultural benefits which one could 
interpret as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and 
the economic literature more generally. Respondents perceived their relationship as 
complementary and supplementary in some respects, though there was no consensus on which 
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aspects of their relationship fit these characteristics. One could interpret this as consistent with 
the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical evolution 
of relations between the government and voluntary sector organisations in Canada. Finally, 
chapter four explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement 
admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies. Though a senior 
government official indicated that some private sponsors had created a large backlog in 
applications and ultimately undermined the capacity of the PSR programme, other respondents 
perceived that this form of domestic responsibility sharing enhanced resettlement admissions 
in Canada. However, some private sponsors raised concerns about responsibility shifting which 
one could interpret as consistent with the historical literature on government-voluntary sector 
relations. The chapter concluded that concerns about respect for the principle of ‘additionality’ 
are salient not only in Canada but also internationally given Canadian and UNHCR efforts to 
promote private sponsorship. 
Finally, chapter five began with a discussion of the history of advocacy on resettlement 
in Canada, which indicated that such efforts produced mixed results. The chapter then explored 
perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and 
advocacy. Interviews indicated that some private sponsors had engaged in advocacy on 
resettlement, and believed some of their efforts had borne fruit, as in the case of efforts to 
resettle Palestinian refugees living in Iraq. Interviews with government officials and private 
sponsors indicated that relations between government officials and some private sponsors had 
been tense in the recent past. Though government officials stated that these tensions had 
dissipated, the perceptions articulated by certain interviewees nevertheless raise questions 
about the potential impact on the effectiveness of advocacy efforts by private sponsors and the 
SAH Council, as well as the broader impact that these tensions may have had on trust between 
government officials and private sponsors. Interviews with private sponsors also revealed 
tensions among members of the sponsorship community on whether and how best to engage in 
advocacy. Though academics still debate the impact of government funding on voluntary sector 
advocacy, the regulatory environment governing charities in Canada could dissuade some 
groups from pursuing activities that could be perceived as inconsistent with their charitable 
status. One could interpret these responses as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on 
government-voluntary sector relations which highlights the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of 
relations between these parties. Furthermore, one could also interpret the structure of relations 
between the government and private sponsors as a policy community existing within the 
broader immigration policy network in Canada, though Freeman (1995; 2006) suggests that 
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the refugee policymaking process is clientelistic. The chapter also presented preliminary 
research which suggests that ethnic community organisations may have a limited role in 
advocacy on resettlement issues. Nevertheless, their gradual political incorporation suggests 
that there is scope for these organisations to exert influence in this area, and further research 
could be beneficial. The chapter concluded by examining the potential influence of issue 
context and salience of resettlement and suggested that the contested nature of resettlement 
could potentially constrain the impact of advocacy efforts. 
Given the exploratory nature of this thesis, the author cannot reach any definitive 
conclusions about why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies. Indeed, given the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this 
thesis, the author acknowledges that there could be multiple explanations for why these 
countries have adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Furthermore, the author 
acknowledges that there may not be a single ‘truth’ about US and Canadian resettlement 
policies and any such ‘truth’ is probably localised and dependent on the historical and social 
constructs unique to those countries. To be sure, many interviewees perceived that resettlement 
benefited their respective countries and that domestic responsibility sharing and advocacy 
enhanced resettlement admissions, and one could interpret many of these responses as 
consistent with elements of the literature on refugee protection, government-voluntary sector 
relations, voluntary sector advocacy, and the history of government-voluntary sector 
partnerships in resettlement. On that basis, the responses and the discussion and analysis 
presented in the preceding five chapters could offer complementary insight into the question 
of why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies 
Nevertheless, as the quote from Martin (2005, 2) in chapter one suggests, resettlement 
admissions policies are likely influenced by a complex range of factors, rather than one factor 
alone. 
6.2 Comparative Analysis 
 The preceding section noted that the factors which potentially influence resettlement 
admissions could be unique to the US and Canada, respectively. Nevertheless, this section 
engages in some comparative analysis through the identification of some similarities and 
differences between these two cases as a means of integrating the research, discussion, and 
analysis presented in chapters to through five. Though chapter one noted that similar historical 
and social constructs can lead to subjectivities that are remarkably alike, the outcome of 
research on resettlement admissions in the US cannot necessarily be generalised to Canada and 
vice versa. 
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 On the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, US and Canadian 
interviewees cited humanitarian and normative motivations for contributing to this durable 
solution. Similarly, US and Canadian interviewees indicated that resettlement confers 
perceived reputational benefits. Furthermore, some respondents in the US indicated that the 
government derives reputational benefits from contributing to resettlement and resettling large 
numbers of refugees. Officials in both countries suggested they could leverage these 
reputational gains in the international refugee regime. US and Canadian respondents also 
perceived cultural benefits from resettlement, though an analysis of the literature indicates that 
diversity is contested in both countries. However, US interviewees uniquely perceived 
resettlement as consistent with their history, identity, and values.  
The author suggested that one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the 
literature on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public 
goods more generally (e.g. Andreoni 1989; Betts 2003; Margolis 1982; Suhrke 1998; 
Thielemann 2003). Since no scholar has proposed a detailed conceptualisation of resettlement 
as a public good, the author suggested that this durable solution could be an impure public good 
that generates joint products in the form of private security benefits for resettled refugees and 
an excludable, non-rival ‘warm glow’ for residents of the US and Canada (e.g. Andreoni 1989; 
Betts 2003; Cornes and Sandler 1996). This warm glow could be excludable because only 
residents of the receiving country could derive satisfaction from voluntarily contributing to a 
durable solution that saves lives and supports international responsibility sharing, solidarity, 
and preserves access in countries of first asylum (e.g. Betts 2003; Thielemann 2003). In the US 
case, the warm glow could be a function of both participation in resettlement and the number 
of refugees resettled in the US—an interpretation consistent with the concepts of participation 
and goods altruism (Margolis 1982; see also Andreoni 1989). However, this warm glow could 
be non-rival insofar as all US and Canadian residents can theoretically enjoy the ‘warm glow’ 
from resettlement without preventing others from doing the same.  
Though governments are unlikely to grant protection for the sole purpose of obtaining 
reputational benefits (Betts 2003, 287), the author suggested that one could also interpret the 
perceived reputational benefits of resettlement as an excludable, non-rival joint product of 
resettlement. Though resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and 
international law, the reputational benefits could be excludable insofar as only resettlement 
countries such as the US and Canada can derive reputational gains from demonstrating their 
voluntary compliance with the perceived “moral obligations” arising from the norms embedded 
in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (e.g. Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-
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27; see also Axelrod 1984). However, these benefits could be non-rival in that the US and 
Canadian governments could enhance and potentially leverage their reputations without 
preventing other resettlement countries from doing the same.95 
Similarly, given that resettled refugees constitute a relatively small proportion of the 
total number of immigrants admitted to the US and Canada, it seems unlikely that these 
governments participate in resettlement simply to enhance cultural diversity. Nevertheless, the 
author suggested that the perceived cultural benefits of resettlement could be an excludable, 
non-rival joint product of resettlement (e.g. Throsby 2010). This joint product could be 
excludable because only US and Canadian residents could benefit from the more 
“cosmopolitan atmosphere (Singer and Singer 1988, 123),” but one person could enjoy the 
increased cultural diversity without preventing others from doing the same. Though the cultural 
benefits of resettlement can theoretically accrue to everyone in the US and Canada, the 
contested nature of cultural diversity suggests that not all Americans and Canadians might 
perceive this as a benefit. 
Conceptualising resettlement as an impure public good that potentially generates joint 
products in the form of private human security benefits for refugees and excludable, non-rival 
warm glow, reputational, and cultural benefits could help us better understand why the US and 
Canada voluntarily participate in resettlement and why these governments have voluntarily 
adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Though the theory of pure public goods 
predicts that actors will not provide a Pareto efficient level of these goods because their non-
excludable, non-rival nature creates an incentive for actors to free ride on the anticipated 
contributions of others (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 22-23; Gruber 2011, 188; Samuelson 1954, 
388), joint products have a privatising effect “not unlike the establishment of property rights 
(Cornes and Sandler 1984, 595).” In other words, the US and Canada may have overcome the 
incentive to free ride and voluntarily chosen to resettle refugees because they potentially derive 
excludable benefits from this durable solution. Since the ‘warm glow’ the US and Canada could 
                                                 
95 Following the law of diminishing returns, the perceived reputational gains obtained by the US and Canada 
could decline as the number of resettlement countries rises. However, even if all members of the international 
community voluntarily participate in resettlement, they could still derive reputational benefits as any 
government that stopped resettling refugees would become an outlier and could be seen as shirking its perceived 
“moral obligations” under the Convention (e.g. Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27). In other words, 
governments could still derive marginal reputational benefits from demonstrating their voluntary compliance in 
the international refuge regime, even if all countries choose to resettle refugees. 
 
Page 239 of 361 
 
receive is an “increasing function” of their contributions, this could potentially explain why 
these countries have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies.96 
 On the perceived nature of relations between the federal government and voluntary 
agencies and between the federal government and private sponsors, interviewees in the US and 
Canada suggested that their relationship features both complementary and supplementary 
elements. One could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-
voluntary sector relations (e.g. Young 1999; Young 2000) and the historical pattern of 
government-voluntary sector partnerships in these countries. Though US and Canadian 
officials saw the involvement of both government and voluntary sector organisations as 
necessary, suggesting a perception of interdependence, this theme appeared more prominent in 
the US. One could potentially interpret this as a reflection of differences in funding; whereas 
the US government provides contributions and grants to each of the nine voluntary agencies 
that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes, the 
Canadian government does not provide any direct funding to private sponsors. 
Though interviewees in the US acknowledged the finite role of government in 
resettlement, some private sponsors expressed concern about perceived responsibility shifting 
and worried that the government was “downloading” or “offloading” its responsibilities under 
the GAR programme to private sponsors and also questioned whether their relationship with 
government was a genuine partnership (Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Marshall 2013; Niazi 2013; 
Woolaver 2013). Though the US and Canada share similar histories regarding collaboration 
between governments and voluntary sector organisations in the provision of public goods and 
services influenced by prevailing British attitudes towards social assistance, one could 
potentially interpret these diverse responses as a reflection of perceived differences in the 
appropriate role of government in the delivery of public goods and services (as is evident in 
the different size and scope of the welfare state in these countries) (e.g. Anheier 2005; Dahl 
1982; Salamon 1987; Salamon 1990). The Canadian responses could also be a manifestation 
of the legacy of New Public Management approaches in immigration policy in Canada 
(Richmond and Shields 2005, 518-20).  
                                                 
96 Conceptualising resettlement in this way could have powerful implications for the provision of this durable 
solution. If members of the international community and the UNHCR can emphasise the excludable benefits of 
resettlement for receiving countries, governments could augment their contributions or more governments could 
adopt resettlement programmes. This could narrow the gap between resettlement needs and places, thereby 
benefiting those so desperately in need of protection. However, the author assumes the perceived motivations 
for resettlement and its benefits are idiosyncratic and dependent on the particular context in each state. 
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 Regarding perceptions of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions 
and domestic responsibility sharing, nearly all US and Canadian interviewees indicated that 
involving voluntary sector organisations in resettlement enhanced admissions. Though 
differences in the structure of resettlement programmes in the US and Canada mean that one 
should not draw direct comparisons between the two, these perceptions could help us 
understand why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions 
policies. However, the decision of President Trump to reduce the resettlement admissions 
ceiling and appropriations for fiscal year 2018, alongside the history of fiscal retrenchment in 
resettlement in Canada and the concerns regarding perceived responsibility shifting, indicate 
that perceived impact of domestic responsibility sharing is not necessarily static and may be 
influenced by political vagaries. 
 Finally, there were considerable differences in responses concerning the potential 
relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Whereas a US 
official indicated that the government is receptive to interest representation, two Canadian 
officials referred to recent (though resolved) tensions with some private sponsors. Though 
certain voluntary agency representatives and private sponsors perceived that some of their 
advocacy efforts enhanced resettlement admissions, voluntary agencies in the US appeared 
more engaged in interest representation. Conversely, private sponsors appeared divided on 
whether and how best to engage in advocacy, and whether the SAH Council should concentrate 
on information dissemination or also engage in advocacy. 
Though one could interpret voluntary agency and private sponsor advocacy efforts as 
consistent with the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of government-voluntary relations (e.g. 
Young 1999; Young 2000), one could potentially attribute these different responses to the 
distinct structure of interest representation in these countries. In particular, the author suggested 
that while Freeman (1995; 2006) views the refugee policymaking process in these two 
countries as ‘clientelistic,’ the literature on interest representation suggests the US has a neo-
pluralist system of interest representation (e.g. Anheier 2009; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Lowery 
and Gray 2004; Moulton and Anheier 2001; Salamon 1987) and that policymaking in Canada 
could be structured around policy communities embedded in broader policy networks (e.g. 
Pross 1992; Skogstad 2008). Despite the contested nature of interest representation in the US 
(e.g. Madison 1787), some view interest representation as an essential feature of democratic 
societies and the raison d’être of voluntary sector organisations (Dahl 1982; Erne 2017; Sherry 
1971 quoted in Kramer 1981). Conversely, though the development of policy communities has 
facilitated access for underrepresented groups, some suggest it has also imposed constraints on 
Page 241 of 361 
 
what is deemed to be ‘appropriate’ advocacy (Pross 1992; see also Phillips 2003). The 
historical and social context surrounding advocacy, alongside factors such as issue context and 
salience (Mahoney 2007), could potentially explain these divergent responses and condition 
the impact of their advocacy efforts. 
6.3 Potential Implications 
Throughout this thesis, the author has attempted to obtain a more meaningful 
understanding of why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies by interpreting the interview responses in relation to the literature. 
Following that theme, this section considers some potential implications of the research and 
analysis presented in chapters two through five. 
In the US case, the perceived motivations and benefits identified by interviewees in 
2013 now appear at odds with the inflammatory statements issued by President Trump on 
resettlement, public opinion polls which indicate divisions in the US public, and the potentially 
increasing political polarisation on resettlement. If the perceived motivations and benefits of 
resettlement change, the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US could also 
change. Indeed, as previously noted, President Trump adopted a substantially lower 
resettlement admissions ceiling for fiscal year 2018 and attempted to augment the resettlement 
of persecuted (that is, Christian) religious minorities through the executive order he signed on 
27 January, 2017 (subsection 5(b), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 February, 
2017)). One could potentially interpret these decisions as a reflection of the desire to obtain 
greater private security benefits (Betts 2003, 292) or to adopt a more ideologically informed 
approach to resettlement admissions (e.g. Walzer 1983). 
Chapter two discussed how government-voluntary sector relationships are a prominent 
and longstanding feature of the provision of public goods and services in the US. Though the 
structure of government-voluntary agency relations in the Resettlement Admissions and 
Reception and Placement programmes appears unchanged, the reduction in the resettlement 
admissions ceiling and budget appropriations for fiscal year 2018 could negatively impact 
voluntary agencies and their local affiliates. Some voluntary agencies like World Relief 
downsized in response to these changes, and many local affiliates could close as a result. 
Furthermore, on 6 March, 2017 President Trump directed the Department of State to report on 
the long-term federal, state, and local costs of resettlement and to development 
“recommendations about how to curtail those costs (US Department of State 2017, 54).” This 
could potentially signal a desire to reduce the costs of resettlement in the US and might impact 
the perceived nature of relations between the government and voluntary agencies in this area. 
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More precisely, if the government wants to reduce the costs of resettlement, it could cut the per 
capita grant allocated to voluntary agencies (in real or relative terms) which could force 
voluntary agencies to assume a more supplementary role in order to continue delivering the 
same services. If such changes materialise, retrenchment in this area could have a deleterious 
impact on the orientation and integration of refugees resettled in the US. 
During the interviews, a federal official indicated the government is open to advocacy 
and the literature generally indicates that the US has a neo-pluralist system of interest 
representation that supports competition among advocacy groups. Conversely, Freeman (1995; 
2006) characterises the policymaking process in refugee protection as clientelistic, suggesting 
that voluntary agencies have “privileged access to the policy formulation process (Freeman 
2006, 239).” During his campaign for president, Donald Trump pledged to “drain the 
swamp”—a reference to the perceived influence of lobbyists in previous administrations 
(Meyer 2017, para. 1 and 3 of 35). This pledge, alongside negative characterisations of 
voluntary agencies in influential far-right media organisations like Breitbart, could indicate that 
government officials and members of Congress are less receptive to voluntary agency advocacy 
efforts.  
For voluntary agencies, the assessment of their advocacy efforts in chapter two and 
especially chapter three indicated that these organisations continue to believe that the US has 
a humanitarian and normative imperative to resettle refugees and that contributing to this 
durable solution is perceived to confer cultural benefits and is seen as consistent with US 
history and values. However, the aforementioned inflammatory statements issued by President 
Trump and the divided and potentially more politically polarised nature of public opinion on 
resettlement indicate that these organisations will need to continue their ‘vigorous’ efforts to 
raise awareness and build grassroots support for resettlement across the country. Though 
voluntary agencies cannot endorse or oppose political candidates, the midterm elections 
scheduled for November 2018 could enable these organisations and their allies to take 
advantage of a potential increase in the salience of immigration policy to disseminate 
information about resettlement and to encourage citizens to exercise their democratic rights. 
However, if the structure of interest representation in resettlement changes, voluntary 
agencies could face increased competition from other stakeholders and may find it more 
challenging to advance their individual and collective agendas in this area. Therefore, voluntary 
agencies might need to allocate more resources to interest representation and leverage their 
close proximity to Washington, DC to augment engagement with politicians and policymakers. 
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This could prove difficult in the face of cuts to federal contributions and grants, and such efforts 
may continue to be mediated by the issue context and salience of resettlement. 
In Canada, much of the literature emphasises the role of policy communities in public 
policymaking (e.g. Pross 1992, Skogstad 2008). Though Freeman (1995, 2006) suggests that 
refugee policies are shaped through a clientelistic process that gives “privileged access” to 
those who favour liberal admissions policies, both approaches suggest that the federal 
government has a close relationship with certain stakeholders. However, as discussed in 
chapter five, two government officials indicated that their relations with some private sponsors 
were tense in the recent past. Though both officials indicated the tensions were resolved, the 
author questioned whether these sentiments could have a broader impact. Though advocacy is 
adversarial in nature, could members of the community choose to marginalise or exclude 
members who adopt strategies or stances that conflict with the preferences of other 
organisations? Could this impact the effectiveness of their advocacy efforts? These are 
arguably compelling questions, but given the exploratory nature of this thesis, they remain 
unanswered at present. 
Furthermore, these tensions and the concerns articulated by some private sponsors 
regarding perceived responsibility shifting could have implications for trust between these 
parties. Owen (2000, 135) highlights the importance of trust and communication between 
governments and immigrant-serving organisations, arguing that these qualities are essential for 
delivering services effectively. Owen explains: 
 
“Trust also allows for respectful and honest dialogue in which criticism aimed at improving programming 
is seen as just that. […] It is important to examine how partnerships can build space for the various forms 
of advocacy in which organizations [sic] engage. While advocacy may create debates that bring partners 
into conflict, it is important for maintaining strong and autonomous elements of civil society. When this 
debate can take place within agreed formats and with mutual respect, it improves trust (2000, 135).” 
 
If tensions between the government officials and private sponsors re-emerge at some 
future date, or if concerns about responsibility shifting persist, there may be negative 
implications for the integrity of the PSR programme. In other words, such an environment 
could potentially dissuade individuals and groups from becoming private sponsors or 
discourage existing SAHs, Constituent Groups, and other stakeholders from sponsoring more 
refugees in the future. This could ultimately undermine the perceived relationship between 
domestic responsibility sharing and resettlement admissions. 
The research, discussion, and analysis presented in this thesis could also have 
implications for the international refugee regime. Since this thesis was originally submitted in 
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September 2015, the UNHCR has augmented efforts to promote collaboration with voluntary 
sector organisations. Chapter one noted how the UNHCR is promoting the expansion of 
humanitarian admissions programmes and the adoption of additional ‘admissions pathways’ 
for Syrian refugees, including the creation of private sponsorship programmes (UNHCR 2016, 
5). In December 2016, the Government of Canada and the UNHCR, in collaboration with 
academia and civil society organisations, launched the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative 
to augment the number of resettlement places and the quality of resettlement programmes, 
while strengthening receiving communities and promoting a more positive discourse on 
refugee protection (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, para. 11 and 14 of 
14). Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, even declared that private 
sponsorship programmes are a “powerful tool to help the bridge the ever-widening gap between 
resettlement needs and places available (Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative 2017, 3).” 
One could interpret these efforts as consistent with the analysis presented in chapter 
four which suggested that domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme is 
perceived to enhance resettlement admissions. Though the Initiative remains in its infancy, 
these efforts could potentially transform domestic responsibility sharing from an idiosyncratic 
feature of certain resettlement programmes into a core feature of the international refugee 
regime. However, the concerns articulated by certain private sponsors about perceived 
responsibility shifting should serve as cautionary tale for governments and voluntary sector 
organisations who are interested in adopting a private sponsorship programme or expanding 
their existing partnerships with voluntary sector organisations. In other words, domestic 
responsibility sharing can only meaningfully enhance refugee protection if governments 
genuinely respect the principle of additionality and avoid using such programmes to shift their 
responsibilities onto civil society. 
That said, greater engagement with voluntary sector organisations could potentially 
challenge the dominant role of states and state power in the international refugee regime. In a 
series of personal observations about the process of formulating the ExCom Conclusion on 
Children at Risk, Fresia (2014, 518 and 525) notes that ‘non-governmental organisations’ were 
permitted to attend the Executive Committee of the UNHCR’s plenary session, but these 
organisations were not invited to informal meetings in which substantive issues were discussed 
and deliberated throughout the year and their overall involvement in the process was 
“peripheral.” In the context of refugee protection, the UNHCR decides which voluntary sector 
organisations to invite and whether these observers can speak after member states have issued 
their statements. However, observers cannot vote or “participate in decision-making UNHCR 
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(UNHCR 2017, para. 21 of 21).” Indeed, epistemic communities have wielded limited 
influence in the international refugee regime (Milner and Wojnarowicz 2017, 13). However, if 
the UNHCR continues its efforts to engage voluntary sector organisations, if more governments 
adopt or expand existing mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing, and if these 
voluntary sector organisations leverage their ‘power’ in the implementation of refugee 
protection (Milner and Wojnarowicz 2017, 14), the privileged role of the state in the 
international refugee regime could change and voluntary sector organisations might take on a 
more active, meaningful role in the development and implementation of refugee protection 
policies. 
6.4 Future Research Prospects, Potential Hypotheses, and Concluding Remarks 
 
 The author has suggested potential avenues for research throughout the thesis. 
However, many of these suggestions were quite specific in nature. Therefore, this section 
presents some more general suggestions for future research that relate to the themes explored 
in this thesis. Given the exploratory nature of this, the author has been unable to test any 
specific propositions about why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous 
resettlement admission policies. Thus, this section also introduces some potential hypotheses 
which readers could use as the basis for future studies. Finally, the author presents some 
concluding remarks. 
 Since resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international 
law, obtaining a better understanding of the perceived motivations for resettlement and the 
benefits of contributing to this durable solution could strengthen UNHCR efforts to expand the 
number of resettlement countries and the number of resettlement places. Though research on 
this topic could be qualitative or quantitative in nature, academics who adopt a qualitative 
approach may find it challenging to explore more than two or three cases, while scholars who 
adopt a quantitative approach may find the scope of their research limited by the availability 
of public opinion data and the methodological difficulties inherent in comparing different 
surveys. 
 Future research could also explore the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector 
relations in resettlement. This research could add to the small but burgeoning scholarship on 
government-voluntary sector relations, including taxonomies such as those developed by 
Coston (1998), Kramer (1981), Najam (2000), Saidel (1989), and Young (1999; 2000). Given 
the distinction between complementary, supplementary, and adversarial relations, future 
research could explore whether and how the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector 
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relations impacts resettlement admissions. A potential hypothesis might be “Complementary 
relationships enhance resettlement admissions.” However, any research undertaken in this area 
should ideally ‘embed’ the analysis in the historical, social, and political context of that 
particular country. 
 Furthermore, future research could explore perceptions on the potential relationship 
between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibly sharing in countries such as 
Australia. Like the US and Canada, Australia has a long history of immigration and refugee 
protection, and it is among the oldest countries of resettlement. However, refugee protection 
appears contested and salient in Australia, and the government is known to use its contributions 
to resettlement to offset protection for asylum seekers. Furthermore, chapter one noted that the 
government introduced the Community Proposal Pilot in 2013, and formalised this mechanism 
for domestic responsibility sharing in 2017. Whereas the structure of resettlement programmes 
in the US and Canada have remained largely unchanged since 1980 and 1979, respectively, 
academics could explore whether this new programme has substantively enhanced resettlement 
admissions in Australia. This approach could be extended to other countries that have recently 
introduced private sponsorship programmes. To that end, a potential hypothesis might be 
“Private sponsorship programmes based on additionality enhance resettlement admissions.” 
 Finally, future research could explore the potential relationship between resettlement 
admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. To that end, research that uses process tracing 
techniques to understand how a particular legislative, operational, or policy change occurred 
could generate some useful insights. Scholars could draw on detailed interviews with 
government officials and voluntary sector representatives and complement this with primary 
source documents. However, any such study should ideally situate these advocacy efforts in 
the broader context of interest representation in that country and consider the potential 
influence of issue context and salience. Given the different models of interest representation 
that exist in resettlement countries, a potential hypothesis might be “Voluntary sector advocacy 
enhances resettlement admissions in neo-pluralist societies.” 
Overall, it is apparent that there are still many avenues for prospective research which 
could further enhance the reliability of the findings presented in this thesis and potentially offer 
additional insights into why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement 
admissions policies. Though resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary 
and international law, the current scale of displacement and the number of refugees in need of 
resettlement creates a strong case for governments, civil society, the UNHCR, and other 
members of the international community to continue searching for innovative solutions that 
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could reduce or even close the persistent gap between resettlement needs and admissions. 
Human security and the ongoing viability of resettlement as a durable solution could well 
depend on it. 
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Labman (2016, 71).
Chart 2 – Total Refugee Resettlement Targets and Admissions in Canada by Year, 1990 to 2016
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Table 1 – Total Number of Resettlement Arrivals by Year, 1980 to 2016 
Year Number Year Number Year Number Year Number 
1980 277,070 1990 179,943 2000 100,023 2010 100,814 
1981 201,722 1991 172,168 2001 93,581 2011 84,834 
1982 139,449 1992 162,410 2002 51,031 2012 81,093 
1983 97,426 1993 150,677 2003 55,612 2013 102,103 
1984 104,433 1994 151,519 2004 84,745 2014 102,771 
1985 102,703 1995 133,964 2005 80,812 2015 110,483 
1986 97,538 1996 102,232 2006 71,718 2016 160,970 
1987 101,598 1997 92,084 2007 75,318 
Total 4,336,960 1988 119,570 1998 103,065 2008 88,814 
1989 160,896 1999 134,326 2009 107,426 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 
2004, 40; 2005, 34; 2005, 7-9; 2007, 84-86; 2008, 8-13; 2008, 71-73; 2009, 160; 2010, 150; 2011, 152; 2013, 153; 2013, 163; 2015, 192; 2017, 198; 2018, 206); US 
Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations. 
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Table 2 – Total Number of Resettlement Arrivals by Country, 2016 
Country Number of Resettlement Arrivals Country Number of Resettlement Arrivals 
Australia 10,586 Japan 18 
Austria 201 Latvia 6 
Belgium 452 Lithuania 25 
Brazil 31 Luxembourg 52 
Cambodia 1 Monaco 4 
Canada 46,703 Netherlands 700 
Czech Republic 32 New Zealand 971 
Denmark 309 Norway 3,291 
Estonia 11 South Korea 41 
Finland 943 Spain 289 
France 1,415 Sweden 1,890 
Germany 1,239 Switzerland 621 
Hungary 15 United Kingdom 5,181 
Iceland 56 United States 84,994 
Ireland 356 
Total 160,970 
Italy 537 
Source: UNHCR (2018, 206). Own calculations. 
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Country 
Table 3 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals in Select Countries by Year, 1980 to 1989 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
AT - - - - - - - - - - 
BE - - - - - - - - - - 
CZ - - - - - - - - - - 
DE - - - - - - - - - - 
DK 440 370 370 490 280 280 380 310 540 800 
ES - - - - - - - - - - 
FI 20 - 10 140 60 10 120 290 400 400 
FR - - - - - - - - - - 
HU - - - - - - - - - - 
IE - - - - - - - - - - 
IT - - - - - - - - - - 
LU - - - - - - - - - - 
NL 1,440 1,140 610 410 480 440 370 560 700 490 
PL - - - - - - - - - - 
PT - - - - - - - - - - 
RO - - - - - - - - - - 
SE - - - 1,370 1,060 670 1,390 1,460 1,480 1,560 
UK 6,850 2,750 810 1,220 800 530 830 440 720 720 
CAN 40,344 14,980 16,933 13,968 15,360 16,729 18,942 21,290 26,557 36,636 
US 207,116 159,252 98,096 61,218 70,393 67,704 62,146 64,528 76,483 107,070 
AUS 19,950 21,850 21,920 17,050 14,770 14,850 11,840 11,100 11,080 10,890 
NZ 910 1,380 700 680 560 720 680 530 650 1,060 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23) US Department of 
Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations. 
 
Country 
Table 4 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals in Select Countries by Year, 1990 to 1999 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
AT - - - - - - - - - - 
BE - - - - - - - - - - 
CZ - - - - - - - - - - 
DE - - - - - - - - - 15,000 
DK 750 860 550 3,206 3,757 20,18 601 501 444 501 
ES - - - - - - - - - - 
FI 640 460 670 585 651 642 840 627 304 543 
FR - - - - - - - - - 8,000 
HU - - - - - - - - - - 
IE - - - - 650 - - - - 1,032 
IT - - - - - - - - 3 - 
LU - - - - - - - - 25 - 
NL 600 520 570 457 498 492 475 187 524 11 
PL - - - - - - - - - - 
PT - - - - - - - - - - 
RO - - - - - - - - - - 
SE 1,460 1,730 3,400 937 7,431 1,956 1,629 1,180 1,130 546 
UK 650 490 620 510 260 70 20 - - - 
CAN 39,727 44,779 30,822 17,427 11,148 11,749 11,057 10,453 9,699 9,791 
US 122,066 113,389 115,548 114,181 111,680 98,973 74,791 69,276 76,181 85,076 
AUS 11,950 7,750 7,160 10,930 13,557 15,412 11,100 7,816 12,558 8,398 
NZ 810 680 620 412 737 822 780 527 677 1,135 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40); US 
Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations. 
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Country 
Table 5 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals in Select Countries by Year, 2000 to 2015 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 388 758 
BE - - - - - - - - - 47 - 29 - 100 34 14 
CZ - - - - - 15 - 10 - 17 48 - 25 1 5 - 
DE - - - - - - - - - 2,069 469 63 307 293 280 481 
DK 464 531 490 509 508 483 530 474 552 433 495 516 476 515 344 592 
ES - - - - - - - - - - - - 80 - - - 
FI 756 739 571 562 735 766 547 657 749 724 541 584 731 674 1,089 1,007 
FR - - - - - - - - 37 - 407 116 62 89 110 - 
HU - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 
IE 40 52 23 54 63 117 198 114 101 192 20 45 39 76 96 176 
IT - - - - - - - - - 191 58 - 9 - - 96 
LU - - - - - - - - - 28 - - - - 28 46 
NL 204 223 155 173 323 419 497 569 693 369 431 538 429 311 791 - 
PL - - - - - - - - - - - 16 - - - - 
PT - - - - - - 17 - 11 30 33 30 27 6 14 - 
RO - - - - - - 38 - - - - - - - 40 - 
SE 1,501 1,089 1,042 942 1,801 1,263 2,376 1,845 2,209 1,936 1,786 1,895 1,873 1,902 1,971 1,902 
UK - - - - 150 175 378 515 722 955 715 454 1,039 966 787 1,864 
CAN 13,605 12,273 10,550 10,768 10,535 10,401 10,665 11,160 10,808 12,466 12,099 12,947 9,653 12,209 12,875 20,045 
US 72,143 69,886 27,131 28,409 52,873 53,813 41,223 48,282 60,191 74,654 73,311 56,424 58,238 69,926 69,987 69,933 
AUS 7,330 6,659 9,172 11,855 15,967 11,654 13,439 9,628 11,006 11,080 8,516 9,226 5,937 13,169 11,570 9,399 
NZ 699 749 674 653 825 741 703 739 741 727 631 497 781 682 737 808 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40; 2005, 34; 
2005, 7-9; 2007, 84-86; 2008, 8-13; 2008, 71-73; 2009, 160; 2010, 150; 2011, 152; 2013, 153; 2013, 163; 2015, 192; 2017, 198); US Department of Homeland Security 
(2013, table 13). Own calculations. 
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Table 6 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals per 1 Million Residents, 2016 
Country Resettlement Arrivals per capita Country Resettlement Arrivals per capita 
Australia 437.2 Italy 8.8 
Austria 23.0 Japan 0.1 
Belgium 39.8 Latvia 3.0 
Brazil 0.1 Lithuania 8.7 
Cambodia 0.0 Luxembourg 89.3 
Canada 1287.8 Monaco 103.8 
Czech Republic 3.0 Netherlands 41.1 
Denmark 53.9 New Zealand 206.8 
Estonia 8.3 Norway 628.7 
Finland 171.6 South Korea 0.8 
France 21.1 Spain 6.2 
Germany 15.0 Sweden 190.4 
Hungary 1.5 Switzerland 74.1 
Iceland 166.9 United Kingdom 78.9 
Ireland 74.8 United States 262.8 
Sources: UNHCR (2018, 206); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations. 
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Country 
Table 7 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals (per 1,000,000 people) in Select Countries by Year, 1980 to 1989 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
AT - - - - - - - - - - 
BE - - - - - - - - - - 
CZ - - - - - - - - - - 
DE - - - - - - - - - - 
DK 85.9 72.2 72.3 95.8 54.8 54.8 74.2 60.5 105.3 155.9 
ES - - - - - - - - - - 
FI 4.2 - 2.1 28.8 12.3 2.0 24.4 58.8 80.9 80.6 
FR - - - - - - - - - - 
HU - - - - - - - - - - 
IE - - - - - - - - - - 
IT - - - - - - - - - - 
LU - - - - - - - - - - 
NL 101.8 80.0 42.6 28.5 33.3 30.4 25.4 38.2 47.4 33.0 
PL - - - - - - - - - - 
PT - - - - - - - - - - 
RO - - - - - - - - - - 
SE - - - 164.5 127.2 80.2 166.1 173.9 175.4 183.7 
UK 121.6 48.8 14.4 21.7 14.2 9.4 14.6 7.7 12.6 12.6 
CAN 1,640.5 601.6 671.9 548.7 597.6 644.9 722.9 801.9 987.4 1338.1 
US 911.5 694.0 423.4 261.8 298.5 284.6 258.8 266.3 312.8 433.8 
AUS 1,357.9 1,463.8 1,444.2 1,109.4 950.2 942.4 739.1 682.5 670.2 647.7 
NZ 292.3 441.6 221.8 212.5 173.5 221.7 209.5 161.9 198.0 321.3 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23) US Department of 
Homeland Security (2013, table 13); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations. 
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Country 
Table 8 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals (per 1,000,000 people) in Select Countries by Year, 1990 to 1999 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
AT - - - - - - - - - - 
BE - - - - - - - - - - 
CZ - - - - - - - - - - 
DE - - - - - - - - - 182.7 
DK 145.9 166.9 106.4 617.9 721.6 385.6 114.2 94.8 83.7 94.1 
ES - - - - - - - - - - 
FI 128.3 91.7 132.9 115.5 127.9 125.7 163.9 122.0 59.0 105.1 
FR - - - - - - - - - 132.2 
HU - - - - - - - - - - 
IE - - - - 181.0 - - - - 274.8 
IT - - - - - - - - 0.1 - 
LU - - - - - - - - 58.9 - 
NL 40.1 34.5 37.5 29.9 32.4 31.8 30.6 12.0 33.4 0.7 
PL - - - - - - - - - - 
PT - - - - - - - - - - 
RO - - - - - - - - - - 
SE 170.6 200.8 392.2 107.5 846.3 221.6 184.3 133.4 127.7 61.6 
UK 11.4 8.5 10.8 8.8 4.5 1.2 0.3 - - - 
CAN 1,429.5 1,589.5 1,080.7 604.4 382.9 400.3 372.6 348.6 320.7 321.0 
US 489.0 448.2 450.5 439.3 424.4 371.7 277.6 254.1 276.2 304.9 
AUS 700.3 448.4 409.3 618.7 759.3 852.8 606.2 422.1 671.2 443.7 
NZ 243.3 194.6 175.6 115.3 203.6 223.8 209.0 139.4 177.5 296.0 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40); US 
Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations. 
 
  
Page 309 of 361 
 
Country 
Table 9 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals (per 1,000,000 people) in Select Countries by Year, 2000 to 2015 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AT - - - - - - - - - - - - - 47.7 45.4 87.8 
BE - - - - - - - - - 4.4 - 2.6 - 8.9 3.0 1.2 
CZ - - - - - 1.5 - 1.0 - 1.6 4.6 - 2.4 0.1 0.5 - 
DE - - - - - - - - - 25.3 5.7 0.8 3.8 3.6 3.5 5.9 
DK 86.9 99.1 91.1 94.4 94.0 89.1 97.5 86.8 100.5 78.4 89.2 92.6 85.1 91.7 61.0 104.2 
ES - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.7 - - - 
FI 146.1 142.4 109.8 107.8 140.6 146.0 103.9 124.2 141.0 135.6 100.9 108.4 135.0 123.9 199.4 183.8 
FR - - - - - - - - 0.6 - 6.3 1.8 0.9 1.3 1.7 - 
HU - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.1 - - - 
IE 10.5 13.4 5.8 13.5 15.5 28.1 46.3 25.9 22.5 42.3 4.4 9.8 8.5 16.5 20.8 37.6 
IT - - - - - - - - - 3.2 1.0 - 0.2 - - 1.6 
LU - - - - - - - - - 56.2 - - - - 50.3 80.8 
NL 12.8 13.9 9.6 10.7 19.8 25.7 30.4 34.7 42.1 22.3 25.9 32.2 25.6 18.5 46.9 - 
PL - - - - - - - - - - - 0.4 - - - - 
PT - - - - - - 1.6 - 1.0 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.6 0.6 1.3 - 
RO - - - - - - 1.8 - - - - - - - 2.0 - 
SE 169.2 122.4 116.8 105.2 200.3 139.9 261.7 201.7 239.6 208.2 190.4 200.5 196.8 198.3 203.3 194.1 
UK - - - - 2.5 2.9 6.2 8.4 11.7 15.3 11.4 7.2 16.3 15.1 12.2 28.6 
CAN 442.2 394.9 336.4 339.9 329.3 321.9 327.4 339.3 325.1 370.7 355.8 377.0 277.7 347.3 362.2 559.2 
US 255.7 245.2 94.3 97.9 180.6 182.1 138.2 160.3 197.9 243.4 237.0 181.1 185.5 221.2 219.7 217.9 
AUS 382.7 343.0 466.7 595.9 793.3 571.4 649.3 462.3 517.9 510.8 386.5 413.0 261.3 569.3 493.2 395.1 
NZ 181.2 193.0 170.7 162.1 201.8 179.2 168.0 174.8 173.6 168.5 144.5 112.8 176.2 152.5 163.4 175.8 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40; 2005, 34; 
2005, 7-9; 2007, 84-86; 2008, 8-13; 2008, 71-73; 2009, 160; 2010, 150; 2011, 152; 2013, 153; 2013, 163; 2015, 192; 2017, 198); US Department of Homeland Security 
(2013, table 13); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations. 
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Table 10 – Current Involvement of Voluntary Sector Organisations in Resettlement to Selected Resettlement Countries 
Country 
Pre-departure Reception Orientation and Integration 
ID/SEL INFO PDCO REC STH ORI TR/IN AD/RE LTH EMP LANG VOL 
AT ✓            
BE  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
CZ  ✓     ✓ ✓   ✓  
DE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
DK ✓ ✓        ✓ ✓ ✓ 
ES    ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
FI  ✓  ✓    ✓   ✓ ✓ 
FR   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
HU             
IE ✓   ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
IT    ✓    ✓     
LU ✓    ✓    ✓  ✓  
NL  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
PL             
PT  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
RO   ✓   ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
SE  ✓      ✓    ✓ 
UK  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ 
CAN ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
US ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
AUS ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
NZ ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Note: The table is intended to capture the main roles played by voluntary sector organisations in resettlement, but the list is not exhaustive. Furthermore, the scope of 
voluntary sector involvement in resettlement may vary by organisation. Post-arrival orientation programmes in some countries may be more formal than in others, and 
their content may also vary. For further details, please refer to the sources cited below. 
Sources: Csehi and Barna (2013, 6-10); Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2014, see section entitled ‘Proposer Obligations’; 
2015, 10); Ekholm, Magennis, and Salmelin (2005, 26, 40, 105, and 123); Gray (2008, 29-32 and 82-83); International Catholic Migration Commission (2013, 242 and 
277-81; 2017, 26 and 28-31); Office of the Minister of Immigration (2017, 5); Refugee Council of Australia (2012, 3); Scharf (2013, 4); Silga (2013, 4); Silska (2013, 5); 
UNHCR (2014, 10-11; 2014, 13-16; 2014, 13; 2014, 8-11). 
 
  
Page 311 of 361 
 
Table 11 – Refugee Resettlement Ceilings in the United States by Fiscal Year, 1980 to 2018 
1980 231,700 1990 125,000 2000 90,000 2010 80,000 
1981 217,000 1991 131,000 2001 80,000 2011 80,000 
1982 140,000 1992 142,000 2002 70,000 2012 76,000 
1983 90,000 1993 132,000 2003 70,000 2013 70,000 
1984 72,000 1994 121,000 2004 70,000 2014 70,000 
1985 70,000 1995 112,000 2005 70,000 2015 70,000 
1986 67,000 1996 90,000 2006 70,000 2016 85,000 
1987 70,000 1997 78,000 2007 70,000 2017 110,000 
1988 87,500 1998 83,000 2008 80,000 
2018 45,000 
1989 116,500 1999 91,000 2009 80,000 
Notes: The US originally adopted a resettlement admissions ceiling of 72,500 for 1988 but later increased the limit to 87,500 (Martin 2005, 
17). Similarly, the US established a ceiling of 94,000 in 1989 and 78,000 in 1999 but raised those annual quotas to 116,500 and 91,000, 
respectively (Martin 2005, 17). 
Sources: Martin (2005, 17); Mayorga and Morse (2017, see table 1); US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US 
Department of Health and Human Services (2015, 5; 2016, 5; 2017, 6). 
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Table 12 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled in the United States by Fiscal Year, 1980 to 2017 
1980 207,116 1990 122,066 2000 72,143 2010 73,311 
1981 159,252 1991 113,389 2001 69,886 2011 56,424 
1982 98,096 1992 115,548 2002 27,131 2012 58,238 
1983 61,218 1993 114,181 2003 28,403 2013 69,926 
1984 70,393 1994 111,680 2004 52,873 2014 69,987 
1985 67,704 1995 98,973 2005 53,813 2015 69,933 
1986 62,146 1996 74,791 2006 41,223 2016 84,994 
1987 64,528 1997 69,276 2007 48,282 2017 53,716 
1988 76,483 1998 76,181 2008 60,191 
Total: 3,060,295 
1989 107,070 1999 85,076 2009 74,654 
Sources: Refugee Processing Center (2018, see annual tables); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations. 
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Table 13 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 1980 to 1989 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
1980 Laos 32,769 Vietnam 30,072 Cambodia 9,295 USSR 8,136 Cuba 1,784 
1981 Vietnam 65,537 Cambodia 38,194 Laos 19,777 USSR 11,151 Afghanistan 4,456 
1982 Vietnam 27,396 Poland 6,559 Cambodia 6,246 Ethiopia 4,019 Laos 3,616 
1983 Vietnam 22,819 Cambodia 13,041 Poland 5,508 Romania 3,741 Laos 2,907 
1984 Vietnam 24,856 Cambodia 19,727 Laos 7,218 Poland 4,300 Romania 4,293 
1985 Vietnam 25,222 Cambodia 19,175 Laos 5,195 Romania 4,456 Iran 3,421 
1986 Vietnam 21,703 Laos 12,313 Cambodia 9,845 Poland 3,577 Iran 3,203 
1987 Vietnam 19,661 Laos 14,597 Iran 6,235 USSR 3,458 Poland 3,406 
1988 USSR 20,020 Vietnam 17,571 Laos 14,597 Iran 6,235 Cuba 3,365 
1989 USSR 39,387 Vietnam 21,924 Laos 12,560 Amerasian 8,720 Iran 4,835 
Note: For fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982, only data on the number of resettlement applications approved was available at the time of research. The term ‘Amerasian’ 
refers to individuals of American and Southeast Asian descent, and reflects the terminology used in the original source documents. 
Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (1986, appendix table 7; 1996, appendix table 1). 
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Table 14 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 1990 to 1999 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
1990 USSR 49,742 Vietnam 27,796 Amerasian 13,916 Laos 8,715 Cuba 4,706 
1991 USSR 38,496 Vietnam 28,385 Amerasian 16,580 Laos 9,232 Romania 4,533 
1992 USSR 61,018 Vietnam 26,856 Amerasian 17,140 Haiti 10,440 Laos 7,285 
1993 USSR 48,354 Vietnam 31,405 Amerasian 11,220 Laos 6,945 Cuba 6,870 
1994 USSR 43,125 Vietnam 34,107 Cuba 15,468 Yugoslavia 7,418 Laos 6,211 
1995 Cuba 37,037 USSR 35,509 Vietnam 32,250 Yugoslavia 9,872 Laos 3,682 
1996 USSR 29,270 Vietnam 16,116 Yugoslavia 12,020 Somalia 6,440 Cuba 3,517 
1997 USSR 26,748 Yugoslavia 21,374 Iraq 9,365 Vietnam 6,611 Somalia 4,948 
1998 Yugoslavia 30,823 USSR 23,257 Vietnam 10,266 Somalia 2,952 Liberia 1,637 
1999 Yugoslavia 38,620 USSR 16,913 Vietnam 9,622 Somalia 4,321 Liberia 2,493 
Note: The term ‘Amerasian’ refers to individuals of American and Southeast Asian descent, and reflects the terminology used in the original source documents. Between 
1996 and 2009, the source documents distinguish between Cuba (refugees) and Cuba (entrants). Cuban ‘entrants’ have been excluded from the figures presented above, as 
this classification refers to asylum seekers rather than resettled refugees. 
Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (1996, appendix table 1; 2001, table 1). 
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Table 15 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 2000 to 2009 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
2000 Yugoslavia 22,548 USSR 14,576 Somalia 6,022 Iran 5,099 Sudan 3,831 
2001 Yugoslavia 15,763 USSR 14,868 Iran 6,581 Sudan 5,950 Somalia 4,939 
2002 USSR 9,951 Yugoslavia 5,438 Vietnam 3,049 Cuba 1,922 Iran 1,524 
2003 USSR 8,730 Liberia 2,940 Yugoslavia 2,523 Iran 2,452 Sudan 2,092 
2004 Somalia 12,813 USSR 8,788 Liberia 7,107 Laos 5,995 Sudan 3,479 
2005 USSR 11,272 Somalia 10,106 Laos 8,487 Cuba 6,359 Liberia 4,221 
2006 USSR 10,452 Somalia 10,330 Cuba 3,142 Vietnam 3,002 Iran 2,785 
2007 Myanmar 9,776 Somalia 6,958 Iran 5,474 USSR 4,583 Burundi 4,525 
2008 Iraq 13,755 Myanmar 12,852 Thailand 5,279 Iran 5,257 Bhutan 5,244 
2009 Iraq 18,709 Myanmar 18,272 Bhutan 13,317 Iran 5,374 Cuba 4,800 
Note: Between 1996 and 2009, the source documents distinguish between Cuba (refugees) and Cuba (entrants). Cuban ‘entrants’ have been excluded from the figures 
presented above, as this classification refers to asylum seekers rather than resettled refugees. 
Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (2001, table 1; 2006, table 1; 2010, appendix table 1). 
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Table 16 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 2010 to 2017 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
2010 Iraq 18,016 Myanmar 16,693 Bhutan 12,363 Somalia 4,884 Cuba 4,818 
2011 Myanmar 16,972 Bhutan 14,999 Iraq 9,388 Somalia 3,161 Cuba 2,920 
2012 Bhutan 15,069 Myanmar 14,148 Iraq 12,233 Somalia 4,921 Cuba 1,948 
2013 Iraq 19,000 Myanmar 16,000 Bhutan 9,000 Somalia 8,000 Cuba 4,000 
2014 Iraq 20,000 Myanmar 15,000 Somalia 9,000 Bhutan 8,000 DR Congo 5,000 
2015 Myanmar 18,386 Iraq 12,676 Somalia 8,858 DR Congo 7,876 Bhutan 5,775 
2016 DR Congo 16,370 Syria 12,587 Myanmar 12,347 Iraq 9,880 Somalia 9,020 
2017 DR Congo 9,377 Iraq 6,886 Syria 6,557 Somalia 6,130 Myanmar 5,078 
Note: In 2013 and 2014, the source documents only provided rounded estimates of the total number of refugees resettled by nationality. 
Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (2010, appendix table 1; 2011, appendix chart II-4; 2012, appendix table II-6; 2013, 82-83; 2014, 80; 2015, 83; 2016, 8); 
Refugee Processing Center (2018, see annual tables). 
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Table 17 – The Total Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Year, Age, and Gender, Fiscal Years 2005 to 2015 
Year Total Admissions Men Women Adults Children 
2005 53,738 27,477 26,261 27,544 26,194 
2006 41,094 21,188 19,962 21,666 19,484 
2007 48,218 25,201 23,016 25,622 22,595 
2008 60,107 30,939 29,169 34,229 25,879 
2009 74,602 38,491 36,111 44,425 30,177 
2010 73,293 38,624 34,669 43,051 30,242 
2011 56,384 29,436 26,948 33,464 22,920 
2012 58,179 31,380 26,799 35,693 22,486 
2013 69,909 37,792 32,117 42,022 27,887 
2014 69,975 36,767 33,208 41,032 28,943 
2015 69,920 36,584 33,335 38,026 31,894 
Note: In 2006, there is a small discrepancy between the total number of refugees resettled (41,094) and the total number of adults and children resettled (41,150). This 
does not appear to be due to a miscalculation by the author, but could potentially be due to a mistake in the number of children resettled (either under 16 or between the 
ages of 16-20) reported in the original source. 
Sources: US Department of Homeland Security (2006, 42; 2007, 42; 2008, 42; 2009, 42; 2010, 42; 2011, 42; 2012, 42; 2013, 42; 2014, 42; 2016, 42, 2016, 42). 
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Table 18 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled and Sum of Unaccompanied Minors under Care in the United States since 
1979, Fiscal Years 1984 to 1995 
Year 
Total Resettlement 
Admissions 
Sum of Unaccompanied 
Minors Under Care Since 
1979 
Number of Unaccompanied 
Minors Remaining Under 
Care 
Average Number of 
Unaccompanied 
Minor Arrivals 
(monthly) 
1984 70,393 5,733 3,694 Unavailable 
1985 67,704 6,895 3,828 Unavailable 
1986 62,146 7,637 3,812 48 
1987 64,528 8,069 3,381 36 
1988 76,483 8,620 3,204 50 
1989 107,070 9,456 2,989 45 
1990 122,066 10,155 2,861 40 
1991 113,389 10,350 2,461 14 
1992 115,548 10,638 2,149 6 
1993 114,181 10,729 1,651 4 
1994 111,680 10,934 1,162 5 
1995 98,973 11,221 1,079 20 
Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (1985, 2; 1986, 2; 1987, 10; 1988, 50-51; 1989, ii; 1990, 38-39; 1991, ii; 1992, 23; 1993, i; 1994, 
27; 1995, 26; 1996, 11-12). 
 
  
 Table 19 – Targets for Resettlement through the Government Assisted Refugees Programme by Year, 1990 to 2019 
1990 13,000 2000 7,300 2010 7,300-8,000 
1991 13,000 2001 7,300 2011 7,400-8,000 
1992 13,000 2002 7,500 2012 7,500-8,000 
1993 13,000 2003 7,700 2013 6,800-7,100 
1994 13,000 2004 7,400 2014 6,900-7,200 
1995 13,000 2005 7,300-7,500 2015 5,800-6,500 
1996 7,300 2006 7,300-7,500 2016 24,000-25,000 
1997 7,300 2007 7,300-7,500 2017 5,000-8,000 
1998 7,300 2008 7,300-7,500 2018 6,000-8,000 
1999 7,300 2009 7,300-7,500 2019 7,000-9,000 
Note: The targets for 1990 through 1995 include members of Designated Classes. The targets for 2013 and 2014 may not include plans to 
resettle 200 Syrian refugees through the Government Assisted Refugees programme, over and above existing targets. 
Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1997, 55; 1998, 22; 2000, 34; 2001, 46; 2002, 16; 2003, 22; 2004, 25; 2005, 43; 2006, 28; 
2007, 32; 2008, 37; 2009, 20; 2009, 18; 2011, 23; 2012, 18; 2013, no pagination; 2014, no pagination; 2015, no pagination; 2016, no 
pagination); Employment and Immigration Canada (1990, 9); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (2017, no pagination); Labman 
(2016, 71). 
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 Table 20 – Targets for Resettlement through the Private Sponsorship Refugees Programme by Year, 1990 to 2019 
1990 24,000 2000 2,800-4,000 2010 3,300-6,000 
1991 23,500 2001 2,800-4,000 2011 3,300-6,000 
1992 20,000 2002 2,900-4,200 2012 3,800-6,000 
1993 20,000 2003 2,900-4,200 2013 4,000-6,500 
1994 15,000 2004 3,400-4,000 2014 4,500-6,500 
1995 15,000 2005 3,000-4,000 2015 4,500-6,500 
1996 2,700-4,000 2006 3,000-4,000 2016 15,000-18,000 
1997 2,800-4,000 2007 3,000-4,500 2017 14,000-19,000 
1998 2,800-4,000 2008 3,300-4,500 2018 16,000-20,000 
1999 2,800-4,000 2009 3,300-4,500 2019 17,000-21,000 
Note: The targets for 1990 through 1995 include members of Designated Classes. The targets for 2013 and 2014 may not include plans to 
resettle up to 1,100 Syrian refugees through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees programme, over and above existing targets. 
Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1997, 55; 1998, 22; 2000, 34; 2001, 46; 2002, 16; 2003, 22; 2004, 25; 2005, 43; 2006, 28; 
2007, 32; 2008, 37; 2009, 20; 2009, 18; 2011, 23; 2012, 18; 2013, no pagination; 2014, no pagination; 2015, no pagination; 2016, no 
pagination); Employment and Immigration Canada (1990, 9); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (2017, no pagination); Labman 
(2016, 71). 
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Table 21 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled in Canada by Year, 1980 to 2016 
1980 40,344 1990 39,727 2000 13,605 2010 12,098 
1981 14,980 1991 44,779 2001 12,273 2011 12,947 
1982 16,933 1992 30,822 2002 10,550 2012 9,653 
1983 13,968 1993 17,427 2003 10,768 2013 12,209 
1984 15,360 1994 11,148 2004 10,535 2014 12,873 
1985 16,729 1995 11,749 2005 10,401 2015 20,046 
1986 18,942 1996 11,057 2006 10,665 2016 46,703 
1987 21,290 1997 10,453 2007 11,158 
Total: 658,143 1988 26,557 1998 9,699 2008 10,807 
1989 36,636 1999 9,791 2009 12,461 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination). Own calculations. 
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Table 22 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled Through the Government Assisted Refugees Programme by Year, 1980 to 2016 
1980 19,233 1990 15,493 2000 10,671 2010 7,266 
1981 10,593 1991 8,886 2001 8,697 2011 7,363 
1982 11,056 1992 6,419 2002 7,506 2012 5,425 
1983 9,755 1993 6,928 2003 7,516 2013 5,722 
1984 11,343 1994 7,635 2004 7,417 2014 7,625 
1985 12,851 1995 8,203 2005 7,425 2015 9,488 
1986 13,742 1996 7,868 2006 7,327 2016 23,624 
1987 13,857 1997 7,711 2007 7,571 
Total: 361,145 1988 14,279 1998 7,432 2008 7,295 
1989 15,055 1999 7,443 2009 7,425 
Note: The figures above include refugees resettled under the Joint Assistance Sponsorship programme (Grégoire 2017, 4). Disaggregated data 
on resettlement arrivals through this programme was unavailable at the time of research. 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination). Own calculations. 
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Table 23 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled Through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Programme by Year, 1980 to 2016 
1980 21,111 1990 24,234 2000 2,934 2010 4,832 
1981 4,387 1991 35,893 2001 3,576 2011 5,584 
1982 5,877 1992 24,403 2002 3,044 2012 4,228 
1983 4,213 1993 10,499 2003 3,252 2013 6,332 
1984 4,017 1994 3,513 2004 3,118 2014 5,071 
1985 3,878 1995 3,546 2005 2,976 2015 9,747 
1986 5,200 1996 3,189 2006 3,338 2016 18,645 
1987 7,433 1997 2,742 2007 3,587 
Total: 291,421 1988 12,278 1998 2,267 2008 3,512 
1989 21,581 1999 2,348 2009 5,036 
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination). Own calculations. 
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Table 24 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries or Regions of Origin and Year, 1981 to 1989 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
1981 Asia 8,571 Europe 5,159 
South 
America 
77 Africa 55 Caribbean 5 
1982 Europe 9,281 Asia 5,668 
South 
America 
72 Africa 64 Caribbean 18 
1983 Asia 5,123 Europe 4,192 
North and 
Central 
America 
291 
South 
America 
122 Africa 107 
1984 Vietnam 3,405 Poland 2,064 El Salvador 2,030 Cambodia 1,492 Laos 863 
1985 Vietnam 4,210 El Salvador 2,491 Poland 2,209 Cambodia 1,593 Iran 819 
1986 Vietnam 3,783 Poland 3,620 El Salvador 2,459 Cambodia 1,665 Ethiopia 905 
1987 Poland 4,545 Vietnam 3,890 El Salvador 2,368 Cambodia 1,546 Iran 994 
1988 Poland 6,801 Vietnam 4,637 El Salvador 2,091 Iran 1,919 Cambodia 1,492 
1989 Poland 12,393 Vietnam 6,378 El Salvador 2,263 Ethiopia 2,136 Iran 1,993 
Note: data for 1980 was unavailable at the time of research. Between 1981 and 1983, only information on the number of refugees resettled by geographic region was 
available at the time of research. The figures presented for these years reflect the number of “designated class” refugees resettled, in keeping with the legislative structure 
of resettlement and terminology used at the time. As there were multiple designated classes, some of the figures above represent totals calculated by the author. 
Sources: Employment and Immigration Canada (1981, 74; 1982, 11; 1983, 11; 1984, 8; 1985, 9; 1986, 9; 1987, 9; 1988, 9). 
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Table 25 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries of Nationality and Year, 1990 to 1999 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
1990 Poland 11,902 Vietnam 5,279 El Salvador 3,750 Ethiopia 2,174 Iran 2,019 
1991 Poland 10,123 El Salvador 5,646 Sri Lanka 4,166 Iran 4,065 Vietnam 3,158 
1992 Sri Lanka 7,972 Poland 4,872 Somalia 4,701 Iran 4,323 El Salvador 4,009 
1993 Sri Lanka 3,894 Somalia 2,514 Iraq 2,437 Vietnam 2,020 Bosnia 1,653 
1994 Bosnia 4,468 Sri Lanka 2,206 Iraq 1,447 Vietnam 1,229 Somalia 735 
1995 Bosnia 5,964 Sri Lanka 4,792 Iraq 1,276 Iran 1,263 Afghanistan 1,094 
1996 Bosnia 4,963 Sri Lanka 3,612 Afghanistan 1,799 Iran 1,725 Iraq 1,347 
1997 Bosnia 3,677 Sri Lanka 2,564 Afghanistan 1,674 Iran 1,665 Somalia 729 
1998 Bosnia 3,590 Sri Lanka 2,132 Iran 1,477 Afghanistan 1,354 Croatia 1,285 
1999 Bosnia 2,698 Sri Lanka 2,611 Afghanistan 1,816 Iran 1,447 Somalia 1,381 
Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1998, 57; 1999, 57; 2000, 62; 2001, 62); Employment and Immigration (1990, 9; 1991, 9; 1992, 9; 1993, 12; 1994, 12; 
1995, 12). 
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Table 26 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries or Regions of Origin and Year, 2000 to 2009 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
2000 Yugoslavia 3,834 Sri Lanka 3,235 Afghanistan 2,538 Iran 1,503 Pakistan 1,237 
2001 Afghanistan 2,917 Sri Lanka 2,504 Pakistan 2,111 Yugoslavia 1,747 Iran 1,474 
2002 Afghanistan 2,743 Sri Lanka 2,207 Pakistan 1,237 Colombia 1,729 PR China 1,249 
2003 
Asia and 
Pacific 
2,636 Europe 2,054 Americas 1,937 Africa 1,293 
United 
States 
1,276 
2004 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,858 Americas 1,756 
Africa and 
Middle East 
1,444 Europe 1,366 
United 
States 
691 
2005 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,919 Americas 1,630 
Africa and 
Middle East 
1,562 Europe 1,121 
United 
States 
538 
2006 
Asia and 
Pacific 
2,246 
Africa and 
Middle East 
1,210 Americas 1,203 Europe 787 
United 
States 
175 
2007 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,718 Americas 1,355 
Africa and 
Middle East 
1,272 Europe 807 
United 
States 
206 
2008 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,472 Americas 984 
Africa and 
Middle East 
885 Europe 708 
United 
States 
226 
2009 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,267 Americas 992 
Africa and 
Middle East 
805 Europe 575 
United 
States 
142 
Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012, 22); Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2018, no pagination). 
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Table 27 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries or Regions of Origin and Year, 2010 to 2016 
Year Origin (1) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (2) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (3) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (4) 
Number 
Resettled 
Origin (5) 
Number 
Resettled 
2010 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,067 Americas 943 
Africa and 
Middle East 
845 Europe 491 
United 
States 
133 
2011 Americas 1,035 
Asia and 
Pacific 
981 
Africa and 
Middle East 
771 Europe 439 
United 
States 
152 
2012 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,420 
Asia and 
Pacific 
1,192 
Africa and 
Middle East 
756 Europe 464 
United 
States 
201 
2013 Americas 1,329 
Asia and 
Pacific 
674 
Africa and 
Middle East 
549 Europe 429 
United 
States 
272 
2014 Americas 1,364 
Asia and 
Pacific 
701 
Africa and 
Middle East 
656 Europe 381 
United 
States 
258 
2015 Americas 1,707 
Africa and 
Middle East 
703 
Asia and 
Pacific 
642 
 
Europe 512 
United 
States 
264 
2016 Americas 1,607 
Africa and 
Middle East 
644 
Asia and 
Pacific 
483 Europe 386 
United 
States 
292 
Source: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2018, no pagination). 
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Table 28 – The Total Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Year, Age, and Gender, 1980 to 1994 
Year Total Admissions Males Females Adults Children 
1980 40,344 22,697 17,651 28,022 12,326 
1981 14,980 8,444 6,536 10,866 4,114 
1982 16,933 9,781 7,146 12,665 4,262 
1983 13,968 8,410 5,559 10,456 3,513 
1984 15,360 9,271 6,071 11,420 3,922 
1985 16,729 10,063 6,697 12,322 4,438 
1986 18,942 11,387 7,760 14,181 4,966 
1987 21,290 12,824 8,741 16,163 5,402 
1988 26,557 15,889 10,947 20,222 6,614 
1989 36,636 21,823 15,181 28,389 8,615 
1990 39,727 23,714 15,975 30,486 9,203 
1991 44,779 32,859 20,542 42,562 10,839 
1992 30,822 31,795 20,080 41,652 10,223 
1993 17,427 17,449 12,933 23,674 6,708 
1994 11,148 10,735 8,354 14,686 4,403 
Note: the original source provided data on the number of male and female refugees resettled by various age groups, ranging from 0-4 to 65 and older. The author 
calculated the total number of male and female refugees by adding together the figures for each age group. The author also calculated the total number of adults resettled 
by adding together the figures for the number of males and females aged 20 to 65 and older. Finally, the author calculated the total number of children resettled by adding 
together the number of male and female refugees aged 0 to 19. The number of males and females and adults and children may not equal the figures given in the total 
admission column, as the source data captures both ‘refugees’ (asylum seekers) and ‘members of designated classes’ (resettled refugees). 
Sources: Employment and Immigration Canada (1985, 9; 1990, 9; 1995, 12). 
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Bob Carey is the former Vice President of Resettlement and Migration Policy at the 
International Rescue Committee, a post he held between 2009 and 2014. Prior to that 
appointment, Mr Carey spent 10 years as the Vice President for Resettlement at the 
International Rescue Committee (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2015, para. 4 
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Ruth Famini 
Ruth Famini is the Director of National Resettlement Programs at World Relief. Ms 
Famini joined the organisation in 1997 as a Coordinator for the Match Grant Program, and later 
became the Match Grant Program Manager (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). 
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Aaron Gershowitz 
Aaron Gershowitz is the former Associate Vice President of Global Program 
Operations at HIAS. He is now Associate Vice President of Program Operations and, in that 
capacity, is responsible for establishing and overseeing HIAS’s domestic resettlement and 
immigration services (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). Mr Gershowitz has been with the 
organisation for more than 18 years, and previously served as the Director of Refugee and 
Immigrant Services. Prior to joining HIAS, Mr Gershowitz represented clients called to appear 
before immigration courts in New York City (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). 
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Anam Gnaho 
Anam Gnaho is the former Self-Sufficiency Programs Manager at the Ethiopian 
Community Development Council, and has since been appointed Associate Director of Self-
Sufficiency Programs (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2018, para. 1 of 13). Ms 
Gnaho has also worked for other voluntary sector organisations, as well as international 
organisations and in the public sector (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2018, para. 
1 of 13). 
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Erol Kekic 
 Erol Kekic is the Executive Director of Church World Service’s Immigration and 
Refugee Program. Mr Kekic—a former refugee from Bosnia—joined Church World Service 
in 2000, and served as the Associate Director of the Immigration and Refugee Program prior 
to his appointment as Executive Director in 2008 (Church World Service 2015, para. 4 of 6; 
PRI and WNYC 2015, para. 3 of 5). Mr Kekic has also held management positions at the 
Lutheran Family and Community Service and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 
(Church World Service 2008, para. 5 of 6). 
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Dan Kosten 
Dan Kosten is the former Senior Vice President of US Programs at World Relief. Born 
to missionaries working in Taiwan, Mr Kosten worked in Africa as part of the Peace Corps, 
and joined World Relief in 2001 (Houghton College 2017, para 1 and 2 of 16). In June 2017, 
Mr Kosten was appointed Policy and Advocacy Assistant Director for Skills and Workforce 
Development at the National Immigration Forum (National Immigration Forum 2018, para. 1 
and 2 of 3), an organisation which, since 1982 has advocated for “the value of immigrants and 
immigration” and “worked to advance sound federal immigration solutions through its policy 
expertise, communications outreach and coalition building work […] (National Immigration 
Forum 2018, para. 2 of 8).” 
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Lavinia Limón 
Lavinia Limón is the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the US 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. She has 43 years of experience working in refugee 
assistance, including 16 years working with the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(Alfred 2016, para. 10 of 13; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2008, 7). Ms Limón 
began her career in 1975, assisting resettled Indochinese refugees arriving at Camp Pendleton 
in California (SourceWatch 2007, para. 3 of 4). Ms Limón has considerable field experience, 
and has worked with refugees in countries as diverse as Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand 
(SourceWatch 2007, para. 3 of 4). In the 1980s, Ms Limón became the Executive Director of 
the International Institute of Los Angeles, and co-founded the Coalition for Humane Immigrant 
Rights of Los Angeles (Gutierrez 2012, para. 3 of 8). In 1993, President Clinton appointed her 
Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, where she served for six years (International 
Institute of Los Angeles 2016, para. 33 of 86). Ms Limón has also worked for Church World 
Service and the International Rescue Committee (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
2008, 7). In June 2017, Ms Limón announced her intention to retire in September 2018 (US 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 1 of 8). 
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Michael (Mike) Mitchell 
Mike Mitchell is the former Vice President for Programs and Protection at the Lutheran 
Immigration and Refugee Service, which he joined in 2012 (Lutheran Immigration and 
Refugee Service 2015, 1). Mr Mitchell spent his childhood in countries as diverse as 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, and South Africa, but attended university in the US (Lutheran 
Immigration and Refugee Service 2015, 1). Thereafter, he forged a career working for the 
Governor of Virginia and former Vice President Al Gore before moving into the voluntary 
sector (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2015, 1). Mr Mitchell is now Associate 
Vice President of U.S. Programs at HIAS (HIAS no date, para. 1 of 2). 
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Eskinder Negash 
Eskinder Negash is the former Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a post 
he held between 2009 and 2015. Mr Negash has said that he has a “very personal” commitment 
to refugees and other migrants due to his own experience fleeing Ethiopia in 1980 
(International Rescue Committee 2011, at 0:58; Office of Refugee Resettlement 2009, para. 1 
of 4; Teich 2016, para. 4 of 7). The International Rescue Committee later sponsored his 
application to immigrate to the US, and he soon began working at the International Rescue 
Committee office in Los Angeles, California (International Rescue Committee 2011, para. 3 
and 4 of 5). Mr Negash’s career spans nearly 40 years, and during this time he has developed 
considerable experience working with immigrants and refugees, managing voluntary sector 
organisations, and taken on a leadership role in the public sector (US Committee for Refugees 
and Immigrants 2017, para. 3 and 4 of 8). Prior to his appointment as Director of the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, he served as the Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the US 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 
para. 4 of 8). For 15 years, Mr Negash served as the Vice President and Chief Administrative 
Officer for the International Institute of Los Angeles, an organisation founded in 1914 whose 
mission is to “help families become self-sufficient, and to promote cross-cultural understanding 
(Beloit College 2017, para. 1 of 2; International Institute of Los Angeles 2016, no pagination).” 
The International Institute has historically provided reception and integration services for a 
broad range of resettled refugees, including Hungarian, Vietnamese, and Hmong refugees, 
among others (International Institute of Los Angeles 2016, para. 16, 24, and 34 of 86). Mr 
Negash has also acted as chair of the Joint Voluntary Agencies Committee of California, 
chaired the California State Refugee Advisory Council, and served as a board member of the 
Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (Beloit College 2017, para 2 of 2). 
Later, as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, Mr Negash oversaw the delivery of 
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benefits and services to more than 850,000 refugees and other persons in need of protection, 
including more than 400,000 resettled refugees (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
2015, para. 1 of 3). In April 2015, Mr Negash returned to the US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants as Vice President for Global Engagement, and he has since become the Acting 
Chief Executive Officer (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 2 of 8). 
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Emily Nesheim Bullock 
Emily Nesheim Bullock is the former Refugee Resettlement Program Manager at the 
Ethiopian Community Development Council, but she has since been appointed Associate 
Director of the Refugee Resettlement Program (Ethiopian Community Development Council 
2018, para. 5 of 13). Ms Nesheim Bullock previously served as the Immigration Services 
Coordinator for the Refugee Resettlement Department at the Lutheran Social Service of 
Minnesota (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2018, para. 5 of 13). 
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David M. Robinson 
Ambassador David M. Robinson is a career diplomat who has served in numerous 
conflict zones and so become a ‘specialist’ in migration and refugee issues (Department of 
State 2017, para. 1 of 3). At the time of the interview, Ambassador Robinson was the Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau 
of Population, Refugees and Migration—a post he held between 2009 and 2013. Following his 
tenure in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Ambassador Robinson served as 
the Assistant Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Afghanistan until 2013, when he 
became the Principal Deputy High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and assumed a 
leading role in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Department of State 2017, 
para. 2 of 3). In March 2017, the former Ambassador became the Executive Director of Jesuit 
Refugee Service USA, an organisation that “accompanies, serves and advocates for the rights 
of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons (Jesuit Refugee Service 2017, para. 1 of 5).” 
Ambassador Robinson has stated that he developed a “lasting commitment” to refugees and 
other migrants while at the Department of State, which also enabled him to acquire experience 
working with refugees from Africa as well as Afghanistan, Macedonia, and Syria (Jesuit 
Refugee Service 2017, para. 3 of 5). 
  
Page 341 of 361 
 
Greg Scott 
 Greg Scott is the Associate Director of Grants and Program Administration at the US 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, a position he has held since 2012 (LinkedIn 2018, no 
pagination). 
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Sovanna Sok 
 Sovanna Sok is a Placements Coordinator at the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee 
Service (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2013, para. 2 of 8). Ms Sok is a former 
refugee from Cambodia who was initially resettled in Utica, New York (Lutheran Immigration 
and Refugee Service 2011, para. 6 of 11). 
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Deborah Stein 
Deborah Stein is the Director of Episcopal Migration Ministries, a position she held 
between 2000 and 2016 (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). Ms Stein has more than 20 years of 
experience working with refugees, both in the US and in Croatia and Macedonia, having 
worked at a number of voluntary agencies including Church World Service, HIAS, the 
International Rescue Committee, and Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (Torrey 
2016, para. 2 of 9). In 2017, Ms Stein utilised her considerable experience in resettlement to 
act as the Lead Consultant for the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Project at Harvard Law School 
(LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). 
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Johnny Young 
Ambassador Johnny Young is the former Executive Director of Migration and Refugee 
Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, a position he held from 2007 until his 
retirement in February 2015 (Catholic News Service 2015, para. 1 of 20). Born into 
impoverished circumstances in Savannah, Georgia, he joined the US Foreign Service in 1967 
and became one of only a handful of black Americans in the Foreign Service (Kennedy 2005, 
para. 4 and 33 of 86). Mr Young’s first posting was in Madagascar, and he later served at the 
American embassies in Guinea—where he was detained following a failed Portuguese-led coup 
d’état in November 1970—as well as in Kenya, Qatar, and Barbados (Kennedy 2005, para. 2. 
33, and 51 to 77 of 86). In 1989, Mr Young was appointed Ambassador to Sierra Leone, where 
he “worked with Liberian refugees (Catholic News Service 2015, para. 15 of 20).” Ambassador 
Young said the experience showed him “firsthand what it means to be a refugee (Catholic News 
Service 2015, para. 15 of 20).” He later served as Ambassador to Togo, Bahrain, and Slovenia 
before retiring from the Foreign Service in 2005 (Kennedy 2005, para. 1 and 2 of 86). In 
recognition of his “especially distinguished service,” Ambassador Young was conferred the 
rank of Career Ambassador in 2004 (Department of State, no date, para. 1 of 1). 
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Wally Boxhill 
Wally Boxhill is the Director of Functional Guidance and Policy Engagement at 
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, where he has served since 2006 (Refugee 
Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In 1978, Mr Boxhill graduated from Carleton 
University with a Master of Arts degree in international affairs (Refugee Sponsorship Training 
Program 2015, 1). His interest in international affairs led him to a position at the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, where he acted as a Technical 
Assistance Expert (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In addition to working at 
Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, Mr Boxhill served at the Public Service 
Human Resources Management Agency of Canada, Statistics Canada, and the Treasury Board 
Secretariat (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). He is the author of several 
publications, including reports on immigration and minorities in Canada (Refugee Sponsorship 
Training Program 2015, 1). 
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Rita Chahal 
Ms Chahal has been the Executive Director of the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration 
Council, the “largest settlement agency” in the province, since 2013 (LinkedIn 2018, no 
pagination). Before becoming Executive Director at the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration 
Council, Ms Chahal served as General Manager of the Manitoba Chambers of Commerce, the 
largest business and community interest group in the province (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination; 
Canadian Race Relations Foundation 2016, para. 1 of 4). Ms Chahal herself is an immigrant to 
Canada, having emigrated from India with her family to Gander, Newfoundland in December 
1966 (Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 2015, no pagination). 
 
  
Page 347 of 361 
 
Derrick Deans 
Derrick Deans is the former Assistant Director of Refugee Affairs at Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada and is now the Assistant Director of the PSR programme at Immigration, 
Refugees, and Citizenship Canada. Mr Deans spoke to the author in a personal capacity. 
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Rose Dekker 
Rose Dekker was the Refugee Coordinator at World Renew from 2004 until her 
retirement in 2014 (Dekker 2017, para. 5 of 10). She previously served as the Co-chair of the 
Overseas Protection and Sponsorship Working Group at the Canadian Council for Refugees, 
and represented the Canadian Council for Refugees at the UNHCR’s Annual Tripartite 
Consultations on Resettlement in 2012 (Canadian Council for Refugees 2012, para. 3 of 3). 
 
  
Page 349 of 361 
 
Tom Denton 
Tom Denton is the Executive Director of Sponsorship at Hospitality House Refugee 
Ministry—a position he has held since 2006 (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). 
Trained as a lawyer, Mr Denton became involved in resettlement in 1979 when he applied to 
resettle a refugee through the newly created PSR programme (Refugee Sponsorship Training 
Program 2015, 6). In 2015, Mr Denton managed more than 1,300 applications for resettlement 
through the PSR programme, representing approximately 3,000 refugees (Refugee 
Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). In addition to his work with Hospitality House 
Refugee Ministry, Mr Denton previously served as Executive Director of the International 
Centre in Winnipeg—now the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council (Refugee Sponsorship 
Training Program 2015, 6). He has also served on the SAH Council, and played a formative 
role in the formation of the Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Agreement Holders (Refugee 
Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). 
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Shelley Duffin 
Ms Duffin is a former Senior Policy Analyst in Refugee Affairs at Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada. In that capacity, Ms Duffin attended the 2006 meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme as part of the Canadian delegation (United 
Nations 2006, 8). Since the interview, Ms Duffin has been appointed Senior Policy Analyst in 
the Social Immigration Policy and Programs Division at Immigration, Refugees, and 
Citizenship Canada. Ms Duffin is also currently a member of a private sponsorship group called 
Ottawa Welcomes, which has sponsored a family of Syrian refugees who arrived in Ottawa in 
November 2016 (Ottawa Welcomes 2017, para. 1 of 8). 
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Brian Dyck 
Brian Dyck is the former Refugee Assistance Program Coordinator at the Mennonite 
Central Committee in Winnipeg, Manitoba. At the time of the interview, Mr Dyck was also 
Chair of the SAH Council—a position he held for three years (Refugee Sponsorship Training 
Program 2015, 1). Before joining the Mennonite Central Committee, Mr Dyck worked as a 
pastor in isolated communities in the province and also served as a missionary in South Africa 
(Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). Since February 2015, Mr Dyck has been the 
National Migration and Resettlement Program Coordinator for the Mennonite Central 
Committee (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). 
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Michelle Manks 
Michelle Manks is the Manager of the Student Refugee Program at World University 
Service Canada—a role she has held since 2008 (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 
4). In that capacity, Ms Manks she endeavours to engage university students in refugee 
resettlement and integration issues and provides training and support to the 65 Constituent 
Groups located at universities across Canada (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 
4). Ms Manks also manages the World University Service Canada programmes that operate in 
countries of asylum in Africa, the Middle East, and in Southeast Asia (Refugee Sponsorship 
Training Program 2015, 4).  
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Paula Marshall 
Paula Marshall is the Immigrant and Refugee Services Liaison for the Salvation Army 
of Canada—a position she has held since 2012 (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 
5). In that capacity, Ms Marshall manages applications for resettlement through the PSR 
programme and provides information and support to Constituent Groups operating under the 
umbrella of the Salvation Army’s Sponsorship Agreement (Refugee Sponsorship Training 
Program 2015, 5). In addition to working with the Salvation Army, Ms Marshall was Chair of 
the Southern Ontario Sponsors Group in 2015 and has pursued studies in immigration and 
refugee law (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5). 
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Ian McBride 
Ian McBride is the Executive Director of the Anglican United Refugee Alliance 
(AURA)—a position he has held for more than 15 years (Hutchinson 2015, para. 1 of 5). Prior 
to becoming the Executive Director, Mr McBride sat on the Board of Directors of AURA 
(Hutchinson 2015, para. 3 of 5). 
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Adeena Niazi 
Adeena Niazi is the founder and Executive Director of the Afghan Women’s 
Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization. Born in Afghanistan, Ms Niazi 
lectured at Kabul University before fleeing the country following the invasion by Soviet forces 
in 1979 (Afghan Women’s Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization 
2018, para. 1 of 3). Ms Niazi immigrated to Canada in 1989 and began working with refugees 
at the Afghan Association of Ontario (Afghan Women’s Counselling and Integration 
Community Support Organization 2018, para. 2 of 3). Ms Niazi founded the Afghan Women’s 
Organization in 1990 to “draw greater attention to the plight of Afghan women” and she 
remains an ardent advocate on “gender issues within the Afghan community” today (Afghan 
Women’s Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization 2018, para. 3 of 3). 
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Gail Schnabl 
Gail Schnabl is the Refugee Coordinator for the Anglican Diocese of Rupert’s Land in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba (Diocese of Rupert’s Land 2018, para. 6 of 6). In addition to her diocesan 
work, Ms Schnabl is a member of the Board of Hospitality House Refugee Ministry—one of 
its Constituent Groups (Hospitality House Refugee Ministry 2018, no pagination). 
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Rob Shropshire 
Rob Shropshire is the Program Coordinator for Refugee Sponsorship and Special 
Projects at the Presbyterian Church in Canada—a position he has held since 2013. In this 
capacity, Mr Shropshire manages and supports Presbyterian churches in the process of applying 
to resettle refugees through the PSR programme (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 
5). Mr Shropshire has long been active in resettlement; in 1985, he joined a group of five 
Canadians seeking to resettle refugees through the PSR programme (Refugee Sponsorship 
Training Program 2015, 5). Between 1987 and 1990, Mr Shropshire worked for the Working 
Group on Refugee Resettlement—now the Anglican United Refugee Alliance (AURA) 
(Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5). 
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Donald (Don) Smith 
Don Smith is the Chair of the Refugee Working Group at the Incorporated Synod of 
the Diocese of Ottawa. In this role, Mr Smith has facilitated the resettlement of more than 100 
refugees to the Ottawa area, including refugees from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rwanda, 
Vietnam, and most recently, Syria (Griffiths 2017, para. 13 of 26). Mr Smith is also an 
Executive Member of a grassroots organisation known as Refugee 613, which describes itself 
as a “coalition of citizens, settlement agencies, sponsorship groups and community partners 
working to provide refugees with the building blocks of successful integration […] (Refugee 
613 no date, para. 1 of 19).” 
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Ed Wiebe 
 Ed Wiebe is the former National Refugee Program Co-ordinator for the Mennonite 
Central Committee Canada. He retired from his position in January 2015. 
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Ellen Woolaver 
Ellen Woolaver is the Refugee Sponsorship Administrator at the Christie Street 
Refugee Welcome Centre. Ms Woolaver is a member of the Community Advisory Committee 
for Lifeline Syria—a voluntary sector organisation formed in 2015 to “recruit, train and assist 
sponsoring groups to welcome and support refugee families during their first year in the 
[Greater Toronto Area] (Lifeline Syria 2017, no pagination; Lifeline Syria 2017, para. 5 of 5).” 
In addition, Ms Woolaver sits on the Steering Committee for Lifeline Syria (Lifeline Syria 
2017, no pagination).  
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Senior Official from Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
This senior official from Citizenship and Immigration Canada had more than 30 years 
of experience on immigration and refugee issues at the time of the interview, including in the 
field and in policymaking. This official had also represented Canada at various UNHCR for a 
on resettlement. 
 
